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Abstract 
 
 
Sexual violence is ubiquitous throughout the Anglophone West and shows no 
sign of abating. Feminist analysis has long demonstrated that this is a 
problem grounded in gender relations, patterns of masculine socialisation, 
and patriarchal social organisation. However, this thesis proposes that the 
roots of the Anglophone West’s rape culture also extend far beyond matters 
of gender and sexuality, deep into the core of the dominant culture itself. 
Setting feminist theory in dialogue with wider socio-cultural analysis, the 
research explores the complex relationships between the prevailing 
ideologies, ethics, systems, structures and practices of the dominant culture 
and the Anglophone West’s high incidence of sexual violence. In so doing, it 
reveals that, contrary to popular misconceptions, rape is neither a ‘natural’ 
nor a ‘savage’ act but a highly ‘civilised’ one which expresses the 
foundational philosophies of Anglophone Western culture in a sexualised, 
gendered form. Specifically, it shows that sexual objectification, which 
presents women as little more than ‘rapable bodies’, is part of a far wider 
pattern of normalised objectification developing from the Anglophone West’s 
underlying belief that some lives are worth less than others and so may be 
legitimately used and ‘consumed’ for personal gain. Expanding this to include 
analysis of men who commit sexual violence, it also establishes that 
perpetrators’ ‘rapist mentalities’, or the modes of thought and relation that 
enable and motivate rapists to commit rape, function as interpersonal, 
gendered expressions of the Anglophone West’s celebration of and reliance 
upon exploitation, conquest and coercive rule. Through these arguments, the 
thesis ultimately demonstrates that rape is not only an act of gender violence 
but also an inevitable manifestation of the dominant culture of the 
Anglophone West at large which can be fully addressed and challenged only 
by expanding analytical frameworks to include broad socio-cultural critiques 
and diverse social justice activism. In taking this position, the thesis expands 
understanding of rape beyond the limits of existing research and raises 
significant issues for both future scholarship and the ongoing struggle against 
sexual violence.  
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Introduction 
 
 
On December 16th 2012, an unnamed woman was beaten and gang raped 
by six men whilst travelling on a bus in Munirka district of New Delhi; despite 
emergency treatment, her injuries—which included the rapists ripping out her 
intestines—were so severe that she died in hospital thirteen days later.1 
Media response was swift and extensive, with numerous articles and reports 
from around the world expressing outrage, shock and disgust at the attack. In 
the Anglophone West, much of this coverage treated the issue as a 
specifically Indian problem, laying the blame on the country’s ‘deeply 
entrenched patriarchy and widespread misogyny’ and its men’s ‘murderous, 
hyena-like male contempt’ for women.2 Recalling the colonial treatment of 
sati or self-immolation in the nineteenth century, sexual violence in India was 
presented as a symptom of India’s supposedly primitive barbarism with 
journalists deploring the country’s ‘medieval attitudes towards women’ and 
speculating whether ‘gang-rape shame could drag India into 21st century’.3 
Alongside this narrative, however, there emerged another which challenged 
the implied image of the West as a paragon of gender equality and 
‘progressive’ attitudes to violence and abuse. This narrative argued that, 
                                                 
1
 Dominique Mosbergen, ‘Delhi Bus Gang Rape Victim has Intestines Removed as Shocking 
Details of Assault Emerge’ (20/12/2012) <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/20/delhi-
bus-gang-rape-victim-intestines-shocking-details_n_2340721.html> [accessed 1 September 
2013]; Ravi Nessman and Heather Tan, ‘India gang rape victim dies in hospital’ (28/12/2012) 
<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/india-gangrape-victim-dies-in-hospital-
8432561.html> [accessed 1 September 2013]. 
2
 Soutik Biswas, ‘How India treats its women’ (29/12/2012) 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-20863860> [accessed 1 September 2013]; 
Libby Purves, ‘Gang-rape shames could drag India into 21st century’ (1/1/2013) 
<http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/gang-rape-shame-could-drag-india-into-21st-
century/story-fnb64oi6-1226545829569> [accessed 1 September 2013]. 
3
 Priya Virmani, ‘Will the protests against the Delhi gang rape reach rural India?’ 
(31/12/2013) <http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/2012/12/will-protests-against-delhi-
gang-rape-reach-rural-india> [accessed 1 September 2013]; Purves, ‘Gang-rape shames 
2
 Soutik Biswas, ‘How India treats its women’ (29/12/2012) 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-20863860> [accessed 1 September 2013]; 
Libby Purves, ‘Gang-rape shames could drag India into 21st century’ (1/1/2013) 
<http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/gang-rape-shame-could-drag-india-into-21st-
century/story-fnb64oi6-1226545829569> [accessed 1 September 2013]. 
3
 Priya Virmani, ‘Will the protests against the Delhi gang rape reach rural India?’ 
(31/12/2013) <http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/2012/12/will-protests-against-delhi-
gang-rape-reach-rural-india> [accessed 1 September 2013]; Purves, ‘Gang-rape shames 
could drag India into 21st century’. 
 10 
 
whilst there is indeed a serious problem with patriarchal violence against 
women in India, it is by no means an isolated issue unique to the country and 
its ‘primitive’ attitudes. Drawing on numerous counter-examples, journalists 
and theorists reported a stark reality that many commentators on the Munirka 
gang rape were reluctant to confront, namely that rape, as Emer O’Toole 
argues, is not ‘something that only happens “over there” – something we 
civilised folk in the west have somehow put behind us’.4 As O’Toole 
highlights, the supposedly ‘progressive’, ‘advanced’ make-up of Western 
culture has not produced countries free of sexual violence; on the contrary, 
Anglophone Western countries have some of the highest incidence rates for 
rape and some of worst records for dealing with the issue.5 Importantly, this 
point can be developed further to suggest that it is, in fact, this ‘progressive’ 
and ‘advanced’ make-up—or more specifically, the underlying systems, 
structures and philosophies that enable such ‘progress’ and ‘advances’—that 
underpin the Anglophone West’s rape problem, and it is precisely this that 
the thesis will argue.   
 
This thesis will analyse the relationship between the foundational ideologies 
of the Anglophone West and its high incidence of rape, suggesting that the 
dominant culture of the Anglophone West is deeply, perhaps even inherently, 
supportive of sexual violence. It has been argued that the ‘civilised’ West is 
the most destructive culture there has ever been, a society, as Stanley 
Diamond notes, founded on ‘conquest abroad and repression at home’, 
which has been steadily gaining cultural hegemony across the globe through 
warfare, colonialism and the insidious spread of its culture, ideologies and 
politics.6 It has been accused of being a culture driven by an insatiable need 
to dominate the world and everything on it, a culture that has destroyed 
                                                 
4
 Emer O’Toole, ‘Delhi gang-rape: look westward in disgust’ (1/1/2013) 
<http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jan/01/delhi-rape-damini> [accessed 1 
September 2013] 
5
 The scale of the Anglophone West’s rape problem will be discussed further into this 
introduction. 
6
 Stanley Diamond, In Search of the Primitive: A Critique of Civilization (Somerset, NJ: 
Transaction Publishers, 1993), p 1. For the suggestion that the West is the most destructive 
culture, see: Derrick Jensen, ‘Introduction’, in Listening to the Land: Conversations about 
Nature, Culture and Eros, ed. by Derrick Jensen (White River Junction, VT: Chelsea Green 
Publishing, 2004), pp. 1–4 (p. 1). For discussion of the West’s ascent to cultural hegemony, 
see: Peter J. Taylor, ‘What’s Modern about the Modern World-System?: Introducing Ordinary 
Modernity through World Hegemony’, Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 3, No. 
2 (1996), 260–286, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4177186> [accessed 31/5/2011]. 
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numerous indigenous cultures and peoples, routinely enslaved, exploited, 
abused and killed those it considers Other or inferior, and been instrumental 
in bringing about the extinction of countless species and the overall 
degradation of the planet.7  From amongst the list of abuses one might select 
the oppression of women, and from the many forms this oppression takes, 
one might further select the sexual violence that is routinely and relentlessly 
directed at women throughout the world by Western men.8 It is the position of 
this thesis that this is precisely how rape should be understood: as one facet 
of the oppression of women, which itself should be understood as one aspect 
of a great network of interwoven and intersecting abuses that characterises 
the dominant culture of the Anglophone West.  
 
Importantly, the above is not intended to suggest that rape should not be 
studied as an important issue in its own right, but rather to argue that 
dissociating it entirely from the wider network of abuses is to overlook how 
deeply ingrained in Anglophone Western culture it truly is. Rape is frequently 
presented as something external to ‘civilisation’, as an aspect of man’s 
‘animal nature’ or as a practice that developed in an ancient and violent past, 
the legacy of which still blights the civilised West to this day.9 This thesis will 
suggest that this position is deeply misguided, and that rape in contemporary 
Anglophone Western society is not an echo of primitive savagery that 
civilisation struggles to contain and eliminate but something that it has 
frequently legitimised for use in conquering and enslaving other peoples, and 
                                                 
7
 For further discussion of these accusations, and their intersectionality, see: Angela Y. 
Davis, Women, Race and Class (London: The Women’s Press, 1982); Jack D. Forbes, 
Columbus and other Cannibals: The Wétiko Disease of Exploitation, Imperialism, and 
Terrorism (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2008); Susan Griffin, A Chorus of Stones: The 
Private Life of War (New York: Doubleday, 1992); Derrick Jensen, Endgame Volume 1: The 
Problem of Civilization (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2006); and Frederick Turner, 
Beyond Geography: The Western Spirit Against the Wilderness (New Brunswick and New 
Jersey: Rutgers University Press, `1986). 
8
 Unless stated otherwise, throughout this work, ‘rape’ refers exclusively to sexual violence, 
or coerced sex, imposed on women by men. Whilst the thesis acknowledges that rape 
survivors include men and women, as well as intersexed and trans* people (of all ages, 
classes and races), it is not within the scope of the project to discuss all forms of rape.  
9
 Examples of this position range from evolutionary biology texts through to feminist theory. 
For example, see: Richard Wrangham and Dale Peterson Demonic Males: Apes and the 
Origins of Human Violence (New York: Mariner Books, 1996), p. 142; Susan Brownmiller, 
Against Our Will: Men, Women and Rape (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1975), pp. 14, 
18. 
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normalised as an inevitable aspect of life in the Anglophone West.10 Of the 
many approaches adopted in the study of sexual violence, the ‘rape culture’ 
paradigm was the first to incorporate this form of analysis. As Robin E. Field 
notes, rape culture theorists understand rape to be a learned behaviour that 
is tolerated and even encouraged by the culture at large, and which will 
continue as long as women’s subordination continues.11 This understanding 
made an important contribution to the study of sexual violence, locating the 
focus of analysis less on individual rapists (as had been the case in most 
previous approaches) and more on the nature of the society that produces 
them and, the paradigm suggests, encourages them to rape.12 However, 
whilst I concur entirely with this shift in focus, this thesis will suggest that the 
perspective from which rape culture theorists approach the issue is too 
narrow and that the almost exclusive focus on patriarchy, misogyny and often 
simplistic understandings of male socialisation mean that the full extent of the 
Anglophone West’s rape culture, and the ways in which it is maintained, are 
not fully explored. Whilst the mechanisms of patriarchy are, indeed, vital 
considerations in the struggle to end rape, the thesis will assert that the roots 
of the Anglophone West’s rape culture extend past patriarchy and into the 
very foundations of the dominant culture itself. In line with this, it will argue 
that to challenge the Anglophone West’s rape culture requires challenging 
the underlying abusiveness and destructiveness of the dominant culture. To 
begin to address this point, it is crucial that we clarify both the precise field of 
enquiry and the scale of the issue being discussed, and it is to this the 
discussion will now turn. 
 
                                                 
10
 For discussion of rape used in the West’s empire building and slave trading, see: Andrea 
Smith, ‘Not an Indian Tradition: the Sexual Colonization of Native Peoples’, Hypatia, Vol. 18, 
No. 2 (2003), 70–85, < http://www.jstor.org/stable/3811012> [accessed 30/5/2011]; Claudia 
Card, ‘Rape as a Weapon of War’, Hypatia, Vol. 11, No. 4 (1996), 5–18, 
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/3810388> [accessed 30/4/2011]; Madley, Benjamin, ‘From 
Terror to Genocide: Britain’s Tasmanian Penal Colony and Australia’s History Wars’, The 
Journal of British Studies, Vol. 47, No. 1 (2008); Edward E. Baptist, ‘“Cuffy,” “Fancy Maids,” 
and “One-Eyed Men”: Rape, Commodification, and the Domestic Slave Trade in the United 
States’, The American Historical Review, Vol. 106, No. 5 (2001), 1619–1650; Davis, Women, 
Race and Class, pp. 172–201; Susan Griffin, Rape: The Politics of Consciousness (San 
Francisco: Harper and Row, 1986), pp. 19–20. 
10
 Griffin, Rape: The Politics of Consciousness, pp. 19–20.  
11
 Robin E. Field, ‘Rape Culture’, in Encyclopedia of Rape, ed. by Merril D. Smith (Westport, 
CT: Greenwood Press, 2004), pp. 174–175 (pp. 174–5).  
12
 Emilie Buchwald, Pamela Fletcher and Martha Roth, ‘Editors’ Preface’, in Transforming a 
Rape Culture, ed. by Emilie Buchwald, Pamela Fletcher and Martha Roth (Minneapolis: 
Milkweed Editions, 1993), pp. 1–4 (pp. 1–4). 
 13 
 
The Scale of Enquiry: The ‘Anglophone West’ and Sexual Violence 
 
This thesis is primarily concerned with, and draws the vast majority of its 
examples from, the contemporary cultures of the UK and US (supplemented 
occasionally by references to other predominantly English-speaking countries 
such as Canada, Australia and Ireland). I refer to these countries throughout 
as the ‘Anglophone West’ and treat them as relatively unified in their cultural 
attitudes, at least as far as sexual violence is concerned, as I will discuss 
presently. However, in certain contexts, I also expand the field of analysis in 
order to consider ‘the West’ or ‘Western culture’ in a wider sense. Thomas H. 
Greer and Gavin Lewis observe that it is ‘standard usage [...] to speak of the 
common values and interests of North America and western Europe as those 
of [...] “the West”’, and note more broadly that these countries share 
significant common roots and traditions.13 It is in this sense that I treat ‘the 
West’ and ‘Western culture’ in this thesis. That is to say, the thesis asserts 
that the cultures of Western Europe and North America (and, I suggest, also 
Australia) hold sufficient commonalities in terms of their cultural foundations 
that it is possible, in specific contexts, to discuss them collectively as ‘the 
West’. Indeed, several of the key texts I employ in my treatment of the wider 
themes of my work do precisely this, treating these countries as comprising a 
single unified culture described with terms such as ‘Western civilization’ or 
‘European culture’.14 Where my analysis addresses the broad themes with 
which these texts are concerned—for example, philosophical traditions or 
deep-seated socio-political systems—I follow the lead of such theorists and 
structure my analysis in terms of ‘the West’ or ‘Western culture’. Similarly, 
where it is pertinent to the discussion, I also move away from my focus on 
the contemporary Anglophone West to consider historical examples and the 
roots of significant Western traditions.15 This is not to suggest that the West 
or the Anglophone West are monolithic cultures that have remained static, 
                                                 
13
 Thomas H. Greer and Gavin Lewis, A Brief History of the Western World, 9
th
 edn 
(Belmont: Thompson Wadsworth, 2005), pp. xxiv, xx–xxv. 
14
 For example, see: Jensen, Endgame volume 1; Marimba Ani, Yurugu: An Afrikan-
Centered Critique of European Cultural Thought and Behavior (Washington DC: Nkonimfo 
Publications, 2007). Ani uses ‘European culture’ to refer not only to the cultures of mainland 
Europe but also those derived directly from European colonisation, such the non-indigenous, 
dominant culture of the US.  
15
 As Greer and Lewis observe, this too is an established approach to understanding the 
contemporary West (for discussion, see: Greer and Lewis, A Brief History of the Western 
World, p. xxiv). 
 14 
 
stable and unchanged throughout history. Rather, this approach highlights 
the fact that, as Greer and Lewis note, many cultural elements of earlier 
‘Western’ civilisations are widely accepted as having ‘continued without 
interruption into the civilization of the modern West’.16 Exploring these 
connections between earlier Western cultures and the contemporary culture 
of the Anglophone West allows us to analyse both the ways in which some 
aspects of contemporary culture come to be seen as ‘natural’ or 
unquestionable, and how contemporary Western societies’ self-identification 
as the progenies of the ‘great’ early civilisations influences their sense of 
culture superiority. Both of these points allow a greater understanding of 
contemporary ideologies, attitudes and practices which, in turn, allows us a 
greater understanding of how sexual violence operates in the contemporary 
Anglophone West.  
 
However, whilst the approaches outlined above are both appropriate and 
effective in the treatment of ‘deep’ cultural themes, they are too broad and 
generalised for my treatment of sexual violence. Accordingly, when 
discussing rape culture or other more detailed specifics such as patterns of 
gender socialisation or trends in media coverage, my analysis is solely 
concerned with the contemporary Anglophone West, and my conclusions, 
like my examples, should be taken as applying only to this specific context.17 
Of course, there remain differences between the cultures of the UK and US 
(as well as those of other Anglophone countries); moreover, neither the 
Anglophone West nor its constituent countries are composed of singular 
coherent, monolithic cultures but rather are populated by multiple 
interconnected subcultures and diverse, heterogeneous discourses, all 
interacting and negotiating every aspect of cultural life. However, this thesis 
is primarily concerned with the dominant cultures of these Anglophone 
countries. The Oxford Dictionary of Sociology (1994), states that in  
 
 
                                                 
16
 Greer and Lewis, A Brief History of the Western World, p. xxiv. For further discussion, see: 
p. xxviii. 
17
 It is possible that some of the analysis is applicable to the wider contexts of ‘the West’ or 
points in Western history, but it is beyond the scope of this thesis to explore these potential 
commonalities. 
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a conglomeration of different, often competing culture and 
subcultures [...] a dominant culture is one whose values, language, 
and ways of behaving are imposed on a subordinate culture or 
cultures through economic or political power. This may be achieved 
through legal or political suppression of other sets of values and 
patterns of behaviour, or by monopolizing the media of 
communication.18 
 
That is to say, a dominant culture comprises the prevailing ideologies, ethical 
systems, behavioural codes and discourses within a network of other cultures 
which it pressures to assimilate or acculturate into the dominant culture with 
the aim of achieving cultural hegemony. Whilst this thesis recognises the 
existence of multiple cultures within the Anglophone West, it is primarily 
concerned with the dominant cultures of the UK and US and, as noted above, 
draws its examples from these cultures. Similarly, whilst my analysis does 
recognise that the dominant cultures of these countries are by no means 
identical, it also proposes that there are sufficient correlations between them 
that it is possible to discuss them collectively as the dominant culture of the 
Anglophone West.  
 
On a basic level, the dominant cultures are connected by the fact that the UK 
and US are both neoliberal democracies characterised by relative affluence, 
political stability, global influence, late capitalist economic organisation and 
advanced levels of industrialisation, all of which, as will be discussed at 
several points throughout the thesis, greatly influence prevailing ideologies, 
ethical codes and prescribed patterns of behaviour. Likewise, both countries 
are hierarchically organised and share similar patterns of social stratification 
along lines of gender, race, class and sexuality, with the highest echelons of 
politics, business and media largely dominated by rich, white, heterosexual 
men.19 The dominant cultures also share what is often referred to as the 
‘special relationship’: a close political and economic partnership based on 
shared values, aims and interests, which both attests to and furthers the 
socio-cultural connections between the two.20 Likewise, there is significant 
                                                 
18
 John Scott and Gordon Marshall, Oxford Dictionary of Sociology, 3rd edn (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), p. 190. 
19
 George Fallis, Multiversities, Ideas, and Democracy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
2007), p. 161. 
20
 For discussion, see: Frances G. Burwell, ‘Building a US−UK “Special Relationship” for the 
Future’ (28/9/2009) 
 16 
 
cultural exchange between the two dominant cultures—especially in terms of 
entertainment media—which also works to strengthen the connections and 
increase the similarities between the dominant cultures.21 The above 
examples all represent areas of interconnection and correlation between the 
dominant cultures of the UK and US, and support and substantiate my 
methodological approach of treating them collectively as the dominant culture 
of the Anglophone West. The thesis will argue that understanding this 
dominant culture is central to understanding—and so, to challenging—sexual 
violence in the Anglophone West. However, before I outline the methodology 
and structure of this argument, it is necessary to establish the scale of rape 
incidence in the Anglophone West. 
 
Amongst the most persistent delusions about sexual violence in the 
Anglophone West is the belief that it is a rare and aberrant act, entirely at 
odds with the prevailing ideologies of the dominant culture.. Although 
coverage is steadily improving, Anglophone Western media still routinely 
reproduces and disseminates this erroneous understanding of sexual 
violence. At the most basic level this is reflected in the fact that, relative to 
the number of rapes that are actually committed in the Anglophone West, 
sexual violence is seldom reported, giving the impression that it is a rare 
occurrence. Moreover, when rape is reported, the coverage almost 
exclusively focuses on individual cases (and, even then, only on cases 
deemed newsworthy by either their ‘extreme’ nature or the celebrity status of 
the rapist) and rarely on the extent of the Anglophone West’s rape problem 
as a whole. Indeed, whilst statistics are regularly employed in the mainstream 
media’s analysis of large-scale atrocities taking place in non-Western 
conflict-zones, such data is frequently absent from reports on rape in the 
Anglophone West. Indeed, as Helen Benedict notes, ‘that news must be the 
unusual, never the usual, virtually guarantees that the press will ignore 
typical rapes or assaults (the rape of a young, single, poor woman by 
someone of her own race, whom she knows) in favour of the bizarre, 
                                                                                                                                          
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmfaff/114/114we18.htm> 
[accessed 10 March 2014].  
21
 See: Andrew Gamble and Ian Kearns, ‘Recasting the Special Relationship’, in Progressive 
Foreign Policy: New Directions for the UK, ed. by David Held and David Mepham 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007), pp. 116−131 (p. 118). 
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sensational, or gory’.22 This trend in reporting gives the illusion, reflected in 
the earlier discussion of the Munirka gang-rape case, that rape is only 
widespread in far away, socially unstable locations: in war-zones and 
‘developing nations’, in lands not yet fully indoctrinated into Western-style 
high-civilisation.23 Furthermore, the focus on ‘extreme’ or ‘unusual’ cases of 
rape inaccurately suggests that, in the Anglophone West, rape is primarily 
committed by a small number of outcasts and violent sociopaths. Indeed, the 
image of the violent, psychologically-disturbed rapist is a central illusion of 
the popular understanding of rape in the Anglophone West. As Julie A. 
Allison and Lawrence S. Wrightsman note, ‘there does seem to be a 
prototypical conceptualisation of rape in the mind of all of us–that of the 
madman with a weapon waiting for his victim to arrive’.24  This rapist-as-
pariah stereotype is an extremely pervasive rape myth, and one that is 
essential to the belief that the Anglophone West does not face a significant 
rape problem. In reality, however, statistics pertaining to rape in both the UK 
and US absolutely undermine assumptions that it is an act only committed by 
a small number of insane outsiders, or that the Anglophone West is greatly 
advanced in the prevention of sexual violence against women.  
 
The British Home Office states that in England and Wales alone 43,579 
cases of ‘most serious sexual crime’ were recorded by the police in the 
2009/10 financial year.25  Whilst this figure, by itself, is extremely high, when 
                                                 
22
 Helen Benedict, Virgin or Vamp: How the Press Covers Sex (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1993), p. 8. 
23
 This is by no means intended to suggest that cases of rape occurring in ‘developing 
nations’ are of less importance than those occurring in the West. The ongoing atrocities 
(including but not limited to wide-scale sexual abuse) found in the world’s conflict-zones 
deserve and require vastly more coverage, attention and, much more importantly, action 
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one considers the fact that the majority of cases of rape are not known to the 
police, the actual incidence of rape potentially rises considerably higher. A 
separate Home Office bulletin estimates that eighty-seven percent of rapes 
occurring in the 2006/7 financial year were unknown to the police.26  If one 
were to assume this percentage to be accurate and that there has not been 
an unprecedented change in the proportion of rapes recorded by the police, 
then the actual number of rapes occurring in England and Wales in the 
2009/10 financial year is likely to be closer to 335,000 than to the 43,579 
suggested above.27  Moreover, it is not only cases of rape that are not 
reported to the police that statistics fail to represent. As Allison and 
Wrightsman observe, ‘some rapes aren’t even labelled as such by the 
victims’.28  In cases where the rape survivor does not recognise an 
experience as ‘rape’ per se, the survivor will obviously not report it as such, 
even on an anonymous survey (let alone officially to the police), and so these 
cases are not accounted for in any statistics. Moreover, such cases are likely 
to be extremely common. As Lisa Jervis observes: 
 
Survivors of any attack that doesn’t fit the most extreme stranger-in-
the-bushes-with-a-knife paradigm are very often reluctant to name 
their experiences as rape. When culture teaches you that lack of 
consent is measured only in active, physical resistance, when your 
actions are questioned if your date refuses to respect your “no,” 
you’re going to have a hard time calling rape by its real name.29                 
 
There are numerous scenarios in which underlying cultural prejudices and 
assumptions prevent rape survivors from identifying their own experiences as 
cases of rape. These so-called ‘grey areas’ of rape include, but are not 
limited to, situations in which subtler forms of coercion are employed, rapes 
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committed by husbands, sexual partners or dates (commonly in cases where 
the survivor believes either that she does not have the right to refuse sexual 
activity or that non-violent coerced sex does not constitute rape) and cases 
where the survivor can be considered incapable of fully providing consent 
(through intoxication, incapacity or similar).30 Whilst it is documented that 
scenarios such as these do occur (as in the sources referenced above), there 
is no way of accurately documenting the frequency of such assaults. 
However, it is a logical deduction that, were there a way of including them in 
statistics, even the already significant figure of 335,000 incidents of rape 
would increase considerably.  
 
Similarly high incidence rates are also found in the United States: a Bureau 
of Justice statistical bulletin states the number of cases of serious sexual 
assault in 2009 to be 125,910.31  However, as with the Home Office reports 
cited above, this figure refers only to cases of rape recorded by the police 
and actual occurrences of rape are almost certainly considerably higher. 
Indeed, a federally-funded report for the U.S. Department of Justice 
estimates that only sixteen percent of rapes occurring in the United States 
are known to the police and suggests that, in 2006 alone, the number of 
actual cases of rape was likely to be over 1,000,000.32  Moreover, even this 
figure cannot account for cases of rape that were not recognised as such by 
the survivor. For both countries, even if one works only with the statistics 
pertaining to rapes recorded by the police, the figures are still extremely high. 
When one considers that every single case represents a human being 
atrociously abused and a life profoundly changed, the magnitude of such 
statistics is readily apparent. When one considers that each case also 
represents a human being prepared to inflict such absolute abuse, the notion 
that rape is only committed by a small number of psychologically-disturbed 
pariahs is simply untenable. It is upon this understanding that the thesis is 
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premised: if the presence of rape in the Anglophone West cannot be 
explained as the anti-social behaviour of a small number of mentally-unstable 
outcasts, then its cause must be found elsewhere.  
 
Throughout the thesis, I will argue that the prevalence of rape can be 
explained through analysis of the Anglophone West itself, that rape is, in fact, 
a socially-learned behaviour, produced and supported by several intersecting 
aspects of Anglophone Western culture. This suggestion is not, in itself, 
original. Many theorists have written extensively on this topic, arguing that 
there is a direct link between cultural attitudes and practices and incidence of 
rape.33  However, the majority of these arguments employ relatively narrow 
fields of enquiry, analysing only cultural factors that are directly connected to 
sexual violence. Moreover, many of these explorations rely on rigid, simplistic 
understandings of patriarchy and gender hierarchy, and often take the form 
of polemical rhetoric. I will both interrogate and extend these arguments, 
locating analysis in the context of wider patterns of hierarchy, exploitation 
and abuse that characterise the dominant culture of the Anglophone West. 
Through this approach of setting gender and sexuality theory in dialogue with 
wider social theory, the argument will develop beyond the limitations of other 
previous approaches to the topic. Accordingly, the discussion will establish 
both a foundational understanding of feminist analysis of sexual violence and 
begin to introduce critical perspectives that extend its focus. 
 
 
Methodology: Revisiting and Revising Radical Feminism 
 
 
The fact that rape is an overwhelmingly gendered act—not only in the sense 
of being disproportionately committed by men against women but also in the 
sense that it is premised on and supported by societal attitudes to gender and 
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sexuality—means that feminist theory is essential for a thorough 
understanding of all aspects of sexual violence in the Anglophone West. 
Feminist understandings of rape provide a solid foundation of analysis of 
patriarchy, misogyny and gendered socialisation and their relationship to 
sexual violence from which to develop the broader themes of my work. This 
considered, feminist theories of rape are of course diverse in both their 
methodologies and their findings, and it is useful at this stage to discuss 
briefly how my own critical position relates to, draws on and critiques some of 
the principal approaches.  
 
The foundation of my critical position is provided by second-wave radical 
feminist analysis, particularly the pioneering anti-rape texts of the 1970s such 
as Susan Brownmiller’s Against Our Will: Men, Women and Rape (1975) and 
Susan Griffin’s Rape: The Politics of Consciousness (1979). As Nicola Gavey 
observes, these texts—alongside concomitant anti-rape activism—helped to 
politicise rape, locating it within detailed and damning critiques of patriarchal 
social organisation and framing it as a site for widespread social change.34 As 
such they made vital contributions to the understanding of sexual violence 
that make them highly influential in a general sense and of great significance 
to my own work. Amongst their most important contributions was to critique 
and expand definitions of ‘rape’. Prior to radical feminist interventions, the 
majority of popular, specialist and legal discourses understood the term ‘rape’ 
to apply to only an extremely narrow band of sexual violence. As Gavey 
reports, ‘[u]nless rape was committed by a stranger using extreme physical 
violence it was something that was easily accommodated within the dominant 
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discourses of heterosexual sex – that is, as just sex and certainly not as 
rape’.35 Early radical feminists were instrumental in beginning to challenge 
these definitions, critiquing both legal conventions—such as ‘marital rape 
exemptions’ which decreed that a man could legally force his wife to engage 
in ‘sexual’ activities—and broader conventions, such as prevailing 
understandings of heterosex as an exercise in men’s active dominance and 
women’s passive submission.36 Alongside challenges to prevailing 
understandings of what constituted ‘rape’, early radical feminists also 
challenged (at least some) misconceptions of ‘who’ rapists were, beginning 
the process of undermining stereotypes of rapists as ‘insane’ pariahs or 
simply overly-passionate lovers in order to highlight the pervasive normality of 
men’s violence against women.37 Indeed, radical feminism not only 
highlighted the fact that ‘normal men’ commit rape but also expanded their 
field of enquiry to attack the social structures, ideologies and cultural norms 
that encourage them to do so. This position is perhaps most explicitly stated 
in Griffin’s argument that rape is so deeply entwined with patriarchal social 
organisation that it simply cannot ‘be rooted out from patriarchy without 
ending patriarchy itself’.38 Statements such as this represented a fundamental 
reframing of sexual violence and its relationship with the dominant culture: by 
highlighting the fact that the majority of rapists were acting within the bounds 
of social convention, enacting normative behaviour patterns, often with the full 
support of a male-dominated, rape-supportive society, radical feminists 
moved the target of anti-rape activism away from an exclusive focus on the 
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(often pathologised) individual and onto the patriarchal social systems that 
simultaneously present women as ‘rapable’ objects and teach men that they 
are entitled to rape them.   
 
Together, the above aspects of radical feminist analysis provide a foundation 
for my critical position. Throughout the thesis, I actively engage with 
definitions of ‘rape’, responding critically to the ways in which it is defined and 
treated in a variety of sources, and problematising understandings that 
attempt to present sexual violence as discretely removed from dominant 
models of heterosex. I explore how the act of defining rape can help 
legitimise sexual violence, and the ways in which understandings of what 
constitutes sexual violence are shaped by societal attitudes around consent, 
women’s subjectivity and men’s conditioned self-interest and sense of 
entitlement. Moving beyond the sometimes limited focus of the early radical 
feminist analysis, I also explore the ways in which these understandings 
intersect with other systems of oppression and are complicated by issues 
such as the stereotyping of women of colour as ‘jezebels’ who always 
consent to all sexual activities or the presentation of sex workers as having 
forfeited their rights to refuse consent because of the stigma associated with 
sex work.39 My work also continues the radical feminist task of undermining 
the stereotyping of rapists as pariahs and outcasts, or as enacting ‘natural’ 
sexual urges, arguing instead that they are operating within an established 
framework of ideology and prescribed behaviour that is widely legitimised, 
celebrated and rewarded in the Anglophone West. Again, however, I develop 
this past what I perceive to be the limitations of much radical feminist 
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analysis—in this case, as I will discuss in more detail presently, the privileging 
of gender oppression as the primary form of oppression—in order to consider 
how rapists relate to prevailing ideologies, ethical systems and behavioural 
codes within the dominant culture at large. Finally, my critical position holds 
as a central tenet the notion that combating sexual violence can only be 
achieved through radical social change throughout the dominant culture 
aimed at undermining and dismantling patriarchal social organisation. Of 
course, as I will discuss in more detail, I also argue that this process can only 
be truly successful if it occurs as part of an intersectional resistance strategy 
that works to dismantle the vast network of interconnected oppressions and 
abuse that structure the dominant culture. Nevertheless, my thesis explicitly 
insists that feminist activism against patriarchy, as well as concerted 
challenges to the ways in which ‘rape’ is defined in relation to normative 
heterosex practices, remains both highly significant and entirely relevant in 
the contemporary Anglophone West.  
 
This insistence means that my critical position sets itself in opposition to 
‘postfeminist’ analysis of sexual violence. Leslie Heywood and Jennifer Drake 
note that ‘“postfeminist” characterizes a group of young, conservative 
feminists who explicitly define themselves against and criticize feminists of 
the second-wave’.40 The decades following the pioneering radical feminist 
anti-rape activism discussed above have seen a steady flow of postfeminist 
critiques which argue that second-wave feminism has been so effective that it 
has either rendered feminism obsolete, or else has produced a culture which 
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is overly sensitive to sexual violence and victimises innocent men by labelling 
innocuous ‘normal’ sex as ‘rape’. Perhaps the most recent high-profile 
example of this is Caroline Kitchens’ article ‘It’s Time to End “Rape Culture” 
Hysteria’.41 Angered by the American government’s declaration that more 
must be done to combat the ‘culture of passivity and tolerance’ surrounding 
sexual violence on university campuses, Kitchens argues that feminist rape 
culture analysis does little more than breed ‘censorship and hysteria’, ‘poison 
the minds of young women’, and create ‘hostile environments for innocent 
males’.42  
 
This last point, that feminism’s pervasive influence on mainstream culture is 
unduly victimising men, is a recurrent theme in the article: Kitchens goes on 
to argue that ‘a growing number of young men find themselves charged with 
rape, named publicly and brought before campus judicial panels informed by 
rape-culture theory’ and claims that ‘[i]n such courts, due process is 
practically nonexistent: guilty because accused’.43 However, Kitchens’ 
suggestion that cultural attitudes in both university administrations and what 
she refers to as ‘the mainstream’ are overwhelmingly biased in favour of 
(alleged) survivors of sexual violence and against (alleged) perpetrators is 
flawed. We have already seen in the previous statistical analysis that, as 
RAINN report, only approximately ‘6% of rapists will ever spend a day in jail’; 
when this is considered in relation to the fact that a 2010 survey conducted 
by the American government reports that ‘[n]early 1 in 5 women (18.3%) [...] 
in the United States have been raped in some time their lives’ and 
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‘[a]pproximately 1.3 million women were raped in the year preceding the 
survey’, there is very little basis for a claim that ‘mainstream’ culture is biased 
in favour of those reporting sexual violence.44 The situation is, if anything, 
worse at American universities and colleges. A 2009 survey of 
undergraduate women, cited in a report by the national public health institute 
of the United States, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, notes 
that ‘19% experienced attempted or completed sexual assault since entering 
college’.45 Further, a U.S. Department of Justice report states that over 95% 
of women who survived ‘completed rape’ at college did not report their 
crimes, largely due to fear of how they will be judged by others.46 In those 
few cases where survivors do report the incident, it is extremely rare that the 
alleged perpetrators face serious consequences: a 2010 investigative report 
by NPR News and the Center for Public Integrity found that only 10 to 25 
percent of men found guilty of sexual assault were even expelled from 
college or university, and the news media abounds with reports of cases in 
which women reporting sexual violence were summarily dismissed by 
educational administrations.47 Again, the suggestion that American 
                                                 
44
 ‘Reporting Rates’; ‘NISVS: An Overview of 2010 Summary Report Findings’ 
<http://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/nisvs/index.html> [accessed 23 March 2014], p. 1. 
45
‘Sexual Violence’ (2012) <www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/sv-datasheet-a.pdf> 
[accessed 23/3/2014], p. 1.  
46
 Bonnie S. Fisher and Francis T. Cullen and Michael G. Turner, ‘The Sexual Victimization 
of College Women’ <https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/182369.pdf> [accessed 21 March 
2014], p. 24. 
47
 ‘Myths that make it hard to stop Campus Rape’ (4/3/2010) 
<http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=124272157> [accessed 25 March 
2014]; Azmat Khan, ‘What’s behind ‘Rape Culture’ on Campus?’ [30/10/2013] 
<http://america.aljazeera.com/watch/shows/america-tonight/america-tonight-
blog/2013/10/30/what-will-changetherapecultureoncampuses.html> [accessed 25 March 
2014]; Susan Donaldson James, ‘American University Erupts Over Date Rape’ (1/4/2010) 
<http://abcnews.go.com/Health/MindMoodNews/date-rape-firestorm-erupts-american-
university-student-newspaper/story?id=10254150> [accessed 25 March 2014]; Rajini 
Vaidyanthan, ‘Sexual Assault Survivors Challenge Universities’ (20/2/2014) 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-26263171> [accessed 25 March 2014]; Tyler 
Kingkade, ‘Amherst College Sexual Assault Policies Treat Alleged Rapists Better Than 
Laptop Thieves’ (25/1/2014) <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/12/15/amherst-college-
sexual-assault-policies_n_4402315.html> [accessed 25 March 2014]; Alexandra Brodsky, 
 27 
 
campuses and educational administrations have abandoned due process is 
without foundation.  
 
Kitchens’ attempt to present America as a postfeminist culture that is entirely 
opposed to sexual violence is equally flawed, for much the same reasons. 
For example, questioning the existence of a ‘culture of passivity and 
tolerance’, she writes:  ‘Tolerance for rape? Rape is a horrific crime, and 
rapists are despised’.48 However, as Jaclyn Friedman asks, ‘[i]f we already 
despise rapists, why are they so rarely held accountable in any way?’49 That 
is to say, if American culture is so adverse to sexual violence and the men 
who commit it, why is this not reflected in any of the statistics and accounts 
cited above? Friedman offers an explanation of this issue, suggesting that 
 
 [w]hat we really despise is the idea of rapists: a terrifying monster 
lurking in the bushes, waiting to pounce on an innocent girl as she 
walks by [...] But actual rapists, men who are usually known to (and 
often loved by) their victims? Men who are sometimes our sports 
heroes, political leaders, buddies, boyfriends and fathers? Evidence 
suggests we don’t despise them nearly as much as we should.50 
 
In other words, Kitchens’ analysis is undermined by the research begun by 
the second-wave feminists so reviled by postfeminists: the reality that not all 
rapists fit the stereotypical model of the pathological violent stranger. Like 
many postfeminist arguments, Kitchens’ position ultimately relies not so 
much on undermining radical feminist challenges to the stereotyping of 
rapists as on simply ignoring it in order to insist that only rapes that are 
achieved through violence and committed by strangers count as ‘real rape’. 
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We find a similar position in Katie Roiphe’s notorious postfeminist article 
‘Date Rape’s Other Victim’, in which she writes:  
 
That rape is a fact in some women’s lives is not in question. It’s hard 
to watch the solemn faces of young Bosnian girls, their words 
haltingly translated, as they tell of brutal rapes; or to read accounts of 
a suburban teenager raped and beaten while walking home from a 
shopping mall [...] but we no longer agree on what rape is. Today’s 
definition has stretched beyond bruises and knives, threats of death 
or violence to include emotional pressure and the influence of 
alcohol.51 
 
Even more explicitly than Kitchens, Roiphe states that feminist analysis has 
created unreasonable expectations of what constitutes rape, suggesting, 
again, that only stereotypically violent acts can be considered rape and so 
denying the significance of numerous forms of coercion and abuse, and the 
experiences of a great many survivors of sexual violence.52  
 
Ultimately, such postfeminism is, as Sujata Moorti (summarising the work of 
Sarah Projansky) suggests, ‘a nostalgic return to a mythical point in time prior 
to feminism’s realization that there is something wrong with patriarchy’.53 
That is to say, it is characterised by a seeming desire to return to the 
understandings that the original radical feminists were responding to—where, 
as Gavey phrases it, ‘[u]nless rape was committed by a stranger using 
extreme physical violence’ it was understood as ‘just sex’—and blames 
feminist ‘hysteria’ for taking away the apparent clarity these understandings 
provided.54 However, as Moorti highlights, this point in time was ‘mythical’: 
the complex issues surrounding consent, coercion and the relationships 
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between normative heterosex and sexual violence were present before 
radical feminists began analysing them. Feminism did not create the issues 
but rather reported them and attempted to unpick and undermine them. The 
fact that these issues are still present and pressing only highlights the 
necessity of further feminist analysis and activism, rather than the straight 
denial of their existence proposed by postfeminists, and this is a principal 
reason why my critical position holds to its foundation in radical feminist 
theory and rejects postfeminism as offering little but reactionary rhetoric to 
the central debates of this thesis.  
 
However, my rejection of postfeminist critiques does not mean that my critical 
position is a direct, non-critical reproduction of radical feminist theory. Since 
the pioneering anti-rape texts were published in the 1970s, feminism has 
developed and diversified significantly, and other theoretical branches have 
critiqued several aspects of second-wave radical feminism’s perspectives, 
methodologies and conclusions far more effectively than postfeminism has 
yet achieved. As I have alluded to earlier in this discussion, my critical 
position is informed by, incorporates and, in some cases, extends these 
criticisms, as well as drawing heavily on other strands of feminist theory in a 
more general manner. One of the most pronounced influences in this regard 
comes from works by feminists of colour. Some of this influence takes the 
form of direct critiques of second-wave radical feminism’s treatment of race, 
such as my analysis of Brownmiller’s racist and classist stereotyping in the 
first chapter, which is greatly informed by Angela Y. Davis’ notion of ‘the myth 
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of the black rapist’.55 However, as suggested above, the importance of 
feminisms of colour to my critical position is not limited to critiques of overt 
racism by radical feminists; the thesis is also shaped by such analysis in a 
more general sense, especially in light of the fact that, when not being overtly 
racist, much second-wave radical feminism is simply more subtly racist in its 
failure to consider race as a significant factor in feminist struggle and the fight 
against sexual violence.  
 
Ellen Willis notes that early radical feminism was based around ‘the 
abstraction of feminist issues from race and class issues’, that is, the 
assumption that the oppression of women could be addressed without 
addressing racial and class oppression; she adds that this further excluded 
women of colour and working-class women from the movement, which in turn 
‘limit[ed] and distort[ed]’ radical feminism’s ‘analysis and [...] practice’ by 
leaving the focus almost solely on the experiences of middle-class white 
women.56 Where it did acknowledge these forms of oppression, radical 
feminism frequently framed them within what bell hooks describes as ‘a 
hierarchy of oppression [...] with sexism in first place’.57 In other words, it 
considered all other forms of oppression to be of less significance than the 
oppression of women, even going so far as to argue, as Willis notes, that the 
oppression of women is the ‘primary form’ of oppression from which all other 
oppression develops, leaving systems of oppression such as white 
supremacism and classism as little more than ‘specialized forms of male 
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supremacy’.58 It is the position of this thesis that these approaches are 
entirely inadequate and that a proper understanding of both the oppression of 
women generally and sexual violence against women specifically can only be 
achieved by considering how gender oppression intersects with other 
systems of oppression. This is true in the sense that, by ignoring other forms 
of oppression, one overlooks the experiences of many survivors of sexual 
violence who belong to marginalised groups and whose experiences do not 
match those of more privileged women, and in the sense that the 
mechanisms of sexual violence and socio-political responses to it are 
profoundly shaped by numerous intersecting hierarchies and oppressions.59 
Moreover, it is also true in the sense that, as hooks argues, ‘[s]ince all forms 
of oppression [...] are supported by similar institutional and social structures, 
one system cannot be eradicated while the others remain intact.’60 That is to 
say, this thesis holds to the belief, outlined by hooks, that one cannot hope to 
challenge a specific form of oppression without understanding that it operates 
as part of an intersectional network of oppressions that share roots, 
structures and systems of operation (an issue I will examine in more detail 
further into this introduction, and throughout the thesis). This conviction 
marks an extremely important area in which my critical position and 
methodology departs from its radical feminist foundations to consider a far 
more intersectional analysis of sexual violence. 
 
Another important departure can be found in the influence of third-wave 
feminism on my critical position. Like the work of pioneering feminists of 
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colour discussed above, a significant amount of third-wave feminism is also 
highly intersectional in its analysis. In a large part this is due to the fact that 
much third-wave analysis is itself influenced by such works and has 
incorporated and benefited from previous critiques of second-wave feminism. 
Indeed, as Leslie Haywood and Jennifer Drake note, ‘the definitional moment 
of third wave feminism has been theorized as proceeding from critiques of 
the white women’s movement that were initiated by women of color, as well 
as from the many instances of coalition work undertaken by U.S. third world 
feminists’.61 Moreover, it is not simply a case of influence: crucially, far more 
than the almost exclusively middle-class white feminism of the second-wave, 
much third-wave analysis and activism comes from marginalised women, 
producing theory, critiquing established ‘truths’, recounting their own 
experiences and exploring their own identities.62 This increasingly diverse 
‘movement’ produces feminist theory and activism that not only explore how 
gender intersects with other identity markers such as race, class and 
sexuality but with wider issues that shaped the lived experiences of such 
identities. As Haywood and Drake note,    
 
third wave feminism’s political activism on behalf of women’s rights is 
shaped by—and responds to—a world of global capitalism and 
information technology, postmodernism and postcolonialism, and 
environmental degradation [...] Third wavers [...] are [...] concerned 
not simply with “women’s issues” but with a broad range of 
interlocking topics [...] ranging from protests of the World Economic 
Forum and welfare reform to activism on behalf of independent 
media outlets.63  
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As a result of this broad, intersectional, often coalition-based approach to 
feminism, third wave analysis often exhibits a far greater awareness of 
difference, of privilege and marginalisation, of the complexities, 
contradictions and fluidity of women’s experiences than that found in most 
second-wave radical feminism. With this greater understanding comes a 
greater capacity to analyse and challenge the complex interpenetrating 
power structures that enable, motivate, legitimise and defend all systems of 
oppression, including the oppression of women, including sexual violence 
against women. It is this approach that has the most significant influence on 
my critical position, providing a framework for exploring the ways in which 
multiple intersecting systems of oppression mark some groups and 
individuals as disposable, ‘consumable’ and abusable, and for examining 
how larger forces such as capitalism, imperialism and globalisation interact 
with sexual violence in the Anglophone West. Indeed, in some respects, my 
critical position goes beyond the intersectionality of third-wave feminism, 
drawing extensively on wider social justice theory to argue that the social 
change required to end sexual violence goes to the very roots of Anglophone 
Western culture. This point is perhaps best illustrated by exploring the ‘rape 
culture’ paradigm: an understanding of sexual violence that arose in radical 
feminism, has been remodelled and redeployed by third-wave feminism, and 
which my work expands even further, employing it to explore the 
relationships between sexual violence and the dominant culture of the 
Anglophone West at large. It is to this that the discussion will now turn.  
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Beyond Patriarchy: Expanding the Rape Culture Paradigm 
 
 
Perhaps the best known and most widely cited definition of ‘rape culture’ is 
the proposal by Emilie Buchwald, Pamela Fletcher and Martha Roth that a 
rape culture is:        
 
a complex of beliefs that encourages male sexual aggression and 
supports violence against women. It is a society where violence is 
seen as sexy and sexuality as violent. In a rape culture women 
perceive a continuum of threatened violence that ranges from sexual 
remarks to sexual touching to rape itself. A rape culture condones 
physical and emotional terrorism against women as the norm.64  
 
What is immediately apparent here is the extent to which this definition 
mirrors the second-wave radical feminist analysis discussed above in its 
focus not on men who commit violence against women, but on ‘a complex of 
beliefs that encourages violence against women’. In other words, like the 
pioneering anti-rape texts of the 1970s, the rape culture paradigm moves 
analytic focus away from the study of the pathologised individual and towards 
the study of the patriarchal enculturation of whole societies. Indeed, this 
reflects the fact that, like my own critical position, the rape culture paradigm 
has its foundations in radical feminist theory. Joyce Williams notes that the 
exact history of the rape culture paradigm is unknown, although she posits 
Margaret Lazarus’s 1975 documentary film Rape Culture as a likely origin.65  
Whilst this may well reflect the origin of the phrase itself, the conceptual roots 
appear to be most firmly grounded, as Patricia Donat and John D’Emilio 
suggest, in Brownmiller’s analysis of ‘rape-supportive culture’ in Against Our 
Will.66 Certainly, the notion that a rape culture ‘condones physical and 
emotional terrorism against women as the norm’ bears a distinct 
resemblance to Brownmiller’s conception of rape as ‘a conscious process of 
                                                 
64
 Emilie Buchwald, Pamela Fletcher and Martha Roth, ‘Preamble’, in Transforming a Rape 
Culture, ed. by Emilie Buchwald, Pamela Fletcher and Martha Roth (Minneapolis: Milkweed 
Editions, 1993), p. vii (p. vii). Italics in original.  
65
 Joyce Williams, ‘Rape Culture’, in Blackwell Encyclopedia of Sociology, ed. by George 
Ritzer 
<http://www.blackwellreference.com/public/tocnode?id=g9781405124331_yr2010_chunk_ 
g978140512433124_ss1-19> [accessed 11 November 2010].  
66
 Patricia Donat and John D’Emilio, ‘A Feminist Redefinition of Rape and Sexual Assault: 
Historical Foundations and Change’, Journal of Social Issues, Vol. 48, No. 1 (1992), 9–22.  
 35 
 
intimidation by which all men keep all women in a state of fear’.67 Likewise, 
the ‘complex of beliefs that encourages male sexual aggression and supports 
violence against women’ described by Buchwald, Fletcher and Roth mirrors 
Brownmiller’s own focus on ‘those elements in our culture that promote and 
propagandize [...] attitudes, which offer men [...] the ideology and psychologic 
[sic] encouragement to commit [sexual violence]’.68 However, whilst the rape 
culture paradigm has its roots in such radical feminist positions, its influence 
is by no means limited to this particular approach; rather, it appears, 
remodelled and refined, in many branches of feminist analysis, although 
perhaps nowhere more prominently than in third-wave feminism.  
 
Writing for third-wave magazine Everyday Feminism, Kelsey Lueptow 
observes that challenging rape culture is one of the primary concerns of third-
wave feminism.69 However, third-wave feminism does not simply adopt the 
rape culture paradigm in its original form but reworks it to suit its own focuses 
and priorities, and responds to rape culture with its own approaches and 
tactics (as well as continuing with methods originally employed by second-
wave feminists). For example, it adapts the paradigm to suit the general turn 
towards ‘sex positivity’ in third-wave feminism. That is to say, where second-
wave radical feminism often discusses heterosex only in terms of violence 
and oppression, and treats pornography and sex work as key causal 
components of rape culture, third-wave feminism frequently explores the 
possibilities of empowerment and liberation through sexuality, and the role 
celebrating sexuality can play in ending rape culture.70 As Jaclyn Friedman 
and Jessica Valenti note: 
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So often it seems as if the discourse is focused solely on the “no 
means no” model—which, while of course useful, stops short of truly 
envisioning how suppressing female sexual agency is a key element 
of rape culture, and therefore how fostering genuine female sexual 
autonomy is necessary in fighting back against it.71 
 
Much third-wave feminist analysis of sexual violence responds to the issues 
highlighted by Friedman and Valenti, expanding the rape culture paradigm 
and ways of challenging it, creating new forms of activism such as 
SlutWalks—which often explicitly identify ‘rape culture’ as the target they are 
confronting—and spaces for voices traditionally marginalised from second-
wave feminist analysis, such as those of sex workers.72  
 
Such remodelling and expansion greatly informs my treatment of the concept 
and my work overall, and mirrors my underlying methodology of setting 
radical feminism in dialogue with third-wave feminist analysis and activism. 
However, there is also another aspect of the third-wave’s development of the 
rape culture paradigm which is of central importance to my work, and which 
my work, in turn, develops even further. Robin E. Field suggests that central 
to the rape culture paradigm is the belief that ‘in order to eliminate rape [...] 
the mechanisms of the rape culture need to be confronted.’73 Early uses of 
the paradigm and associated analysis primarily identify these mechanisms as 
products of patriarchy and misogyny, exploring only the ways in which the 
male-dominance of Western cultures encourages, supports, legitimises and 
rewards sexual violence against women. However, there are many other 
‘mechanisms of [...] rape culture’ that are crucial to understanding rape in the 
Anglophone West. Third-wave feminism’s increasing regard for the 
intersectionality of oppression means that it further remodels the rape culture 
paradigm to include ‘mechanisms’ that are produced by the intersection of 
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gender oppression, white supremacism, heterosexism, classism, ableism and 
other systems of oppression.74 These revisions and expansions are, I argue, 
crucial to making the rape culture paradigm an effective means of 
understanding, and so challenging, the Anglophone West’s rape culture. 
Indeed, as Alisa Bierra suggests, ‘Transforming [a Rape Culture]’s assertion 
that rape culture supports violence against women is true but incomplete. 
Rape culture as a paradigm representing a set of principles shows us how 
the culture of rape actually supports many types of violence against many 
groups of people’.75 That is to say, a rape culture cannot be discretely divided 
from the dominant culture within which it exists; rather it is one of many 
violent, abusive and destructive practices that emerge from the ‘character’ of 
the dominant culture itself. In line with this, I propose that the rape culture 
paradigm must be expanded further by treating the ‘mechanisms’ of the 
Anglophone West’s rape culture, and the rape culture itself, as 
manifestations of a larger pattern of normalised exploitation, abuse, social 
stratification, violent domination and the commodification and objectification 
of life that are, I argue, central to the overall structure of dominant culture. 
This holistic approach brings us back to the discussions from the beginning 
of the chapter and the relationships between how the Anglophone West 
views itself as superior and ‘civilised’, the realities that exist beneath this 
perception, and the rape culture of the Anglophone West.   
 
In Feminist Theory: From Margin to Centre (1984), bell hooks adopts a 
position similar to this, arguing that male violence against women cannot be 
separated from other patterns of hierarchical violence found in Western 
society. She writes 
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While I agree [...] that male violence against women [...] is an 
expression of male domination, I believe that violence is inextricably 
linked to all acts of violence in this society that occur between the 
powerful and the powerless, the dominant and the dominated. While 
male supremacy encourages the use of abusive force to maintain 
male domination of women, it is the Western philosophical notion of 
hierarchical rule and coercive authority that is the root cause of 
violence against women.76 
 
hooks makes a crucial connection here, marrying together a feminist critique 
of patriarchy with not only wider social theory, but also analysis of the deep-
seated philosophies, systems and structures that shape the dominant culture 
and underpin multiple forms of oppression. The result is a compelling and 
logical argument that male violence against women originates not simply 
from patriarchal social structures, nor only from patriarchy intersecting with 
other systems of oppression, but also from the underlying systems of 
oppression and hierarchy on which dominant Western ideology is based. As 
such, it presents a significant challenge to the Anglophone West’s perception 
of itself as a peaceful, just and progressive society, and the resultant 
ideological tensions are, I suggest, central to understanding the relationships 
between the dominant culture of the Anglophone West and its rape culture. 
Exploring the concept of ‘civilisation’ is useful to my arguments on this 
matter, serving as a means of understanding and articulating the prevailing 
ideologies, systems and structures of Anglophone West. As I explore in detail 
in the first chapter, in much philosophical, political and popular thought in the 
Anglophone West, ‘civilisation’ is understood as a mode of existence that is 
separate from and inherently superior to both ‘nature’ and ‘uncivilised’ or 
‘savage’ human societies. Moreover, such understandings frequently present 
the Anglophone West specifically as the principle example of this superiority, 
identifying, as Greer and Lewis note, ‘the civilization[s] of Greece and Rome 
and [...] Christian Europe [...] as forerunners of the West of their own time’, 
and so presenting themselves as the progeny of these ‘great’ civilisations 
and the pinnacle of a long chain of succession and ‘progress’.77 Such 
reasoning often manifests in what Jensen describes as ‘the deeply and most-
often-invisibly held beliefs that there is really only one way to live, and that 
we are the one-and-only possessors of that way. It becomes our job then to 
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propagate this way, by force when necessary until there are no other ways to 
be’.78 As Jensen alludes to, one of the most immediately apparent 
manifestations of this self-declared superiority is a cultural tendency to 
spread the dominant culture of the Anglophone West, to ‘civilise’ the 
‘savages’ of other, less enlightened nations and cultures. However, this 
reasoning also manifests in and helps to shape many other aspects of the 
dominant culture including prevailing perceptions of sexual violence. As 
suggested earlier in this introduction, we can identify a clear example of this 
in the coverage of the Munirka gang rape case, and the belief, paraphrased 
by O’Toole, that rape is ‘something we civilised folk in the west have 
somehow put behind us’.79   
 
However, the obvious issue here is that, as discussed throughout this 
introduction, the Anglophone West does, in fact, have both extremely high 
levels of rape incidence and an extremely poor record of dealing with the 
problem. Sexual violence, then, becomes a stark challenge to the vision of 
the Anglophone West as the paragon of liberal, progressive, benevolent 
civilisation. I suggest that the primary response to this challenge is a, 
frequently unknowing or unintended, conceptual framing of rape as 
something ‘savage’ or ‘natural’ that ‘civilisation’—in this case, the ‘civilised’ 
Anglophone West—endeavours to contain and control. In some cases, 
including much of the coverage of the Munirka gang rape, this takes the form 
of suggestions that the ‘civilisation’ of the Anglophone West has already 
succeeded in controlling or even eliminating rape; in others, it manifests in 
suggestions that the Anglophone West, although not entirely successful in 
this task, is more advanced and more successful than other, less ‘civilised’ 
cultures. Implicit in both constructions, however, is the belief that, regardless 
of whether it has yet succeeded, ‘civilisation’ remains the best, or even the 
only, means of ending rape: the sole antidote to the ‘savagery’ of sexual 
violence. Sometimes this belief is overtly stated, but more often it seeps 
insidiously into discourses of sexual violence as a subtextual bias transmitted 
alongside or beneath the intended meaning. In either case, however, it 
reflects the same basic understanding: that further ‘progress’ away from 
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‘savagery’ and (human) ‘nature’, and towards higher or greater ‘civilisation’ is 
the solution to the Anglophone West’s rape problem. This thesis explores the 
ways in which this understanding is constructed and conveyed, and the ways 
it undermines different approaches to combating sexual violence. It also 
challenges this understanding and its foundations, questioning prevailing 
perceptions of ‘civilisation’ and ‘civilised’ Anglophone Western culture, and 
critiquing the conceptual framing of rape as something ‘savage’ and 
‘uncivilised’. These critiques build ultimately into an argument that, far from 
being a means of ending sexual violence, the ‘civilisation’ of the dominant 
culture may in fact be a principal cause of the Anglophone West’s rape 
culture.     
 
We have already observed that the prevailing understanding of the 
Anglophone West—at least within the Anglophone West itself—is that it is the 
pinnacle of human development, a benevolent global force spreading 
enlightenment, liberty, peace and progress throughout the known world. 
However, as alluded to previously, submerged beneath this dominant and 
dominating account is a far bloodier narrative of conquest, abuse and 
exploitation. In this narrative, the Anglophone West is not characterised by 
benevolence, erudition and liberty but by atrocities and cruelty, by an 
insatiable desire to dominate and devour. Importantly, this is not limited to 
‘civilised’ states and institutions; it shapes the behaviours of ‘civilised’ 
individuals, recreating the same forms of behaviour on an interpersonal level. 
Jack D. Forbes describes civilisation as a pathological condition, a 
contagious ‘cannibal psychosis’ in which ‘consuming [...] another’s life for 
one’s own private [...] profit’ becomes the ‘normal’ mode of existence.80 In 
other words, to be socialised into the prevailing mores of a ‘civilised’ culture 
such as the dominant culture of the Anglophone West is to learn that abusing 
and exploiting others for personal gain is an acceptable, normative form of 
behaviour.  
 
The above understanding is vital to a proper assessment of the Anglophone 
West’s rape culture because it reveals that, contrary to popular belief, the 
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prevailing ethical codes, behavioural norms and underlying philosophies of 
the dominant culture do not prescribe cooperation, mutuality, equality and 
respect for life but rather self-interest, objectification and the consumption of 
others. As Marimba Ani notes  
 
it is not considered immoral in the West to act in one’s own interest at 
the expense of [...] others; rather, selfishness, competitiveness, 
exploitation of others [...] represent moral behavior [...] in that they 
are sanctioned by every aspect of the culture, and the individual [...] 
is conditioned to manifest them.81 
 
It is in this context, I suggest, that rape and the Anglophone West’s rape 
culture must be understood as one manifestation of the normalising of self-
serving, exploitative and abusive treatment of others. Considered in this 
context, sexual violence is neither an aberrant act nor the product of some 
form of ‘savage’ or ‘natural’ instinct that ‘civilisation’ cannot control; rather, it 
is a highly normative, widely legitimised and often even celebrated 
expression of prevailing ideologies and ethics. This is not to deny the 
significance of gender dynamics and gendered socialisation to Anglophone 
Western rape culture but to situate these issues in the broader, and more 
fundamental, ‘character’ of the ‘civilised’ dominant culture. Likewise, it is not 
to say that the struggle to end rape should be co-opted into a broader 
political ideology, a fate that has too often befallen feminist movements, but 
to suggest that a larger pattern of abuse must be considered if the struggle 
against rape culture is to be fully realised.82 The effectiveness of such a 
struggle is reliant on the ability to identify and challenge the deeper roots of a 
rape culture rather than the surface manifestations. As hooks notes, ‘it is [the 
West’s violent and hierarchical] belief system that is the foundation on which 
sexist ideology and other ideologies of group oppression are based; they can 
be eliminated only when this foundation is eliminated’.83 In line with, and 
extending beyond, hooks’s position, this thesis will ultimately argue that the 
Anglophone West’s rape culture has roots that spread far beyond gender 
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dynamics and sexual practices, down into the very foundations of the 
dominant culture of the Anglophone West. 
 
 
Dissecting a Rape Culture: Structuring the Argument 
 
The relationships between the dominant culture of the Anglophone West and 
sexual violence are many and complex; they form a vast network of 
associations and intersections, operating from the most foundational Western 
philosophies through to the most superficial expressions of Anglophone 
Western culture. Accordingly, unpicking this network is also extremely 
complex, requiring analysis not only of gender and sexuality but also of 
politics, economics, history and psychology, all of which share numerous 
points of intersection and must be considered from a range of critical 
perspectives. However, as wide ranging as this analysis must be, it can be 
relatively neatly contained in three key tasks. These are: 1) to establish a 
critical position that combines feminist analysis of sexual violence with 
broader analysis of the dominant culture of the Anglophone West; 2) to apply 
this critical perspective to the question of why the objectification (and 
subsequent abuse) of women is so common throughout the Anglophone 
West; and 3) to apply this same perspective to the matter of why so many 
men in the Anglophone West choose to commit rape. It is these three key 
tasks that form the three chapters of the thesis.  
 
The first chapter, then, introduces the positions that inform the whole thesis, 
bringing together theoretical perspectives that are critical of ‘civilisation’, 
social justice analysis of the dominant culture of the Anglophone West and 
feminist analyses of sexual violence, and using each to critique and inform 
the other. Central to structuring this is the introduction of a case study—
Dominique Strauss-Kahn’s alleged rape of Nafissatou Diallo—which is used 
throughout the chapter to illustrate and expand key points of analysis.84 
Using this case study as a point of departure, the opening chapter explores 
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how notions of ‘civilisation’, ‘savagery’ and ‘nature’ inform contemporary 
understandings of sexual violence. Drawing on critical analysis of how the 
dominant culture of the Anglophone West presents ‘civilisation’ as both 
inherently superior to and the antithesis of ‘nature’ and ‘primitive’ or ‘natural’ 
humans, the discussion demonstrates that many analyses of rape attempt—
consciously or unconsciously—to present both the act and the perpetrator as 
somehow outside of or unconnected to civilisation. In this understanding, 
rape is the product of ‘natural’ or ‘savage’ instincts and something to which 
‘civilisation’, the antithesis of ‘the natural’, is inherently opposed. This 
conception of sexual violence is manifest both in Western analysis of sexual 
violence in non-Western cultures and, through allusions and associations, in 
many discussions of Anglophone Western rapists, who are widely portrayed 
as ‘uncivilised’ or as committing rape because they have not been properly 
socialised into the dominant culture and its supposed opposition to sexual 
violence.  
 
Much of this argument is concerned with the way this misguided conception 
of rape shapes many Anglophone Western feminist analyses, which imply 
that further ‘civilisation’ or further passage along the road of ‘progress’ is the 
solution to the sexual violence in the Anglophone West. Often unintended, 
this message creeps into feminist theory in numerous forms, from 
presentations of rape as something ‘natural’ that must be ‘refined’ out of men 
by external cultural influence to the scapegoating of poor men and men of 
colour (both seen as inherently further from ‘civilisation’). Such conceptions 
and implications, the chapter argues, are far from accurate: in reality, the 
normalising of rape in the Anglophone West is deeply entwined in the fabric 
of ‘civilised’ Anglophone Western society, not only in its gender dynamics but 
also its broader ideologies and normative practices. Using feminist analysis 
of ways in which a cultural acceptance of violence encourages a cultural 
acceptance of sexual violence as a point of departure, the chapter asserts 
that the normalising of abuse and exploitation as part of how the dominant 
culture operates provides a foundation for the Anglophone West’s rape 
culture, socialising individuals to believe that it is normal and acceptable to 
‘consume’ others for private gain. Ultimately, this resolves into an argument 
that rape cannot be blamed on subcultural groups who express ‘uncivilised’ 
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ideologies and practices but rather must be seen as a manifestation of the 
West’s superculture of objectification: its almost total normalisation of the 
treatment of others as objects to be exploited and consumed. 
 
This notion of a superculture of objectification provides the starting point for 
the second chapter, which explores the notion that Western commodification 
and objectification of life in general is the key foundation for the sexual 
objectification of women or the social production of ‘rapable’ bodies.85 
Building on the previous assertion that rape is not the product of ‘nature’ or 
‘savagery’, this chapter establishes how one key aspect of rape—the 
widespread belief that women may be ‘justifiably’ or ‘legitimately’ raped—is 
firmly rooted in the ‘civilised’ culture of the Anglophone West. The chapter 
draws parallels between the highly normalised sexual objectification of 
women and the highly normalised objectification of other marginalised 
groups, ultimately suggesting that Western culture is founded on and shaped 
by an underlying philosophy of objectification: the belief that some lives are 
less valuable than others and may be used as objects and instruments so 
that others may profit. This belief is central to the dominant culture of the 
Anglophone West, enabling it to function and to spread its cultural hegemony 
throughout the world; it underpins everything from (neo)colonialism to 
profiteering from sweatshop labour to the commodification of non-human 
nature. It also underpins the Anglophone West’s rape culture, providing a 
foundational understanding that it is acceptable and ‘normal’ to treat others 
as objects to be used for one’s own benefit. Put simply, without the basic 
belief that it can ever be ‘acceptable’ to perceive a living being as an object 
rather than as an autonomous, subjective whole, one cannot develop the 
gender-specific objectification of women that helps enable men to commit 
rape. This perception inculcates Westerners into an understanding that it is 
‘normal’ to relate to the world as though it were composed of objects to be 
used and consumed and this understanding is routinely manifest in the 
actions of individuals, including in the sexual objectification of women that 
underpins rape. The significance of this point will be highlighted through 
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cross-cultural analysis which demonstrates that non-Western cultures that do 
not perceive the world in general as composed of objects to be used and 
consumed also have remarkably lower levels of sexual violence than those 
found in the Anglophone West. 
 
Returning to analysis of the Anglophone West, this point is further clarified 
through the suggestion that, even in direct terms, it is not only sexual 
objectification that is used to justify rape; rather, numerous forms of 
objectification, all of which have their roots in the same basic belief, intersect 
together to exert influence upon and help shape the Anglophone West’s rape 
culture. Illustrating the argument by returning to the case study, the chapter 
notes that the objectification of people of colour, immigrants and sex workers, 
as well as many other marginalised groups, all intersect in various scenarios 
to maintain the belief that rape can be justified because survivors are simply 
objects who exist to be consumed by rapists. Bringing these points together, 
the chapter asserts that, whilst systems of gender oppression mark women’s 
bodies as culturally rapable, they do so in inseparable intersectional 
conjunction with other systems of oppression, all of which are, at best, deeply 
ingrained in the structure of the dominant culture and, at worst, inherent 
elements of it. In line with this, the chapter suggests that the social 
production of rapable bodies is the product of the West’s underlying 
philosophy of objectification and so raises the question of whether the 
Anglophone West’s rape culture can ever be truly challenged without 
challenging the belief that some lives are worth less than others and so may 
be treated as objects to be consumed for personal gain.  
 
Where the second chapter discusses the social production of rapable bodies, 
the third addresses the other side of the same issue: the social production of 
rapist mentalities, or the processes by which men develop both the 
psychological capacity and the desire to commit rape. Framed around 
challenges to the twin myths that rape is a ‘natural’ male instinct and that 
rapists are deviant pariahs, the chapter suggests that it is in fact normative 
socialisation into both prevailing models of masculinity and the dominant 
culture more broadly that enables and motivates so many Anglophone 
Western men to commit rape. Initially, this discussion focuses on the belief 
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that men have a natural psychological capacity to commit rape and have to 
be socialised to ‘unlearn’ this instinct. Drawing on a range of sources 
concerned with the ways in which institutional figures such as soldiers or 
concentration camp guards are trained to harm others, the chapter suggests 
that human beings must learn to perceive abuse as personally acceptable 
through specific patterns of socialisation. Applying this analysis to sexual 
violence, it argues that there are three key characteristics that rapists must 
hold—at least for the duration of the assault—in order to commit rape: self-
interest, lack of inhibitory empathy, and a sense of entitlement. Contrary to 
the longstanding perception of rapists as deviant, psychopathological figures, 
these characteristics are, in fact, an aspect of how a great many men are 
socialised to relate to women, both ‘sexually’ and in general. This is a key 
point as it highlights the fact that the psychological capacity to rape, although 
not ‘natural’, is extremely common amongst men because it represents an 
aspect of normative masculine behaviour. Even more significantly, these 
characteristics are not only part of normative masculine behaviour but are 
actually widely celebrated throughout the dominant culture. That is, the 
chapter argues that far from deviant and rare, the characteristics that enable 
rapists to commit rape are also those held by many of the Anglophone 
West’s most successful figures, and are widely perceived to be both routes to 
and measures of ‘success’. 
 
From here, the chapter takes this basic premise—that the supposedly 
aberrant psychologies of rapists are actually highly normative—and applies it 
to the issue of rapists’ motivations. Whilst acknowledging that rapists are not 
a conveniently homogeneous group and so commit rape for a variety of 
reasons, the chapter argues that at their most fundamental level these 
motivations all revolve around domination or power over others, in 
intersection with prevailing understandings of masculinity and heterosex. As 
in the previous argument, it suggests that this too is not aberrant or unique to 
rapists’ mentalities but rather is both an aspect of normative (heterosexual) 
masculine socialisation and an expression of the prevailing ideologies and 
practices of the dominant culture at large. That is to say, the desire to 
dominate others—and the cultural rewards for doing so—are a central 
component of Anglophone Western culture, manifest in everything from 
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(neo)imperialism to the organisation of workplace hierarchies.. The chapter 
brings the two aspects of rapist mentalities together and questions whether 
they can truly be said to be only the product of gender dynamics and 
masculine socialisation or if they too must be considered as part of a wider 
pattern of normalised abusive behaviour. Central to this is a consideration of 
whether prevailing models of masculinity shape the cultural ideals of a 
patriarchal society or if these models of masculinity are themselves the 
product of a society that requires ‘agents’ to enact its desires and satisfy its 
broader ‘need’ for power, wealth, resources and ceaseless expansion. 
Ultimately, then, the chapter raises the question of whether, like the social 
production of rapable bodies, the social production of rapist mentalities can 
ever be fully challenged without challenging the broader abusiveness of the 
dominant culture of the Anglophone West. 
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Consuming Others: Civilisation, Savagery and Sexual Violence 
 
 
 
Nafissatou Diallo vs. Dominique Strauss-Kahn: An Overview   
 
On May 14th 2011, Nafissatou Diallo, a Guinean refugee working at the 
Sofitel hotel in New York, alleged that Dominique Strauss-Kahn, at that time 
the Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), sexually 
assaulted her after she entered his suite to clean the room.86 The official 
complaint made against Strauss-Kahn by the State of New York states that 
he trapped Diallo in the suite, tried to remove her underwear, forcibly 
grabbed her breasts and crotch, attempted penile-vaginal penetration without 
Diallo’s consent and ‘engaged in oral sexual conduct and anal sexual 
conduct [...] by forcible compulsion’.87 Although, in general, rape receives 
relatively little coverage in the mainstream media, reports of Diallo’s 
allegations spread throughout the world within hours.88 However, although 
this is an exception to the media’s standard response to sexual violence 
(which, as discussed in the introduction, is most often to deem it not 
newsworthy), the reaction was, in the circumstances, largely to be expected.  
As we saw in the introduction, Helen Benedict makes this same point when 
she writes ‘that news must be the unusual, never the usual, virtually 
guarantees that the press will ignore typical rapes or assaults [...] in favour of 
the bizarre, sensational, or gory’.89 In line with this observation, it is 
reasonable to suggest that Strauss-Kahn’s high-profile, supposedly 
publically-accountable position and status (and the fact that Diallo had the 
courage to challenge it) are the key reasons that the story was deemed 
newsworthy. Certainly, this is in keeping with another of Benedict’s 
observations: that the Western media routinely fails to report on cases of 
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sexual violence committed against women of colour (particularly when they 
are committed by white men) and fixates on cases of sexual violence 
committed by men of colour (particularly acts committed against white 
women).90 In this sense, were it not for Strauss-Kahn’s public profile and the 
fact that the story could be presented as a ‘celebrity scandal’ rather than yet 
another instance of the privileged violating the marginalised, it is unlikely that 
Diallo’s name would even have appeared in a police report, let alone a 
national news report. Indeed, it is also extremely likely that Strauss-Kahn’s 
status was the principal factor that provoked the American police and judicial 
system into the relatively unusual act of arresting, charging and imprisoning a 
wealthy, white man accused of raping a poor, refugee woman of colour.91 
Despite his claims that he had ‘diplomatic immunity’, on the afternoon of May 
14th plainclothes police officers removed Strauss-Kahn from a plane 
moments before it left JFK airport.92 On May 15th Strauss-Kahn was charged 
with a ‘criminal sexual act, unlawful imprisonment, attempted rape’ and was 
incarcerated, without bail, in Riker’s Island prison, New York.93 Strauss-Kahn 
was formally indicted on May 19th, facing seven charges carrying together a 
maximum penalty of seventy-four years in prison, although he was also 
granted bail and the following day was moved from Rikers Island to house 
arrest in a rented townhouse (allegedly rented for $50,000 per month).94    
      
Even taking into account the ostensibly unusual nature of the case, the fact 
that Strauss-Kahn was not only arrested but also charged and incarcerated 
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is, perhaps, somewhat surprising.95 Certainly it represents a statistical 
irregularity: working from United States government figures, the Rape Abuse 
and Incest National Network (RAINN) states that, in America, only 
approximately ‘6% of rapists will ever spend a day in jail’.96 Far less 
surprising, however—at least to anyone who has studied Western judicial 
responses to sexual violence—is the fact that the case was dismissed: on 
August 23rd, the incident in the Sofitel room was decreed to have been 
consensual and Diallo’s clothing, stained with Strauss-Kahn’s semen, was 
declared to be evidence of nothing but a ‘hurried sexual encounter’.97 Later, 
Strauss-Kahn would apologise for what he called ‘a moral fault’: a fault to his 
wife and to his family, a fault to ‘the French people, who placed in me their 
hope for change’ and in whom, were he to run for a publically-elected 
governmental position, he would in turn have placed his hope for votes.98 
Diallo, meanwhile, would become increasingly vilified in the media as a profit-
seeking liar with dubious morals and links to criminal networks.99  
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This shift in the popular perception of Diallo from abused to abuser left a void 
in the orthodox narrative around which much media analysis is structured, a 
void that was quickly filled by Strauss-Kahn himself. Although accused of two 
further instances of sexual assault, Strauss-Kahn became widely (although 
by no means exclusively) presented—particularly in the French press—as 
the victim of a terrible abuse.100 It was a position he embraced with 
enthusiasm, insensitivity and a statement about his treatment by the 
American judicial system that so closely resembles the account of a 
survivor’s experience of rape it could almost have been consciously intended 
to do so: ‘I was afraid. I was very, very afraid. When you are in a crunching 
machine like that [the US justice system], you have the impression it is 
crushing you to death. I felt ground under its heel, humiliated, and I wasn't 
able to say a word. I have suffered a violent experience.’101 However, as the 
results of the trial (whether ‘true’ or not) should not surprise given the biased 
and even corrupt nature of the American judicial system, so too should the 
reaction of the media and Strauss-Kahn himself not be considered a 
shocking anomaly.102 Disbelieving, interrogating or discrediting rape survivors 
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or suggesting that they are somehow culpable for their own assaults are 
extremely common responses to rape allegations, as are automatically 
believing accused rapists’ accounts or treating them as victims, and each of 
these trends has been extensively documented.103 Indeed, the fact that these 
trends have been so widely analysed actually means they will not be 
discussed in great detail in this thesis (although, of course, their significance 
to the topic at large requires that they will be, at least, referred to throughout). 
Of far greater interest to this discussion is a trend that, whilst by no means 
unique to this case, is perhaps more apparent in this instance than in many 
others: the presentation of rape as a ‘savage’ or ‘primitive’ act that is 
fundamentally in conflict with the ideologies, attitudes and prescribed 
behaviour of the ‘civilised’ Anglophone West. This trend relates to the West’s 
great dualisms of civilisation/savagery and civilised/savage, dualisms which 
are, as will be discussed, variations on the underlying dualism of 
civilisation/nature that is so central to Western ideology. That these dualisms 
are so central to the dominant ideologies of the West means that they are 
central to understanding Western culture and, as such, are fundamental to a 
proper understanding of the Anglophone West’s rape culture. In this sense, it 
is essential to move away briefly from the direct consideration of sexual 
violence in order to outline the form and function of this dualistic thinking.   
 
 
‘Dualistic Thinking’ and the ‘Discourses of Civilisation’ 
 
In Beyond Geography: The Western Spirit Against the Wilderness (1983), 
Frederick Turner writes that the emergence of early civilisation in the Near 
East saw:  
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the supplanting of the older, organically derived feelings of gratitude 
towards nature and of the vital interdependence of all things by [...] 
notions of force meeting force, of the enduring opposition of man and 
nature [...] Civilization as it emerged here was consciously walled off 
from organic harmonies and defined in terms of oppositions.104 
 
What Turner is referring to here is, I propose, a definitive theme in Western 
thought: ‘dualistic thinking’. Ecofeminist Heather Eaton defines ‘dualistic 
thinking’ as ‘a manner of thinking in pairs or opposites, with one side having 
priority over the other.’105 What this means is that ‘dualistic thinking’ firstly 
divides the world into supposed ‘opposites’, categories that exist as and take 
their definition from being the discrete antitheses of each other, and 
secondly, assigns one ‘side’ of the dualism the position of superiority. 
Perhaps the most widely analysed example of this thinking (and the one 
which is especially relevant in the context of my overall subject matter) is 
masculine/feminine. As will be discussed in more detail later in the thesis, in 
the dominant discourses of the West, masculinity is defined as ‘not femininity’ 
and femininity is defined as ‘not masculinity’; in this sense, the two 
‘categories’ are defined as discrete and oppositional, each taking their 
definition from not being the other.106 Additionally, masculinity is the ‘side’ of 
the dualism that, in Eaton’s terms, has ‘priority over the other’: that is to say, 
masculinity is defined as ‘not being femininity’ but it is also defined as being 
implicitly superior to femininity (as femininity is defined as being implicitly 
inferior to masculinity).107 There are numerous other dualisms underpinning 
Western thought. Carol J. Adams provides further examples as follows: 
‘independence/interdependence; heaven/earth; [...] culture/nature; 
mind/body; white/“non-white”; humans/animals; humans/nature.’108 Each of 
these dualisms plays a central role in many of the dominant ideologies of the 
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Anglophone West. More than this, however, I suggest that the central 
‘ideology of civilisation’ is an amalgamation, or distilling, of these dualisms 
into civilisation/nature.  
 
As in my discussions of the definition of masculinity above, ‘civilisation’, as it 
is understood by the civilised, is defined by what it is not, and by its supposed 
superiority to what it is not: civilisation is not nature; it is a superior form of 
existence, beyond nature.109 Maintaining these dichotomous definitions of 
‘civilisation’ and ‘nature’—and preserving this understanding of the 
superior/inferior relationship between them—is a key function of what I shall 
call the ‘discourses of civilisation’: those discourses that seek both to 
maintain and expand civilisation and to justify the frequently destructive acts 
committed in the name of civilisation and its expansion through the ‘civilizing’ 
of ‘savages’, the acquisition of land, labour and resources, the transformation 
of living beings into commodities, property and capital. These are the 
discourses that rationalise the wholesale devastation of the planet by arguing 
that this is the necessary cost of ‘progress’, the discourses that explain 
warfare, invasion, colonisation as efforts to liberate and enlighten benighted 
peoples, to free them from their barbarous customs and bring to them a 
superior mode of existence. Sometimes these discourses operate brazenly, 
their intentions openly declared, but often, as I will discuss, they disseminate 
their message more insidiously, influencing both ‘civilised’ and ‘non-civilised’ 
people so that their own meaning is overlaid on a statement or practice, a 
parasite on the intended message. In short, the discourses of civilisation are 
those that seek, openly or surreptitiously, both to ‘police’ (often literally) ‘the 
borders’ between ‘civilisation’ and ‘nature’ and to insist upon the superiority of 
civilisation, and each of the dualisms suggested by Adams represents one of 
the principal means by which this is enacted.  
 
The valuing of independence over interdependence is employed to argue 
that civilisation and civilised humans are not reliant upon—or even part of—
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the vast networks of life that comprise the ‘natural world’ and that, at its most 
civilised, humanity has evolved beyond the rest of life on the planet. It is this 
dualism that Derrick Jensen is referring to when he discusses ‘civilised’ 
people’s  
 
attempts to separate ourselves from the rest of the world, to pretend 
we’re not natural, to consider ourselves exempt from the ways the 
world works. Consider our utter disregard for overshooting carrying 
capacity—our belief that somehow these ecological principles don’t 
apply to us.110  
 
The dualism of ‘heaven/earth’ represents a variation on this idea: in 
devaluing the earth, the material world to which all other species are bound, 
in favour of heaven (ultimately, a human construct), civilisation again sets 
itself apart and above, destined for a higher and greater kingdom. Val 
Plumwood argues this point particularly eloquently when she notes that:  
 
For both Platonic and Christian systems, the meaning of death is that 
the meaning of human life is elsewhere, not to be found in the earth 
or in human life as part of nature, but in a separate realm accessible 
only to humans (and only to certain chosen of these) [...] The 
salvation awaiting them beyond and above the world of nature, a fate 
marked out for humans alone, confirms their difference and 
separation from the world of nature, and their destiny as one apart 
from that of other species.111  
 
The same theme is found again in the valuing of ‘mind’ over ‘body’: the body, 
tied forever to the corporeal world of nature, is devalued in favour of the 
mind, the tool that has allowed humanity to rise to its position of dominance 
over the rest of nature, the attribute that by its very existence appears to 
mark humans as self-evidently ‘superior’. Ward Churchill makes a similar 
argument when he notes that:  
 
Rationality is held by those of European intellectual inclination [as 
opposed to those working in American Indian and other indigenous 
traditions] [...] to be the most important (“superior”) relation of all; 
humans, being the only entity possessing it, are thus held ipso-facto 
to be the superior beings of the universe.112  
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The dualisms of human/animals and human/nature mirror this once again, 
suggesting that ‘civilisation’, that is to say (in the discourses of civilisation) 
humanity at its furthest distance from ‘nature’ and from other species, is a far 
superior form of existence to anything that could conceivably be found 
amongst the other species of the world. ‘White/“non-white”’ can be seen as 
an extension of the dualism, which Adams does not suggest (and to which I 
will return shortly), of civilised/primitive: the ‘civilised’ West has long believed 
itself superior to ‘uncivilised’ peoples and, as Dean Johnson notes, the 
colonial era found this belief developed in white-supremacist, racial terms, 
with white Europeans seen as civilised and superior whilst people of colour 
were presented as ‘savages’ and ‘primitives’ and inherently inferior, an 
understanding which continues to shape prevailing perceptions of race in the 
contemporary Anglophone West.113  
 
Similar projections onto gender dynamics show how the male/female dualism 
supports the alleged superiority of civilisation: the discourses of civilisation 
have long presented civilisation as a male achievement, the result of men of 
science, men of war, men of power. Rosemary Radford Ruether refers to this 
as ‘the male monopolization of culture’, noting that in the development of 
Western society ‘female consciousness and culture was sunk underneath the 
growing male power to define the culture for the whole society, socializing 
both males and females into this male-defined point of view’ 114 With men 
laying claim to civilisation, women were located, in this male-defined view, in 
nature, as the natural, the irrational, the uncivilised. Although many 
(eco)feminists have worked to reconfigure this association as a site of 
resistance, as a positive, liberating rejection of ‘masculine’ reason and 
civilisation, there is no escaping the fact that, as Plumwood notes,  
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To be defined as “nature” in this context is to be defined as passive, 
as non-agent and non-subject, as the ‘environment’ or invisible 
background conditions against which the ‘foreground’ achievements 
of reason and culture (provided typically by the white, western, male 
expert or entrepreneur) take place.115  
 
What Plumwood highlights here is that being placed in the role ‘nature’ within 
the discourses of civilisation is to become a resource, an object to be 
consumed and exchanged. In their supposed lack of reason, the ‘savage’ 
lack of civilised control, women become equated with that which is seen as 
without the subjectivity or autonomy that Western culture suggests come only 
with the ability to reason. Moreover, this notion of civilised reason as superior 
to irrationality and emotion is not only played out in gendered terms.  As 
Laura B. Citrin, Tomi-Ann Roberts and Barbara L. Fredrickson note:  
 
Cultural discourse on emotional control – controlling one’s allegedly 
less civilised characteristics – is tied with cultural values not only 
about gender [...] but also about race and class. As a signifier of 
“civility,” emotional control has been used to distinguish between 
groups – men from women, whites from blacks, North American from 
South Americans [...] and the rich or middle class from the poor.116  
 
Underpinning all of the dualisms explored above, and more besides, is this 
notion of rational control, of civilised reason as the mark of superiority: those 
who reason gain subjectivity, autonomy, mastery, and those who are said to 
be incapable, to be too irrational, too ‘natural’, are seen as the uncivilised 
objects, existing to be manipulated and used.  
 
Plumwood presents this concept of reason over nature as key to Western 
philosophy, containing all other systems of oppression. She writes that it is 
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exclusion from the master category of reason which in liberation 
struggles provides and explains the conceptual links between 
different categories of domination, and links the domination of 
humans with the domination of nature. The category of nature is a 
field of multiple exclusion and control, not only of non-humans, but of 
various groups of humans and aspects of human life which are cast 
as nature. Thus racism, colonialism and sexism have drawn their 
conceptual strength from casting sexual, racial and ethnic difference 
as closer to the animal [...] as a lesser form of humanity lacking the 
full measure of rationality of culture.117  
  
In this sense, then, it can be suggested that the guiding principle, the central 
dualism, of Western culture is one of rationality/nature, or culture/nature: 
those that possess culture and rationality—those that are culture and 
rationality—are separate from and superior to those who are ‘only’ natural, 
who are excluded and defined as another part of nature. However, this, I 
suggest, can be developed further: rationality and culture are the tools 
through which the civilised and natural are differentiated and marked as 
subject and object, dominator and dominated. Ultimately, they too can be 
subsumed within a dualism of civilisation/nature for the discourses of 
civilisation present civilisation as the very pinnacle of rational culture (the 
greatest height to which humanity can currently ascend) and the very 
antithesis of irrationality and nature (the furthest from ‘nature’ that humanity 
can currently extend). Through the deployment of the culture/nature and 
rationality/nature dualisms, and all the dualisms that can be subsumed within 
them, the discourses of civilisation maintain this central understanding of 
civilisation and nature as discrete and opposing, and insist upon civilisation’s 
inherent superiority.  
 
 
The Civilised/Primitive Dualism 
 
Whilst the central dualism of civilisation/nature discussed above is, on an 
underlying level, essential to this thesis, there is a variant of it that is 
particularly relevant to the current discussion. Because the analysis here is 
focused primarily on human cultures, it is more expedient to look at what one 
might call the ‘human-cultural variation’ of civilisation/nature: the dualism of 
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‘civilised/primitive’, mentioned above in relation to the dualistic understanding 
of race. Civilised/primitive may be considered a variation of civilisation/nature 
because the dominant understanding of indigenous (‘primitive’) communities 
and nations in Western thought is that they are closer to a ‘natural’ condition 
of humanity, that they are, in fact, the as yet undeveloped product of ‘pure’ 
human nature. This is not to suggest that there is a single conception of what 
this human nature is. On the contrary, as Mary E. Clark notes, 
understandings of pre-contact/pre-colonial indigenous peoples are largely 
made of two conflicting images, generally considered to be mutually 
exclusive: the Rousseaunian ‘noble savage’ and the Hobbesian violent, war-
making brute.118 However, regardless of how the ‘natural’ condition of 
humanity is conceived of by the civilised, indigenous peoples are still 
understood to represent that ‘undeveloped’ state. Likewise, it is also 
important to note that historically—and to a lesser, but still significant, extent 
contemporaneously—indigenous peoples have been considered not an 
example of ‘natural’ humans but, as Ronald Niezen notes, as subhuman, as 
being either somewhere between human and animal or explicitly vermin, 
‘deserving’ or ‘requiring’ extermination.119 However, whilst this does not place 
indigenous peoples closer to ‘human nature’, the notion that they are more 
like animals than humans places them closer to non-human nature and so, 
again, maintains the understanding of indigenous cultures as ‘natural’ or 
simply ‘nature’. In this sense, however it is approached from within the 
dominant understanding, the civilisation/nature dualism can become ‘civilised 
humanity/human nature’, and from here may become the dualism of 
‘civilised/primitive’ or ‘civilised/savage’ or even ‘civilised/barbarian’. These 
later terms are all pejorative names that have been—and continue to be—
used, largely interchangeably, by the civilised to describe indigenous 
cultures. This is part of an extremely long tradition in Western civilisation, 
stretching back at least far as the ancient Greeks from whom we get the word 
barbarian, used, as Anthony Pagden notes, in the form barbaros to describe 
someone who could not speak Greek (and so, to the Greeks, merely 
‘babbled’ incoherently) and was, as such, presumed to be entirely uncivilised 
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and barely human.120 The terms, and the dualistic thinking to which they 
relate, have, as Jack D. Forbes notes, continued through colonialism and into 
the neo-colonialism of the present day.121 I use them here consciously, to 
highlight the fact that, in the dominant ideologies of the West, the ‘opposite’ 
of  civilisation is not ‘indigenous’ but ‘primitive’ ‘savage’ and ‘barbarian’, terms 
that dehumanise and devalue anyone who is not ‘civilised’. 
 
Essential to this understanding is the notion that there is a universal timeline 
for all cultures—a single trajectory along which all human culture 
‘progresses’—where both the ‘cavemen’ of prehistory and contemporary 
indigenous cultures are considered to be an early, or primitive, stage in this 
trajectory, heading inexorably towards the dizzying cultural heights of 
‘civilisation’. Pierre Clastres provides a succinct analysis of this notion, 
referring to it as the ‘Western conviction [...] that history is a one-way street, 
that [‘primitive’] societies [...] are the image of what we have ceased to be, 
and that for them our culture is the image of what they have to become.’122 
As Clastres’ statement suggests, in this perception of the world’s cultures, 
civilisation—particularly Western civilisation—is understood to be the end 
point of the one-way street, the pinnacle of this universal trajectory, or, at 
least, the closest humanity has yet come to it. This understanding has long 
coloured the West’s  perception of itself and it remains a prominent trend in 
Western theory to this day; in recent years, a slew of texts have been 
published that present some variation on this idea, most notably Francis 
Fukuyama’s The End of History and the Last Man (1992), Dinesh D’Souza’s 
What’s So Great About America (2003), Pascal Bruckner’s The Tyranny of 
Guilt: An Essay on Western Masochism (2010), Niall Fergusson’s 
Civilization: The West and the Rest (2011) and Stephen Pinker’s The Better 
Angel of Our Nature: The Decline of Violence in History and Its Causes 
(2011).123 With this self-perception comes, of course, the other side of the 
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dualism: indigenous cultures—treated as the homogenous ‘primitive 
peoples’—are seen as visions of the West’s ‘savage’ origins, its distant and 
murky past, whilst ‘achieving’ civilisation is seen as the destiny of all 
indigenous cultures, their glittering, inevitable, inescapable future. The 
assumption, then, is that ‘primitive peoples’—both as that image of the 
prehistoric caveman and as the Western interpretation of contemporary 
indigenous cultures—are the ‘raw material’, the human nature which 
civilisation must—and will—refine and shape and mould; the ‘primitive’, in 
short, becomes yet another form of ‘nature’ that civilisation must conquer and 
control to ‘prove’ its self-declared superiority. This dualistic understanding of 
human cultures underpins both how the civilised West conceives of itself and 
its place in the world, and the ways in which the discourses of civilisation 
seek to justify the forcing of civilisation (by propaganda and hollow promises 
or by more direct, physical coercion) onto indigenous communities.124 
However, it is also essential for understanding how the discourses of 
civilisation influence a significant proportion of writing on rape, an influence 
that is well demonstrated in the media coverage of the Strauss-Kahn/Diallo 
case.  
 
 
‘Civilisation’, ‘Savages’ and Sexual Violence 
 
Through a series of allusions to ‘primitive’, ‘savage’ or ‘uncivilised’ behaviour, 
dualistic thinking and the discourses of civilisation are highly present in the 
media coverage of the Strauss-Kahn/Diallo case. Regardless of whether the 
articles are supporting Strauss-Kahn or condemning him, the act of rape itself 
is repeatedly presented as an act of backward savagery, unexpected or 
inconceivable from a man as apparently ‘civilised’ as the Managing Director 
of the IMF. A particularly pertinent example of this is Maureen Dowd’s article 
‘Powerful and Primitive’, published originally in The New York Times and 
reproduced in at least six other publications throughout the Anglophone 
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West. Describing Strauss-Kahn’s behaviour as ‘boorish and primitive’, Dowd 
recreates the alleged rape as a scene of bestial and savage predation with ‘a 
crazed, rutting, wrinkly old satyr charging naked out of a bathroom, lunging at 
[Diallo] and dragging her around the room, caveman-style.’125 The 
suggestion, here, that rape is ‘uncivilised’ is readily apparent; it is bluntly 
stated with the descriptor ‘primitive’ and the allusions to ‘cavemen’, and 
heavily suggested with the bestial savagery implied by ‘crazed, rutting’, the 
lack of ‘civilised’ dignity in the image of a ‘wrinkly’ old man apparently 
debasing himself, and in describing Strauss-Kahn as a ‘satyr’, an ancient 
civilisation’s image of half-bestial primitive nature, untamed and 
untameable.126 Similar language—as well as a marked tendency towards 
francophobia—appeared in other articles, with Strauss-Kahn again presented 
as behaving in a primitive, savage manner.127  
 
Those proclaiming Strauss-Kahn’s innocence also used the same language 
and allusions, but simply reversed the implications to suggest that Strauss-
Kahn—an apparent model of sophisticated and seductive civilised 
masculinity—was incapable of such supposedly primitive behaviour. 
Philosopher, journalist and long-time friend of Strauss-Kahn, Bernard-Henri 
Lévy stated in an interview that Strauss-Kahn: 
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bears no resemblance to this monster, this caveman, this insatiable 
and malevolent beast now being described nearly everywhere. 
Charming, seductive, yes, certainly; a friend to women and, first of 
all, to his own woman, naturally, but this brutal and violent individual, 
this wild animal, this primate, obviously no, it's absurd.128 
 
Clearly, these responses to Diallo’s allegations vary greatly in their opinions 
of Strauss-Kahn, and in their attitudes to patriarchal ideologies in general 
(compare, for instance, the reactionary attitude of Lévy’s statement—
exemplified by his referring to Strauss-Kahn’s wife as Strauss-Kahn’s ‘own 
woman’—with the somewhat myopic, but still broadly feminist, tone of 
Dowd’s article).129 However, despite these divergences, a central assumption 
unites these responses: that rape is a primitive and savage act. That is to 
say, the notion that rape is entirely at odds with the dominant ideologies of 
the ‘civilised’ West is never in question; the only debate is whether Strauss-
Kahn himself is ‘civilised’ or ‘primitive’. In this fashion, Western culture is 
subtly distanced from rape, and its potential culpability for acts of sexual 
violence committed by Strauss-Kahn or any other ‘civilised’ man is almost 
unconsciously denied. As I will argue presently, this is part of a far wider 
trend that pervades much analysis of sexual violence, working to disguise the 
possibility, not only that rape is far from at odds with the dominant ideologies 
of Western culture, but that it may actually be the product of them.   
 
Because, as noted above, the dominant Western understanding of 
indigenous cultures and nations is that they are closer to (human) nature, the 
presentation of rape as something ‘primitive’ or ‘savage’ suggests that it is 
the product of nature and not the product of culture (and certainly not the 
product of Western civilised culture specifically). In this sense, the 
presentation of rape as ‘savage’ can be seen as a variation on the trend of 
‘naturalising’ rape, of treating sexual violence as a ‘natural’ and unavoidable 
aspect of ‘male’ sexuality. Although this trend is discussed briefly in the 
introduction, it is important to reiterate that it extends beyond the scope of 
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Thornhill and Palmer’s A Natural History of Rape: as Peggy Reeves Sanday 
notes, the view that rape is a natural expression of a supposed ‘male 
sexuality’ has a wide range of adherents and finds voice in both popular and 
specialist discourses, in diverse forms ranging from the simplistic ‘boys will 
be boys’ attitudes that abound in mainstream media to the complex 
reasoning of sexological studies.130 It also, as I will discuss in more detail 
presently, has a more insidious form that, whilst not necessarily working to 
excuse rape, does manipulate the use of sexual violence in order to support 
and perpetuate ‘civilisation’ and many of the West’s  dominant power 
structures. To begin addressing this insidious form, it is important to realise 
that the naturalising of rape is part of a far larger trend in which, as Michael 
Parenti notes, certain acts or modes of behaviour are presented as being 
‘natural’ or universal to ‘human nature’ in order to support certain political 
aims.131 These aims may be to excuse the act itself by arguing that it is ‘only 
natural’ and so is exempt from any code of ethics or morals, or to support 
and celebrate civilisation by arguing that, although the act itself may be 
undesirable, it is a product of (human) nature and not of (civilised) culture 
and that civilisation represents the best means of ‘challenging’ nature and 
addressing the undesirable act.  
 
The first of these aims is commonly seen when those who benefit from a 
system or act which causes damage or suffering to others seek to justify their 
involvement in, or profit from, the system or act by suggesting that it is a 
product of ‘human nature.’ Amongst the most widely noted examples of this 
are assertions that war and capitalism (or the all too common combination of 
the two) are merely contemporary expressions of ‘natural’ instincts or drives, 
expressed by those who seek to justify their involvement in war-profiteering 
or capitalist exploitation.132 In the context of sexual violence, this aim is most 
readily identified in the many variations of the ‘boys will be boys’ defence that 
                                                 
130
 Peggy Reeves Sanday, ‘Rape-Free versus Rape-Prone: How Culture Makes a 
Difference’, in Evolution, Gender, and Rape, ed. by Cheryl Brown Travis (Massachusetts: 
MIT Press, 2003), pp. 337-361 (p. 348). 
131
 Michael Parenti, Human Nature and Politics (1990) 
<http://www.radio4all.net/index.php/program/1764> [accessed 27 February 2012].  
132
 For example, see: Parenti, Human Nature and Politics; Stanley Diamond, In Search of the 
Primitive: A Critique of Civilisation (New Brunswick and New Jersey: Transaction Books, 
1974), pp. 10–11; Erich Fromm, The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness (Middlesex: 
Pelican, 1982), pp. 295–296. 
 65 
 
states that rape is the ‘normal’—perhaps even admirable—behaviour of ‘red-
blooded’ males, the inevitable result of men acting like ‘real men.’133 This 
‘defence’ is frequently seen as a means to excuse the actions of soldiers or 
fraternity-affiliated college students and school sports teams accused of rape. 
A notable example of this with regard to soldiers is Fox News commentator 
Liz Trotta’s response to a 2010 report that noted that cases of sexual 
violence in military service academies had increased by 64% since the 
previous year.134 Trotta dismissed the significance of this extensive, arguably 
institutionalised, sexual violence with the statement ‘what did they expect? 
These people are in close contact’ and used this notion that such rapes are 
inevitable to support her belief that there should be no funding for programs 
‘to support women in the military who are now being raped too much.’135  
 
The same argument as used to defend privileged school or college sports 
stars also yields a particularly notable example in the notorious ‘Glen Ridge 
rape case’.136 In this case, the attorney defending the group of school-age 
athletes accused (and later convicted) of raping a developmentally disabled 
female student actually said in his opening statement that ‘[b]oys will be 
boys. Pranksters. Foolarounds. Do crazy things. Experiment with life and 
disregard their parents. Boys will be boys.’137 Moreover, these are by no 
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means the only examples, and the ‘justification’ of rapes committed by 
soldiers and privileged students are not the only scenarios in which this use 
of the naturalising of rape is to be found. Rather, it is a widely applied 
argument that is frequently employed in media, judicial and popular 
responses to sexual violence.138 In line with this, this particular use of the 
naturalising of rape is a significant issue, both for the ways in which it is used 
to support sexual violence, and for the fact that it highlights how conservative 
presentations of ‘human nature’ can be utilised to fortify pre-existing power 
structures. Although I will return to this matter in more detail in the third 
chapter, it is not central to the current discussion.139 Of more immediate 
significance to my analysis is the second use of the naturalising of rape: to 
argue not only that civilised Western culture is not culpable for the West’s 
rape problem, but that it is actually the socio-cultural system best suited to 
ending rape throughout the world. This application of the naturalising of rape 
is important for several reasons, including its use in the creation of civilised 
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images of ‘the savage’ and the part it has played in ‘justifying’ Western 
colonialism and neo-colonialism; however, most pressing for the current 
discussion is the insidious influence this use of the naturalising of rape has 
had on some Western feminism, and it is to this that the analysis now turns. 
 
 
Western Feminism, Naturalised Rape and the ‘Primitive Rapist’ 
   
Anthropologist Christine Helliwell raises the issue of the naturalisation of rape 
in Western feminism with a pertinent observation about the ways in which 
many Western feminists respond to violence against women in other 
(supposedly less civilised) cultures. She notes that:  
 
Within Western feminist discourse [...] practices deemed oppressive 
to women that are not commonly found in the West, such as 
clitoridectomy and sati, are explained as resulting from the barbarism 
of Third World peoples, while oppressive practices that are common 
in the West, such as rape, are explained in universalistic terms.140 
 
What Helliwell highlights here, although she does not describe it in these 
terms, is the unconscious influence of the discourses of civilisation on 
Western feminist theory. As suggested earlier, the influence of the discourses 
of civilisation is insidious: supporting ‘civilisation’ may not be the primary, 
intended message of an influenced text, but it creeps in nevertheless, 
underneath and around the primary message, warping and distorting the 
intended meaning. This insidious mutating of meaning is highly pronounced 
in the feminist discourse Helliwell is discussing: underneath the primary, 
intended message that practices such as female genital cutting or self-
immolation are oppressive to women is the message that the civilised West is 
superior to the primitive Majority World because it does not practise such 
‘barbaric’ customs.141 This underlying message, like many of the messages 
disseminated by the discourses of civilisation, has a self-fulfilling circular logic 
that states that the West does not practice such customs because it is 
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civilised and that it is civilised because it does not practice such customs 
(and simultaneously, that the MajorityWorld practices such customs because 
it is savage and primitive, and that it is savage and primitive because it 
practices such customs).  
 
The influence of the discourses of civilisation in this area is a serious issue 
that results in many Western feminists supporting neo-colonialism in the 
belief that they are supporting women’s rights or, as Chandra Talpade 
Mohanty notes, presenting Majority World women as a monolithic victim 
class, devoid of all agency, whilst perpetuating the view of Western 
civilisation as a superior mode of existence.142 Similarly, the notion that 
women in other (‘primitive’) countries need to be ‘liberated’ from the 
‘barbarity’ of their native cultures has often played a significant role in 
Western rationalisations of imperialism and warfare. Amongst the most 
recent examples is the employment of feminist rhetoric to justify the Western 
war against Afghanistan; as Andrea Smith reports, Laura Bush actually 
stated, in defence of the war, that ‘[t]he fight against terrorism is also a fight 
for the rights and dignity of women.’143 As award-winning author and activist, 
Arundhati Roy countered: ‘We’re being asked to believe that the US marines 
are actually on a feminist mission’.144 Stated like this, the concept could 
easily be read as absurd, but people did believe it, amongst them many 
Western feminists. As Smith notes, the view articulated by Laura Bush (and 
ridiculed by Roy) was shared by many mainstream Western feminists, even 
after groups such as the Revolutionary Association of Women of Afghanistan 
(RAWA) released statements condemning the war and describing it as just 
another example of American imperialism.145 This is a particularly clear 
example of the influence of the discourses of civilisation on feminist theory, 
where the rhetoric of ‘women’s liberation’ is mutated by the discourses of 
civilisation into imperial propaganda. This in itself is a significant issue and 
one that has long characterised the uncomfortable intersection of Western 
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feminism and Western colonial ideologies.146 However, Helliwell’s 
observations above also highlight an issue of even greater significance to this 
discussion: the universalising of rape in Western feminisms.  
 
Whilst non-Western practices are regularly cited (intentionally or 
unintentionally) as examples of the superiority of ‘Western civilisation’, issues 
such as rape—which very few feminists would argue is not a serious problem 
in the West—present a more complex issue. As Helliwell notes, such 
practices cannot be explained as the product of Majority World (or ‘primitive’) 
barbarism as they are too widely present in the civilised West. Responding to 
this fact can be problematic, for if feminist discourse is influenced by the 
discourses of civilisation (and the extent of this varies considerably) then 
there is potentially a conflict between the intended message (for example, 
that rape is a terrible violation and abuse) and the underlying discourses-of-
civilisation message (that civilisation is superior to nature/primitive societies). 
Put simply, the argument that an atrocity such as rape can be regularly, 
indeed routinely, practised in the civilised West challenges the idealised 
image of civilised life that the discourses of civilisation are supposed to 
present. The only way in which this conflict can be resolved without 
endangering the civilised/primitive or civilisation/nature dualisms is if rape is 
distanced from, or even presented as unrelated to, civilised Western culture. 
That is to say, the only way in which rape can be presented as a serious 
problem without implicating Western civilisation is by suggesting that it stems 
not from a problem inherent in Western culture but a problem inherent in 
‘human nature’. As Helliwell observes, the primary way in which this is 
achieved is by explaining rape in ‘universalistic terms’: that is, by suggesting 
that rape is, and has always been, a serious problem across all cultures and 
not just with the civilised West.  
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Being constantly immersed in the discourses of civilisation (and to live in a 
‘civilised’ culture is to be constantly immersed in these discourses) means 
that one is ceaselessly, in uncountable ways, being informed that civilisation 
is a superior form of existence founded upon equality and justice and a high 
quality of life for all. Simultaneously, to live in a civilised is also to have it 
ceaselessly suggested that life outside the boundaries of civilisation is a 
pitiful and savage struggle, characterised by barbaric violence and the primal, 
animalistic (and, certainly, ‘un-chivalrous’) abuse of women: in short, a life, to 
quote Thomas Hobbes’ famously contemptuous description of ‘the natural 
condition of mankind’, that is ‘solitary, poore [sic], nasty, brutish, and 
short.’147 Conditioned by such discourses, it is not at all surprising that many 
people—including ‘civilised’ Western feminists—come to view rape as 
universal and ‘natural’. A return to Helliwell’s critique highlights how this 
conditioning manifests in some feminist discourse. She writes that: 
 
Because within Western feminist discourse rape is depicted as a 
shockingly barbaric practice [...] there is a tendency to view it as 
atavistic. Because the practice is widespread in “civilised” Western 
countries, it is assumed to pervade all other societies as well, since 
these latter are understood as located closer to the savagery end of 
the evolutionary ladder.148        
 
Through enculturation into the belief that civilisation represents the least 
violent, least ‘savage’ form of social organization, it becomes assumed that 
any violent, ‘savage’ practice found within civilisation—in this case rape—
must be universal, an aspect of human nature that even civilisation (the 
antithesis of nature and the natural) has not (yet) managed to contain and 
control.149 In effect, the discourses of civilisation lose a battle in order to win 
the war: an admission is made that civilisation cannot control all of nature 
                                                 
147
 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (London: J. M. Dent and Sons, 1973), p. 65. Hobbes’ view of 
non-civilised humanity has been widely challenged and discredited. For example, see: 
Fromm, Anatomy of Human Destructiveness, p. 190; Raymond C. Kelly, Warless Societies 
and the Origin of War (Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 2007), pp. 124, 159–160; 
Lewis Mumford, The Myth of Machine: The Pentagon of Power (New York: Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich, Inc., 1970), pp. 98–102; Robert L. Kelly, The Foraging Spectrum: Diversity in 
Hunter-Gatherer Lifeways (Washington and London: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1995), 
pp. 337–338. 
148
 Helliwell, ‘It’s Only a Penis’, p. 793. 
149
 This belief is by no means limited to assumptions about rape. Fromm, for example, in his 
seminal text The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness (1973), makes similar observations 
about (equally inaccurate) civilised assumptions about warfare: ‘Almost everybody reasons: 
if civilised man is so warlike, how much more warlike must primitive man have been!’ 
(Fromm, The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness, p. 206). 
 71 
 
(again, yet) but the overall implication is still that civilisation is superior to 
‘savage’ nature because, apparently in the name of equality, women’s rights 
and ending sexual violence, civilisation’s aim is to dominate the violent 
(human) nature that causes rape. In this sense, what Helliwell discusses is a 
‘win-win’ scenario for the discourses of civilisation: aspects of other cultures 
that are considered negative by dominant Western ideologies and that do not 
exist in Western culture are considered a sign of savagery and are attributed 
to (human) nature, while aspects that are considered negative by dominant 
Western ideologies but do exist in Western culutre are presented as human 
universals and so are also attributed to (human) nature. In other words, 
practices such as female genital cutting and sati are presented as not 
happening in the West because of civilisation, and rape is presented as 
happening in the West in spite of civilisation. In this sense, the discourses of 
civilisation, through their pervasive influences on Western theorists, are 
successful in preserving the dualisms of civilisation/nature and 
civilised/primitive, and rape remains naturalised as the unavoidable product 
of primitive savagery and (human) nature. An interesting, and in some 
respects challenging, example of this process—albeit in a modified form 
where the Majority World ‘savage’ is replaced by the prehistoric ‘savage’—
can be found in Susan Brownmiller’s speculative discussion of rape’s 
prehistoric origins. 
 
 
Giving Rape its (Pre)History: Brownmiller’s Uncivilised Origins of Rape 
  
Brownmiller’s seminal text Against Our Will: Men, Women, and Rape (1975) 
examines sexual violence throughout (primarily Western) history, noting how 
patterns of attitudes, practices and gender dynamics that encourage or 
legitimise rape can be traced from some of the earliest historical documents 
through to twentieth-century legal practices and popular culture.150 Indeed, 
the final lines of the text note that ‘my purpose in this book has been to give 
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rape its history. Now we must deny it a future’.151 This is, of course, an 
extremely noble aim, and the text itself remains in many respects 
remarkable, not least for the significant role it played in bringing feminist 
analysis to the forefront of research on sexual violence. However, the text is 
also quite profoundly influenced by the discourses of the civilisation. In part, 
this influence manifests in the scapegoating of men marginalised by 
hierarchies of race and class as archetypal rapists (an issue that will be 
picked up further into this chapter). More relevant to the current discussion, 
however, the influence of the discourses of civilisation also manifests in the 
presentation of rape as something natural and primitive. This is primarily due 
to the fact that, as well as charting the presence of rape through history, 
Brownmiller also explores what she considers to be the origins of rape in 
prehistory. The introduction to the text contains a speculative scenario 
detailing the possible forms that the first and second rapes ever committed 
may have taken. Although clearly speculative and not intended as factual 
observations, Brownmiller nevertheless provides in this introductory section 
the fundamental basis of her analysis of rape, the underlying presentation of 
sexual violence as a part of (human) nature that the civilised must struggle to 
contain or conquer.    
 
Setting the scenario in ‘the violent landscape inhabited by primitive woman 
and man’, Brownmiller describes a prehistoric man’s assault of a woman, a 
woman who has ‘a prescient vision of her right to her own physical integrity’ 
and who ‘after a thunderbolt of recognition that this particular incarnation of 
hairy, two-legged hominid was not the Homo sapiens with whom she would 
like to freely join parts [...] might have [...] picked up the first stone and hurled 
it.’152 In this scenario, where the woman fights for her right to her own bodily 
integrity, Brownmiller indicates quite clearly why the woman wishes to defend 
herself but fails to give any suggestion as to why the man decides that he 
wishes to rape her, or what makes him conclude that she is in fact—to 
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borrow a phrase from Smith—‘rapable’.153 However, slightly earlier in the 
introduction, Brownmiller has already outlined an explanation for this. She 
presents an ‘accident of biology, an accommodation requiring the locking 
together of two separate parts, penis into vagina’ as holding the key, stating 
that:  
 
We cannot work around the fact that in terms of human anatomy the 
possibility of forcible intercourse exists. This single factor may have 
been sufficient to have caused the creation of a male ideology of 
rape. When men discovered that they could rape, they proceeded to 
do it.154 
 
The answer for Brownmiller, then, lies simply in the fact that it is physically 
possible for a man to rape a woman and that simply realising this was 
enough not just to prompt a few isolated acts of rape but an entire ‘male 
ideology of rape’. In short, in this account, rape is once again represented as 
entirely natural, the inevitable result of ‘primitive woman and man’ coexisting 
in a ‘violent landscape’: no questions are asked about motivation, no human 
agency or cultural influence is suggested; there is simply a savage and 
natural male drive to commit rape.155   
 
Whilst this assumed naturalness and failure to ask the reasons why a man 
may rape or a woman may be considered rapable is already resembling the 
naturalising of rape outlined previously, this becomes more complex as 
Brownmiller’s scenario progresses to the ‘second rape’. She writes: 
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The dim perception that had entered prehistoric woman’s 
consciousness [that she had a right to physical integrity] must have 
had an equal but opposite reaction in the mind of her male assailant. 
For if the first rape was an unexpected battle founded on the first 
woman’s refusal, the second rape was indubitably planned. Indeed, 
one of the earliest forms of male bonding must have been the gang 
rape of one woman by a band of marauding men. This accomplished, 
rape became not only a male prerogative, but man’s basic weapon of 
force against woman, the principal agent of his will and her fear. His 
forcible entry into her body, despite her physical protestations and 
struggle, became the vehicle of his victorious conquest over her 
being the ultimate test of his superior strength, the triumph of his 
manhood.156 
 
The failure to enquire into why a man may be motivated to rape and a 
woman may be considered rapable is modified here. Brownmiller begins to 
offer some reasons why the men may desire to commit rape. However, these 
are, in fact, simply the reasons often associated with contemporary rape in 
the West—preoccupations with ‘victorious conquest’, ‘superior strength’ and 
triumphant manhood—each stripped of their cultural context and projected 
onto prehistory. What Brownmiller now fails to ask is precisely why these 
supposed motivators are present, what cultural components create a culture 
in which conquering, strength and triumph are desirable attributes for men.157 
Like the notion that ‘male’ and ‘female’ genitals automatically produce rapists 
and rapable victims, Brownmiller suggests that the ‘motivation’ to rape is 
simply a pre-cultural (and therefore, to follow the dualistic thinking outlined 
above, ‘natural’) product of homogenised male sexuality and female 
vulnerability. Once again, rape is rendered a product not of culture (and 
certainly not of civilisation) but of (human) nature and primitive savagery, 
and, once again, the reasons for this can be located in the influence of the 
discourses of civilisation. The reason that Brownmiller assumes that rape 
would not only occur in prehistory but would occur in forms that so closely 
mirror rape in the contemporary West is much the same as the reason that 
the feminist discourse discussed by Helliwell assumes that rape is universal: 
if rape is present in civilised cultures—assumed to be the model of social 
organisation furthest away from primitive, violent savagery—then it must 
surely have existed in the ‘violent landscape’ of prehistory amongst those 
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‘natural’ humans as yet untamed, unimproved by civilisation, just as surely as 
it must occur amongst the ‘primitive’ people of the Majority World or 
indigenous communities. This assumption has serious implications for the 
rest of the text, laying down a foundation of naturalised rape that 
problematises Brownmiller’s later discussion of the cultural aspects of rape.    
 
Because this opening explanation of rape denies any cultural influence, 
presenting the origins of rape as the inevitable product of un-civilised 
humanity living in the ‘violent landscape’ of prehistory, Brownmiller’s later 
critiques of contemporary ‘civilised’ cultures are largely undermined. 
Brownmiller certainly does critique civilised cultures (particularly Western, 
and especially American, cultures), suggesting that it has a serious rape 
problem that is largely institutionalised and organised so as to further 
patriarchal power and privilege. However, by initially presenting rape as 
something innate and biologically determined—a product of (human) 
nature—the critique becomes an analysis of how civilisation has responded 
to pre-cultural ‘natural’ rape and not to how it culturally produces and 
encourages rape. Indeed, Brownmiller does not suggest that rape in early 
Western civilisations was in any respect the product of the civilised ideologies 
and ways of life per se; rather she suggests that rape pre-existed the rise of 
those civilisations and that they simply formalised and organised a pre-
established, natural male proclivity towards sexual violence. The role of 
civilisation in relation to rape is reduced to simply organising male power 
structures around the threat of rape, and gradually making them more 
refined, complex and formal. Brownmiller writes that ‘the price of woman’s 
protection by some men against an abuse by others was steep [...] those who 
did assume the historic burden of her protection—later formalised as 
husband, father, brother, clan [...] reduced her status to that of chattel’.158 
She furthers this position by adding that ‘it seems eminently sensible to 
hypothesize that man’s violent capture and rape of the female led first to the 
establishment of a rudimentary mate-protectorate and then sometime later to 
the full-blown male solidification of power, the patriarchy’.159 Quite evidently, 
the role of ‘civilisation’ here is simply profiting from rape, organising male 
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power structures around pre-existing sexual violence. In this sense, 
Brownmiller recreates the universal trajectory of ‘progress’ discussed earlier, 
where rape originates in the (human) nature of the uncivilised and continues 
in an unbroken timeline from this point, heading, presumably, to the high-
point of progress—of civilisation—at which we may ‘deny it a future’.160 That 
she also critiques how civilisation has responded to this is not the issue; the 
issue is that Brownmiller identifies rape as a natural, pre-cultural and pre-
civilised occurrence that civilised society must progress away from. In this 
last respect, Brownmiller’s position is actually surprisingly close to that found 
in Dowd’s ‘Powerful and Primitive’ discussed earlier, differing only in the 
stage of the trajectory of ‘progress’ that American society is considered to 
have reached.  
 
 
Beyond Savagery: Brownmiller, Dowd and ‘Progress’ 
 
The similarity between Brownmiller and Dowd’s understandings of ‘the 
primitive’ and the supposed naturalness of rape is, perhaps, not immediately 
obvious; the two writers do, after all, differ significantly in their treatment of 
contemporary American society. Both writers do identify rape as an aspect of 
primitive (human) nature, but for Brownmiller the natural drive to rape is still 
entirely present in contemporary society (albeit in a more formal, refined and 
organised form) whilst Dowd takes what is effectively a ‘postfeminist’ 
position, treating rape as something that has  already been largely 
suppressed, contained or conquered. That is to say, whilst Brownmiller 
suggests that the task awaiting feminism is to ‘deny [rape] a future’, for Dowd 
this struggle is effectively already achieved, at least within the supposedly 
democratic and just civilisation of America. This is particularly evident in 
Dowd’s description of the Strauss-Kahn/Diallo case not as yet another case 
of civilised abuse and exploitation but as a victory for (American) civilisation, 
as, in fact, ‘an inspiring story about America, where even a maid can have 
dignity and be listened to when she accuses one of the most powerful men in 
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the world of being a predator’.161 Even more than this, Dowd also sets up 
false dualisms of civilised/primitive that suggest that American civilisation 
(and, presumably, only American civilisation) holds the key to ending rape. 
She does this initially by comparing America to France, suggesting that the 
French are far behind America on the trajectory of progress, unable to match 
or support America’s advanced, civilised justice system. In an awkwardly-
phrased outburst of unrestrained patriotism (and, of course, Francophobia 
and pro-civilisation propaganda) she writes: ‘while the French excoriated the 
American system of justice [...] Americans could pride themselves on the 
sound of the “bum-bum” “Law & Order: SVU” gong sounding, the noise that 
heralds that justice will be done without regard to wealth, class or 
privilege’.162 The message here, of course, is that France is in some way 
‘backward’, closer to the primitive law of ‘might-is-right’ than the highly 
progressed American civilisation.  
 
However, this dualism is subtle and restrained compared with the one Dowd 
establishes between America and Diallo’s home country of Guinea. 
Summarising Diallo’s experiences in a somewhat crude and biased manner, 
Dowd writes that:  
 
The young woman escaped horrors in her native Guinea, a 
patriarchal society where rape is widespread and used as a device of 
war, a place where she would have been kicked to the curb if she 
tried to take on a powerful man. When she faced the horror here, she 
had a recourse.163  
 
The suggested superiority of (American) civilisation to Guinean ‘savagery’ is 
readily apparent here: in Guinea, Dowd suggests, rape is accepted and 
tolerated whilst in America it is considered a terrible crime. Within this is the 
implication that, in contrast to Guinea, America is not patriarchal, does not 
have a serious rape problem, and does have a fair and just judicial system: 
after all, Dowd does not write that Diallo ‘escaped horrors in her native 
Guinea, a patriarchal society where rape is widespread and used as a device 
of war’ by coming to face fresh horrors in America, a patriarchal society 
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where rape is widespread and used as a device of war. Such a statement, 
had it been made, would have been entirely valid, not only for Diallo but for 
the experiences of many women living in America. As I have indicated 
previously, Diallo’s experiences as a refugee/immigrant are far from unusual; 
although receiving little media coverage or discussion in mainstream (white, 
non-immigrant dominated) feminist analysis, it is still widely noted that female 
immigrants routinely face the horrors of institutionalised sexual violence in 
America, as well as the other indignities and abuses less specific to their 
gender.164 Even more widely noted is the fact that contemporary America is 
profoundly patriarchal in its social, political and cultural organisation (and that 
this patriarchy intersects with white supremacism, classism, homophobia, 
transphobia, ableism and other systems of oppression).165 Likewise, that 
rape ‘as a device of war’ has been employed as a routine part of American 
military practice, from the original colonisation of continent through to the 
present day, is also well documented.166 Considered in light of these facts, 
Dowd’s dualistic approach, in which American civilisation is held up as the 
single true beacon of liberty amidst the ‘savagery’ of the ‘dark continent’ and 
the corrupt decadence of Europe, is severely undermined.  
 
Moreover, despite Dowd’s ‘civilised/primitive’ comparisons of America and 
France and America and Guinea, she is in reality only comparing civilisation 
and civilisation each time. France is, of course, a part of the civilised West, 
and shares  common ideological, cultural and political roots, and similar 
contemporary neoliberal, capitalist social organisation with America. It also, 
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contrary to Dowd’s insinuations, matches the general trends of rape 
incidence, reportage and conviction found throughout the West.167 Guinea, 
too, although not part of the Western ‘First World’, can largely be considered 
to fall most accurately into the category of ‘civilised’; only gaining 
independence from French colonial rule in 1958, Guinea has a long legacy of 
‘civilised’ Western influence and control, a legacy that includes financial 
‘support’ and pressure to privatise (including, appropriately, from the IMF), 
Western involvement in extracting the country’s great mineral wealth and the 
West training and equipping the Guinean military (including troops who would 
later be involved in a massacre and mass rape in 2009).168 In this sense, 
Guinea can certainly be considered to be both ‘civilised’ and greatly 
influenced by the civilised West specifically. Moreover, without diminishing 
the atrocities committed in Guinea, the image of the country as a rape-ridden 
bastion of corrupt patriarchy largely develops from the massacre and mass 
rape of pro-democracy demonstrators committed by Guinean military forces 
on September 28th 2009.169 This is, of course, an extremely significant event 
and a severe indictment of the Guinean military and government (and, 
presumably, also reflects some degree of institutionalised tolerance of rape). 
However, when one considers the extremely high incidence of rape in 
America (in excess of a million cases per year) and the level to which the 
American military, police and other state bodies are known to use, or tolerate 
the use of, sexual violence, Dowd’s dualistic approach is, again, 
undermined.170      
 
Regardless of these contradictions and inconsistencies, however, Dowd still 
presents contemporary American civilised culture as holding the key to 
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ending sexual violence. This, as noted above, is clearly in direct opposition to 
Brownmiller’s presentation of American culture as characterised by high 
levels of both rape and rape-supportive attitudes. However, despite these 
differences, there remains a unifying strand between Dowd and Brownmiller: 
both assume that the ‘starting point’ of rape in civilised cultures can be 
located in primitive (human) nature. Following from this, they each propose 
that civilised ‘progress’ away from this condition holds the answer to ending 
sexual violence. Their only significant point of conflict is, as suggested 
earlier, whether or not America has already ‘progressed’ far enough, or 
become ‘civilised’ enough, to achieve this aim. In this sense, we can read 
Brownmiller’s position discussed above as a less blinkered version of Dowd’s 
own stance: Dowd thinks that American culture has already reached the 
stage where it can end rape, whereas Brownmiller believes that it is still a 
long way from achieving this, but they both share the position that rape 
originates in nature and is or can be ended by civilisation. For each, rape is a 
part of (human) nature, the raw material that must be refined and moulded by 
civilisation to create rape-free equality, a presumed higher stage on the 
trajectory away from primitive savagery and towards civilised harmony.  
 
However, despite how Dowd and Brownmiller present supposed ‘primitives’, 
it has been widely noted that many indigenous, ‘uncivilised’ cultures and 
nations are or have been—prior to sustained contact with, or direct ‘civilising’ 
by, the West—either free from rape or characterised by remarkably low 
incidence of rape. This fact contradicts the understanding of rape originating 
in a primitive (human) nature and unavoidably provokes the question of why, 
if some cultures are effectively free from rape, the civilised Anglophone West 
has such a ubiquitously high incidence of sexual violence. A small number of 
theorists have attempted to undermine this question by challenging the 
assertion that rape incidence varies significantly between cultures. Perhaps 
most notable among them is Craig Palmer, co-author of A Natural History of 
Rape, who provides a brief critique of ethnographic data pertaining to rape in 
order to support his own socio-biological explanation of sexual violence and 
provide an argument in support of maintaining ‘patriarchal traditions’.171 
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Although Palmer’s analysis does highlight some pertinent issues with the 
tasks of defining rape and collecting data across cross-cultural samples, and 
provides valid critiques of several of the examples, other of his critiques are 
composed of weak, ‘straw man’ arguments and conjecture—in particular, the 
implication that the presence of a single reported rape somehow proves a 
culture to be prone to sexual violence—and his study covers only a fraction 
of the theorists making such claims and even fewer of the cultures to which 
such claims are attached. Moreover, Palmer’s argument is reliant on 
demonstrating that rape has occurred at least once in the societies 
discussed, whereas the majority of claims he is attempting to discredit state 
simply that rape incidence is significantly lower in certain societies and that 
there are cultural patterns that can be extrapolated from this. For these 
reasons, I suggest that Palmer’s critique does little to discredit the claims that 
there is a significant variation in rape incidence cross-culturally and, as such, 
fails to discredit the question these claims raise: why, if some cultures have 
very low rates of sexual violence, is the Anglophone West’s rape incidence 
so remarkably high? As I will argue, the answer to this question lies ultimately 
in the civilised culture of the Anglophone West itself. 
 
 
Culture and Rape 
 
If rape cannot be said to be a product of (human) nature, as suggested 
above, then it must logically be considered a product of culture. Certainly, the 
majority of research concerned with sexual violence suggests that rape is a 
cultural phenomenon, a product of practices and ideologies, of political 
structures and social organisation. Joanna Bourke provides a concise 
summary of this broad position when she notes that, far from being the 
universally occurring results of a homogenous ‘human sexuality’, ‘rape and 
sexual violence are deeply rooted in specific political, economic and cultural 
environments.’172 Across the full range of socio-cultural explanations of rape, 
precisely what these environments are remains a point of contention, but the 
overarching notion that they exist—and are key to understanding sexual 
violence—is constant. In Western feminist analysis, the West’s twin traditions 
                                                 
172
 Bourke, Rape: A History from 1860 to the Present, p. 7. Italics in original.  
 82 
 
of cultural misogyny and patriarchal social organisation are considered to be 
key aspects of the environments in which Western rape is rooted.173 Again, 
precisely how misogyny and patriarchy relate to rape is far from universally 
agreed, but feminist analysis is united in the assertion that they do relate, and 
that they are profoundly significant to the study of, and fight against, sexual 
violence. Indeed, as Helliwell notes, a ‘focus on rape as stemming from 
difference in social position [between men and women] is what distinguishes 
feminist from other kinds of accounts of rape.’174  
 
However, as well as identifying the central role of cultural misogyny and 
patriarchal social organisation to the West’s rape problem, feminist analysis 
has also explored the influence of other aspects of Western culture(s). One 
of the key areas targeted in this respect is cultural acceptance (and/or 
celebration) of violence and warfare. A marked correlation between cultural 
acceptance of violence and cultural acceptance of rape has been noted in a 
great many feminist texts, from the popular to the academically rigorous.175 
The majority of such analysis is accurate and insightful; however, there are 
certain limitations that pervade many—although by no means all—texts. 
These limitations—which, as will be discussed, largely revolve around a 
failure to explore the issues underlying violence and militarism—also 
illuminate key aspects of the current discussion. Two theories, in particular, 
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are useful in this respect: Brownmiller’s discussion of the ‘the typical 
American rapist’ and ‘the subculture of violence’ and Eileen L. Zurbriggen’s 
analysis of connections between masculinity, militarism and rape. 
Brownmiller’s discussion, although highlighting the importance of exploring 
wider cultural influences, is a notable example of how such analysis can also 
provide reactionary support for the dominant culture through the 
scapegoating of marginalised groups. Arguing that the ‘typical’ rapist is a 
working-class or Black man—whilst simultaneously suggesting that powerful 
white men do not commit rape—Brownmiller presents rape-supportive 
ideologies as the product of a subcultural rejection of the dominant culture, 
effectively denying the culpability of Western culture at large. Zurbriggen’s 
study, in contrast, draws important correlations between rape and (other) 
practices that are sanctioned by the dominant culture, beginning the process 
of implicating the dominant culture itself in the West’s rape problem. 
However, Zurbriggen’s study also reprises some of the issues that mar 
Brownmiller’s analysis, suggesting that a specific aspect of the dominant 
culture is central to its relation to rape, and so redeeming the many other 
aspects that might also be said to be causal factors. Through exploring these 
weaknesses and expanding upon the texts’ strengths, my own analysis will 
begin to situate rape in a wider context of objectification and oppression and 
to more fully implicate the dominant culture of Western civilisation in the 
West’s rape problem.  
 
 
Brownmiller and the ‘Typical Rapist’ 
 
As suggested previously, although locating the origins of rape in (human) 
nature, Brownmiller does allow for the influence of culture—or, more 
specifically, patriarchal culture—on the incidence of, and cultural responses 
to, sexual violence. However, aside from observing that ‘patriarchy’ is central 
to the issue of rape, the presentation of cultural influence in Against Our Will 
is restricted to very specific factors. Concerning cultural variations throughout 
the long history of civilisation—from Ancient Babylon to twentieth-century 
America—Brownmiller is strangely reticent; rape is treated as a 
transhistorically and transculturally constant occurrence, appearing across 
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history in near-identical forms, with a near-identical rate of incidence and 
near-identical political or patriarchal motivation and function.176 However, 
despite treating patriarchy and rape as historically static, Brownmiller does 
argue that specific variations within an overarching culture produce variations 
in incidence of rape. In particular, she notes that certain subcultures in 
twentieth-century America have a far higher incidence of rape and are, in 
fact, responsible for producing the ‘the typical American rapist’.177 Despite 
her arguments that rape is a universal male drive that has existed unchanged 
from the origins of human society, Brownmiller nevertheless focuses a great 
deal of attention on detailing precisely ‘who’ the average American rapist is.  
 
Although Brownmiller’s discussion of ‘the typical rapist’ does provide some 
useful insights—chiefly an examination of the patriarchal and misogynistic 
biases of Freudian analysis of sexual violence and challenges to the notion 
that rapists are pathologically disturbed pariahs (a point that underpins my 
own analysis of rapists in the third chapter)—the overarching presentation of 
rape is extremely problematic.178 The opening statement of the chapter in 
question sets the tone for the analysis:  
 
The typical American rapist might be the boy next door. Especially if 
the boy next door happens to be about 19 years of age and the 
neighbourhood you live in happens to fit the socioeconomic 
description of lower class or bears the appellation of “ghetto.” That is 
what the statistics show.’179  
 
Perhaps the most striking thing about this statement is the obvious classist 
message it contains: ‘the typical American rapist’ is the product of working-
class communities or ‘ghettos’. Of course, some of this understanding might 
be explained by biases within the statistics Brownmiller is employing; 
certainly she acknowledges that ‘[o]ne must approach all statistics with 
caution if one is going to make generalizations.’180 However, this caution is 
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not actually evidenced in the discussion, except as an acknowledgment that 
limited legal definitions of rape and patriarchal biases (as well as racist 
biases against non-white rape survivors) prevent many incidents of rape 
appearing in official statistics.181 Throughout the analysis, there is no 
consideration of how biases, prejudices and hierarchical power structures 
influence which rapists are actually arrested and incarcerated. Such biases 
are an essential consideration when working with statistics from police 
reports or prison surveys. As Diana Scully notes, classist and racist biases 
within Western judicial systems intersect with biases concerning what 
constitutes a ‘real rape’, resulting in the fact that rapists who are imprisoned 
for their crimes ‘are more likely to have raped strangers, used weapons, 
physically injured their victims, and committed other crimes in addition to the 
rape. They are also likely to be poorly educated, lacking economic resources, 
and members of racial minorities.’182 
 
 Despite her professed caution, Brownmiller entirely fails to consider how 
issues such as these may influence the statistically ‘typical’ rapist. Certainly, 
they do not prevent her from making extremely bold—indeed, extremely 
incautious—generalisations such as:  
 
Rape is a dull, blunt, ugly act committed by punk kids, their cousins 
and older brothers, not by charming, witty, unscrupulous, heroic, 
sensual rakes, or by timid souls deprived of a “normal” sexual outlet, 
or by super-menschen [sic] possessed of uncontrollable lust.183  
 
It is, perhaps, tempting to read this as Brownmiller simply reporting dominant 
understandings of rapists rather than detailing her own view; certainly, she 
acknowledges that the statement is based on the ‘police-blotter rapist’ (the 
‘type’ of person most commonly arrested for rape), derived from the image of 
rapists as reflected in key sociological studies, FBI statistics and the 
experiences of Clinton Duffy, a San Quentin prison warden. However, these 
sources are presented uncritically, with no questions asked of their reliability, 
no evaluation of the image of rape that they present and no real caveat to 
suggest that statements such as that above are intended to refer only to 
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specific ‘forms’ of rape and rapist. Indeed, the discussion moves on to how 
‘police-blotter rapists’ relate to other, less marginalised men, with the 
suggestion that ‘[a]lthough they are the ones who do the dirty work, the 
actual attentat, to other men, their superiors in class and station, the lasting 
benefits of their simple-minded evil have always accrued.’184 In this 
suggestion, which is Brownmiller’s own theorising rather than a report of what 
statistics and studies indicate, the ‘superiors’ of the ‘typical rapist’ do not do 
the ‘dirty work’—they do not rape—but simply accrue the benefits of rapes 
committed by their supposed inferiors. In this, Brownmiller appears to be 
arguing that men are divided into the rapists (who are the ‘punk kids’ and 
other marginalised men) and those who benefit from, but do not actually 
commit, rape (the punk kids’ ‘superiors’). In light of these points, it is 
reasonable to suggest that the previous description of rape and rapists 
reflects Brownmiller’s own understanding and not simply what is reported by 
others.  
 
The above considered, it is possible, with reference to the rest of the text, to 
deduce what Brownmiller is trying to convey. Given her challenges to the 
notion that rape is driven by sexual desire rather than violence and 
domination elsewhere in the text, a similar challenge can be read in the 
discussion of ‘timid souls’ lacking sexual outlets and lustful ‘super-
menschen’. Certainly, statements such as ‘rape is not a crime of irrational, 
impulsive, uncontrollable lust, but is a deliberate, hostile, violent act of 
degradation and possession on the part of a would-be conqueror’ appear to 
support this reading.185 Similarly, given her later chapter refuting ‘the myth of 
the heroic rapist’, it is possible to read Brownmiller’s presentation of rape as 
an ‘ugly act committed by punk kids’ as part of this same process of de-
glamorising rape and rapists.186  This reading correlates with a statement that 
Brownmiller made during a radio debate with Randy Thornhill (co-author of A 
Natural History of Rape) in which she notes that the 1970s feminist 
movement highlighted the fact that  
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rape was not sexy [...] The men, up to that point, had romanticized 
rape [...] And the act was constructed as sort of a Robin Hood act of 
machismo. When women started to speak up about their own 
experiences of rape, the first thing they said was, “No, there’s nothing 
sexy about this. This was pure power humiliation, degradation.” And 
that’s where the feminist theory came from, out of listening to the 
experiences of women.187   
 
However, even if these readings of Brownmiller’s description of ‘what rape is’ 
are accurate, the underlying message of her statement still reinforces the 
previous classism: rape, the statement suggests, is not something done by 
the powerful, the glamorous or the charming and desirable; it is committed by 
‘no-hopers’ and ‘drop-outs’, by ‘punk kids’ with no charm, no wit, no 
sensuality, just dumb aggression.  
 
This message is even more readily apparent in Brownmiller’s explanation of 
her logic. She writes that a group of ‘typical’ (that is to say, young, working-
class or Black) rapists gang raping a woman together 
 
strengthens the notion of group masculinity and power [...] in much 
the same way that an executive dining room “open to males only” 
strengthens the notion of group masculinity and power, or the way an 
all-male climb up Mount Everest [...] strengthens the notion of group 
masculinity and power. Corporate executive dining rooms and climbs 
up Mount Everest are not usually accessible to [poor, working-class 
or Black men]. Access to a female body—through force—is within 
their ken.188   
 
The message here is not open to misinterpretation: rich, powerful, upper-
class white men do not rape because they have other means of feeling 
powerful and masculine, whilst disempowered, poor, working-class or Black 
men do rape because it is the only power they can possibly grasp. 
Interestingly, this understanding recalls Thornhill and Palmer’s socio-
biological explanation of sexual violence in A Natural History of Rape. 
Thornhill and Palmer suggest that one of the reasons men commit rape is 
because they cannot get a ‘mate’ through the ‘usual methods’ of intra-male 
                                                 
187
 Brownmiller cited in Nicola Gavey, Just Sex? The Cultural Scaffolding of Rape (East 
Sussex and New York: Routledge, 2005), pp. 32–33. Italics in original. 
188
 Ibid., p. 194. I have used the description ‘poor, working-class or Black men’ to replace 
Brownmiller’s original phrase ‘those who make up the subculture of violence’ as I have not 
yet introduced or explained the meaning of the phrase. I take the description from 
Brownmiller’s suggestion that the ‘subculture of violence’ is ‘formed of those from the lower 
classes, the poor, the disenfranchised, the black’ (Brownmiller, Against Our Will, p. 181). 
 88 
 
competition or female mating preference because they lack the social status 
and resources required to compete in these areas. Such men, they suggest, 
are reduced to rape as a means of fulfilling their innate ‘male’ urges to 
procreate.189 Brownmiller applies a remarkably similar logic here except that 
she conceives of rape as an act of power and domination rather than sexual 
reproduction: marginalised men commit rape because they cannot get 
‘power’ through the usual methods because they lack social status and 
resources and, as such, they are reduced to rape as a means of fulfilling their 
innate ‘male’ urges to ‘prove’ how ‘powerful’ and ‘masculine’ they are. In a 
sense, this similarity sets the tone for my continuing analysis of Brownmiller, 
highlighting the homogenous categories and disregard for individual choice 
and agency that characterise both Brownmiller’s and Thornhill and Palmer’s 
arguments. As I will now discuss, in Brownmiller’s theorising, this position 
reinforces both the oppression of marginalised communities and the popular 
misconception that powerful men don’t rape, a misconception which in turn 
reinforces the routine failure of Western judicial systems to bring powerful 
rapists to justice and relates directly to the Strauss-Kahn/Diallo case.     
 
 
‘Powerful Men Don’t Commit Rape’: Problems with ‘the Typical Rapist’ 
 
The classist and racist understanding of rape discussed above is the one of 
the key reasons why Brownmiller’s discussion of ‘the typical American rapist’ 
is problematic. In situating America’s rape problem squarely in working-class 
and Black communities, the analysis supports existing power structures and 
prejudices, undermining the rights of marginalised communities (including, it 
should be noted, rape survivors within those communities). As Angela Y. 
Davis observes, the ‘myth of the Black rapist’—the notion that all Black men 
have an inherent proclivity to rape women, and especially white women—has 
been a key pretext for racially-motivated violence and repression conducted 
against Black communities, and for sexual violence committed by white men 
against Black women.190 Brownmiller’s analysis of the ‘typical’ rapist not only 
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follows this pre-existing model of racial (and class-based) profiling, but also 
actively reinforces it. Indeed, Davis notes that Brownmiller’s discussion of the 
‘typical’ rapist ‘has been severely criticized for its part in the resuscitation of 
the old racist myth of the Black rapist.’191 Specifically, Brownmiller’s 
discussion helps to rationalise existing prejudices and myths, providing them 
with fresh ‘relevance’ and a gloss of liberal, academic credibility. In this 
sense, the analysis undermines struggles for Black and working-class rights, 
supports violence and repression conducted against Black and working-class 
communities and may even contribute to the ‘justification’ of sexual violence 
committed against Black and working-class women. Moreover, this is not the 
only area in which Brownmiller’s theory may actually undermine the struggle 
against sexual violence. The suggestion that rape generally takes a specific 
form, occurs in specific scenarios and is committed by specific ‘types’ of 
man—along with the suggestion that rape is not committed by other ‘types’ of 
man—also carries serious implications.   
 
As noted in the introduction, the majority of rapes that occur in the 
Anglophone West are not reported to the police. There are numerous 
reasons for this; however, one of the chief issues is that many rape survivors 
do not feel that their assaults count as ‘real rape’ unless they fit the model 
most widely discussed in the discourses of the dominant culture. As Diana 
Scully notes, survivors are more likely to report ‘if the characteristics of their 
attack resembled a “classic rape”—a sudden, violent attack by a stranger in a 
public place or a home that was broken into, involving the use of a weapon 
and resulting in injuries in addition to rape.’192 Moreover, this issue not only 
relates to the reporting of rape but also influences whether or not survivors 
actually recognise their own experience as rape. As Lisa Jervis observes, 
‘survivors of any attack that doesn’t fit the most extreme stranger-in-the-
bushes-with-a-knife paradigm are very often reluctant to name their 
experiences as rape’.193 In this sense, the belief that only assaults that match 
the dominant conception of rape are actually ‘real rapes’ greatly influences 
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whether or not a survivor reports their assault, or even recognises it as rape, 
both of which contribute significantly to the failure to bring the rapist to 
justice. Brownmiller’s work contains a variation of this issue. In suggesting 
that rich, powerful white men do not rape (and maintaining the illusion that 
most rapes are committed by working-class or Black men who are strangers 
to the survivor), Brownmiller decreases the chances of women who have 
been assaulted by rich, powerful white men recognising or reporting their 
experiences as rape—particularly if the rape takes a different form to the 
dominant violent-stranger model—whilst simultaneously decreasing the 
chances of the rapist being arrested or charged.  
 
This same understanding, I suggest, is an important component of the biases 
that virtually guaranteed that Strauss-Kahn would be found innocent. Indeed, 
it is precisely the logic that underpins political commentator Ben Stein’s 
undermining of Diallo’s account of the incident:    
 
In life, events tend to follow patterns. People who commit crimes tend 
to be criminals, for example. [...] Can anyone tell me of any heads of 
nonprofit international economic entities who have ever been 
charged and convicted of violent sexual crimes? [...] Maybe Mr. 
Strauss-Kahn is guilty but if so, he is one of a kind, and criminals are 
not usually one of a kind.194 
 
Stein’s argument is based on the notion that powerful, rich white men such 
as Strauss-Kahn simply do not rape; it is, instead, stereotypical ‘criminals’ 
who commit rape, because it is, according to Stein’s supremely circular 
reasoning, only criminals who commit crimes. The same basic belief that 
underpins this argument is quite overtly stated by Brownmiller when she 
makes her observations about rich and powerful men and their ‘executive 
dining rooms’ and poor and Black men and their supposed proclivity to rape: 
Strauss-Kahn must surely have access to enough ‘executive dining rooms’ 
(and, indeed, executive hotel suites) to make him feel powerful and 
masculine, so why would he need to rape a woman like a desperate, 
disenfranchised commoner? Such logic greatly increases the chances of 
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men such as Strauss-Kahn being found innocent by the West’s judicial 
systems, and greatly decreases the chances of women such as Diallo feeling 
able to report their assaults. There is another issue, too, which stems from 
both of the previous points and is, for the purposes of this discussion, even 
more significant: Brownmiller’s presentation of the ‘typical’ rapist’s relation to 
violence. Intimately connected to the stereotyping discussed above, 
Brownmiller’s position on violence and rape serves to further distance the 
dominant culture from the Anglophone West’s rape problem, denying both 
the violence upon which this culture is based and the other cultural elements 
that support or encourage sexual violence. In highlighting this process of 
distancing, my analysis begins to explore the very opposite of Brownmiller’s 
own position: the complexity and depth of rape’s relationship to the dominant 
culture.     
 
 
Brownmiller and ‘The Subculture of Violence’ 
 
Underpinning both the classist and racist elements of Brownmiller’s analysis 
and the focus on specific dominant models of rape is criminologist Marvin 
Wolfgang’s theory of ‘the subculture of violence’.195 Brownmiller provides a 
summary of Wolfgang’s theory, as follows:  
 
[W]ithin the dominant value system of our culture there exists a 
subculture formed of those from the lower classes, the poor, the 
disenfranchised, the black, whose values often run counter to those 
of the dominant culture [...] The dominant culture can operate within 
the laws of civility because it has little need to resort to violence to 
get what it wants. The subculture, thwarted, inarticulate and angry, is 
quick to resort to violence; indeed, violence and physical aggression 
become a common way of life.196 
 
Brownmiller considers this theory to be a useful way in which to understand 
rape, suggesting that it provides a well researched and statistically-supported 
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explanation of her (classist and racist) reading of America’s rape problem. 
She credits Menachem Amir’s 1971 study Patterns in Forcible Rape as 
applying the subculture theory to sexual violence, suggesting both that it is 
an extremely significant contribution to the field and that it applies to ‘the 
rapist’ as a homogenous and fixed type.197 She writes that ‘the single most 
important contribution of Amir’s study was to place the rapist squarely within 
the subculture of violence’, an understanding that she herself adopts.198 In 
this sense, then, Brownmiller suggests firstly that the dominant culture is 
opposed to rape (a point that seems to contradict the majority of her 
arguments about patriarchal society’s support of rape) and secondly that 
working-class and Black people homogenously adhere to a set of values that 
both accept and encourage rape. Here, again, we see Brownmiller’s 
willingness to believe that working-class and Black men are prone to rape, as 
well as some of the limited reasoning behind the suggestion. 
 
However, putting the racism and classism aside (given that the above 
analysis and references already discredit the notion adequately), it is also 
possible to discern an important point about Brownmiller’s understanding of 
the relationship between rape and violence. Certainly there are people for 
whom violence is a common way of life (although such people are not the 
West’s entire populations of working-class and Black people, nor are 
working-class or Black people inherently predisposed to hold this attitude to 
violence). Likewise, Brownmiller is correct in positing a correlation between 
value systems that accept, tolerate or encourage violence and value systems 
that accept, tolerate or encourage rape (albeit not necessarily in the totalising 
fashion that she describes).199 In this sense, it is certainly possible—and I 
suggest highly probable—that being highly desensitised to, or glorying in, 
violence also leads to one being distinctly desensitised to, or glorying in, 
rape. However, the crucial failing of Brownmiller’s analysis (aside from the 
prejudiced stereotyping) is the notion that it is only from acceptance of 
violence that men learn to accept, justify or celebrate rape. In suggesting that 
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the dominant culture opposes rape whilst a homogenous violent subculture 
entirely justifies it, Brownmiller both denies the violence on which the 
dominant culture is built and organised and overlooks the ways in which 
other cultural attitudes and ideologies within the dominant culture are key—
even more key than violence, in fact—to the ‘justifying’ and legitimising of 
rape. This overemphasis on violence is, I suggest, a recurrent issue in areas 
of mainstream feminist analysis and presents several significant problems, to 
which my analysis will now turn. 
 
 
Feminism, Rape and Violence  
 
As Nicola Gavey suggests, one of the most crucial distinctions developed in 
the early stages of second-wave feminist anti-rape activism and scholarship 
was the assertion that rape is not an ‘overflowing’ of sexual desire but an act 
of domination and aggression focused on the humiliation and control of the 
survivor; this understanding is widely known by, and widely disseminated in 
the form of, the sloganistic phrase ‘rape is an act of violence, not sex’.200 As 
Andrea Lowgren notes, Brownmiller was one of the pioneers of this 
understanding, along with feminists such as Susan Griffin, who presents the 
concept explicitly in phrases such as her claim that ‘[r]ape is an act of 
aggression in which the victim is denied her self-determination. It is an act of 
violence.’201 As a rhetorical device, and in the context of the time the 
understanding was formulated, the maxim that ‘rape is an act of violence, not 
sex’ was extremely significant, providing a stark and effective challenge to 
the longstanding belief that rape was simply an expression of uncontrollable 
lust motivated by desire rather than power. However, this conception—
especially in the simplistic slogan-form of ‘violence, not sex’—is also 
problematic.202  
                                                 
200
 Gavey, Just Sex? p. 30. 
201
 Andrea Lowgren, ‘Brownmiller, Susan (1935– )’, in Encyclopedia of Rape, ed. by Merril D. 
Smith (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2004), pp. 30–31 (p. 30); Griffin, Rape: The Politics 
of Consciousness, p. 23. 
202
 It should be noted, as Gavey does, that at least some of the issues associated with this 
understanding relate more to the reductive slogan ‘violence, not sex’ than to the scholarship 
of Brownmiller or Griffin (Gavey, Just Sex?, pp. 32–33). Neither Brownmiller nor Griffin 
suggest that rape has nothing to do with sex, although Brownmiller can still be argued to 
 94 
 
 
The ‘violence, not sex’ understanding of rape has been widely critiqued by 
other feminists, perhaps most famously by lawyer, academic and activist 
Catharine MacKinnon, who views it as unintentionally legitimising and 
disguising coercive behaviour within the dynamics of (in MacKinnon’s 
construction, an often homogenised) ‘heterosexuality’. For example, she 
writes that:        
 
The point of defining rape as “violence not sex” [...] has been to 
separate sexuality from gender in order to affirm sex 
(heterosexuality) while rejecting violence (rape). The problem 
remains what it has always been: telling the difference. The 
convergence of sexuality with violence, long used at law to deny the 
reality of women’s violation, is recognized by rape survivors, with a 
difference: where the legal system has seen the intercourse in rape, 
victims see the rape in intercourse.203  
 
MacKinnon highlights an important issue here: constructing a discrete 
dichotomy of ‘sex’ and ‘rape’ fails to contend with the fact that sexually 
coercive behaviour (or, more simply, rape) is a common aspect of 
heterosexual intercourse, denying survivors’ experiences and entirely 
legitimising rape in certain contexts. The key point of this argument is 
compelling and insightful, although the universalism and essentialism for 
which MacKinnon is widely criticised are problematic. Whilst it is certainly a 
valid assertion that male coercive behaviour is normalised within many 
dominant heterosexual scripts, MacKinnon undermines her own argument by 
insisting that rape is inherently the central aspect of a homogenised ‘male’ 
sexuality or asserting that all women struggle to tell the difference between 
intercourse and rape.204 Nevertheless, MacKinnon provides informed and 
reasoned analysis of significant issues, especially those concerning how rape 
is defined, understood and experienced in different contexts, by different 
people and institutions.  I will return to these arguments, in particular, in more 
detail later in the thesis. However, at this stage in the discussion, the key 
issue raised by MacKinnon’s analysis is the assumption that permeates work 
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such as Brownmiller’s, namely that all rapes are ‘violent’ or ‘violently 
realised’.  
 
In continuing Amir’s placing of ‘the rapist squarely in the subculture of 
violence’, Brownmiller suggests that rape is inseparable from ‘violence’. Of 
course, in a very significant sense, all rapes are violent: they are a violation 
and invasion, an undesired intrusion and abuse. However, the subculture 
explanation of rape implies that ‘violence’—in the dominant conception of 
direct, aggressive physical force—is the central aspect of rape and the key 
means through which rape is realised by all rapists, and that a cultural 
acceptance of ‘violence’ automatically correlates with a cultural acceptance 
of rape. The relationship between ‘violence’ and rape is far from being this 
simplistic. As MacKinnon notes: ‘Sexual intercourse may be deeply 
unwanted—the woman would never have initiated it—yet no force may be 
present [...] When sex is violent, women may have lost control over what is 
done to us, but absence of force does not ensure the presence of that 
control.’205 Using violence is not an essential component of rape and it is not 
required for an assault to qualify as ‘real rape’: the presence of coercion in 
any form, however ‘non-violently’ expressed, transforms sexual intercourse 
into rape. For example, if we return briefly to Strauss-Kahn and the three 
cases of rape or attempted rape of which he has recently been accused, we 
find two distinct forms of coercion. Diallo accuses him of aggressively 
grabbing her (leading to a torn shoulder ligament and genital bruising) and 
physically forcing her to perform oral sex on him.206 Journalist and writer 
Tristane Banon gave a similar account of her ‘encounter’ with Strauss-Kahn, 
saying that they ‘ended up scuffling on the ground. I kicked him. He 
unfastened my bra and tried to take down my jeans.’207 Both of these cases 
                                                 
205
 Ibid., p. 650. 
206
 Philip Sherwell, ‘Dominique Strauss-Kahn to Reject Plea Deal’ (21/8/2011) 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/dominique-strauss-kahn/8713052/Dominique-Strauss-
Kahn-to-reject-plea-deal.html> [accessed 4 April 2012]; Jennifer Peltz, ‘Report on NY Maid’s 
Exam Riles Strauss-Kahn Team’ (17/8/2011) 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/feedarticle/9800833> [accessed 4 April 2012]. 
207
 John Lichfield, ‘Dominique Strauss-Kahn: What’s in a Reputation?’ (17/5/2012) 
<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/politics/dominique-strausskahn-whats-in-a-
reputation-2284965.html> [accessed 6 April 2012]. Lack of evidence meant the charge of 
attempted rape was reduced to an accusation of sexual assault (for which there was 
evidence and at least a partial confession from Strauss-Kahn); however, too much time had 
elapsed for Strauss-Kahn to be prosecuted on such a charge under French law and the case 
was dropped in October 2011 (‘Strauss-Kahn French Rape Case Dismissed’).  
 96 
 
do meet the stereotypically ‘violent’ model of rape/attempted rape: 
aggressive physical force was used in order to realise the alleged assaults, 
and was a central part of the acts themselves. However, Piroska Nagy, an 
economist who worked at the IMF when Strauss-Kahn was still Managing 
Director, presents a very different form of coercion.  
 
Unlike those of Diallo and Banon, Nagy’s (alleged) experiences do not 
contain direct physical force. Rather, she asserts that Strauss-Kahn used his 
position as her boss to intimidate her into engaging in what the mainstream 
media refer to as ‘an affair’ but which—given Strauss-Kahn’s alleged forceful 
and insistent behaviour and Nagy’s statement that she felt that she was 
‘damned if I did and damned if I didn’t’—should be more accurately be 
considered rape.208 No physical force features in Nagy’s accusation, but the 
existing power structure, Strauss-Kahn’s insistent disregard for Nagy’s right 
to give un-coerced consent and the ever-present threat of workplace 
reprisals make it no less coercive, no less a case of rape. Moreover, there 
are numerous other forms of rape, and numerous other ways in which a rape 
may be realised, in which violence—in the sense of direct, aggressive 
force—is not present. Everything from verbal coercion, threats and blackmail 
or the exacting of economic control to lying, spiking with intoxicants or 
implying that the survivor has a responsibility, duty or simply no choice but to 
‘provide sex’ may be employed (along with many other ‘techniques’) to 
facilitate rape without the presence of ‘violence’. Certainly, these scenarios, 
as in the discussion above, may be considered to be ‘violent’ by virtue of their 
transgression and abuse, but they are not facilitated through direct, 
aggressive force. An analysis of rape that focuses exclusively or primarily on 
rapes committed with or through violence in the form direct, aggressive force 
fails to account for all such rapes. Accordingly, whilst ‘violence’ is undeniably 
significant to the issue of rape, and whilst correlations between cultural 
acceptance of violence and cultural acceptance of rape do exist, a position 
focused too heavily on direct-force violence overlooks the ideologies and 
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understandings that underpin (and encourage) both acceptance of violence 
and acceptance of rape; such ideologies and understandings are, I suggest, 
entirely normalised—even celebrated—not just within subcultures but within 
the dominant culture of the Anglophone West. Zurbriggen’s essay ‘Rape, 
War, and the Socialization of Masculinity: Why our Refusal to Give up War 
Ensures that Rape cannot be Eradicated’ (2010), provides an interesting 
perspective on this issue, developing an analysis of conceptual links between 
militarism, rape and masculine socialisation that both transcends the 
limitations of Brownmiller’s ‘subculture of violence’ and recreates them. 
 
 
Beyond Subcultures and Scapegoats: Rape, War and Hegemonic 
Masculinity  
 
Like Brownmiller, Zurbriggen explores the ways in which wider cultural 
attitudes and ideologies influence attitudes towards, and incidence of, rape. 
Like Brownmiller’s discussion of ‘the subculture of violence’, this exploration 
focuses primarily on a specific group within an overarching dominant culture, 
in this case, the military.  However, Zurbriggen’s study is, for the most part, 
considerably better developed, with deeper, more challenging analysis and a 
more considered approach to the underlying causes of rape (and violence). 
In this respect, the choice of group on which the study is focused is 
significant. Brownmiller’s study focuses on a homogenised group that she 
argues represents values in conflict with those of the dominant culture, an 
argument which supports the legitimising of the ideologies and practices of 
the dominant culture whilst—and through—scapegoating working-class and 
Black communities. Zurbriggen’s focus on the military, in contrast—although 
guilty of some of the same scapegoating—means that the text is analysing a 
group that is approved of by the dominant culture, a group, in fact, that the 
dominant culture valorises and celebrates, and is reliant upon to maintain its 
dominance. In this sense, Zurbriggen’s analysis cannot explain away sexual 
violence as being the result of a specific subculture’s ‘savagery’ but must 
contend with its intricate relations to Western culture, charting the complex 
intersections and causal relationships between militarism, rape and 
masculine socialisation. Accordingly, it is not only individual 
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men/soldiers/rapists who are presented as culpable, but also militaristic 
states/governments, national militaries as institutions and, to an extent 
(although, as will be discussed, by no means entirely), the dominant culture 
at large. The fact that Zurbriggen focuses not on a simplistic model of 
violence but on various key aspects of Western culture and masculine 
socialisation that underpin violence, support militarism, and allow ‘properly’ 
socialised men to both rape and kill, reinforces this position. The same is true 
of the fact that Zurbriggen’s study of the military is—at least in part—used as 
a framework for considering wider cultural factors and ‘to explain not only 
why rape occurs during periods of armed conflict and in military contexts, but 
also why rape occurs in civilian contexts and during peacetime.’209 
Approaching the issue in this fashion provides a more complex and balanced 
analysis of statistical and theoretical data: where Brownmiller discusses a 
simplistic connection between violence and rape and then sweepingly 
blames this upon subcultural views, Zurbriggen explores the underlying 
complexities of how men, and especially soldiers, are socialised into certain 
models of masculinity and modes of behaviour that, she argues, result in 
both warfare and rape.   
 
Starting with the fact that ‘[r]ape perpetrated by soldiers is endemic during 
wartime’, Zurbriggen posits that there are significant links between warfare 
and rape, and that these links are largely traceable to the centrality of 
‘traditional (or hegemonic) masculinity’ to both.210 Indeed, the central 
proposition of the text is that ‘traditional masculine socialization is a causal 
antecedent of both rape and war.’211 The validity of this suggested causality 
is debatable, as will be discussed presently; however, the correlations 
between warfare and rape—and the centrality of the current hegemonic 
model of masculinity to these correlations—are significant, and well 
reasoned, observations. Certainly, the key notions that ‘[hegemonic] 
masculine socialization is a risk factor for rape perpetration’ and that 
‘elements of [hegemonic] masculinity are valued by the military and 
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reinforced in military training’ are both important and near-irrefutable 
propositions.212 Crucially, Zurbriggen’s arguments in support of these points 
go beyond observing simplistic similarities or direct connections between 
warfare and rape to explore the conceptual links between those 
characteristics valued in soldiers (and other men) and widely observed in 
rapists (and other men). For example, Zurbriggen notes that ‘[o]bjectification 
or dehumanization has long been recognized as a precursor to violence [...] 
in an intergroup context. Similarly, treating women like objects within 
interpersonal relationships makes it more likely that they will be abused 
(sexually or otherwise).’213 In this discussion, the argument is not reliant on 
simplistic declarations about ‘violence as a way of life’ as Brownmiller’s is, 
but rather is grounded in explorations of the legitimising and enabling 
processes that rape and (‘non-sexual’) violence share. Moreover, this 
analysis of conceptual connections is further situated in the context of the 
dominant culture at large with observations such as the claim that ‘[t]he 
objectification of others that is often linked to hierarchical social systems 
clearly plays an important role in preparing soldiers to injure and kill others. 
Dehumanization and objectification of the enemy are necessary 
preconditions to killing,’ just as, the analysis implies, the dehumanisation and 
objectification of women are necessary preconditions to rape.214 Here, the 
analysis is moved even further away from the simplistic scapegoating of 
groups who are proposed to simply be violent and amoral, and is instead 
situated firmly in the ways in which the dominant culture legitimises certain 
modes of behaviour.  
 
Moreover, Zurbriggen notes that being socialised into believing the 
desirability of practices in one context (such as learning to objectify ‘the 
enemy’) routinely cross over into other contexts (such as men’s relationships 
with women) despite the numerous (and inevitably doomed) efforts by 
military groups to encourage soldiers to ‘compartmentalise’ and ‘turn off’ 
certain aspects of their character outside of combat situations.215 In this 
respect, Zurbriggen’s analysis is grounded in the study of underlying 
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processes—in this case, objectification—that may be manifested in different 
ways but share conceptual and ideological roots and develop from the same 
cultural acceptance of a process that legitimises violence and/or abuse. It is 
this form of analysis that allows Zurbriggen’s work to progress past the 
blaming of certain stereotyped and homogenised groups to analyse instead 
the systems and ideologies that run through the dominant culture itself, 
legitimising or normalising destructive behaviour. That is to say, where 
Brownmiller effectively suggests that supposedly intrinsically violent men will 
also be (particularly violent) rapists because they do not share civilisation’s 
professed values, Zurbriggen explores how hegemonic masculinity—as both 
an aspect of the dominant culture and a means through which the dominant 
culture is maintained—socialises men in a variety of ways that may be 
manifested both in military violence or in rape (or, often, both). It is this 
aspect of the analysis that makes Zurbriggen’s study useful for my 
examination, providing a precedent both for exploring the ways in which the 
dominant culture supports and encourages sexual violence and for treating 
rape as partly the product of state-sanctioned ideologies and practices. This 
considered, however, when Zurbriggen begins to move beyond observing 
correlations and conceptual links and begins to posit causal relationships, her 
discussion becomes more problematic. 
 
 
Making War, Making Rapists: Zurbriggen and Causality  
 
Zurbriggen suggests that the model of masculinity that she describes 
interchangeably as ‘traditional’ and ‘hegemonic’ understands ‘status and 
achievement; toughness and aggression; restricted emotionality; and power, 
dominance, and control’ to be crucial elements of ‘masculinity’ or 
‘manliness’.216 As noted above, the central proposition of ‘Rape, War, and the 
Socialization of Masculinity’ is that the model of masculinity is a cause of both 
warfare and rape. However, Zurbriggen notes that the arguments provided in 
support of this are ‘silent [...] on the reasons why this form of masculinity is so 
prevalent, historically, culturally and individually’.217 Accordingly, she 
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proposes ‘a possible answer: that most societies construct masculinity in the 
particular hegemonic form [discussed in the essay] because they want the 
capability to wage war, either in self-defence or as a means of conquest’.218 
Of course, there is no inherent reason why traditional masculinity cannot be a 
cause of warfare and rape whilst warfare is simultaneously the cause of 
traditional masculinity—a circular causality is by no means an impossibility—
but there is still an important issue raised by Zurbriggen’s proposals. Whilst 
the assertion that the model of masculinity in question is a cause of rape is 
accurate and well documented, the argument that it is a cause of war is more 
problematic. Indeed, despite claims to the contrary, Zurbriggen actually 
provides very little support for this notion; certainly, there are detailed 
discussions of how the model of masculinity influences the behaviour of 
soldiers, helps to make soldiers more ‘effective’ and encourages men to 
become soldiers, but these do not support the argument that the model of 
masculinity is actually a cause of warfare. For example, Zurbriggen notes 
that ‘[b]ecause killing the enemy is one of the important goals of warfare, 
soldiers must be capable of committing violent acts’ and that the model of 
masculinity is consequently extremely useful to the military because 
‘[t]raditional masculine socialization teaches men that violence is manly’.219 
Whilst this observation is both accurate and significant, it explains only how 
‘traditional masculine socialization’ makes training soldiers to kill easier for 
the military and not how it is a cause of warfare. Similarly, when Zurbriggen 
argues—again, perfectly accurately—that ‘[w]hen men leave behind 
restricted emotionality, toughness and aggression, and dominance and 
control, they are less likely to join the military as a means for proving their 
manhood’, she is only explaining how the currently hegemonic model of 
masculinity encourages men to join the military and fight in wars, not why 
these wars actually occur.220  
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The only argument that might qualify as supporting the claim that ‘traditional’ 
masculinity is a cause of war is the observation that: ‘War is an act of power, 
at both the geopolitical and individual levels. Thus it is not surprising that 
political leaders with high levels of power motivation (i.e. a chronic concern 
with impact and control) are more likely to enter a war.’221 However, this 
statement simply recreates for politicians the same individual-based analysis 
that was employed in the discussion of soldiers, attempting to locate the 
cause of warfare in an individual’s characteristics rather than the structure of 
the dominant culture at large. This argument is reductive and short-sighted, 
recalling—albeit in a far more considered and reasoned fashion—the more 
essentialist feminist position that proposes that men’s ‘inherent’ capacity for 
violence is the cause of warfare, whilst simultaneously making invisible the 
systems of imperialism, exploitation, violence and abuse upon which the 
dominant culture of the Anglophone West relies.222 Indeed, as Michael 
Parenti notes in regard to American imperial war-making:  
 
Those who see empire [and empire’s wars] as arising from the 
macho need to dominate do not explain why U.S. leaders want to 
dominate some nations more than others. The machismo theory 
does not explain why Washington comes down so consistently on the 
side of transnational corporate interests, landowners, and military 
autocrats rather than on the side of workers [or] peasants.223  
 
In suggesting that masculine socialisation creates politicians who enter wars 
because of a personal desire for power, Zurbriggen makes invisible the 
economic, political and imperial motivations that underpin the decision to ‘go 
to war’. In this sense, although correlations and connections between this 
model of masculinity and warfare do exist, it cannot be reasonably argued 
that masculinity causes warfare, only that it plays a supporting or enabling 
role in military recruitment and training. 
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Beyond the Military: The Limits of Zurbriggen’s Focus on War 
 
Once the notion that ‘traditional’ masculinity causes war is removed from the 
analysis, the problematic proposal that underlies Zurbriggen’s argument is 
more starkly revealed. If, as noted above, this model of masculinity is central 
to rape incidence, and if warfare is central to the processes by which this 
model comes to be hegemonic (and the point is well documented), then 
Zurbriggen’s argument is effectively that warfare causes rape.224 Indeed, she 
actually makes this claim quite explicitly, suggesting that ‘society’s need for 
effective soldiers is the root cause of traditional masculine socialization and 
[...] this socialization ensures that rape will be prevalent.’225 This assertion is, 
in isolation, a valid point, but the connections between militarism, masculine 
socialisation and rape happen in anything but isolation; the issue that 
Zurbriggen fails to engage with is that there are numerous areas other than 
warfare/militarism that play central roles in maintaining the hegemony of the 
currently hegemonic model of masculinity. Through this oversight, 
Zurbriggen’s analysis begins to recreate the same failings found in 
Brownmiller’s analysis.  
 
Although the focus on hegemonic masculinity ostensibly means that 
Zurbriggen’s analysis implicates the dominant culture at large in the West’s 
rape problem, her subsequent move to locate the origins of this hegemony in 
a specific element of the dominant culture begins to treat rape as something 
grounded not in the dominant culture itself but in isolated aspects of it or 
within specific (military or militaristic) individuals or groups. In this fashion, 
just as Brownmiller’s scapegoating of the ‘subculture of violence’ suggests 
that the values of the dominant culture—the ‘laws of civility’—do not 
contribute to rape incidence and are, in fact, opposed to rape, Zurbriggen’s 
analysis scapegoats militarism and militaristic individuals or groups, implying 
that, aside from these elements, the dominant culture does not create and 
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celebrate models of masculinity that significantly influence incidence of rape. 
In this analysis, ending the hegemony of this model of masculinity is 
presented as central to the struggle against rape, and ending militarism is 
suggested to be the blow required to end the hegemony. In her conclusion, 
Zurbriggen makes precisely this argument, stating that: 
 
[P]eace work and rape prevention are intimately intertwined. Efforts 
aimed at new strategies for global interaction, ones that leave war 
behind as a failed experiment, will (if successful) eliminate the need 
for soldiers and the larger military apparatus. With this need 
eliminated, masculine socialization will no longer be necessary or 
useful. Because only the negative consequences of masculinity 
would then remain, it should be possible to embrace new forms of 
masculinity that are healthier for men, for women, and for the 
planet.226 
 
Ending warfare would, undoubtedly, influence masculine socialisation, and 
might accordingly have some impact on rates of rape in the Anglophone 
West (aside from ending wartime rape). However, the notion that ending 
warfare would entirely undermine the dominance of the currently hegemonic 
model of masculinity (and so significantly influence rape incidence) is simply 
inaccurate. This model of masculinity is useful and necessary to civilised 
Anglophone West because it socialises many men (and women) into 
accepting a series of ideologies, understandings and practices that are 
beneficial to the civilised project.227 However, supporting militarism is only 
one way in which these ideologies, understandings and practices are 
‘beneficial’; they support many aspects of Western culture that are central to 
the continued existence and spread of Western civilisation, socialising men 
into a series of ‘useful’ and ‘necessary’ roles. In this sense, although 
Zurbriggen’s own analysis has a limited scope, the analytical model she 
develops can be applied to a far wider discussion, providing a more 
comprehensive understanding of the complex relationships between 
masculinity, the dominant culture and rape.  
 
If the West’s militaries were disbanded as the result of developments in 
global interaction, the model of masculinity that Zurbriggen associates almost 
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exclusively with militarism would still be highly significant to many areas of 
the culture and socio-political organisation of the Anglophone West. Perhaps 
the most obvious example, given its (increasingly) close proximity to the 
military is internal security forces such as the police.228 As Stanley Diamond 
notes, ‘[c]ivilization originates in conquest abroad and repression at home.’229 
Soldiers are required for the former, but internal security forces are required 
for the latter.  The internal structure of the Anglophone West is, as Derrick 
Jensen notes, reliant on legitimised violence and coercive authority to 
maintain the power structures and hierarchies on which the West is founded; 
accordingly, ending the ‘need’ for the soldiers and military apparatus used to 
conquer and exploit those in other countries would not end the ‘need’ for 
police officers and the apparatus of internal state repression required to 
control ‘the masses’ within the Anglophone West itself.230 (In fact, one might 
argue that losing the military would limit the West’s opportunities to exploit 
workers overseas, leading to an increased exploitation of—and so an 
increased need to police—workers ‘at home’.) In this sense, the police can 
be seen to perform a similar function to the military, and, as such, it is not 
surprising that the ‘masculine’ qualities favoured by the military are also 
favoured by the police. The elements of contemporary hegemonic 
masculinity that Zurbriggen highlights—including respect for hierarchy, lack 
of empathy, focuses on status, aggression, and power, dominance and 
control—all encourage certain men (and women) to join the police and play a 
central role in making the police ‘effective’.231  It is also, perhaps, not 
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surprising that Western internal security services (police, border guards and 
so forth) have a reputation for routinely practising (or employing the threat of) 
sexual violence akin to that of the West’s militaries.232 In this sense, 
Zurbriggen’s analysis must be expanded past indictments of soldiers and war 
as central to the Anglophone West’s rape problem to include internal security 
services and coercive state authority as well. However, this is only a very 
slight improvement on Zurbriggen’s limited scope, remaining focused on 
clearly demarcated groups with a strong connection to violence. In light of 
this, it is useful to consider how the same model of masculinity also supports 
ostensibly different groups: privileged, powerful men with jobs far removed 
from direct violence and aggression.     
 
It is widely noted that the model of masculinity discussed above is central to 
the ‘effectiveness’ of, for example, businessmen and corporate bosses.233 
Sheltered from the direct violence and abuses routinely associated with 
militarism and internal security, the ‘effectiveness’ of the privileged ranks of a 
large corporation—or a large financial institution such as the IMF—
nevertheless requires the same respect for hierarchy, the same absence of 
empathy, and the same focus on status, aggression (in the form of 
aggressive ‘negotiation’, sales pitches and so forth), and power, dominance 
and control that are required for soldiers to be effective. As Ann Oakley 
notes, ‘[m]ost corporate decision-making is in the hands of men recruited for 
their ability to put profit before ethics and act out a tough-minded, aggressive 
                                                                                                                                          
Ideology, Conspiracy, Ethnic Life and Class Power (San Francisco: City Lights, 1996), p. 
37). 
232
 For example, see: Eithne Luibhéid, Entry Denied: Controlling Sexuality at the Border 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002), pp. 118–127; ‘Policing Sex Work’  
http://www.incite-national.org/media/docs/4668_toolkitrev-sexwork.pdf> [accessed 1 May 
2012]); Kathy Kelleher, ‘G20 Journalist Threatened with Rape, Violence in Jail’ (29/6/2010) 
<http://jezebel.com/5575356/g20-journalist-threatened-with-rape-violence-in-jail> [accessed 
1 May 2012]; Rowenna Davis, ‘Irish Police Chief Apologises for Officers who joked about 
Raping Protestors’ (8/4/2011) <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/apr/08/irish-police-
chief-aplogises-rape-jokes> [accessed 1 May 2012]. 
233
 For example, see: Mike Donaldson, ‘What is Hegemonic Masculinity?’, Theory and 
Society, Vol. 22, No. 5 (1993), 643–657 (pp. 654–657); Cliff Cheng, ‘Marginalized 
Masculinities and Hegemonic Masculinity: An Introduction’, The Journal of Men’s Studies, 
Vol. 7, No. 3 (1999), 295–315 (pp. 299–300); Agneta H. Fischer, and Annelies E. M. van 
Vianen, ‘Corporate Masculinity’, in A Companion to Gender Studies, ed. by Philomena 
Essed, David Theo Goldberg and Audrey Kobayashi (Chichester: Blackwell, 2009), pp. 342–
353 (pp. 345–348); James W. Messerschmidt, Masculinities and Crime: Critique and 
Reconceptualization of Theory (Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 1993), pp. 133–142. 
 107 
 
attitude to furthering the goals of the corporation above all else.’234 Only on 
the final point do I contest Oakley’s statement: the ‘goals of the corporation’, I 
suggest, are not valued ‘above all else’ but rather are subordinated to the 
goals of the individual decision-makers, valued only when they match those 
of the individuals. That is to say, profit and power for the corporation is only a 
goal for individual decision-makers because it translates into profits (or, at 
least, continued pay) and power for the individuals themselves. R.W. Connell 
makes a similar argument, noting that what she calls ‘transnational business 
masculinity’ is characterised by ‘increasing egocentrism, very conditional 
loyalties (even to the corporation), and a declining sense of responsibility for 
others (except for the purposes of image making).’235 In this sense, it is 
readily apparent that contemporary capitalism is as deeply entwined with the 
hegemonic model of masculinity—and its associated proclivity to rape—as 
the military.  
 
In the wake of the Strauss-Kahn/Diallo case, there have been numerous 
media attacks on the IMF, Wall Street bankers and the higher levels of 
corporate capitalism over charges of sexually aggressive or coercive 
behaviour and attitudes, many of them drawing attention to correlations 
between business practices and ‘sexual’ practices in the competitive, male-
dominated and, arguably, often unethical world of high level finance.236 
Indeed, some, such as Lacy MacAuley, took this to the point of stating that 
‘Strauss-Kahn’s alleged sex attack on an African immigrant is a harrowing 
metaphor for how the IMF treats the rest of the world.’237 Men such as 
Strauss-Kahn and other privileged, powerful financial and business figures 
are far removed from soldiers; hegemonic masculinity does not lead them to 
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join an army, nor is it employed to help teach them to kill enemy soldiers in 
the heat of battle, but it does lead them into the competitive world of high-
level capitalism and it encourages them in their efforts to triumph and to 
profit, even when their choices and their actions leave poverty, suffering and 
death in their wake. As with the soldiers discussed in Zurbriggen’s essay, the 
attitudes, ideologies and values that support these practices also produce a 
marked proclivity to rape. This begins to highlight a crucial point: although 
hegemonic masculinity is significant to both of these examples (as will be 
explored further in chapter three), it is itself a manifestation of the ideologies 
and practices of the dominant culture of the Anglophone West, just as 
warfare or corporate capitalism are.  
 
 
Objectifying and Consuming Others: The Dominant Culture of the 
Anglophone West 
 
The current hegemonic model of masculinity, as suggested above, is 
intimately connected to the Anglophone West’s rape problem. Similarly, 
hegemonic masculinity—as experienced by soldiers—does, as Zurbriggen 
notes, help some men to accept orders and hierarchy, to kill without 
hesitation and without showing fear, guilt or empathy.  Likewise, hegemonic 
masculinity—as experienced by high-ranking capitalists—also helps some 
men to treat workers and consumers as objects in an equation and the non-
human world as meaningless resources, to make profits at the cost of the 
lives and liberties of others, without hesitation, guilt or empathy. However, the 
significant point here is that hegemonic masculinity is not the origin of these 
behaviours; the model of masculinity in question supports these practices not 
because it produces them but because both the practices and the model’s 
hegemony are products of the same underlying cultural ideologies, 
understanding and practices. The dominant culture of the Anglophone West, 
I argue, is predicated on and reliant on objectification, on the normalising of 
subject-object relationships and the utilitarian, self-interested exploitation of 
others; it functions in its current form precisely because it is widely accepted 
that—in the correct circumstances—one person’s life, liberty, safety or bodily 
integrity can be worth less than the pleasure, the profit or the personal gain of 
 109 
 
another, more privileged person. Jack D. Forbes presents this aspect of 
Western culture as a kind of contagious madness spread by contact with the 
civilised, as a ‘cannibal psychosis’ which teaches that ‘the consuming of 
another’s life for one’s own private purpose or profit’ is an acceptable, or 
even preferable, way of life.238 This understanding of life, I will argue, informs 
a great many of the ideologies and practices that shape the dominant culture.  
 
The current hegemonic model of masculinity, for example, is hegemonic 
precisely because it supports this aspect of the dominant culture: the form 
this model takes and the hegemony it has achieved are the product of the 
belief that ‘consuming’ others is acceptable, because ‘consuming’ others for 
personal gain is key to the objectification, the restricted emotionality, the 
focus on power, control and dominance that shapes this model of 
masculinity. Warfare, too, is a product of this belief, of the understanding that 
the conquering and exploiting of other communities for the profit of one’s 
‘own’ country is normal and justifiable. The same is true of the IMF, Wall 
Street bankers and corporate capitalism, which treat the lives of poor people, 
workers, consumers and other ‘subordinates’ as expendable objects in an 
equation geared towards profits for the rich and powerful. Finally, the same is 
true of rape: at its root, the central premise on which rape is predicated is that 
the pleasure or personal gain of the rapist is more significant than the bodily 
integrity, the right to consent, the life, of the survivor. Each of these issues 
intersects with the others at numerous points; they mutually support each 
other in multiple ways, but they are all—rape included—assuredly products of 
the same underlying understandings and beliefs. That is to say, sexual 
violence intersects with a wide range of ideologies and practices, but the 
underlying issue is the dominant culture itself, the belief that some lives are 
worth less than others and so may be treated as objects that exist only to be 
used and ‘consumed’. Looking at how specific groups or ideologies are 
implicated in the Anglophone West’s rape problem is an important—even 
essential—task, but locating the roots of rape in these groups or ideologies 
avoids addressing the true extent of the issue. In this sense, there must 
come a point at which one stops adding to the list of culpable parties, and 
begins instead to address that which underlies all of them and the problem of 
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rape itself, to look, that is, not to subcultures of violence but to the 
superculture of objectification, to the dominant culture’s normalising of 
exploiting and consuming others. To this end, the next chapter will explore 
and expand on the notion of the Anglophone West as a superculture of 
objectification, analysing how consuming others is a central component of the 
dominant culture in order to suggest that rape, as an extreme example of 
normalised objectification, is an inevitable and perhaps even inherent product 
of the dominant culture of the Anglophone West. 
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In a World of Objects: The Social Production of Rapable Bodies 
 
 
 
In the previous chapter, I critiqued the West’s dominant narrative of sexual 
violence, challenging the understanding of rape as something ‘natural’ and 
‘savage’ that civilisation struggles to contain and control. Countering this 
narrative, I proposed that, far from being the echo of an imagined, primitive 
past, rape in the Anglophone West is the product of the dominant culture of 
the Anglophone West itself, of its ideologies, practices and modes of thinking. 
At the close of my argument, I suggested that the cultural acceptability of 
objectification is central to this process, and described the Anglophone West 
as a ‘superculture of objectification’: a culture in which the objectification, use 
and consumption of others is widely normalised, legitimised and even 
celebrated. This chapter will develop the argument further, substantiating this  
description  and exploring in detail the key role objectification plays both in 
enabling rape and in structuring Western society, culture and politics.   
 
As I will argue, the understanding that the use and ‘consumption’ of 
subordinated others is acceptable, even laudable, has been and remains at 
the very core of the Anglophone West’s cultural and political development, 
from its origins to the present day. This philosophy has underpinned the 
violence and exploitation that characterise the history of the Anglophone 
West, enabling and ‘justifying’ innumerable acts of objectification and abuse, 
and continues to exert a pronounced influence to this day; indeed, as I will 
discuss, this core understanding of the self in relation to others and to the 
world at large remains a central component of the socio-cultural terrain of the 
contemporary Anglophone West. Central to this argument will be the outlining 
of three key ways in which the ‘underlying philosophy of objectification’ 
operates in support of the Anglophone West’s rape culture: by providing a 
philosophical and ideological foundation for the normalising of rape, by 
influencing the socio-political organisation of Western countries in a manner 
that makes them susceptible to the legitimising of sexual violence against 
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(marginalised) women, and by supporting the proliferation of modes of 
interpersonal interaction that share conceptual links with, and provide 
ideological support for, rape as a form of objectifying, utilitarian relation. This 
chapter will address these three points in sequence, moving from the 
macrosocial to the microsocial. First, however, it is important to explore the 
concept of ‘objectification’ in more detail and to situate it in the context of 
Western culture so as to clarify—and defend—my description of the 
Anglophone West as a superculture of objectification.  
 
 
The Anglophone West: A Superculture of Objectification  
 
Describing Western civilisation as a ‘superculture of objectification’ is 
perhaps a bold declaration, and one that requires careful development. 
Firstly, it is essential to establish what is meant by ‘objectification’. In her 
philosophical exploration of the concept, Martha C. Nussbaum suggests that 
there are ‘at least seven distinct ways of behaving introduced by the term’: 
‘Instrumentality’, ‘Denial of autonomy’, ‘Inertness’, ‘Fungibility’, ‘Violability’, 
‘Ownership’ and ‘Denial of objectivity’.239 Each of these ‘ways of behaving’ 
can indeed be classified as a form of objectification, and each will inform my 
own analysis to some extent. However, from the list, there is one form that is 
the most significant to my employment of the concept of objectification: 
‘Instrumentality’, a form of behaviour in which, Nussbaum argues, ‘[t]he 
objectifier treats the object as a tool of his or her purpose’.240 This particular 
form of objectification is the most useful for my analysis partly because it is 
perhaps the most consistent, wide-ranging form—indeed, it could be said that 
understanding ‘the object’ as existing for the objectifier’s own purpose is 
present in and underpins all the other forms—and partly because it is the 
form most closely related to the abusive or exploitative use and consumption 
of others. Nussbaum herself highlights instrumentality, at least in the context 
of sexual objectification, as particularly significant, suggesting in a separate 
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essay that ‘if [...] we want to understand what is wrong with objectification in 
the context of gender relations we will do well to focus on the idea of (mere) 
instrumental use: the objectifier treats the objectified as a mere tool of his 
ends, not as an end in herself.’241 This emphasis is mirrored by Deborah H. 
Gruenfeld and others, who suggest that instrumentality is key to the process 
by which an objectifier comes to understand a potential target as ‘desirable’, 
as having the capacity to serve the objectifier’s interests.242 Certainly, it is 
instrumentality that is central to many feminist definitions of objectification. 
Barbara L. Frederickson and Tomi-Ann Roberts provide a representative 
definition in this respect: 
 
Sexual objectification occurs whenever a woman’s body, body parts, 
or sexual function are separated out from her person, reduced to the 
status of mere instruments, or regarded as if they were capable of 
representing her [...] In other words, when objectified, women are 
treated as bodies—and in particular, as bodies that exist for the use 
and pleasure of others. 243  
 
The centrality of instrumentality to this definition is readily apparent: in 
perceiving a woman only in terms of her ‘body, body parts, or sexual function’ 
the objectifier is viewing and valuing her only in terms of her use to the 
objectifier. This instrumental perception leads in turn to instrumental 
treatment: the treating of women ‘as bodies—and in particular, as bodies that 
exist for the use and pleasure of others’. When women are treated as bodies 
to be used by others, they are treated as tools or instruments, as a means to 
another’s ends and, as such, we might refer to this as ‘instrumental 
objectification’. Importantly, this treatment may well include any or all of the 
other forms of objectification suggested by Nussbaum. For example, in the 
form of rape, treating a woman as a sexual object always includes denying 
her autonomy and subjectivity and treating her as violable, and may include 
treating her as inert, fungible or as owned property. However, these forms of 
objectifying treatment are all grounded in the instrumental treatment of the 
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woman and, ultimately, all develop from the instrumental perception of the 
woman: it is the perception of the woman as an instrument to be used that 
provides the ‘justification’ for the objectifying treatment. In this sense, sexual 
objectification, as it is defined here, is a clear illustration of the centrality of 
instrumentality to objectification.  
 
However, it is crucial to note that this instrumental objectification—as both a 
type of act and a mode of perception—is by no means restricted to the 
sexual objectification of women; the definitions found in feminist analysis 
require only relatively slight modification to become applicable to other forms 
of objectification. For example, described by Aristotle as an ‘animate tool’, a 
slave is both perceived and treated as a body that exists ‘for the use and 
pleasure of others’, viewed and—quite literally—valued in relation to the 
capacity to labour for the slave master.244 (Of course, enslaved women and 
girls—and to a lesser extent men and boys—are also frequently subject to 
sexual objectification and exploitation).245 Similarly, workers are frequently 
both perceived and treated as little more than labouring bodies or the 
capacity to labour (the embodiment of the skills and knowledge required to 
fulfil certain tasks).246 This instrumental treatment is not limited to 
relationships between humans: great numbers of animals, caged in zoos or 
raised in the feculent darkness of factory farms, are also perceived and 
treated purely in terms of their use to humans, as food, clothing or 
entertainment.247 Likewise, the vernacular of the Anglophone West routinely 
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describes the non-human world as ‘natural resources’, as things to be used 
by humanity, reducing them to the wooden ‘bodies’ of trees, the mineral 
‘bodies’ of mountains, the oil and gas beneath the surface of the land.248 
Each of these examples—and there are many more—share a common 
characteristic: they all describe the treatment of forms of life (or elements of 
the land that provide habitats to many forms of life) as instrumental objects, 
as means to an end, tools to be used for benefit of others. Indeed, placing 
the last example in a colonial context (and a discussion of the Anglophone 
West is effectively always a colonial context) makes this conceptual 
connection even more apparent. In the civilised, imperialist understanding, 
‘natural resources’ includes more than trees, minerals and fossil fuels; the 
fertile land itself, the ‘exotic’ plants and animals, the ceremonial practices of 
colonised cultures, the labouring bodies of colonised peoples, the raped 
bodies of colonised women all fall under the same objectifying perception, 
becoming, in intricate and intersectional ways, ‘resources’ for the invading 
civilised to exploit.249 In this sense, at the raped bodies of colonised women, 
the examples come full circle, arriving back to ‘bodies that exist for the use 
and pleasure of others’ with each example in between not a departure but 
simply a variation on a common theme and a common definition of 
instrumental objectification.   
  
The fact that the above examples are each only a few short modifications 
away from Frederickson and Roberts’ definition of sexual objectification 
highlights the reason I used the definition as a starting point for my analysis: 
because my work seeks to draw parallels and connections between different 
forms of objectification (and the discourses of civilisation that normalise and 
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legitimise them), the wide-ranging applicability of Frederickson and Roberts’ 
definition already highlights conceptual connections. However, there is a 
distinction I wish to make between my own approach and that of 
Frederickson and Roberts. Like many feminist definitions and discussions of 
objectification, Frederickson and Roberts’ approach is focused on women’s 
experiences of being objectified and how it affects their lives, relationships, 
mental health and self-identity. This approach is, of course, extremely 
important: in focusing on women’s experiences, theorists both improve 
understanding of the issues women face under patriarchy and help to return 
voices—and, indeed, to restore subjectivity—to a marginalised and 
objectified class. However, my own approach deviates from this. Because I 
will be situating the concept of objectification in an analysis of the 
Anglophone West, exploring how objectification is a learnt behaviour that is 
normalised and, to varying degrees, legitimised by the dominant culture, I will 
be interrogating the experiences of objectifiers, as well as exploring the 
resultant repercussions for the objectified. In this respect, it is useful to 
borrow from ecofeminist Val Plumwood’s concept of ‘instrumentalism’, a 
concept that is distinct from, although closely related to, the ‘instrumental 
objectification’ used in this analysis.250 Plumwood writes that 
‘[i]nstrumentalism is a way of relating to the world which corresponds to a 
certain model of selfhood, the selfhood conceived as that of the individual 
who stands apart from an alien other and denies his own relationship to and 
dependency on this other.’251 Although I will return this theory later, at this 
stage it is Plumwood’s description of instrumentalism as ‘a way of relating to 
the world’ centred on a specific conception of the self that is of interest. Like 
Plumwood’s instrumentalism, the instrumental objectification my analysis is 
concerned with is a means of relating to others or to the world around 
oneself. It is not an isolated act, or the product of single specific context or 
power-relation, but a largely normalised understanding of the objectifier’s self 
in relation to others, to society, and to the world at large. In this sense, 
instrumental objectification not only refers to the treatment of others as a 
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means to one’s own ends, but also to a self-centred, individualistic mode of 
perception that views, values and relates to others in terms of their capacity 
to serve one’s own ends, and which understands the self as entitled to this 
service despite the cost to the objectified party. 
  
The above definition of instrumental objectification as a mode of perception 
or a means of relating to others is central to the concept of a ‘superculture of 
objectification’. A superculture of objectification is not simply a culture in 
which objectification is widely practised (although that is certainly true as 
well); rather, it is a culture in which instrumental objectification plays a vital 
structuring role, informing the culture’s dominant ideologies, social 
organisation and normative practices. It is a culture in which objectification, in 
numerous forms, is normalised and legitimised, a culture in which the 
instrumental use of others—on both a micro- and macrosocial scale—is one 
of the most prevalent means of relating to others. This suggests that the 
Anglophone West is an (or perhaps, the) archetypal model of a superculture 
of objectification. Shaped by its long history of warfare, imperial expansion 
and the enslavement of objectified Others, the modern Anglophone West, I 
suggest, is organised socially and politically around the underlying belief that 
some lives are less valuable than others, that some may be used as objects 
and instruments so that others may profit. As Stanley Diamond argues, 
‘[c]ivilization originates in conquest abroad and repression at home.’252 That 
is to say, in the terms of the current discussion, that the colonial 
objectification of non-Western peoples (and land and ‘resources’) and the 
hierarchical objectification of marginalised and subordinated Westerners are 
both central to the ‘civilised’ Anglophone West.253 We might also add to 
Diamond’s statement that civilisation also originates in the objectification and 
exploitation of non-human life, that, as argued in the previous chapter, 
dominating nature is central to civilisation’s definition and self-conception. 
Crucially, instrumental objectification is central to each of these aspects of 
Anglophone Western culture, providing a foundation of self-serving 
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ideologies that encourage, normalise and legitimise the utilitarian treatment 
of living beings as expendable objects. As I will argue presently, on the 
macrosocial scale, it underpins the actions of Western governments, from 
resource wars and colonisation to the marginalisation of whole classes of 
people and the degradation and exploitation of the non-human world. On the 
microsocial scale, it influences individual practices and interactions, 
encouraging and normalising self-interested forms of interaction that treat 
others—from sexual partners and family members to shop workers and 
sweat-shop labourers—as things to be used in order to serve one’s own 
interests.  
 
In this sense, the Anglophone West’s superculture of objectification is a 
complex web of intricately intersecting relations, all premised on the notion 
that it is acceptable to treat others as objects, but all taking different forms 
and operating on vastly different scales. Within this complexity there are 
numerous points at which the Anglophone West’s superculture of 
objectification supports or enables its rape culture. For the purposes of 
clarity, I will group these points into three broad categories, distinguished by 
the social scale on which they operate. These three categories map onto and 
are consistent with what I suggest are the three key ways in which the 
Anglophone West’s superculture of objectification supports its rape culture: 
by providing the rape culture with an ideological and philosophical 
foundation, by helping to shape a dominant form of social and political 
organisation that is sympathetic and conducive to the rape culture, and by 
normalising forms of ‘day-to-day’ relation and interaction that share 
significant conceptual links to the practice of rape. The remainder of this 
chapter will discuss these points of connection and support, moving from the 
macro to the micro, addressing the underlying philosophy of objectification, 
its influence on the social structuring of the Anglophone West, and finally, its 
manifestation in daily life and individual interaction.       
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The Underlying Philosophy of Objectification 
 
As suggested above, objectification is widely present in the Anglophone 
West, operating on a wide scale that encompasses everything from the 
relatively benign objectification of shop workers, taxi drivers or waiters by 
their customers—whose reason for relating to the ‘object’ is premised only on 
their own interests—through to the mass objectification required to destroy 
an ecosystem in the name of urban expansion, or to drop a nuclear bomb on 
a huge number of ‘enemy’ civilians (who are carefully turned, in civilised 
discourse, from living beings to the objectified ‘collateral damage’).254 It is to 
this underlying philosophy, I suggest, that Powhatan-Renápe/Delaware-
Lenápe activist and academic Jack D. Forbes is referring when he writes of 
the ‘cannibal psychosis’ of the civilised, the belief in the acceptability of 
‘consuming [...] another’s life for one’s own private purpose or profit.’255 
Similarly, hooks’ discussion of the relationship between violence against 
women and the West’s traditions of hierarchy and coercive rule can be 
argued to refer, ultimately, to the same underlying philosophy. What hooks 
describes as ‘the Western philosophical notion of hierarchical rule and 
coercive authority’ is intimately connected to—and perhaps even 
interchangeable with—the underlying philosophy of objectification.256 The 
Cambridge Dictionary defines a hierarchy as ‘a system in which people or 
things are arranged according to their importance.’257 This arrangement by 
order of importance is itself premised on the central condition of the West’s 
‘underlying philosophy of objectification’ suggested above: some lives are 
less valuable than others. That is to say, the belief that lives have no intrinsic 
value, that some may be classed as ‘worth’ less than others, provides the 
foundation upon which both the philosophy of objectification and the West’s 
hierarchical social organisation are constructed. In addition, social hierarchy 
is, in many respects, a manner of organising the underlying philosophy of 
objectification. As Gruenfeld and others note, ‘the purpose of organizational 
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hierarchy, almost by definition, is to formalize who is allowed to be used as a 
means to an end, and by whom.’258 In this sense, hierarchy functions as an 
extension of the West’s philosophy of objectification, as one of the key 
systems through which objectification operates. Indeed, one could even 
argue that to discuss ‘the Western notion of hierarchy’ is also to discuss—
albeit from a marginally different position—‘the West’s underlying philosophy 
of objectification’, the philosophical position that is formalised in hierarchy. 
Moreover, the coercive authority that hooks discusses refers to a form of 
institutionalised behaviour common to both the notion of hierarchy and the 
philosophy of objectification: depending on the position from which one is 
approaching the issue, one may describe ‘coercive authority’ as either the 
legitimised violence used by those higher up the hierarchy to suppress the 
rights, and preserve the exploitation, of those below them, or the legitimised 
violence used by objectifier classes to suppress the subjectivity, and 
preserve the instrumental use of, objectified classes. In this sense, hooks’ 
discussion of the ‘philosophical notion of hierarchy’ and my own analysis of 
the ‘philosophy of objectification’ are, again, intimately connected. The 
common ground held by the two concepts is particularly useful to my analysis 
when hooks’ discussion is considered in its original context. 
 
Highlighting the conceptual links between violence, hierarchy and gender 
oppression, hooks writes:  
 
While I agree [...] that male violence against women [...] is an 
expression of male domination, I believe that violence is inextricably 
linked to all acts of violence in this society that occur between the 
powerful and the powerless, the dominant and the dominated. While 
male supremacy encourages the use of abusive force to maintain 
male domination of women, it is the Western philosophical notion of 
hierarchical rule and coercive authority that is the root cause of 
violence against women.259 
 
Given the connections between hooks’ analysis and my own, hooks’ full 
statement provides a model for understanding the relation of the West’s rape 
culture to the underlying philosophy of objectification. Central to hooks’ 
argument is the observation that male violence against women, whilst 
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undeniably a product of patriarchal social organisation, does not occur in 
isolation; rather, she suggests, it is profoundly related to violent oppression in 
general, and deeply grounded in the philosophical normalisation of social 
stratification. This argument also applies to the relationship between the 
Anglophone West’s rape culture and the West’s ‘philosophy of 
objectification’. By virtue of the fact that it is enabled by the perception of a 
woman as an objectified tool through which a rapist may gain personal 
gratification—and the fact that it necessarily involves the denial of the 
woman’s subjectivity, agency and autonomy—rape is, I suggest, quite 
evidently an extreme form of sexual objectification. Given that this sexual 
objectification is normalised and, to varying degrees, legitimised by 
patriarchal social organisation, it is also undeniably a form of male 
objectification of women that is supported and validated by systems of male 
domination. However, as in hook’s argument, this explicitly gendered 
objectification does not occur in isolation. Rather it is grounded in a deeper 
philosophical foundation of Western culture, a foundation that underpins both 
patriarchal domination and the systems of legitimised violence alluded to by 
hooks and, in the earlier discussion, by Zurbriggen and, to a lesser extent, 
Brownmiller. Patriarchy and gender oppression certainly dictate the form of 
the objectification, providing the patriarchal power structure and heterosexual 
scripts that are so fundamental to rape, but it is the underlying notion that 
some lives are less valuable than others and so may be used as objects for 
another’s benefit that provides the necessary legitimising foundation.  
 
Without this underlying philosophy, objectification—in the form of rape or 
otherwise—cannot be normalised or legitimised within the dominant culture 
at large; stripped of its foundations, it can only be a deeply stigmatised 
transgression, culturally unacceptable and indefensible. In this sense, the 
normalising and legitimising of rape is profoundly grounded in a philosophy 
that is, as argued above, central to—and perhaps even inherent to—Western 
culture. However, because this philosophy is underlying—that is to say, 
deeply immersed, often unseen, within the fabric of the dominant culture—it 
is difficult to highlight the true extent of its influence. As anthropologist Ruth 
Benedict notes, it is extremely difficult for anyone raised under the influence 
of ‘the dominant traits of our own civilization’ to actually recognise, analyse 
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and criticise those traits.260 Cross-cultural analysis is a useful remedy to this 
predicament, providing, through the study of other cultures, a stark reflection 
of the flaws in civilised Western culture. Indeed, as Diamond notes, ‘man in 
civilization is the problem’ and only through knowledge of other cultures—of 
human constants and cultural differences—can we gain ‘self-knowledge as 
the ground for self-criticism’.261 It is in this spirit, and with this intention, that I 
will now refer to cross-cultural analysis of sexual violence: explorations of the 
trends and commonalities shared by cultures with low or non-existent rape 
incidence, contrasted with analysis of Western culture, helps to expose the 
influence of the West’s underlying philosophy of objectification, providing 
‘self-knowledge as the ground for self-criticism’. 
 
 
‘Rape Prone’ and ‘Rape Free’: Cross-Cultural Analysis of Rape  
 
Perhaps the most extensive analysis of cultural attitudes to rape can be 
found in Peggy Reeves Sanday’s ‘The Socio-Cultural Context of Rape: A 
Cross-Cultural Study’ (1981). The study brings together analysis of ‘156 tribal 
societies’, with two key objectives: ‘to provide a descriptive profile of “rape 
prone” and “rape free” societies’ and ‘to present an analysis of the attitudes, 
motivations, and socio-cultural factors related to the incidence of rape.’262 
These combined objectives make Sanday’s work a valuable resource that 
highlights the fact that rape is not a universal act with a single, coherent 
cultural status. Of course, the scale on which the survey operates means that 
its findings must remain relatively broad—processing data from across such 
a wide range of cultures means that some of the complexities of each culture 
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are not fully accounted for—but, despite this limitation, Sanday’s research 
does demonstrate significant trends and patterns. Perhaps most significant of 
all is the observation that attitudes to rape are intimately connected to wider 
cultural ideologies and practices, and that ‘a high incidence of rape is 
embedded in a distinctly different cultural configuration than a low incidence 
of rape.’263 Whilst this is only a broad finding, it is, nevertheless, extremely 
revealing: correlations between cultural configuration and incidence of rape 
not only demonstrate conclusively that rape (or at least high levels of rape) is 
not the product of a universal ‘human nature’ but also begin to show that 
specific elements of a culture can be seen as encouraging or normalising 
sexual violence. Moreover, Sanday goes into further detail on what these 
elements are. Unsurprisingly, the analysis finds that gender relations are key 
to variations in rape incidence. In particular, the study shows that ‘rape prone’ 
cultures (that is, societies ‘in which sexual assault by men of women is either 
culturally allowable or, largely overlooked’) are male dominated, with women 
excluded from positions of social power and authority, and from public 
decision making.264 However, the study also reveals other correlations 
between cultural attitudes and rape incidence.  
 
As in Brownmiller and Zurbriggen’s studies discussed earlier, Sanday also 
finds cultural attitudes to violence to be a significant determinant in rape 
incidence. She writes that ‘where interpersonal violence is a way of life, 
violence frequently achieves sexual expression’.265 Importantly, in this 
statement, Sanday presents sexual violence as more than just a product of 
gender dynamics and locates it in a wider matrix of normalised behaviour. 
Rape becomes, in this understanding, one expression of a broader cultural 
pattern, the sexual, gendered manifestation of a cultural existence, a ‘way of 
life’, in which violence is normalised and exalted. In this sense, Sanday’s 
observation can be seen as a cross-cultural version of Brownmiller and 
Zurbriggen’s findings (albeit without Brownmiller’s racist and classist 
assumptions): the cultural acceptance of violence in general terms frequently 
extends to include the cultural acceptance of sexual violence. Moreover, as 
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with that of Brownmiller and Zurbriggen, Sanday’s research provides a 
precedent for considering wider cultural attitudes as factors contributing to a 
society’s rape culture. However, because objectification is, as argued earlier, 
central to both gender oppression and interpersonal violence, it is also 
possible to include cultural acceptance of objectification within these wider 
cultural attitudes. That is to say, it is possible to posit a relationship between 
cultural acceptance of objectification (as the foundation of, amongst other 
things, both gender oppression and interpersonal violence) and cultural 
acceptance of rape. Moreover, if the cultural acceptance of objectification 
that enables both gender oppression and interpersonal violence is premised 
on an underlying philosophy of objectification, as I have argued, then 
Sanday’s findings support my earlier suggestion regarding Western culture: 
that the presence of an underlying philosophy of objectification is directly 
related to the Anglophone West’s rape culture and high incidence of rape. In 
this sense, one can remodel Sanday’s statement on the relationship between 
violence and rape to reflect this broader focus: ‘where objectification is a way 
of life, objectification frequently achieves sexual expression in the form of 
rape.’ Certainly, my previous discussion suggests this understanding. 
However, this pronouncement is given further support by the cultural patterns 
that distinguish ‘rape free’ societies—that is, by Sanday’s definition, societies 
‘where the act of rape is either infrequent or does not occur’—from ‘rape 
prone’ societies such as the Anglophone West.      
 
Just as gender oppression is a marked characteristic of ‘rape prone’ cultures, 
gender equality is a marked characteristic of ‘rape free’ cultures. Sanday 
notes this directly, writing that ‘[i]n “rape free” societies women are treated 
with considerable respect, and prestige is attached to female reproductive 
and productive roles.’266 However, the cultural patterning shared by ‘rape 
free’ cultures also extends into wider cultural attitudes and ideologies, 
including, again, cultural attitudes towards objectification. Indeed, the findings 
of Sanday’s research suggest that, whilst the cultural normalising of 
objectification correlates to a high incidence of sexual objectification in the 
form of rape, the converse is also true: cultures in which instrumental 
objectification is rarely, if ever, practiced or culturally condoned largely have 
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a low incidence of rape. This cultural trend includes a wide range of non-
objectifying forms of relation. Sanday’s research shows that ‘rape free’ 
cultures are characterised not only by an absence of gender oppression, but 
also an absence of hierarchical social organisation, interpersonal violence 
and exploitative attitudes towards the non-human world.267  Each of these 
absent practices is, as discussed previously, an objectifying form of relation: 
the objectification of subordinates, the objectification of enemies, and the 
objectification of non-human life.268 Moreover, each of these forms of relation 
is widely practiced in the Anglophone West and, as argued earlier, finds its 
foundations in the West’s underlying philosophy of objectification. In line with 
this, one can argue that an underlying philosophy of objectification correlates 
to a high incidence of rape, and that the absence of this philosophy—or the 
presence of what we might call an underlying philosophy of interconnection 
and egalitarianism—correlates to a low incidence of rape. Analysis of the 
traditional cultures of the indigenous nations of North America—in 
comparison with civilised Western culture—provides strong support to this 
argument, highlighting how these underlying philosophies play a significant 
role in determining a whether a culture is ‘rape prone’ or ‘rape free’.269  
 
 
Underlying Philosophies and Rape: Native North America and the West 
 
It has been widely noted that prior to, and for varying periods after, European 
colonisation, rape was a relatively rare occurrence in the majority of 
                                                 
267
 Ibid. 
268
 See also: Gruenfeld and others, ‘Power and the Objectification of Social Targets’, p. 113; 
Eileen L. Zurbriggen, ‘Rape, War, and the Socialization of Masculinity: Why our Refusal to 
Give up War Ensures that Rape cannot be Eradicated’, Psychology of Women Quarterly, 
Vol. 34, No. 4 (2010), 438–549 (p. 543); Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature, 
pp. 4–5). 
269
 As the subject of my thesis is the rape problem and rape culture of the Anglophone West, 
my analysis of Native North America will be necessarily brief and focused on comparison 
with the dominant Western culture. This concision is not intended to suggest—as is too often 
patronisingly implied by Western studies of supposedly ‘primitive’ or ‘simple’ cultures—that 
the complex histories, belief systems, social organisation and cultural composition of even a 
single First Nations or American Indian nation can be adequately described in such a short 
analysis. Rather it draws on a number of extremely thorough texts (mainly written by 
indigenous scholars and activists) to produce a highly condensed overview intended to serve 
a specific purpose.  
 126 
 
American Indian nations.270  There is, perhaps, a temptation to romanticise 
this fact, to fall back on old stereotypes of ‘noble savages’ living in a peaceful 
state of grace, inherently free from sexual violence. Such a position is, I 
suggest, misguided (not to mention racist) and actually undermines the more 
significant, and more accurate, assertion that many American Indian and 
First Nations peoples had low levels of sexual violence, and that this was 
firmly grounded not in an inherent peacefulness but in the nations’ dominant 
cultural attitudes. As Cherokee scholar and activist Andrea Smith suggests: 
 
[I]t is important not to overgeneralize or give the impression that 
Native communities were utopian prior to colonization. Certainly 
gender violence occurred prior to colonization. Nevertheless, both 
oral and written records often note its relative rarity as well as the 
severity of the punishment for perpetrators of violence.271 
 
What Smith discusses here is not the Western stereotype of simple, ‘natural’ 
people whose inherently peaceful disposition renders sexual violence utterly 
incomprehensible; rather, she describes complex and culturally rich nations 
populated by heterogeneous peoples and characterised by the same wide 
range of behaviour that marks any human culture, including sexual violence. 
However, and this is a most significant point, the nations Smith discusses are 
nations whose cultures provide little or no cultural foundation for the 
normalising and legitimising of rape.272 In line with this, the purpose of the 
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following analysis is not to present American Indian and First Nations 
peoples as noble savages, inherently too innocent and peaceful to commit 
rape, but as examples of peoples whose dominant cultures prevent, 
discourage and revile, rather than support, encourage, normalise and 
legitimise sexual violence. Significantly, this understanding highlights the fact 
that incidence of, and attitudes towards, sexual violence are the products of 
specific cultural configurations, and that those traditionally found throughout 
much of Native North America produce both low incidence and few rape-
supportive attitudes and ideologies.   
 
Consistent with Sanday’s research discussed above, a key part of this 
cultural configuration is certainly the relative gender equality and respect for 
women that characterises many traditional American Indian and First Nation 
cultures. Although there is some variation in theorists’ understandings of this 
relative equality and respect—ranging, for example, from Laguna Pueblo 
activist and writer Paula Gunn Allen’s discussion of ‘gynecentric [sic], 
egalitarian [...] social systems’ to Nancy Shoemaker’s slightly more reserved 
statement that ‘[w]omen and men had complementary roles of equal 
importance, power, and prestige’—it is widely agreed to have been present in 
most, if not all, Native cultures.273 However, as argued in my above 
discussion, this relative gender equality does not occur in isolation but rather 
is part of a wider egalitarian philosophy. As Shoemaker notes, whilst the 
authority and autonomy traditionally attributed to Native women comes in part 
from respect for what Sanday refers to as ‘female reproductive and 
productive roles’, they are firmly grounded in ‘an inherent respect for 
individual autonomy’.274 Indeed, as Eleanor Burke Leacock so neatly phrases 
it, in many egalitarian societies, from Native North America, Indigenous 
Australia and elsewhere, ‘egalitarianism applied as fully to women as it did to 
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men’.275 That is to say, the relative autonomy and authority of women is less 
an isolated and remarkable aspect of Native North American cultures and 
more a continuation of their egalitarian social organisation, a manifestation of 
cultural beliefs in the right of all individuals to autonomy, authority and 
subjectivity. In the context of my earlier discussion of objectification, this 
understanding again points to the fact that a low incidence of rape correlates 
not only to non-objectifying gender relations but also to a broader absence of 
normalised objectification in society at large. Moreover, in the case of 
American Indian and First Nations cultures, this absence is not restricted to 
human relations and social organisation but rather, extends into a far wider 
understanding of the world that stands in stark contrast to the West’s 
‘underlying philosophy of objectification’.   
 
In an exploration of the Lakota greeting ‘hau, metakuyeayasi’ (‘hello, my 
relatives’), American Indian activist and academic Ward Churchill provides a 
particularly pertinent insight into the extent of the respect for all forms of life 
found throughout the traditional cultures of Native North America.276 He 
writes: 
 
I have come to understand that when Lakota people use the word 
Metakuyeayasi, they are not simply referring to their mothers and 
fathers, grandparents, aunts and uncles, ancestors, nieces and 
nephews, children, grandchildren, cousins, future generations, and 
all the rest of humankind. Oh, these relatives are certainly included, 
but things don’t stop there. Also involved is reference to the ground 
we stand on, the sky above us, the light from the sun and water in 
the oceans, lakes, rivers, and streams. The plants who populate our 
environment are included, as are the four-legged creatures around 
us, those who hop and crawl, the birds who fly, the fish who swim, 
the insects, the worms. Everything. These are all understood in the 
Lakota way as being relatives.277 
 
This understanding of everything from family members to plants, from 
animals to rivers, as not only sentient beings deserving respect but as actual 
relatives is markedly different from dominant Western understandings 
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discussed previously. Where the West normalises the objectification of the 
vast majority of life on this planet, including many humans, the indigenous 
understanding discussed by Churchill treats all life, including those entities 
considered in Western thought to be unconscious, insensate and insentient, 
as significant and valuable, as inherently capable of, and inherently 
deserving of, autonomy and subjectivity. Indeed, as Forbes notes, ‘[t]he life of 
Native American peoples revolves around the concept of the sacredness, 
beauty, power and relatedness of all forms of existence. In short, the ethics 
or moral values of Native people are part and parcel of their cosmology or 
total world view.’278 This point is key to my analysis: central to traditional 
American Indian attitudes, ideologies and practices is an understanding of 
the world as populated by, and composed of, interrelated, sentient and 
subjective beings, a belief that what the dominant culture of the Anglophone 
West might refer to as ‘the natural world’ has, as Kanien’kehá:ka (Mohawk) 
scholar, Taiaiake Alfred says, ‘an inherent value, beyond human needs’.279 
Where the West’s underlying philosophy of objectification suggests that life 
has no inherent value, and so encourages a means of relating to the world in 
which others are objectified and assigned worth solely in relation to one’s 
own goals, American Indian cosmologies directly oppose such objectification, 
understanding the world to be composed of interrelated life forms (or ‘forms 
of existence’) that are all inherently valuable, and inherently deserving of 
respect, subjectivity and autonomy. Indeed, Standing Rock Sioux theologian, 
academic and activist Vine Deloria suggests that these different ways of 
understanding and relating to the world represent the primary difference 
between Western and American Indian ways of life, noting that ‘Indians 
experience and relate to a living universe, whereas Western philosophy [...] 
reduces things to objects [...] to manipulate and exploit.’280 In this sense, in 
contrast to the West’s underlying philosophy of objectification, American 
Indian and First Nations cultures are characterised by what we might call 
‘underlying philosophies of interrelation and egalitarianism’: a pervasive 
guiding understanding of the world that suggests that all forms of existence 
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are inherently valuable, and should not be treated as objects to be consumed 
for one’s own gain.281  
 
In my earlier analysis, I outlined how the understanding that life has no 
inherent value enables the objectifying and abusive treatment of others, and 
suggested that the West’s underlying philosophy of objectification 
encourages both this understanding and this manner of treating, or relating 
to, others. Here, I suggest that the converse is also true: an understanding of 
all life as having inherent value (outside of its value to one’s own goals) helps 
to prohibit the objectifying and abusive treatment of others, and an underlying 
philosophy of interrelation and egalitarianism encourages this understanding 
and supports this prohibition. This is much evidenced in many Native North 
American cultures. The understanding that the lives of animals, for example, 
have inherent worth profoundly influenced traditional hunting practices. As 
Oglala-Lakota writer Luther Standing Bear notes, ‘[t]he animal had rights—
the right of man’s protection, the right to live, the right to multiply, the right to 
freedom, and the right to man’s indebtedness . . . the Lakota never enslaved 
the animal, and spared all life that was not needed for food and clothing.’282 
Animals, though they are killed for meat and for clothing, are not treated as 
mere objects that exist solely for the use of humans; rather they are 
considered to have rights, to be deserving of respect, to be killed only out of 
necessity, rather than with the callous ease of one who does not consider the 
animal’s life to have inherent worth. This respectful, even reverential, 
approach to the lives of others is found also in the treatment of these entities 
traditionally considered inanimate and insentient by the West, as Forbes 
notes:  
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Native American philosophy recognizes the right of every living 
creature to life and to live in its own life without interference. For this 
reason, Native people traditionally avoid the killing of living trees, 
avoid trampling on plants and seldom, if ever, kill any creature except 
for food.283  
 
Here, again, non-human life—including trees and plants—is not treated as 
objects that exist to be used and consumed by humans; rather each form of 
life is considered to be subjective and autonomous, to have an inherent value 
and a right to exist unmolested by human cruelties and violence.  
 
Although animals may be killed for meat and clothing, or plants for food and 
medicine, these deaths are not simply the unthinking ‘use’ of an object, 
achieved with the callous ease of the purely self-interested, as they are in 
much of the West, but acts of great significance, moments of solemnity and 
gratitude. As Forbes continues:     
 
When a plant, tree or animal is to be killed, first, the need must be 
great; second, permission is asked for, if time allows; third, the 
creature is thanked and, fourth, dances, prayers and ceremonies are 
used to further thank the creatures so killed and to help those that 
are alive to grow and prosper.284 
 
The plants, trees and animals discussed by Forbes are clearly not objects, 
and they are clearly considered to have a worth far beyond their utilitarian 
use to the hunter or gatherer who ends their life. The West’s underlying 
philosophy of objectification makes such reverence appear ridiculous—who, 
after all, would offer gratitude and honour to a mere object that exists solely 
for one’s own benefit?—but for those raised without this sense of entitlement 
and self-interest, without the belief that objectifying others is normal and 
acceptable, it is an act of appalling cruelty and callousness to do otherwise. 
As in the previous discussion, this too is a manifestation of the differing 
philosophies that Deloria suggests is the principal distinction between 
Western and Native understandings of the world: where the West’s 
underlying philosophy of objectification views life as having no inherent value 
and so works to normalise the objectification of others, Native philosophies of 
interrelation and egalitarianism view all forms of existence as equally valid 
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and equally valuable and so work to normalise the respectful, compassionate 
and considerate treatment of others. The above analysis shows that these 
different levels of respect for life and these different cultural responses to the 
objectification and consumption of others underpin the differences between 
how the West and many Native nations relate to the non-human world. As 
demonstrated previously, they also underpin the differences between how 
the West and many Native nations are socially organised and politically 
structured. Finally, as suggested at the beginning of this discussion, they also 
underpin the differences between the gender relations in the West and 
gender relations in traditional Native North America. In light of this, I suggest 
that it must be in the context of this key difference, and its multiple 
manifestations, that we consider the low incidence of sexual violence in 
traditional American Indian and First Nations cultures, compared to the 
remarkably high incidence found in the Anglophone West.   
 
As observed above, the relative gender egalitarianism of Native North 
America must be seen as a significant element of the low incidence of rape 
traditionally found in these cultures. However, this, in turn, should be seen as 
being grounded in an underlying philosophy that opposes the objectification 
and consumption of others. In my reworking of Sanday’s discussion of 
violence, I made the observation that ‘where objectification is a way of life, 
objectification frequently achieves sexual expression in the form of rape’ and, 
here, the converse is also true. Just as the absence of normalised 
objectification means that animals are not valued solely for their meat and 
skins, or trees for their wood, rivers for their fish, humans (in a general 
sense) for the ability to labour and toil and serve, so too does this absence 
mean that women are not valued solely for their genitals or sexual function, 
for their ability to fulfil the goals of the would-be seducer or the would-be 
rapist. As Thomas Macaulay Miller notes, the West is ‘a culture where sex is 
not so much an act as a thing: a substance that can be given, bought, sold, 
or stolen, that has a value and a supply-and-demand curve.’285 This 
understanding, Miller suggests, induces forms of relation centred on the male 
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acquisition of female sexuality.286 Such forms of relation are profoundly 
objectifying: the woman is reduced, in the objectifier’s eyes, to her sexual 
function or sexual capability; she is no longer fully a human, a subjective, 
autonomous whole, but simply a carrier for her sexuality.287 In such a 
relation, the woman is seen as having no inherent value beyond her ability to 
satisfy another’s desires.  This understanding, as established earlier, is 
central to enabling rape: if the survivor is simply an object that exists to be 
used, then the question of consent is irrelevant to the rapist. In many 
traditional Native cultures this understanding is absent. As John D’Emilio and 
Estelle B. Freedman note, ‘[i]n cultures in which one could not “own” another 
person’s sexuality [...] [r]ape—the theft of sex—only rarely occurred, and it 
was one of the few sexual acts forbidden by Indian cultures.’288 Because 
Native women were considered to be autonomous subjects (that is, coherent 
wholes not reducible to their sexuality, and not possessable by others), the 
objectification required to enable rape was largely absent. Crucially, this 
understanding is firmly rooted in the understanding of the world as entirely 
populated by and made up of autonomous subjects: in a philosophy or world-
view that teaches respectful, non-objectifying treatment of all forms of 
existence, the profoundly abusive and objectifying act of rape is in 
fundamental conflict with the very core of the culture. The antithesis of this is 
found in the Anglophone West, where rape is firmly rooted in the 
understanding of the world as composed of objects to be used and 
consumed for personal gain. 
 
Importantly, my analysis of American Indian cultures is not to suggest that 
they are homogenous, static or utopian, or that they are lost or dead ‘relics’; 
likewise, it is not intended to the harsh reality of many contemporary Native 
women’s suffering—at the hands non-Native and Native men (and, of course, 
colonialism, racism and classism)—or the gender violence that afflicts some 
Native communities. Perhaps most significantly though, at least for the 
current discussion, my analysis of Native North America is not intended to 
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propose, or even condone, the mimicking of Indian cultures and the 
appropriation of Indian spiritualities by non-Natives.289 Certainly, as 
Oklahoma Choctaw activist and scholar Devon Abbott Mihesuah observes, 
many Native activists (and ‘tribalists’) propose the embracing of their cultural 
traditions as a means of addressing gender inequality and sexual violence 
within their own communities (just as many others turn to Western feminism 
or other traditions, or a combination of these approaches) but, crucially, this 
is only appropriate within those communities; when practiced by non-Natives 
it is nothing more than cultural appropriation, regardless of how well 
intentioned the non-Native is.290 Of course, there are, as Oglala Sioux activist 
and writer Frank Black Elk suggests, lessons that can be learned from 
American Indian cultures without engaging in cultural appropriation (just as 
there are from other, less ‘iconic’ indigenous cultures, other non-Westerners 
and, as Churchill notes, from the West’s own pre-civilised European 
cultures).291 However, this task is delicate and problematic and I suggest 
that, in the current context, the most appropriate and applicable ‘lessons’ are 
those gained through employing analysis of Native cultures (particularly when 
that analysis is by Native activists and scholars) as a means of highlighting 
the more destructive and abusive elements of civilised Western culture, to, as 
Diamond phrases it, seek ‘self-knowledge as the ground for self-criticism’.292 
Accordingly, my discussion of Native North America is intended to highlight 
issues with Western culture, and not to present Indian cultures as lost utopias 
or as containing ‘the answer’ to the Anglophone West’s rape problem. In this 
sense, my comparison of Western and Native philosophies is not a dualistic 
comparison (which suggests two discrete, inherently opposing and 
hierarchically organised categories) or a ‘reverse-dualism’ in which the 
values assigned to the cultures are swapped over whilst the basic dualistic 
structure remains in place.293  
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Indeed, the very fact that the West and Native North America are complex 
heterogeneous cultures that have developed with markedly different guiding 
principles (rather than discrete categories, inherently opposed to one 
another) is actually central to my point: these cultures both contain the full 
range of ‘human’ behaviours, practices and ideologies (including misogyny 
and sexual violence) and a diverse range of people who enact them, but the 
fact that this manifests in remarkably low rape incidence in one culture and 
remarkably high in the other is testament to the profound influence that 
underlying philosophies can have. This entirely reinforces my argument that 
the West’s underlying philosophy of objectification is central to its rape 
problem, just as Native North America’s philosophies of interconnection and 
egalitarianism have traditionally worked to greatly limit sexual violence. It is 
useful at this point to return to Deloria’s observation, cited earlier, that 
‘Indians experience and relate to a living universe, whereas Western 
philosophy [...] reduces things to objects [...] to manipulate and exploit.’294 
What is particularly significant here, at least for the purposes of the current 
discussion, is that the focus of Deloria’s comparison recalls a key element of 
my definition of instrumental objectification: that ‘instrumental objectification’, 
as I employ it, does not refer simply to single, isolated acts or contexts but to 
the conception of objectifier’s self in relation to others, and the mode of 
perception that views, values and relates to others on the basis of their ability 
to serve the objectifier’s own ends.  
 
As noted previously, this definition borrows from Plumwood’s concept of 
‘instrumentalism’, which she describes as ‘a way of relating to the world 
which corresponds to a certain model of selfhood, the selfhood conceived as 
that of the individual who stands apart from an alien other and denies his own 
relationship to and dependency on this other.’295 The parallels here are quite 
apparent: both cited passages are concerned with ways of relating to the 
world and both identify the dominant Western means as being characterised 
by a sense of separation and the utilitarian use or consumption of ‘objects’. 
Deloria’s statement and the analysis I have constructed around it, highlights 
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this further by comparing the dominant Western means with the common 
Native means, which are characterised by interconnectivity and the 
egalitarian interaction of subjective, autonomous beings. In this sense, it 
seems reasonable to rework the phrasing of Deloria’s statement and propose 
that the principal difference between the dominant cultures of the West  and 
Native North America is that the Native philosophies discussed above teach 
an understanding of the self as part of an interconnected network of equals, 
and that relation to others should be respectful of their autonomy and 
subjectivity, whilst the dominant philosophies of the West teach an 
understanding of the self as separate from, and superior to, others, and that 
relation to others should therefore be based on subjugation, objectification 
and consumption. This, then, is the true product of the West’s underlying 
philosophy of objectification and its key relevance to sexual violence: 
because this philosophy normalises and legitimises the abusive and 
objectifying treatment of all forms of existence, the profoundly abusive and 
objectifying act of rape is firmly in line with the very core of the culture, a 
variation on an accepted, even celebrated, means of relating to the world. As 
Forbes notes, ‘[t]he rape of a woman, the rape of a land, and the rape of a 
people, they are all the same. And they are the same as the rape of the 
earth, the rape of the rivers, the rape of the forest, the rape of the air, the 
rape of the animals.’296 Each of these acts is premised on, and enabled by, 
the belief that the world and everything and everyone in it exist as objects to 
be used and consumed, and this belief is the central product of the West’s 
underlying philosophy of objectification. It is this philosophy that plays the 
most crucial role in making the West a superculture of objectification, and it is 
this philosophy that provides the ideological foundation for the Anglophone 
West’s rape culture, underpinning the normalising and legitimising of sexual 
objectification and sexual violence. However, as established earlier, this 
philosophy not only lays the foundations for the Anglophone West’s rape 
culture but helps to structure it in a manner that is both intricate and wide-
ranging. 
 
The above analysis shows how a culture’s deep-seated guiding principles, its 
underlying philosophies, although operating on a far broader scale than those 
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directly pertaining to gender relations or sexual violence, nevertheless play a 
significant role in influencing incidence of rape within that culture. As 
discussed, the West’s underlying philosophy of objectification, the core belief 
that objectifying others is normal, acceptable, or even desirable, which 
makes such a central contribution to the West’s status as a superculture of 
objectification, provides the foundation for the objectification of women and 
the normalising and legitimising of rape. Although only specific forms of 
objectification enable rape in this sense, it is the underlying philosophy that 
supports and enables these specific forms. That is to say, although the 
objectification of women, for example, may be said to be central to the 
process of enabling rape (often, as I will discuss, in conjunction with other 
systems of objectification), this specific form of objectification emerges from, 
and is partly normalised and legitimised by, the underlying philosophy of 
objectification, the generalised belief that objectification is acceptable or 
desirable. Evidence from cross-cultural analysis supports this position by 
highlighting the fact that the converse is also true: without an underlying 
philosophy of objectification there is no ideological basis for the objectification 
of women and no basis for the normalising and legitimising of rape. The 
above exploration of American Indian and First Nations cultures and their 
underlying philosophies of interrelation and egalitarianism illustrates this quite 
plainly, although, given that, as Sanday notes, the majority of ‘rape free’ 
cultures are similarly egalitarian and respectful of other humans and the non-
human world, it is certainly possible to suggest that other cultures would have 
illustrated the point as clearly.297 However, the West’s underlying philosophy 
of objectification is not the only component of the West’s  superculture of 
objectification, nor the only element to contribute so profoundly to the 
Anglophone West’s rape problem. Rather the superculture of objectification 
is, as suggested earlier, manifest in other ways, in the social organisation of 
Western societies and in individual practices and relationships. That is to say, 
whilst the previous analysis operates on the most macro-social level, 
exploring broad trends and ideological foundations, it is also possible to 
support my argument that rape is firmly rooted in the superculture of 
objectification through the study of the micro-social. In line with this, my 
analysis will now begin that process, exploring how the underlying philosophy 
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of objectification is manifest in a dominant form of social and political 
organisation that is sympathetic and conducive to the Anglophone West’s 
rape culture, before moving on to discuss how it is manifest in ‘day-to-day’ 
practices and relationships. 
 
 
Objectification, Rape and ‘Systems of Oppression’ in Western Socio-Political 
Organisation 
 
Although the way in which the West’s underlying philosophy of objectification 
provides ideological and philosophical foundations for the Anglophone West’s 
rape culture is, in itself, a significant consideration, it is important to note that 
it also contributes to the rape culture through the pronounced influence it 
exerts over Western socio-political organisation. As suggested earlier, the 
West’s superculture of objectification can be conceived of as a web of 
intersecting relations, all of which are premised on the notion that it is 
acceptable, normal and even desirable to treat others as objects. Hierarchy 
and dualistic thinking (which, as previously argued, are deeply, and perhaps 
intrinsically, embedded in Western culture) operate as means of organising 
and formalising these objectifying relations. As Gruenfeld and others note, in 
the passage cited earlier, ‘the purpose of organizational hierarchy, almost by 
definition, is to formalize who is allowed to be used as a means to an end, 
and by whom’.298 Importantly, this statement is at least as applicable to 
dualistic thinking as it is to hierarchy. Eaton’s definition, cited at the previous 
chapter, states that dualistic thinking is ‘a manner of thinking in pairs or 
opposites, with one side having priority over the other.’299 Importantly, this 
definition suggests not only that one half of the dualism is dominant or 
considered to be superior, but also that the dominant half of the dualism has 
‘priority over the other’. That is to say, an inherent component of dualistic 
thinking is the belief that the dominant half of a dualism is more valuable than 
the subordinated half, that their interests outweigh those of the subordinated 
class, and if their interests directly contradict or impede those of the 
subordinated class, then theirs are considered to be the priority; in short, the 
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belief that the dominant half of a dualism may objectify, use and consume the 
subordinated half is built into the very structure of dualistic thinking. In this 
sense, dualistic thinking, at least as much as hierarchy, functions to 
‘formalize who is allowed to be used as a means to an end, and by whom’, 
marking one class as objectifier and the other as object. Indeed, this 
objectifier/object dualism can be superimposed onto any of the dominant 
dualisms that shape Western thought, reflecting everything from racial 
stereotyping of non-whites (white/non-white dualism) to the human 
degradation and ‘resourcification’ of the non-human world (human/nature 
dualism).300 In this sense, both hierarchy and dualistic thinking profoundly 
shape the socio-political structure of the West in a manner that formalises—
indeed, that writes into the very fabric of Westernculture—the notion that 
some lives are more valuable that others, and so may be legitimately treated 
as objects to  be used and consumed. Through this pervasive influence on 
Western culture and socio-political organisation, hierarchy and dualistic 
thinking (what we might, given the context, call collectively ‘systems of 
oppression’) also influences the Anglophone West’s rape culture, further 
normalising and formalising sexual violence against subordinated groups. 
This is perhaps most readily apparent in the objectification of women, and the 
ways in which it is normalised and legitimised by the West’s patriarchal social 
organisation (which, as ‘gender hierarchy’ or dualisms of male/female, 
man/woman and masculinity/femininity, is structured by both hierarchy and 
dualistic thinking). However, as I will discuss shortly, numerous other 
systems of oppression, each firmly grounded in Western hierarchy and 
dualistic thinking, also exert a significant influence on the Anglophone West’s 
rape culture.   
 
Sexual objectification, normalised and legitimised within the dominant culture, 
is central to the oppression experienced by women under Western 
patriarchy. As Frederickson and Roberts note: 
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Although sexual objectification is but one form of gender oppression, 
it is one that factors into—and perhaps enables—a host of other 
oppressions women face, ranging from employment discrimination 
and sexual violence to the trivialization of women’s work and 
accomplishments.301 
 
Frederickson and Roberts make an important point here: although gender 
oppression is, indeed, complex and multifaceted, the central enabling 
process from which it stems is the objectification of women, the belief that it 
is acceptable, normal and desirable to treat women as objects or tools to be 
used for another’s purpose. Certainly, in the case of sexual violence, 
objectification not only describes the act but also plays a crucial role in 
enabling the act: rape, ultimately, is not only an act in which the survivor is 
treated as a tool to be used to achieve the rapist’s own ends, but also an act 
that emerges from—and is reliant upon—the understanding that it is 
acceptable to treat women as objects that have no right to autonomy, 
subjectivity or bodily integrity.302 Without this initial understanding—whether it 
takes the form of a belief that women are no more than objects and so may 
be raped without guilt, or the belief that the rapist’s own interests simply take 
priority over the survivor’s—rape cannot be a viable action for the rapist.303  
 
Of course, it could also be argued that some rapists do not realise that they 
are committing rape (owing, for example, to encultured misunderstandings of 
what constitutes meaningful consent or complex patterns of normalised 
denial that obscure the reality of their actions); certainly, this is a well-
documented aspect of many rapists’ understandings of their behaviour.304 In 
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a cursory analysis, this might appear to contradict the position outlined 
above, suggesting that some rapists do not view women as objects but rather 
‘misread’ the situation and objectify women inadvertently through rape. 
However, I suggest that such cases are also the product of the same process 
of objectification, albeit in a more oblique manner: the so called ‘grey areas’ 
of rape, such as those concerning questions of what constitutes consent, are 
equally the product of treating women as objects because they necessarily 
involve a failure to relate to the survivor as a subjective whole, to consider 
her response to sexual advances even if they are in conflict with the rapist’s 
intentions, to think beyond a sense of male entitlement to consider the 
realities of informed consent.305 That is to say, the perception of women as 
objects to be used for the rapist’s own benefit may not constitute a 
consciously held belief in such cases (although equally it may do so) but it 
nevertheless remains the rapist’s understanding of the survivor, the principal 
means through which he evaluates his behaviour and mode of relation.306 As 
such, the objectification of the rapist’s target remains central to the enabling 
of rape. Indeed, it can be said to be a key component of the four elements 
that Allison and Wrightsman—drawing heavily on the works of David 
Finkelhor and Diana Russell—suggest are required for the act of rape to be 
committed. They write that for rape to occur:  
 
1. First, someone must want to rape or assault women sexually. 
2. The person’s internal inhibitions against acting out this desire have 
to be undermined.  
3. This person’s social inhibitions against acting out this desire (for 
example, fear of being caught and punished) have to be 
undermined. 
4. The would-be perpetrator has to undermine or overcome his or her 
chosen victim’s capacity to avoid or resist sexual abuse.307  
 
                                                                                                                                          
Rape, ed. by Jaclyn Friedman and Jessica Valenti (California: Seal Press, 2008), pp. 163–
169. 
305
 For wider discussion around this issue, see: Millar, ‘Toward a Performance Model of Sex’, 
pp. 29–40; Hazel/Cedar Troost, ‘Reclaiming Touch: Rape Culture, Explicit Verbal Consent, 
and Body Sovereignty’, in Yes Means Yes!: Visions of Female Sexual Power and a World 
Without Rape, ed. by Jaclyn Friedman and Jessica Valenti (California: Seal Press, 2008), 
pp. 171–176; Jervis, ‘An Old Enemy in a New Outfit’. 
306
 Importantly, nothing in the previous discussion is intended to suggest that any of the 
above ‘forms’ of rape are less abusive or severe than the others, or in any sense more 
‘justifiable’. 
307
 Allison and Wrightsman, Rape: The Misunderstood Crime, p. 35.  
 142 
 
Although it does not fully account for a rapist’s motivation to commit rape (a 
point which will be explored in detail in the third chapter), objectification can 
certainly be said to provide a significant foundation for that motivation. The 
desire to rape is premised on the understanding (again held as either a long-
standing belief or a temporary position) that it is desirable to relate to another 
as though they were an object rather than a human being.308 If such a mode 
of relation is perceived as abhorrent, or even simply unsatisfying, then there 
is no motivation, no desire, to relate to another person in that manner, 
through rape or through other acts. However, if one desires this form of 
objectified and objectifying relation then relating on a mutual, respectful level 
to a fellow subjective, autonomous being will not satisfy that desire. That is to 
say, a rapist must understand objectifying forms of relation to be desirable, at 
least in the context of sexual violence, in order to desire to rape. As such, 
wanting to commit rape, although motivated by other factors, is enabled by 
and reliant upon objectification.  
 
In a slightly less direct sense, the fourth requirement—the rapist’s ability to 
overpower the survivor—can also be said to be intimately related to 
objectification. This is particularly apparent when one considers that the 
rapist is more likely to succeed in overpowering the survivor if the survivor is 
physically weak, dressed in a fashion that prohibits self-defence or the ability 
to run away from the rapist, or is incapacitated through fear. The hegemonic 
model of femininity in the Anglophone West dictates that women should not 
be physically or emotionally strong or capable, and that they should wear 
clothing such as high heels and skirts, which inhibit the ability to fight or 
run.309 The internalising of the objectifying ‘heterosexual male gaze’ has been 
suggested to play a key role in women conforming to this potentially 
incapacitating model of femininity.310 Similarly, it has been widely noted that 
the near ubiquitous experience of being viewed and treated as a sexual 
object is central to many women’s feelings of vulnerability and fears of 
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attacks in general and rape in particular.311 In line with this, the fourth 
requirement, like the first, has key foundations in the normalised 
objectification of women. However, as I will demonstrate, objectification is of 
even more significance to the second and third requirements, which are, in 
turn, of even more significance to my current argument, providing a key basis 
for understanding how rape is enabled and ‘justified’ in a culture that 
normalises objectification.  
 
Personal inhibitions against rape are most readily overcome by the belief—
however temporarily held—that the survivor exists for this use, and that her 
security, her suffering, her self-determination and right to bodily integrity are 
all either non-existent or less significant than the rapist’s own desires. That is 
to say, the feelings of guilt and internal prohibitions that may (and, I would 
argue, should) be triggered by committing an act of abuse against another 
human being are alleviated—however temporarily—by the understanding 
that the survivor is simply an object, rather than an abused and suffering 
human being.312 A similar process also applies to social inhibitions, but on a 
broader scale wherein the fear of arrest, or of other social reprisals, is greatly 
decreased if the objectification of women is widely normalised and legitimised 
by the society in which the crime is committed: if the objectification of women 
is a socially acceptable act, then acts that objectify, and are premised on the 
objectification of, women—albeit extreme ones such as rape—enjoy some 
level of social acceptability, reducing the risk of social reprisals, and so 
reducing rapists’ social inhibitions.313 It is in this sense that I suggest that 
objectification is the central component required to enable sexual violence, 
and that the patriarchal nature of Western socio-political organisation is, in 
turn, central to normalising this objectification. However, as I will now explore, 
patriarchal social structuring is by no means the only system of oppression to 
normalise objectification in a fashion so profoundly related to rape; numerous 
other systems—each of which exhibits a considerable influence on Western 
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socio-political organisation—also make significant contributions that are often 
overlooked.    
 
 
Intersectional Objectification and Sexual Violence  
 
Thomas Macaulay Millar notes that whilst cultural understandings of gender 
and sex are crucial to the processes by which rape is legitimised, ‘[n]ot all of 
the structures of rape support are about sexual culture: racism, classism, and 
the prison-industrial complex, as just a few examples, create circumstances 
under which some women can be and are raped with impunity’.314 This is a 
vital consideration: although, in the form of rape discussed in this thesis (the 
rape of women by men), gender oppression is always an important factor, it 
is neither the only relevant system of oppression nor, in some cases, 
necessarily the most significant. Gender oppression certainly does—on both 
individual and societal levels—objectify all women to varying degrees, 
encouraging, normalising or legitimising sexual violence against them. 
However, it also intersects with other systems of oppression which also 
objectify and subordinate particular marginalised groups. As I will discuss, 
these intersectional systems of oppression mean that women of colour, 
working-class/poor women, queer women, transgender women (as well as 
transgender men, who are often viewed as—and treated as—women by 
rapists), women with mental health issues and women sex workers (as well 
as numerous other marginalised women) are subject to particularly virulent 
discourses of objectification. In this sense, intersectional discourses—even 
more than those of gender oppression alone—present marginalised women 
as (sexual) objects, and so as legitimate targets who may be raped without 
personal guilt, social reprisals or state/judicial intervention or punishment. 
Returning to my study of the Strauss-Kahn/Diallo case provides a clear 
example of this: as a working-class/poor, immigrant woman of colour working 
in a hotel for the ultra-rich (indeed, working in the room of an ultra-rich, 
socially-powerful, white Western man), Diallo is objectified—and so culturally 
reduced to a ‘rapable body’ rather than a subjective, autonomous being—by 
several intersecting systems of oppression. Gender is, of course, a central 
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component of this: as a woman, Diallo is, like all women, subject to the 
sexual objectification and gendered violence that abounds in the Anglophone 
West. However, several other systems of oppression intersect with gender 
oppression in Diallo’s case, each contributing significantly to her 
objectification. Accordingly, my analysis will now explore some of the 
discourses and systems of oppression in question, highlighting both how the 
socio-political organisation of the West is structured hierarchically and 
dualistically, and how this form of organisation is central to the objectification 
of marginalised women and so is central to the Anglophone West’s rape 
culture. 
 
Although there are many different systems of oppression that are pertinent to 
an analysis of objectification and rape, there are marked commonalities in the 
ways that they function that allow them to be discussed through 
representative examples. Each of them is premised on dualistic or 
hierarchical thinking and the notion that some lives are less valuable than 
others. As such, each is deeply rooted in the West’s underlying philosophy of 
objectification in the same manner as the gender oppression discussed 
earlier. Similarly, they are all largely normalised and, to varying degrees, 
legitimised within Western socio-political organisation. They also all serve to 
objectify—and to legitimise and normalise the objectification of—marginalised 
groups. More significantly for this discussion, this is all carried out in a 
fashion that is intimately connected to sexual violence, providing ideological 
‘justifications’ for treating marginalised women as sexual objects, motivation 
for privileged men to (re)enact forms of subject-object relation, and 
institutionalised biases that allow rape to be committed with relative impunity. 
The specifics of how these systems of oppression operate do vary but these 
commonalities unite them, at least for the purposes of my analysis here. In 
this sense, my essential premise that systems of oppression other than 
gender oppression serve to objectify and make ‘rapable’ marginalised women 
can be demonstrated through discussion of those systems of oppression 
directly related to Diallo’s (alleged) assault by Strauss-Kahn. Of these 
systems, aside from gender oppression, perhaps the most widely critically 
analysed (although it was largely absent from the mainstream media 
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coverage of the Strauss-Kahn/Diallo case) is white-supremacist oppression 
and it is to this that the analysis will now turn.315     
 
 
Sexual Savages and Objectified Animals: White-Supremacist Oppression 
and Rape 
 
In the West, women of colour face particularly virulent forms of oppression in 
general, and of objectification in particular. Importantly, this oppression and 
objectification is not simply that experienced by men of colour and that 
experienced by white women but an intersectional form connected to but 
distinct from each. As Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw notes, ‘the intersection of 
racism and sexism factors into Black women’s lives in ways that cannot be 
captured wholly by looking at the race or gender dimensions of those 
experiences separately.’316 That is to say, whilst the oppression and 
objectification experienced by women of colour may contain elements of 
white-supremacist and misogynistic or patriarchal oppression, these 
elements are not experienced discretely but in a distinct, combined form that 
is unique to women of colour.317 This considered, having already provided an 
overview of gendered objectification, it is useful to balance this with a 
discussion of general white supremacist objectification before exploring the 
intersectional objectification experienced by women of colour.  
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The objectification of people of colour in the Anglophone West has a long 
and brutal history and there are innumerable examples that could be drawn 
on in this discussion. One of the most pertinent, of course, is the transatlantic 
slave trade, which, as discussed earlier, treated vast numbers of people of 
colour (primarily Africans but also a significant number of American Indians) 
as nothing more than labouring objects, resources to be bought and sold and 
used as ‘animate tools’.318 This is far from an isolated example; Western 
colonialism in general provides numerous stark examples of normalised 
white-supremacist objectification. Indeed, at root, colonisation is an act of 
objectification, treating all aspects of the colonised country as objects to be 
owned and used by the colonisers, from land and mineral wealth to the 
colonised peoples themselves. Aimé Césaire notes this with an equation as 
astute as it is succinct, writing that ‘colonization = “thingification”’, that to be 
colonised is to be reduced, in the eyes of the coloniser, to a ‘thing’, an object, 
to be used, owned, exploited and controlled.319 In this sense, in the cases of 
both the transatlantic slave trade and Western colonialism more generally, 
the historic treatment of people of colour by Euro-American cultures was 
centred on objectification, on the understanding—and use—of non-whites as 
resources and objects, as childlike or bestial primitives who must be 
governed, ‘civilised’ and put to use as a source of labour and profit.320 
Importantly, for women of colour, this white-supremacist, colonial 
objectification frequently also took on sexual forms, as Deborah K. King 
notes, that were related to (though distinct from) the objectification 
experienced both by men of colour and white women.321 Female slaves were 
widely treated as sexual objects to be used for both the gratification and the 
profits of their white ‘masters’; they were routinely raped both by white men 
(for the purposes of the men’s gratification and, as Davis notes, reinforcing 
the subordination and disempowerment of the slaves) and by male slaves 
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who were forced to do so in order that so-called ‘breeding wenches’ might 
produce the next generation of slaves to labour for, or be sold by, the 
master.322 The centrality of objectification to this oppression is starkly 
highlighted by Barbara Omolade’s description of how white slave masters 
perceived enslaved Black women. She writes: ‘to him she was a fragmented 
commodity whose feelings and choices were rarely considered: her head and 
her heart were separated from her back and her hands and divided from her 
womb and vagina.’323 In this understanding, enslaved Black women were not 
seen as complete and whole or as sentient, autonomous, subjective beings 
but as the sum of those body parts that could serve the master, as only the 
capacity to labour and toil, to be raped and to reproduce: as, in short, an 
object, that existed only for the master’s pleasure and profit. Moreover, as I 
will now discuss, this process extends beyond the transatlantic slave trade 
and the colonisation of African nations, marking the processes of colonisation 
and conquest in a far broader sense. 
 
Sexual objectification—particularly in the form of normalised and 
institutionalised rape—has also characterised many other colonial 
‘encounters’, following the same pattern of perceiving and treating colonised 
women as objects or tools through which the objectifier’s intentions can be 
realised. Frequently, this intention has been the process of colonisation itself; 
indeed, in the colonial context rape is both a product of colonisation and a 
means through which this colonisation is achieved, both the understanding of 
colonised women’s bodies as inherently rapable and a conscious effort on 
the part of the colonisers to both achieve and symbolically display their 
conquest.324 Claudia Card’s discussion of ‘rape as a weapon of war’ 
highlights this, noting that rape may be employed with the aim of ‘genetic 
imperialism’—forcing colonised women to bear the children of colonisers—or 
as part of a campaign of ‘ethnic cleansing’ or genocide, or to (re)enact the 
colonisers’ dominance over the colonised: ‘dominance not simply over 
women but in war even more importantly over other men who are presumed 
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to take pride in being protectors of women.’325 Here, again, it is not only 
gender oppression that results in the objectification and rape of women of 
colour, but also systems of racial oppression and colonial violence that 
provide both the ‘justification’ for the act and at least part of the motivation (to 
(re)enact dynamics of white-supremacy). Importantly, however, the 
objectification and rape discussed above is far from a purely historical issue. 
Sexual colonisation (in neo-imperial wars such as the invasions of Iraq and 
Afghanistan as well as in ongoing cases of colonisation, such as that of 
American Indians and Australian Aborigines) and sexual slavery (of women 
of colour and white women) are both highly prevalent.326 Even setting these 
aside for the current discussion (as they do not directly relate to my 
discussion of Diallo), the objectification of people of colour established as 
part of Western colonialism (including the transatlantic slave trade) also 
remains commonplace in contemporary white-supremacist discourses and 
practices. Certainly, understandings of people of colour as exploitable 
labourers, childlike primitives, subservient attendants, bestial subhumans, or 
threatening savages—all established in the (original) colonial period—
continue to hold currency the contemporary Anglophone West.327 Again, 
whilst women of colour experience these forms of white-supremacist 
oppression as do men of colour, they also experience oppression specific to 
women of colour, which frequently takes the form of sexual objectification 
and sexual violence. Just as female slaves suffered the same labour 
exploitation and cruel treatment experienced by male slaves but also suffered 
institutionalised sexual objectification and sexual violence, so too do a great 
many contemporary women of colour share the economic marginalisation, 
labour exploitation and racially-motivated violence that many men of colour 
are subjected to, but also frequently suffer sexual objectification and 
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exploitation both in and outside the workplace.328 However, this sexual 
objectification and exploitation is not simply the addition of gender oppression 
to racial oppression, but rather is an intersectional model that is as distinct 
from the oppression of white women as it is from the oppression of men of 
colour.  
 
Patricia Hill Collins highlights the above distinction, exploring how, whilst 
white women are routinely treated as objects, women of colour are frequently 
seen as even less, simply as animals. She writes: ‘[r]ace becomes the 
distinguishing feature in determining the type of objectification women will 
encounter. Whiteness as symbolic of both civilization and culture is used to 
separate objects from animals’.329 What Collins discusses here is, effectively, 
gradations of objectification: white women, she acknowledges, are treated as 
sexual objects, but this objectification does not involve the absolute loss of 
human status as it does for women of colour. Of course, this is a broad 
approach and there are obviously examples of white women also being 
entirely dehumanised by systems of gender oppression (and by gender 
oppression intersecting with other systems of oppression), but, in the general 
terms Collins employs, this is an important distinction. The intersectional 
oppression experienced by women of colour means that the dominant culture 
frequently strips away further layers of subjectivity, not simply treating them 
as human-objects to be used with relative impunity by men but as animal-
objects, uncivilised bestial objects to be used with near-total impunity by 
white men and, by extension, by men of colour. Summarising bell hooks’ 
discussion of this issue in Ain’t I a Woman: Black Women and Feminism 
(1981), Karen Michelle Bowdre provides a concise assessment of this 
process of dehumanising objectification and its particular significance to rape. 
She writes: ‘Once it was believed that Black women were sexual savages, 
the following logic could exist: African American women were sexual 
savages; savages were not human; they were animals; animals cannot be 
raped, hence, Black women could not be raped.’330 This dehumanising 
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‘reasoning’ has long characterised the dominant culture’s view of Black 
women and, as I will now discuss, it continues to exert a significant influence 
over contemporary Western perspectives. 
 
As in the historical examples, contemporary intersectional oppression of 
women of colour normalises and legitimises virulent sexual objectification, 
making them highly ‘rapable’ in the dominant discourse of Western socio-
political organisation. The examples of this discussed above are pertinent to 
analysis of Diallo’s assault by Strauss-Kahn: both her status as a 
marginalised Black female worker and the prevalence of dehumanising 
white-supremacist discourses work, in the manners suggested above, to 
present Diallo as a sexual object/animal who can be raped without personal 
guilt or serious legal recourse. This intersectional objectification matches the 
two most objectification-centric conditions of rape given by Allison and 
Wrightsman: that the rapist must overcome both personal and social 
inhibitions against the act of rape.331 The pervasive influence of this 
objectification means that women of colour such as Diallo are widely 
considered to be acceptable targets of sexual violence, who may be raped 
without personal guilt because they are less than human and so do not 
qualify for ‘human rights’ (as Bowdre notes, ‘animals cannot be raped’). 
Similarly, the proven history of white-supremacist bias within Western judicial 
systems means that white men (especially rich, powerful white men such as 
Strauss-Kahn) can rape women of colour (especially poor, immigrant women 
of colour such as Diallo) with little fear of punishment. In this respect, the fact 
that the Strauss-Kahn/Diallo case came to court is unusual (and owes much 
to Diallo’s courage and determination and, perhaps, anti-European 
sentiments within the American judicial system and media); the fact that 
Strauss-Kahn was acquitted was a dramatic return to the established 
pattern.332 Likewise, that Diallo was more successful in her later civil suit 
against Strauss-Kahn—reaching a settlement for an undisclosed sum of 
money—is unusual, but the fact that, as wealthy and powerful white man, 
Strauss-Kahn was able to use his considerable wealth to avoid potential 
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sentencing (in a manner that is obviously beyond less privileged, financially-
solvent men) is, again, a return to the standard pattern.333 Moreover, there is, 
as I will now discuss, another element of the intersectional oppression of 
women of colour (which might be said to be an extension of the ‘women of 
colour as animals’ discourse discussed above) that is even more pertinent to 
this analysis: the stereotype of Black women (and, to some extent, women of 
colour more generally) as inherently promiscuous.    
 
 
Always Consenting: The ‘Unrapability’ of ‘Promiscuous’ Black Women  
 
Racist stereotyping of Black people as sexual savages is a pertinent 
illustration of the ways in which Black women (and women of colour more 
generally) experience white-supremacist oppression in a different fashion 
from Black men (and men of colour more generally). The stereotype is 
applied to both Black men and Black women but in distinct ways. For Black 
men it has fostered what Angela Y. Davis calls ‘the myth of the Black rapist’: 
the notion that Black men are inherently prone to rape, which contributes 
significantly to white-supremacist oppression directed at Black men, from 
historic lynching to contemporary police brutality and wrongful arrest.334 This 
same stereotyping is, however, manifest differently, although no less 
destructively, for Black women. As Davis notes: 
 
The fictional image of the Black man as rapist has always 
strengthened its inseparable companion: the image of the Black 
woman as chronically promiscuous. For once the notion is accepted 
that Black men harbour irresistible and animal-like sexual urges, the 
entire race is invested with bestiality. If Black men have their eyes on 
white women as sexual objects, then Black women must certainly 
welcome the sexual attentions of white men. Viewed as “loose 
women” and whores, Black women’s cries of rape would necessarily 
lack legitimacy.335 
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This understanding is, as suggested above, an extension of the dominant, 
white-supremacist culture’s animalising of Black women; indeed, hooks’s 
analysis, as reported by Bowdre above, begins with the treatment of Black 
women as ‘sexual savages’, and relates this to their consequent 
dehumanisation and objectification. In both accounts, and as exemplified in 
the discussion at the beginning of this chapter, the dominant culture’s 
perception of Black women as closer to nature, as primitive, savage and 
animalistic, is shown to suggest not only that, as ‘animals’, Black women do 
not qualify for ‘human rights’ but also that, due to their supposedly 
‘animalistic’ sexuality, they are inherently promiscuous, desiring and 
consenting to all sexual acts, all of the time.336 Crucially, in relation to rape, 
this understanding that Black women are inherently always consenting 
effectively means that they are understood as having no right to consent, no 
right—or even capability—to refuse sexual contact or seek effective legal 
recourse if this refusal is ignored. This understanding, therefore, makes Black 
women culturally rapable in that, in a sense, it renders them entirely un-
rapable: it presents Black women as hyper-sexual objects whose constant 
state of consent means that no sexual contact can ever be classed as rape. 
This particular form of objectification and oppression, as I will now discuss, 
has particular bearing on Diallo’s alleged assault by Strauss-Kahn.  
 
The intersectional white-supremacist/patriarchal objectification and 
oppression that presents Black women as inherently promiscuous and 
always consenting played a key role in Diallo’s case against Strauss-Kahn.337 
The central argument of Strauss-Kahn’s defence—and so, ultimately, the 
closest we have to an ‘official’ understanding of what occurred in the Sofitel 
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Hotel room—is that there was ‘a hurried sexual encounter’ between Strauss-
Kahn and Diallo but that it was entirely consensual.338 This position was 
maintained outside of the courtroom, as Jenny Barchfield notes, with extracts 
from Michel Taubmann’s forthcoming biography of Strauss-Kahn, DSK 
Affairs: The Second Inquiry, presenting the encounter as the result of Diallo 
behaving ‘seductively’, citing the following passage: ‘[Diallo] started walking 
toward the exit. But she wasn’t in any hurry [...] She stares him in the eyes. 
Then, she looks openly at his genitals.’339 Although it was ultimately 
accusations of ‘other’ apparent dishonesties that undermined Diallo’s position 
(a point to which I will return later in the discussion), they did so by adding 
weight to Strauss-Kahn’s defence that Diallo was lying about having refused 
consent.  The media and judicial response to this defence cannot be 
adequately discussed without considering the stereotype of Black women as 
promiscuous and always consenting and how this supported Strauss-Kahn’s 
position. One of the most significant considerations in this respect is the short 
duration of the ‘encounter’: given that Diallo was in Strauss-Kahn’s room for 
somewhere between seven and ten minutes (accounts vary), several articles 
and online commentaries raise the question of how exactly the ‘encounter’ 
was initiated and completed within such a short period without the use of 
force.340 Indeed, as one of Diallo’s lawyers, Douglas Wigdor, states: 
 
The encounter lasted 10 minutes, she didn't know who he was, had 
never met him before and believed the room was empty [...] So you 
have to believe that she walks into a room she thought was 
unoccupied, agrees to have sex... and then, despite being aware of 
the issues in her background, decides to claim she was a victim of 
rape.341  
 
                                                 
338
 From the recommendation for dismissal court document: ‘Recommendation for Dismissal 
of Strauss-Kahn Case’ (22/8/2011) 
<http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/08/22/nyregion/dsk-recommendation-to-dismiss-
case.html?nl=nyregion&emc=ura1> [accessed 30 July 2012]. 
339
 Jenny Barchfield, ‘Book purports to tell DSK’s Side of Rape Charges’ (1/12/2011) 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/feedarticle/9974264> [accessed 1 August 2012]. 
340
For example, see: John Eligon, ‘What Happened in Room 2806: Three Possibilities’ 
(7/7/2011) <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/08/nyregion/what-happened-in-room-2806-
three-possibilities.html> [accessed 1 August 2012]; Michelle Madden Dempsey, ‘The State 
of New York vs. Dominique Strauss-Kahn: A Critique of Prosecutorial Reasoning’ (6/9/2012) 
<http://www.ihej.org/laffaire-strauss-kahn-un-point-de-vue-americain/?la=en> [accessed 15 
January 2013].  
341
 Cited in Philip Sherwell, ‘Dominique Strauss-Kahn to Reject Plea Deal’ (21/8/2011) 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/dominique-strauss-kahn/8713052/Dominique-Strauss-
Kahn-to-reject-plea-deal.html> [accessed 4 April 2012].  
 155 
 
Approached in this fashion, there are few plausible explanations: that 
Strauss-Kahn raped Diallo, that Diallo is a sex worker and consented to sex 
expecting payment or that Diallo simply decided, having just entered his 
room, to have sex with Strauss-Kahn and is, therefore, in the dominant 
culture’s understanding of female sexuality, ‘promiscuous’. In claiming that 
the encounter was consensual but not seriously proposing that Diallo is a sex 
worker (although, as I will discuss, the media filled in this absence, drawing 
even more heavily on white-supremacist stereotyping), Strauss-Kahn’s 
defence effectively relied on this ‘promiscuity’, amplified by suggestions that 
Diallo was deceitful and manipulative.  
 
Given the widely observed biases within Western judicial systems, media and 
culture at large, it is perhaps not surprising that the burden of proof fell to 
Diallo, who had to defend herself against accusations of lying, manipulation 
and, ultimately, promiscuity. As Zoe Williams, reporting on the trial, notes: 
 
[W]hen a charge of sexual assault is made, everything the accuser 
says is picked over for inconsistency and improbability [...] All the 
accused has to say is: “It was consensual.” Nobody says: “What 
exactly made her consent to sex with you? What was your killer 
move? Do you have a really good line, or do you just do it with your 
eyebrows?”342 
 
The implausibility of Strauss-Kahn’s account—that in the ten minutes or less 
that Diallo was in the room she spontaneously decided to perform oral sex on 
him and then decided to ‘cry rape’ despite, as Wigdor notes, her vulnerable 
social status—was largely not the subject of the trial or much of the media 
coverage. Rather, as Williams observes, it was Diallo’s (arguably, altogether 
more plausible) account, along with her past and her entire character, that 
was subjected to repeated accusation and condemnation; although covered 
by some areas of the media, Strauss-Kahn’s past—which is littered with prior 
allegations of rape and sexual aggression—was, on the whole, not subject to 
the same scrutiny.343 Much of this can be considered to be a reflection of the 
patriarchal biases and tendencies of Western judicial systems to effectively 
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put the rape survivor on trial, defending themselves against accusations of 
lying and ‘crying rape’ (this is why rape trials are sometimes referred to the 
‘second rape’ or ‘second victimisation’).344 As executive director of the New 
York City chapter of the National Organization for Women, Sonia Ossorio, 
notes ‘Dominique Strauss-Kahn got lucky.  He attacked a woman with a 
shady past, and all too often in rape cases that’s exactly what we see.  A 
woman’s past, her credibility, is what’s on trial — not the incident at hand’.345 
However, given the pervasive influence that the stereotype of the 
promiscuous Black woman has over dominant attitudes, as discussed above, 
one must also consider that this argument is strongly supported by the 
intersectional oppression experienced by women of colour.   
 
As suggested earlier, as a Black woman, Diallo is subject to the objectifying, 
white-supremacist, patriarchal stereotypes that present Black women as 
inherently promiscuous. Whilst it is impossible to conclusively demonstrate 
that this underpinned the judicial and media treatment of Diallo, the fact that 
Diallo’s case so neatly fits Davis’ statement that ‘[v]iewed as “loose women” 
and whores, Black women’s cries of rape [...] lack legitimacy’ certainly makes 
it a reasonable proposition and an important consideration.346 White-
supremacist discourses objectify people of colour, presenting them as 
exploitable, subhuman savages who may be used and consumed by racially 
privileged whites. Upon intersection with patriarchal oppression, these 
discourses present women of colour as hyper-sexual objects that may be 
raped with relatively low levels of guilt, social reprisal or judicial response. It 
is in this sense that I suggest that Diallo, and other women of colour, are 
objectified by more than gender oppression, and that, as such, one must 
consider more than the issue of gender when analysing the extent and scope 
and cultural fixity of the Anglophone West’s rape culture.347 Moreover, as I 
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will discuss towards the close of this section, these are not the only ways in 
which white-supremacist discourses, or discourses on female promiscuity 
and survivor-responsibility for rape, contribute to Diallo’s, and others’, 
objectification (the issue of sex work, in particular, contributing significantly to 
the issues at hand). First though, it is useful to provide an overview of other 
objectifying discourses that, upon intersection with gender oppression and 
white-supremacist oppression, also exert significant influence on Diallo’s 
case. These discourses—particularly those concerned with immigration 
status—share distinct commonalities with the white-supremacist oppression 
discussed above but also require some preliminary discussion before I 
address them, as part of an intersectional whole, in relation to Diallo.  
 
 
Trafficked Bodies and Disposable Lives: Anti-Immigrant Oppression and 
Rape 
 
In a similar fashion to its application to people of colour, the notion of ‘sexual 
savagery’ is also directed by the dominant culture at immigrants (who are 
often perceived as coming from ‘backward’ or more primitive and savage 
countries) and lower-class or poor people (who are often presented as being 
further from a ‘civilised’ ideal and closer to a more animalistic and barbarous 
‘natural condition’).348 As with the stereotyping of people of colour, this 
applies to both men and women but in different forms: poor or immigrant men 
are frequently presented in the media (and treated by judicial systems) as 
inherently prone to rape, and poor or immigrant women are frequently 
perceived as ‘promiscuous’ or ‘always consenting’, and are routinely not 
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believed when they report having been raped.349 There are other 
commonalities between the treatment of women of colour and the treatment 
of poor or immigrant women—such as frequent and normalised accusations 
of lying, of wrongly accusing men in order to get money from them or of being 
sex workers—as I will discuss presently. However, anti-immigrant oppression 
has several unique issues that relate to the objectification and rape of women 
that should be addressed briefly first. Of course, in some respects, the 
dominant culture has similar objectifying understandings of immigrants as it 
does of people of colour (and, of course, many immigrants are also people of 
colour). This is particularly true with regard to the issue of labour: even more 
than communities of colour, immigrant communities are disproportionately 
poor in the West, and disproportionately marginalised and exploited as a 
cheap, expendable and exploitable labour force.350 Immigrant workers are 
regularly forced, by external coercion or economic necessity, to take 
underpaid (or sometimes unpaid) menial labour or to work in dangerous, 
unhealthy conditions, often without job security, sick or maternity leave, and 
with exploitative and abusive bosses.351 In this sense, immigrants are often 
treated as, and even more widely, perceived to be, exploitable labouring 
objects, to be used and consumed by bosses and profiteers.  
 
As in the experiences of women of colour, the objectification of immigrants 
often finds a sexual expression in the treatment of immigrant women. 
Numerous reports by human rights groups note that immigrant workers 
employed in the Anglophone West face extremely high levels of sexual 
abuse (including rape), with as much as eighty-percent of some interviewed 
groups having suffered some form of sexual harassment or abuse (including 
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rape) by bosses or co-workers.352 Considering my focus on Diallo it is worth 
noting that this is as applicable to hotel maids (and housemaids) as it is to 
the more commonly discussed immigrant women who work on farms or in 
factories; as Tiffany Williams, advocacy director for Break the Chain 
Campaign,  notes, the master/servant dynamic ingrained in their work 
objectifies and dehumanises maids, and the requirements of their profession 
brings them into regular close contact with the very men who dehumanise 
them, and believe that they ‘own’ them and are entitled to use them as they 
wish.353 Also as with women of colour, this normalised objectification is not 
limited to sexual abuse by bosses and co-workers but rather represents a 
pervasive understanding of female immigrants as expendable, exploitable 
objects to be owned, used and consumed that is found throughout the 
dominant culture, manifest in everything from economic exploitation by 
businesses and bosses and sexual abuse by police and border guards to the 
murder of ‘mail order brides’ and the coerced sterilisation of immigrant 
women.354 However, whilst this objectification and sexual violence closely 
mirrors that experienced by women of colour (and many other marginalised 
women), there is an additional element to the experiences of immigrant 
women: issues surrounding immigration status and the threat of deportation.  
 
For immigrants living in the Anglophone West (or at least endeavouring to do 
so), subject/object status is closely related to immigration status. This is 
particularly true of so-called ‘illegal immigrants’; although all immigrants face 
distinctly objectifying discourses, for ‘illegal’ immigrants, this is effectively an 
automatic process. In countries where even (marginalised) citizens are 
subject to normalised and, to varying degrees, legitimised objectification, 
people who are not in the country legally frequently find themselves outside 
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of the rights that are, at least theoretically, granted to citizens and ‘legal’ 
immigrants. Without this legal status, ‘illegal’ immigrants are often treated as 
lacking the status of subjective beings, being routinely treated as objects that 
may be exploited by those who hold the threat of deportation (amongst other 
threats) over them. As Pérez notes, many immigrant women find themselves 
‘dependent on their abusers for their immigration status [...] this creates the 
power imbalance that facilitates [...] abuses and makes it extremely difficult 
for women [...] to escape these situations without facing the threat of 
deportation.’355 It is this absence of autonomy (in conjunction with other forms 
of objectification) that erodes many women’s statuses as subjective beings, 
reducing them to dependent, exploitable objects in the perception of 
traffickers, employers, sexual partners and other abusive men. This 
objectification is manifest in multiple ways; even more than other immigrant 
groups, many ‘illegal’ immigrants are forced to work dangerous jobs, or to 
work in unhealthy conditions for extremely long hours with little or no pay, 
and no security or protection from exploitation by gangs, bosses, government 
officials or lovers and family members.356  
 
Unsurprisingly, this objectification and exploitation frequently takes a sexual 
form in men’s treatment of ‘illegal’ immigrant women. This sexual violence 
operates on a particularly significant scale and in many forms. Crossing 
borders is particularly dangerous in this respect, with ‘illegal’ immigrants 
being raped by guides, gangs, fellow immigrants and government officials 
during crossings so routinely that many women attempting to cross the 
U.S./Mexico border take contraceptive pills or shots before leaving due to the 
high probability that they will be raped.357 Similarly, human trafficking, which 
is responsible for bringing many ‘illegal’ immigrants into Western countries, 
also makes a significant contribution to the sexual violence experienced by 
‘illegal’ immigrant women. Large numbers of women and girls are trafficked 
into Western countries every year, often voluntarily under the belief they will 
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be given jobs, and many are then raped and forced into prostitution to pay off 
debts to their traffickers.358 Given the illegal, unofficial nature of this practice, 
exact figures are impossible to acquire although various estimates exist that, 
considered together, provide an insight into the extent of the problem.359 For 
example, the European Union estimates that 120,000 women and children 
are trafficked into Western Europe yearly, whilst America’s Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) estimates that between 45,000 and 50,000 are 
trafficked into the United States; although not all trafficked women and 
children are forced into prostitution or sexual slavery, a United Nations study 
estimates that eighty percent of all trafficked people—primarily women and 
children—are trafficked for this purpose.360 As with the rape statistics 
discussed in the introduction, lack of reporting, survivor recognition, 
appropriate definitions or adequate governmental efforts to assess the 
situation make it extremely difficult to attach firm numbers to this issue, and 
many charities and organisations consider government estimates to be highly 
conservative.361  
 
The above issues are compounded by the fact that trafficked and immigrant 
women who have been raped or forced into prostitution frequently receive 
little help from governments and police, often being arrested and deported for 
illegal entry, prostitution or other coerced criminal activity (such as being 
forced to traffic drugs), or being further raped and abused by police and other 
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officials.362 Combined with the threat of reprisals from traffickers and other 
exploiters, this lack of legal support often means that trafficked immigrants, 
and other ‘illegal’ immigrants, are reluctant to report sexual violence, and 
other exploitation, committed against them.363 The understanding of 
immigrants as objects to be bought, sold, used and consumed is central to 
this objectification; the objectification of immigrants—including legal, illegal 
and trafficked immigrants—as expendable and exploitable sources of profit 
intersects with the patriarchal objectification of women to create an 
understanding of immigrant women as inherently rapable, as dehumanised 
sexualised objects who may be raped or forced into prostitution without guilt 
or significant fear of legal recourse. For ‘illegal’ immigrants the latter point is 
particularly significant: the threat of deportation makes such women uniquely 
vulnerable to sexual predation, as their legal status leaves them alienated 
and removed from many systems of support and legal recourse, further 
marking them as objectified and rapable. However, sexual violence and 
exploitation, in various forms, remains a significant issue for ‘legal’ 
immigrants as well. 
 
Although the threat of deportation is most obviously applicable to ‘illegal’ 
immigrants, to some extent it is a threat to all immigrants: immigration status 
may be changed and papers withdrawn, visa ‘top ups’ may be declined, prior 
applications may be reassessed or conditions necessary to immigration 
status, such as marriage to a citizen or the support of a sponsor, may cease 
to be valid.364 As such, even a ‘legal’ immigrant’s status is rarely entirely 
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secure. As well as official changes to ‘legal’ immigration status, there are 
numerous reports of police officers and immigration officials confiscating 
documents and passports, threatening to change immigrants’ legal statuses 
or falsifying the conditions of legal immigration status in order to coerce and 
exploit immigrants or to stop them from reporting exploitation; this is 
particularly true of the treatment of immigrant women who are often raped (by 
bosses, traffickers, police officers, border agents or others) and told that if 
they report their abuse they will be deported.365 As a consequence of this and 
other potential threats, fear of deportation—sometimes rational, sometimes 
the result of understandable paranoia—discourages both immigrants who 
entered Western countries ‘legally’ and those who came in ‘illegally’ from 
drawing attention to themselves or becoming too closely involved with the 
authorities, including the police.366 Some of the reasons for this are well 
demonstrated by Diallo’s case. As well as suggesting that Diallo was 
‘promiscuous’, one of the key components of Strauss-Kahn’s defence was 
the suggestion that Diallo was a serial deceiver who would lie about anything, 
up to and including rape; supporting this position meant that Strauss-Kahn’s 
legal team explored every aspect of Diallo’s past that they could, seeking 
anything that might throw a damning light upon her credibility and, 
accordingly, on her testimony. Amongst the points raised by the defence in 
this respect was the fact that Diallo not only had an improper residency and 
insecure asylum status (which, as Zoe Williams argues, greatly undermined 
her credibility, especially in the ‘trial by media’), but that she achieved this 
illicit asylum status by lying about being gang raped by soldiers in her home 
country of Guinea.367 It is important to clarify, here, that as Nittle highlights, 
Diallo was raped in Guinea but instead reported a fictionalised gang rape by 
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soldiers on her asylum application, having been encouraged and coached to 
do so to increase the likelihood of her application being accepted (by, it is 
worth noting, presenting herself as the survivor of a model of sexual violence 
more widely acknowledged as significant within the biases of the Anglophone 
West’s prevailing attitudes to rape).368 This does not, of course, as will be 
argued presently, in any way prove that she lied about her alleged rape by 
Strauss-Kahn. Nevertheless, the accusations of deception were used to 
portray Diallo as a chronic liar and fraudster, a woman whose word could 
never be trusted and who was intent on getting as much free money and 
support as she could, an image that was widely present in some media 
coverage, such as that provided by the New York Post which, aside from the 
allegations that Diallo was a sex worker (for which Diallo sued the paper, 
reaching an undisclosed settlement in December 2012), actually published 
statements such as ‘she wants to clean out his monetary fund’ and even 
described Diallo as ‘[t]he maid who cried sexual assault.’369  
 
Also widely present in the media coverage, largely as a result of the previous 
‘revelations’, were calls for Diallo to be deported (including from some 
surprising sources, such as human rights activist and ex-ambassador Craig 
Murray, who wrote a blog article entitled ‘Diallo Must Be Deported’).370 This 
highlights the significance of the threat of deportation: in coming forward to 
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report the alleged rape, Diallo was confronted with intense scrutiny of her 
entire past, including her asylum application. This is far from an isolated 
issue; many immigrants and asylum seekers who are raped are faced with a 
difficult and unpleasant choice: to accept that they cannot even report sexual 
violence committed against them, or to do so and risk deportation or other 
serious repercussions. As journalist Zoe Williams observed, ‘if you're a 
migrant who fled an ambiguous situation, if you can get into another country, 
good luck with that – but you forfeit your rights under the rule of law.’371 In 
light of this, it is not surprising that many immigrants and asylum seekers do 
not report that they have been raped. Those whose asylum applications are 
‘genuine’ or whose immigration status is legal are still unlikely to report 
sexual violence due to fear of what an opposing legal team—especially the 
highly-paid legal team of a rich and powerful man—might be able to discover 
(or manipulate) to discredit them, and what it might do to their immigration 
status.372 Indeed, many survivor support advocates and anti-rape activists 
have spoken out about how the handling of Diallo’s case is likely to cause a 
decline in rape reporting from all women due to an increased fear of having 
one’s past publically scrutinised and an increased belief that rich and 
powerful men always escape prosecution.373  
 
Moreover, the issue of whether or not a woman is ‘legally’ or ‘illegally’ in the 
country (like the issue of whether she is an immigrant or a ‘native’) makes no 
difference to her right not to be raped. As Holly Dustin, of the organisation 
End Violence Against Women, notes, ‘[r]ape victims can be less than perfect, 
they can have insecure immigration status [...] and they can still be raped’.374 
Dustin’s point here is significant: no aspect of a woman’s status, identity or 
activities (including those that the dominant culture considers illegal or 
immoral) should mean that she can be raped with impunity, or disbelieved 
when she reports sexual violence. However, what is perhaps more significant 
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is the reason that points such as Dustin’s still have to be raised. The key 
reason that it remains necessary to explain and to argue that there are no 
aspects of a survivor’s life that justify and negate sexual violence committed 
against them is that the Anglophone West not only objectifies all women but 
also has multiple intersecting systems of objectification that present and treat 
certain marginalised women as rapable, as objects who are always 
consenting, or who ‘asked for it’, or who simply lied for their own benefits.  
 
The above discussion has gone into some detail on some of these points, so 
as to provide a detailed overview of how they relate to systems of oppression 
that remain normalised in the dominant culture of the Anglophone West. 
However, this discussion has only covered some of the many ways through 
which normalised systems of oppression objectify marginalised women. 
Moreover, the previous analysis has also treated the points as isolated or as 
the product of only two intersecting systems of oppression. In reality, of 
course, as Diallo’s case demonstrates, there are multiple means through 
which survivors are objectified, and their testimony discredited and voice 
silenced, and these means of objectification are not discrete or isolated or 
attributable to a single system of oppression (or even a single pair of 
intersecting systems).  Rather, the lived experience of many survivors 
(particularly marginalised survivors) reveals an entire complex of issues used 
to undermine the survivor’s testimony and subjectivity, each of which is 
supported, in various ways, by multiple systems of oppression, all 
intersecting at multiple points. Having now established some of the more 
complicated issues that pertain specifically to white-supremacist and anti-
immigrant oppression (in intersection with gender oppression), it is now 
useful to employ Diallo’s case as a lens through which to explore in more 
detail the great complexity of objectification faced by many survivors, and the 
complex, intersectional nature of the discourses that discredit survivors’ 
accounts of sexual violence. 
 
As suggested earlier, the forms of objectification pertaining to Diallo’s 
treatment by Strauss-Kahn, the American judicial system and the West’s 
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media are complex, multifaceted and intersectional.375 At its most basic level, 
this is demonstrated through the issue of promiscuity discussed above. The 
notion that a survivor’s supposed ‘promiscuity’ can excuse rape is, in its most 
basic form, a product of patriarchal oppression: women are presented as 
having no intrinsic right to not be raped, but rather have to earn it through 
restricting themselves to certain ‘patriarchy-approved’ modes of behaviour, 
whilst the patriarchal violence remains unchallenged. More specifically, such 
discourses around ‘promiscuity’ and rape are a form of sexual objectification 
arising from patriarchal oppression: women deemed to be promiscuous are 
presented as having willingly embraced their own sexual objectification by 
engaging in sexual acts and, as such, are treated as ‘fair game’ for sexually 
objectifying behaviour, up to and including rape. In this sense, the notion that 
certain behaviour by survivors ‘justifies’ their rape is both an expression of 
the patriarchal sexual objectification of women by men and a process through 
which that sexual objectification is normalised and legitimised. However, 
these accusations of promiscuity are grounded in patriarchal responses to 
women’s behaviour and there was nothing in Diallo’s behaviour, as reported 
by the press, that could be said to display this kind of ‘promiscuity’; as 
established earlier, the allusions to promiscuity that undermine Diallo’s 
testimony come from patriarchal oppression’s intersection with white-
supremacist oppression, and the belief that women of colour are ‘sexual 
savages’ inherently characterised by bestial insatiability. As such, the implied 
promiscuity that undermines Diallo’s testimony is not just the product of 
gender oppression but of the intersection of gender oppression with white-
supremacist oppression.  
 
However, it is not only white-supremacist oppression that needs to be 
considered in the case of Diallo. Although not necessarily employing the 
same dehumanising discourses as found in white-supremacist treatment of 
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women of colour, both classist and anti-immigrant oppression do, as noted 
earlier, characterise marginalised women as promiscuous, presenting poor 
and immigrant women as being distanced from a supposedly reserved, 
controlled and, ultimately, ‘civilised’ female sexuality.376 In this sense, the 
allusions to promiscuity that helped to undermine Diallo’s account were 
supported by a complex intersection of patriarchal, white-supremacist, anti-
immigrant and classist oppression. However, the point also becomes more 
complex still, as allusions to promiscuity do not only function in the direct 
suggestion that a woman consented to sex (or even that she inherently 
consents to all sex); there are other allegations that produce similar 
discrediting narratives, and these allegations also draw on various 
intersecting systems of oppression. The allegation that Diallo is a sex worker 
which spread throughout the media part way through the trial illustrates this 
point particularly well, and it is to this question that the analysis will now turn.  
 
    
‘Fair Game’: Rape and the Objectification of Sex Workers 
 
The response of the dominant culture to sex workers who have been raped 
represents a (frequently even more extreme) variation on its response to 
‘promiscuous’ women: they are treated as though their choice of actions and 
profession means that, like women who have chosen to be ‘promiscuous’ (or 
to get drunk, or dress ‘provocatively’), they have sacrificed the right to give or 
refuse consent. Indeed, as pro-sex worker advocate and ex-sex worker 
Susan Lopez notes, ‘[a] common misconception about sex workers is that we 
have no boundaries, and that we will do anything for money. As such, we are 
considered fair game for all kinds of denigration, sadly, including rape.’377 
This attitude characterises many police responses to sexual violence against 
sex workers; as Hilary Kinnell notes, when sex workers report being raped, 
their cases are frequently unsuccessful because ‘[p]olice, courts, and jurors 
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[...] believe that, by offering sex for sale, the victim has forfeited the right to 
refuse any partner or sexual practice.’378 This understanding leads to 
dismissive, victim-blaming responses  in many Western judicial systems, 
including, for example, the response of a former state public prosecutor to 
the rape, torture, murder and sexual mutilation of alleged sex workers in 
Mexico, who declared that ‘[i]t’s hard to go out on the street when it’s raining 
and not get wet.’379 Although this is an extreme example, it starkly 
demonstrates the institutionalised perception of sex workers as always 
consenting, as objects that exist to be penetrated by men without any right to 
define the boundaries of their own bodily integrity and without any recourse 
within the law.  
 
This absence of meaningful legal status is deeply ingrained and attitudes 
such as those shown above are not simply the beliefs of isolated misogynists 
but a normalised and widely accepted position frequently found in Western 
judicial systems. As Corinne E. Blackner notes:  
 
[s]tatistics attest to the difficulties prostitutes face when they do 
report rape. Under most circumstances, they are denied protection of 
law. In the United States, police often call such reports “unfounded,” 
meaning that no crime ever occurred, and in many other countries 
prostitutes never file reports.380  
 
The description of sex workers’ reports of rape as ‘unfounded’ is particularly 
telling here: the very foundation for a report of sexual violence—that the 
survivor has a right to bodily integrity, a right not to be raped—is absent in 
this understanding of sex workers. Because sex workers are understood to 
be always consenting, to have no claim to an autonomous, subjective right 
over their own bodies, there is no basis on which to establish an allegation of 
violating such a right. Nussbaum’s description of ‘violability’ as acts and 
understandings in which ‘[t]he objectifier treats the object as lacking in 
boundary-integrity, as something that it is permissible to break up, smash, 
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break into’ is useful in this respect.381 In many respects, the foundation of 
understanding rape as an invasive act of abuse is the recognition of an 
existing boundary and the acknowledgement that it has been violated.382 As 
such, to deny that a survivor has that boundary is to deny that there is any 
crime, any abuse or violation involved in raping that ‘boundaryless’ individual, 
effectively ‘justifying’ rape within the limits of that understanding. However, in 
this context, it is not only the rapist who understands sex workers to be 
‘lacking in boundary-integrity’ but also police and judicial systems and 
beyond: throughout the dominant culture sex workers are understood to have 
undermined their own boundary-integrity by engaging in sex work, effectively, 
making it so ‘permeable’ as to by largely non-existent. With the perceived 
absence of a boundary, the notion of a transgression or violation is seen as 
inapplicable, impossible even, and any reports of sexual violence are, 
accordingly, treated as inherently ‘unfounded’. 
 
Of course, rapist and police are by no means necessarily separate parties; 
the attitudes above manifest not only in police apathy and indifference but 
frequently in the widespread sexual violence committed by police officers 
against sex workers. As Hilary Kinnell reports:  
 
Sex workers in many countries report victimization by police, from 
demands for unpaid sexual services to sexual abuse and humiliation, 
rape, physical violence, and extortion. This behavior is not confined 
to police who abuse their power while off duty, but is reported as 
happening during arrests and in police custody.383  
 
In this sense, the treatment of sex workers is reminiscent not only of the 
objectification of ‘promiscuous’ women but also that experienced by 
immigrants: as in the treatment of ‘illegal’ immigrant women discussed 
earlier, the extralegal position of sex workers both undermines chances of 
seeking legal resolutions to matters of abuse and makes them acutely 
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vulnerable to objectification and exploitation by police officers and other 
government officials.  
 
Moreover, the similarities to previous analysis also extend to parallels 
between the treatment of sex workers and women of colour in that sex 
workers are not only presented as always consenting but also as being less 
deserving of the right to consent, as having bodies less worthy of bodily 
integrity. Where women of colour are presented as rapable because they are 
seen as subhuman, as not qualifying for a human (by which we can infer 
‘white’) woman’s (debatable) right not to be raped, sex workers are seen as 
so tainted, as having bodies so far removed from the standards of virginal 
worth and so inherently objects rather than subjective beings, that they do 
not qualify for subjective rights.384 As Smith notes, ‘[p]rostitutes are almost 
never believed when they say they have been raped because the dominant 
society considers the bodies of sex workers undeserving of integrity and 
violable at all times’.385 In this sense, sex workers are presented as rapable 
by the dominant culture through the understanding that, by virtue of their 
profession, they are always consenting, have chosen to be sexual objects 
(and nothing more than sexual objects), and are so ‘tainted’ that they have no 
intrinsic worth outside of their sexual, ‘pleasure-giving’ capacities and no 
existence, no subjective and autonomous life, outside of being sexual objects 
to be used and consumed by men, all in conjunction with a vulnerable 
position in relation to the law and its agents.386 Of course, it is not simply the 
case that the objectification of sex workers mirrors that of other marginalised 
women; it frequently intersects with them too. Indeed, the alleged sex 
workers who were raped, tortured, murdered and sexually mutilated in 
Mexico, as discussed above, were all, as Smith notes, also poor and/or 
indigenous women of colour.387 As such the objectification that underlay their 
treatment by both the rapist/torturer/murderers and the disinterested, 
misogynistic police and state officials was the result of a particularly virulent 
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intersection of systems of oppression. Moreover, as in the previous 
discussions, the damaging effects of discourses surrounding sex work and 
the fact that these discourses intersect with other systems of oppression are, 
again, readily demonstrable through looking at Diallo’s case. 
 
Although Diallo is not a sex worker, public opinion about her case was still 
greatly influenced by allegations of sex work published in The New York 
Post. On the July 2nd 2011, the paper published the unsubstantiated 
headline ‘DSK MAID A HOOKER’ and so began a rumour that spread 
through much online media and public discussion relating to the case, and 
was widely, and uncritically, reported in other newspapers.388 As Nadra 
Kareem Nittle notes, although the other papers (and several television 
companies) that carried the story did not directly make the same allegations, 
the result was much the same: by reporting that the story had been published 
by The New York Post, without engaging critically with the allegations or 
providing investigative reporting of their own, these secondary reports 
furthered both the spread of the story and its credibility.389 The original article, 
which as noted earlier led to Diallo successfully suing the paper, suggested 
that the ‘[a]llegations that [Diallo] worked as a hotel hooker may explain why 
Strauss-Kahn insists their encounter was consensual’ before describing the 
allegations as ‘damning evidence’.390 The key issue here is the latter aspect: 
the paper’s description of the allegations as ‘damning evidence’. Firstly, it 
must be observed that the allegations fail to qualify as ‘damning evidence’ in 
that they remain only unsubstantiated accusations, rather than, in any sense, 
real proof of anything. More importantly, however, if the allegations were 
proven to be true, they would only be evidence that Diallo was a sex worker, 
not ‘damning evidence’ that she was not raped: if Diallo was proven to be a 
sex worker who worked through her role as a maid, this would offer only the 
possibility of another explanation for what occurred in the hotel room 
(although notably not one that matches either Diallo’s or Strauss-Kahn’s 
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accounts), not automatic proof that no rape occurred. Even proven 
allegations of sex work only function as ‘damning evidence’ if one accepts 
the notion that sex workers cannot be raped. In this sense, the suggestion 
put forth by The New York Post demonstrates the dominant culture’s 
understanding of sex workers as always consenting, or as culturally rapable 
through being unrapable: the possibility that Diallo was a sex worker and was 
raped is not considered because the two are treated as mutually exclusive, 
with the image of Diallo as a ‘hotel hooker’ being presented as ‘damning 
evidence’ against the incompatible image of Diallo as a rape survivor.  
 
This treatment reflects a larger trend in the ways the objectification of sex 
workers operates in public opinion and judicial practices in the Anglophone 
West. Certainly, the automatic disbelief and discrediting of sex workers’ rape 
allegations is a pronounced issue, to the extent that the ‘World Charter for 
Prostitute Rights’ declares that ‘[t]he word of prostitutes is generally assumed 
to be invalid [...] In public, be it on the street corner or in court, their testimony 
and opinion are silenced’.391 Moreover, the assumption that, by virtue of their 
employment, sex workers simply cannot be raped is also highly normalised, 
in courts and the police force especially. Joshua M. Price points to this as a 
recurrent theme in many sex workers’ experiences of surviving and reporting 
sexual violence, with one representative interviewee noting: ‘I can’t tell you 
the countless time I’ve heard police say that a prostitute can’t be raped [...] 
After a while you stop telling the police’.392 That is to say, the prevailing 
understanding that ‘sex worker’ and ‘rape survivor’ are mutually exclusive 
consistently renders sex workers as culturally rapable by marking them as 
‘unrapable’, as having forfeited all right to give or refuse consent to any 
sexual activity.    
    
Moreover, such understandings of sex workers intersect with white-
supremacist, anti-immigrant, classist and other systems of oppression. 
Despite occasional portrayals of sex workers as rich, white, liberated and 
independent women (for instance, the British television series Secret Diary of 
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a Call Girl), the image of sex workers as women of colour, immigrant women 
and poor women remains a dominant narrative in much Anglophone Western 
media.393 This dominant narrative corresponds to—and (re)creates and (re-
)enforces—dominant narratives within Anglophone Western culture more 
generally, which also stereotype women of colour, immigrant women and 
poor women as sex workers. The group ‘Coalition to Support Sexual-
Violence Victims and Survivors’ note this in a petition/open-letter to the 
editors of The New York Post released in the wake of the newspaper’s 
coverage of the Strauss-Kahn/Diallo case:  
 
Regardless of the current state of the case, this is not the time—or 
any other time, for that matter--[sic] for NY Post to try this woman in 
the court of public opinion, especially using the standard victim-
blaming rhetoric of saying the woman is “a hooker.” Not only is this 
abhorrently sexist, but it takes on a grossly racist tone. Black women 
have been historically cast as “Jezebels”—a synonym for “hooker”—
which has been used as the reason why Black women could not 
possibly be “good” (meaning “sympathetic” or “relatable”) rape 
victims [...] Considering the victim’s and the alleged perpetrator’s 
races in the Strauss-Kahn sexual-assault case, the Post’s headline 
and story play too neatly into the perpetuating this bigotry that has 
been around since the days of US slavery.394 
 
This statement highlights two significant trends in the intersectional 
oppression of marginalised sex workers: that the tone and content of much 
media coverage are in themselves offensive and oppressive, and that they 
bias public opinion against marginalised sex workers by referring to pre-
existing prejudices and stereotypes, whilst simultaneously reinforcing and 
recreating those stereotypes. The first of these points is, in the context of this 
thesis at least, relatively self-explanatory. Words such as ‘hooker’ are 
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derogatory towards sex workers, women in general and women of colour in 
particular, contributing to an extensive legacy of misogynistic and racist 
stereotyping in Western media and public opinion. The second point is more 
complex and, arguably, more significant. Referring to pre-existing 
stereotypes is not only insensitive and derogatory; it also exerts a significant 
influence on how allegations of sexual violence from marginalised women are 
perceived in the dominant culture, shaping both public opinion and legal 
practices.  
 
As the coalition’s statement argues, when a journalist or other commentator 
uses terms such as ‘hooker’ to describe a Black survivor it ties their account 
to a long-standing stereotype of promiscuous, always consenting Black 
‘jezebels’. This ‘jezebel’ stereotype has, as the coalition suggest, deep 
cultural roots, grounded in the transatlantic slave trade and ‘forged’, as 
Kimberly Springer notes, ‘in the complex and perverse race relations of the 
post-Civil War South’ where it served ‘to set white women on a pedestal and 
excuse white men’s rape of black women’.395 It remains highly pervasive in 
the contemporary dominant culture, due in no small part to further prejudiced 
reporting by Anglophone Western media and what Samhita Mukhopadhyay 
describes as its ‘overused narrative’ that states ‘that if a woman of color is 
raped, she was lying about it and doing it for the money’.396 The pervasive 
influence of this stereotype means that there is already a story branded into 
the public consciousness of the dominant culture in which the promiscuous 
‘jezebel’ has sex with the wealthy white man, for financial gain or simply 
because she inherently consents to all sexual activity, and then ‘cries rape’ in 
order either to disguise her ‘sluttish’ ways or to exploit the man in question.397 
Accordingly, when media coverage alludes the jezebel stereotype by 
associating women of colour with sex work, this story is superimposed over 
the facts of the case, and the survivor’s account is subsumed by the 
dominant narrative, filtering out the fine detail and remoulding the facts until 
the case starts to resemble the story of the deceitful, promiscuous ‘jezebel’. 
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As such, public opinion of the case becomes a foregone conclusion: because 
people know the dominant narrative, and they understand the case in 
question to resemble that narrative, they ‘know’ the truth of the case and how 
it should be resolved.398 Moreover, similar cultural associations of other 
marginalised women (especially poor women, immigrant women and trans* 
women) with sex work also intersect with these understandings, increasing 
the damage of the white-supremacist ‘jezebel’ stereotype, or producing 
parallel stereotypes that render such women culturally rapable.399 Indeed, as 
I will now argue, both media coverage and wider cultural attitudes around 
sexual violence are shaped by multiple systems of oppression, all of which 
interact in complex, multifaceted ways and connect at numerous points of 
intersection, and in doing so reflect not only the structures of the rape culture 
but also the dominant culture of the Anglophone West.   
 
 
Complexes of Oppression: The Intersectional Objectification of Survivors  
 
As a point of departure, it is useful at this stage to briefly reprise the earlier 
discussion of the Strauss-Kahn/Diallo case, and to note specifically that the 
intersectional objectification and oppression discussed above carries over 
into other aspects of the attempts, by Strauss-Kahn’s defence and elements 
                                                 
398
 This is a common result of prejudiced reporting on issues such as rape. A similar process 
occurred, for example, in 2011 when The Daily Mail described two twelve-year old survivors 
as ‘Lolitas’: in alluding to a familiar character, the article allows the case to be eclipsed by a 
pre-existing narrative, casting the survivors and the rapists in fixed roles already known in 
the public consciousnesses, significantly influencing how the case is understood by readers 
of the article. See: ‘Six Footballers Jailed over Gang Rape of 12-year-old Girls in Midnight 
Park Orgy’ (17/3/2011) <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1367377/Six-footballers-
jailed-gang-rape-12-year-old-girls-midnight-park-orgy.html> [accessed 21 January 2013]. For 
a brief critique of the article, see: ‘End Violence Against Women Coalition FINAL Submission 
to the Leveson Inquiry, January 2012’ <http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2012/01/End-Violence-Against-Women-Coalition-Submission.pdf> 
[accessed 21 January 2013]. 
399
 For discussion, see: Monica Massari, ‘The Other and her Body: Migrant Prostitution, 
Gender Relations and Ethnicity’ (26/6/2009),Cahiers de l’Urmis, no. 12 (2009) 
<http://urmis.revues.org/index787.html> [accessed 17 January 2013]; ‘Migrants and their 
Descendants’, p. 247; Imogen Tyler, ‘Chav Mum, Chav Scum: Class Disgust in 
Contemporary Britain’ (2008) 
<http://eprints.lancs.ac.uk/27152/1/Imogen_Tyler_chavmumchavscumdraft%5B1%5D.pdf> 
[accessed 17 January 2013], p. 13; Naomi B. McCormick, Sexual Salvation: Affirming 
Women’s Sexual Rights and Pleasures (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1994), p. 87; 
Gordene MacKenzie and Mary Marcel, ‘Media Coverage of the Murder of U.S. Transwomen 
of Color’, in Local Violence, Global Media: Feminist Analyses of Gendered Representations, 
ed. by Lisa M. Cuklanz and Sujata Moorti (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 2009), pp. 79–
106 (pp. 82–83). 
 177 
 
of the Anglophone Western media, to discredit Diallo’s account that we have 
not yet explored. Diallo was accused of seeking to exploit Strauss-Kahn for 
financial gain, of being involved in, or at least connected to, crime and drug 
dealing, of falsifying her social security claims and asylum application, and of 
having a generally dishonest and deceitful character (or, as The New York 
Post phrased it, being ‘a pathological liar and scam artist’).400 In this regard, 
the case is representative, for such accusations are routinely levelled at 
many rape survivors regardless of their marginalisation by other aspects of 
the West’s socio-political organisation, and each in itself is a means through 
which Western misogyny objectifies women and silences survivors. Indeed, 
as Gregory M. Duhl notes, in rape trials, ‘[t]he victim’s character [...] is almost 
always scrutinized’, and critical judgements are made by ‘[m]embers of 
society and even officers of the court’ about the appropriateness of the 
survivor’s behaviour and the credibility of their actions before, during and 
after the attack, and throughout the course of the investigation.401 However, 
disparaging assessments and direct accusations are also given further 
credence when applied to marginalised women because each of these points 
also corresponds to dominant narratives and traditional Western discourses 
about people of colour, immigrants, poor people and sex workers. In general 
terms, it is widely noted that stereotypes of people of colour, immigrants and 
poor people as criminals and drug dealers, as social security ‘scroungers’ 
and ‘cheats’, and as generally deceitful and intent of acquiring money from 
others abound in the mainstream media, public opinion and within 
government services and police forces.402 When a woman of colour, 
                                                 
400
Italiano, ‘Maid Cleaning Up as “Hooker”’. For an overview of the accusations levelled at 
Diallo see: Dominic Rushe and Kim Willsher, ‘Dominique Strauss-Kahn’s Accuser goes 
Public as Case Nears Collapse’ (25/7/2011) 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jul/25/strauss-kahn-accuser-breaks-
silence?INT7CMP=SRCH> [accessed 2 February 2012]; Peter Walker, ‘Dominique Strauss-
Kahn Accuser not a “Scheming Opportunist”, Lawyer Insists’ (28/7/2011) 
<www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jul/28/dominique-strauss-kahn-nafissatou-diallo-tapes> 
[accessed 5 March 2012]. 
401
 Gregory M. Duhl, ‘Credibility’, in Encyclopedia of Rape, ed. by Merril D. Smith (Westport, 
CT: Greenwood Press, 2004), pp. 52–53. Also see: Nancy E. Snow, ‘Evaluating Rape Shield 
Laws: Why the Law Continues to Fail Rape Victims’, in A Most Detestable Crime: New 
Philosophical Essay on Rape, ed. by Keith Burgess-Jackson (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1999), pp. 245–266. 
402
 For discussion, see: Haslam and Loughnan, ‘Prejudice and Dehumanization’, pp. 98–99; 
Margaret L. Andersen and Howard F. Taylor, Sociology: Understanding a Diverse Society, 
4
th
 edn. (Belmont, CA: Thomson Wadsworth, 2008), p. 276; Steve Martinot, The Rule of 
Racialization: Class, Identity, Governance (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2003), pp. 
166–175; Hannah Frith, ‘Appearance and Society’, in The Oxford Handbook of the 
 178 
 
immigrant woman or a poor woman reports that she has been raped, these 
stereotypes undermine the survivor’s testimony, supporting suggestions that 
the survivor is lying and seeking personal benefits through ‘crying rape’; this 
trend is manifest in everything from the ‘overused narrative’ of deceitful, 
exploitative women of colour discussed by Mukhopadhyay to what charity 
group Women for Refugee Women call ‘the culture of disbelief’ at the United 
Kingdom Border Agency and Home Office which leads to many asylum-
seeking survivors having their experiences disbelieved, and their asylum 
applications denied.403  
 
Furthermore, not only are such accusations more widely accepted when 
directed at marginalised survivors, they also cause greater public response 
and outrage. Of course, regardless of their relative marginalisation or 
privilege, women accused of ‘crying rape’ are frequently the subject of 
intense anger and hatred, particularly from those who view the issue as an 
endemic victimisation of ‘men’ as a class; indeed, ‘men’s rights’ and 
‘masculist’ groups such as the False Rape Society and A Voice for Men are 
often deeply concerned with, or even formed around, this understanding.404 
To be sure, actual cases of ‘false rape allegation’ (if the term can be divorced 
from its ‘masculist’ connotations) are serious issues that pose a genuine 
threat to the rights and the liberty of the wrongly-accused. However, the 
image of ‘false rape allegation’ as far-reaching, society-wide menace—the 
image propagated by groups such as those above—is greatly exaggerated. A 
report by ‘The National Center for the Prosecution of Violence Against 
Women’ notes that, based on the findings of the most methodologically 
rigorous studies available in America, the United Kingdom and Australia, 
‘estimates for the percentage of false reports begin to converge around  2-
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8%’.405 When this already low percentage is considered in light of the fact 
that reported rapes represent only the slightest fraction of those actually 
committed (as discussed in the introduction), then the relative scale and 
significance of the issue recedes even further. Despite this, the issue remains 
a source of violent outrage for many of those who seek to preserve male 
privilege and entitlement, who cast themselves as the beleaguered victims of 
a sadistic ‘feminazi’ conspiracy and—between articles claiming to expose 
‘the myth of women’s oppression’ or blaming women’s supposedly 
domineering attitudes for domestic violence—denounce Western judicial 
systems’ (already intensely patriarchal and ineffective) rape laws as ‘the 
instruments of tyranny’ directed against men.406 As virulent and vindictive as 
such anger is, it takes on new dimensions and greater intensity, and often 
gains ‘credibility’ and proponents, when the survivor is accused of using the 
supposedly false allegations as a means of ‘scrounging’ financial support or 
sullying the reputation of a man considered to be the survivor’s racial or class 
superior. Such scenarios not only unleash the rage of misogynists but also 
tap into the currents of white-supremacism and other systems of oppression 
that characterise Western culture.407 Indeed, as Mukhopadhyay rhetorically 
asks: in the discourses of the mainstream media, ‘what could be worse than 
a woman of color lying about a rape that could potentially threaten the lives 
and futures of [...] privileged white men?’408  
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The above discussion demonstrates that, in line with my earlier declaration, it 
is not only systems of patriarchal and misogynistic gender oppression that 
are central to the Anglophone West’s rape culture. Even then it has only 
addressed a limited number of other systems of oppression; there are 
others—for example, homophobia, transphobia, abelism, ageism and 
xenophobia—that function in similar fashions (and in various intersecting 
formations), objectifying and making marginalised women culturally rapable 
throughout the Anglophone West.409 Of course, patriarchal and misogynistic 
gender oppression is central to the objectification of women, which, in turn, 
is, as established earlier, central to the enabling of rape. However, this does 
not mean that somehow eliminating gender oppression (ignoring for the 
moment the fact that, as argued earlier, gender oppression is itself deeply 
embedded in the West’s superculture of objectification) would automatically 
eliminate rape. Marginalised women would still be subject to objectification 
that would render them culturally rapable in the views of privileged men.  
 
The oppression and objectification experienced by marginalised women is 
intersectional rather than cumulative, and as such cannot be neatly divided 
into discrete forms, each the product of a single system of oppression. For 
example, as noted earlier, the objectification experienced by women of colour 
is not objectification as a person of colour plus objectification as a woman but 
a unique, intersectional objectification as a woman of colour. King highlights 
this point in her critique of the notions of the ‘double jeopardy’ of racism and 
sexism, and the ‘triple jeopardy’ of racism, sexism and classism. She writes:  
 
Unfortunately, most applications of the concepts of double and triple 
jeopardy have been overly simplistic in assuming that the 
relationships among the various discriminations are merely additive. 
These relationships are interpreted as equivalent to the mathematical 
equation, racism plus sexism plus classism equal triple jeopardy. In 
this instance, each discrimination has a single, direct, independent 
effect on status, wherein the relative contribution of each is readily 
apparent. This simple incremental process does not represent the 
nature of black women’s oppression410  
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What King highlights here is that the results of a single system of oppression 
on a multiply-marginalised person cannot be neatly separated from the 
whole, from the actual oppression as experienced. Accordingly, the notion 
that eliminating a single system of oppression simply removes that 
oppression from the marginalised person’s experiences (for example, 
eliminating ‘gender oppression’ means that women of colour only experience 
white-supremacist oppression) is not workable: the oppression experienced 
by multiply-marginalised people is intersectional, and just as single, discrete 
forms of oppression cannot be treated as separate from the whole, they 
cannot be neatly excised from the whole. As such, the notion of eliminating 
gender oppression, unless understood as fully situated within a network of 
intersectional oppression, effectively translates as eliminating only the 
oppression experienced by privileged women, by the relatively small number 
of women whose oppression is grounded only in gender hierarchy and 
gendered dualistic thinking. For example, the elimination of gender 
oppression might mean that ‘women’ as a problematically homogenised 
group are not viewed as rapable objects by virtue of their gender, but that 
does not mean that marginalised women would not be considered rapable in 
the discourses of the dominant culture  because they would still be objectified 
and presented as rapable through the intersectional oppression that is a lived 
reality for many marginalised women in the Anglophone West.. Similarly, the 
elimination of gender oppression might mean that ‘women’ are not 
interrogated as liars when reporting rape, but this would not necessarily apply 
to many marginalised women  because of the stereotypes surrounding 
marginalised women, as outlined above. Systems of oppression can be 
discussed, as to some extent I have done above, as isolated forces (albeit 
isolated forces with a shared root in the West’s underlying philosophy of 
objectification); however, the reality or the lived experience of oppression, 
shows that oppression, and objectification in particular, frequently take 
complex intersectional forms that cannot be adequately addressed (or 
combated) on a purely disconnected, discrete basis. In this sense, the 
Anglophone West’s rape culture, as well as taking its ideological foundation 
from the West’s underlying philosophy of objectification, is also closely 
structured and organised by multiple, intersectional forms of oppression and 
objectification, each with its roots in the underlying philosophy. As I will now 
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demonstrate, it is this issue that begins to show the true significance of the 
previous analysis and the extent to which sexual violence is enmeshed in the 
dominant culture of the Anglophone West. 
 
 
Abusive Culture: The Civilised Foundations of Rape 
 
Western culture’s underlying philosophy of objectification—the understanding 
that some lives are worth less than others and so can be used and 
consumed—is organised and formalised through the complex, intersecting 
systems of oppression that shape Western socio-political organisation, 
outlining who may be objectified and consumed by whom. Systems of 
patriarchal and misogynistic gender oppression mark men as subjects and 
consumers and women as objects to be consumed, but they do so in 
inseparable, intersectional conjunction with many other systems of 
oppression, all of which are, at best, deeply ingrained in the structure of 
Western culture and, at worst, inherent elements of it. Certainly, it can, at 
least, be argued that these structures are intrinsic to the Anglophone West in 
its current form or that they are elements that cannot be eliminated without 
radical social change across the entirety of the dominant culture. For 
instance, the West’s current (and longstanding) capitalist social organisation 
both constantly produces and is entirely reliant upon the existence of 
subordinated and marginalised groups who may be legitimately objectified 
and consumed; as David Watson succinctly phrases it: ‘[c]apitalism needs a 
colony, and someone has to be that colony.’411 In this sense, Western 
capitalism is both product and guardian of social hierarchy and a 
contemporary manifestation of the belief that some lives are worth less than 
others; it works to organise and legitimise the objectification of the 
disempowered by the powerful and celebrates—even venerates—the 
consumption of the marginalised by the privileged.  
 
Moreover, as Watson’s statement suggests, the groups marked as 
exploitable, consumable by Western capitalism are not simply the ‘lower-
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class’ but numerous different groups, each marginalised and objectified by 
multiple, intersecting systems of oppression that also play an ‘essential’ 
structuring role in the capitalist West. As Silvia Federici notes: 
 
capitalism [...] is necessarily committed to racism and sexism. For 
capitalism must justify and mystify the contradictions built into its 
social relations—the promise of freedom vs. the reality of widespread 
coercion, and the promise of prosperity vs. the reality of widespread 
penury—by denigrating the “nature” of those it exploits: women, 
colonial subjects, the descendents of African slaves, the immigrants 
displaced by globalization [...] If capitalism has been able to 
reproduce itself it is only because of the web of inequalities that it has 
built into the body of the world proletariat, and because of its capacity 
to globalize exploitation.412  
 
To maintain the colonies—both in the sense of territorial expansion and the 
‘cultural colonies’ of marginalised and exploited classes or groups—
capitalism must mark those it consumes as inherently consumable, as 
inferior and worthless by their very ‘nature’. In doing so, it presents the 
exploitation and abuse of the marginalised as ‘normal’ and ‘natural’. 
Furthermore, capitalism does not, as is often assumed, operate only in the 
realm of economics. Rather, it is perhaps best understood in the manner 
Marimba Ani presents it: as ‘a system of ethics that regulates the behavior of 
individuals in definite directions and in accord with a consistent image of the 
human being and of his proper relation to others.’413 That is to say, capitalism 
not only normalises the economic exploitation of the marginalised but 
infiltrates and influences modes of relation on a far broader scale, presenting 
objectification and consumption as legitimate, laudable means of relating to 
others and to the world at large. As this chapter has demonstrated, this mode 
of relation—and its pervasive normalisation—is central to the maintenance of 
the Anglophone West’s rape culture. In this sense, without suggesting that 
capitalism is the cause of rape (a point which is soundly disproved by high 
incidence of rape in communist countries and throughout the pre-capitalist 
West), it can certainly be argued, along the lines suggested above, that 
contemporary Western capitalism creates a culture in which rape thrives.414 
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From this point, it can also be argued that eliminating the objectifying 
systems of oppression that underpin the Anglophone West’s rape culture 
(and so moving closer to eliminating rape) necessarily requires eliminating 
capitalism.  
 
However, as suggested earlier, capitalism is only a manifestation of the 
underlying philosophy of objectification, a current means through which it is 
organised and legitimised, not the cause of these distinct trends in the 
structuring of Western culture. Indeed, as Ani notes, capitalism simply 
‘provides another vehicle for the expression of the insatiable European “will-
to-power”’ already firmly grounded in Western culture and worldview.415 
Whilst capitalism is one of the dominant means of (re)producing, maintaining 
and enforcing it, the underlying philosophy, the perception of world as 
composed of objects to be consumed, has far deeper roots. It can, for 
example, be identified in the fact that, as Ward Churchill notes, the systems 
of oppression, capitalist social organisation, and the society they shape and 
produce, all operate on stolen, colonised land and are themselves the 
product of an inherently objectifying colonial relationship that spreads across 
much of the world.416 Similarly, it is reflected in the understanding that, as 
Derrick Jensen asserts, ‘industrial civilisation’ is, by its very nature, 
unsustainable and so intrinsically requires subordinated groups, colonised 
lands and an objectified world not only to sustain capitalist social organisation 
but simply to exist.417 The extent to which such issues are origins or 
expressions of the underlying philosophy of objectification is not our concern 
here: the philosophy is a complex, convoluted network of mutually reinforcing 
strands, and its structures and manifestations change constantly as the 
dominant culture develops and evolves, rendering the notion of an 
identifiable point of origin utterly unfeasible. The significant point is that these 
issues, and the others discussed throughout this chapter, are all firmly 
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enmeshed in the network, and collectively, as the underlying philosophy of 
objectification, they profoundly shape Western culture, providing the 
foundations, the cultural backdrop, for the Anglophone West’s rape culture. 
 
In this sense, the Anglophone West’s rape culture is not only supported by, 
and the product of, the numerous intersecting systems of oppression that 
structure Western socio-political organisation, but also, more broadly, and by 
the same logic, it is the product of the West’s underlying philosophy of 
objectification and of the dominant culture of the Anglophone West. It is the 
product of a society that is structured around the consumption of others, a 
culture that produces rape survivors as predictably as it produces wastelands 
and warzones, colonies and slaves, tortured bodies and starving children. It 
is the product of a culture that is founded on the belief that some lives are 
worth less than others, a culture that is structured and shaped by the 
organising and formalising of who is worth less and who is worth more, who 
is a subjective consumer and who is a consumable object, existing only to be 
used for the benefit of others. Contemporary gender order and the long 
traditions of patriarchal social organisation and misogynistic ideologies and 
practices dictate the specific forms this objectification and consumption take, 
marking women as rapable rather than simply ‘consumable’, but they are 
grounded in, and profoundly supported by, this foundational understanding; 
whilst the foundations remain in place, the structure of the Anglophone 
West’s rape culture will remain strong and its influence will remain as 
pervasive and destructive as it currently stands.     
 
These are large, significant issues that, within the scope of the thesis, have 
helped fuel my analysis so far and will continue to shape the following 
chapter. Considered in the light of my discussion of objectification and its 
centrality to the Anglophone West’s rape culture, they begin to raise 
important questions about what may be required to end sexual violence and, 
indeed, whether this can ever truly happen within the abusive structures, 
ideologies and philosophies that prevail in the dominant culture of the 
Anglophone West. However, this represents only half of the argument; 
understanding sexual violence, after all, requires not only that we explore the 
cultural treatment of rape survivors but also that we analyse rapists 
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themselves. Consequently, understanding the relationships between the 
dominant culture the Anglophone West and its rape culture requires that we 
interrogate the place of the rapist within the dominant culture. Central to this 
is acknowledging that rapists are no less ‘socially produced’ than are rape 
survivors: that is, just as a complex of attitudes, ideologies, systems and 
structures works to reduce survivors to ‘rapable bodies’, so too do they 
generate the processes by which ‘normal men’ come to commit acts of 
sexual violence. Popular images of rapists as enacting ‘natural’ instincts or as 
rare aberrations that emerge as a result of chance, idiosyncratic ‘mental 
illness’ or improper inculcation into the supposedly rape-opposed ethics of 
the dominant culture actually work to mark rapists as existing outside of the 
‘civilised’ culture of the Anglophone West and deny this ‘civilised’ culture’s 
culpability for sexual violence. The following chapter will argue that, in reality, 
neither the desire nor the psychological capacity to commit rape is ‘natural’ or 
inherent; rather they are learned processes developed not through rapists’ 
exclusion from but their inculcation into the dominant culture. Likewise, these 
socialised characteristics are not rare and aberrant but commonplace and 
highly normalised, functioning as extensions of normative attitudes, 
ideologies and practices that characterise Anglophone Western culture. On 
the most immediate level, they extend normative gender conditioning and 
masculine socialisation, which produce in many men a profound sense of 
entitlement and self-interest and a drive to attain and display power over 
others. However, as with the social production of rapable bodies, the roots of 
this socialisation stretch beyond gender and into the deepest structures of 
the dominant culture itself. Building on the above analysis, the chapter will 
argue that the Anglophone West is shaped by and reliant upon the 
normalising of self-interested exploitation and the celebration of conquest 
and domination, and that rape is a sexualised, gendered expression of these 
deep-seated cultural characteristics. In this manner, the philosophies, 
ideologies, systems, structures and practices of the Anglophone West play a 
central role in the social production of what I describe as ‘rapist mentalities’: 
the rationales, unconscious thought processes, beliefs, understandings, 
value systems, behavioural codes and modes of perception and relation that 
both enable and motivate rapists to commit rape. Understanding this process 
adds new layers of complexity to the relationship between Western culture 
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and sexual violence, raising further questions of whether the Anglophone 
West’s rape culture is an inherent component of the dominant culture of the 
Anglophone West, and it is to exploring this issue that the discussion will now 
turn. 
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Culture of Abuse: The Social Production of Rapist Mentalities 
 
 
 
Myths and Misconceptions: The Natural Rapist and the Aberrant Rapist 
 
The realities of sexual violence are shrouded in misconception, obscured and 
distorted by numerous myths of its forms and functions, its meanings and 
motivations, its relationships with the dominant culture. Most such myths 
have been widely critiqued in feminist studies and shown to have foundations 
no deeper than speculation, hearsay and prejudice, yet many still hold 
considerable sway in both popular and specialist understandings of rape.418 
Of those myths pertaining to the often intangible figure of ‘the rapist’, there 
are perhaps two that exert the most significant influence. The first suggests 
that rapists are expressing a ‘natural instinct’ for coercive, predatory sexuality 
that is inherent to ‘all men’, and the second that rapists are aberrant, deviant 
pariahs who exist and operate outside the realms of ‘normal’ society. Both of 
these myths serve the same basic function of denying that the dominant 
culture has any culpability for the behaviour of rapists or for the Anglophone 
West’s rape problem in general. The myth of the ‘natural’ rapist, as we have 
seen in the first chapter, presents rape as pre-cultural, as something fixed 
that culture may respond to—organising it, controlling it, condemning or 
celebrating it—but cannot be said to actively cause.419 As such, it presents 
rapists’ actions as originating outside of ‘culture’ and so asserts that ‘nature’, 
and not ‘culture’, is responsible for sexual violence. The myth of the aberrant 
rapist conveys much the same message, this time by suggesting that 
‘normal’ men do not commit rape and that the propensity to do so arises from 
influences outside of ‘normal’ society, in those who, by dint of ‘mental illness’ 
or social exclusion, are not properly socialised into the dominant culture.420 
Accordingly, this myth purges ‘the rapist’ from the dominant culture and its 
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 For discussion, see: Diana Scully and Joseph Marolla, ‘“Riding the Bull at Gilley’s”: 
Convicted Rapists Describe the Rewards of Rape’, Social Problems, Vol. 32, No. 3 (1985), 
251–263 (pp. 251−252). 
 189 
 
field of responsibility by marking his propensity to rape as the product of his 
exclusion from, rather than his socialisation into, culturally-prescribed 
ideologies, attitudes and behaviour patterns.  
 
At times, these two myths contradict one another because the notion that a 
propensity to rape is ‘natural’ and common to ‘all men’ undermines the notion 
that rapists are rare and ‘deviant’.  More often, they work in unison, either in 
the belief that rape is an expression of the ‘natural’ psychopathology of 
‘deviant’ individuals or, most commonly, in the belief that ‘all men’ have the 
same ‘natural’ propensity but that most have learned to suppress it, leaving 
only the ‘deviant’ and improperly socialised to actually act upon their 
‘instincts’. Both of these beliefs have long shaped the study of rapists, 
particularly in psychopathological approaches. For example, A. Nicholas 
Groth’s seminal and still highly influential study Men Who Rape: The 
Psychology of the Offender (1979), is largely premised on the first belief, as 
reflected in his assertion that ‘the rapist’ is ‘a person who has serious 
psychological difficulties which handicap him in his relationships with other 
people’.421 In other words, all rapists are, according to Groth, aberrant 
individuals expressing the ‘natural’ deviance of their own psychopathologies. 
Interestingly, the second belief can also be identified in Groth’s text, in this 
case in Edward M. Brecher’s foreword to the main study. Brecher writes that 
‘many, perhaps most, rapists [...] grew up under circumstances which 
deprived them of the civilizing influences and the rewards that mold the lives 
of nonrapists’.422 That is to say, for Brecher, men require the ‘civilizing 
influences’ of normative socialisation in order not to become rapists, 
suggesting that predisposition to rape is something pre-cultural that is 
contained and controlled by civilised culture. However, whether alone, 
conflicting or intersecting, both myths still maintain the overarching fallacy 
that rapists’ propensity to commit rape arises from outside the dominant 
culture rather than being the direct product of the prevailing  ideologies, 
ethics, attitudes and practices of the Anglophone West. The analysis in this 
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the Offender (New York and London: Plenum Press, 1990), pp. vii–ix (p. viii). 
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chapter will challenge such understandings, arguing instead that rapists are 
merely expressing and conforming to the roles prescribed to them by both 
contemporary gender order and wider patterns of exploitative, self-serving 
behaviour that shapes the dominant culture.   
 
The previous chapter proposed that sexual violence is at once a product of 
the Anglophone West’s traditions of misogyny and patriarchal social 
organisation and a manifestation of a broader process of objectification and 
consumption on which the ‘civilised’ West relies, ultimately concluding that 
the social production of rapable bodies is an inevitable, and arguably 
inherent, aspect of the dominant culture of the Anglophone West. This 
chapter addresses the other side of the same issue, exploring how the 
dominant culture, again perhaps intrinsically, produces what I shall refer to as 
‘rapist mentalities’. The concept of a ‘rapist mentality’ is employed by several 
theorists, although largely without a fixed definition or qualifying analysis.423 
In this thesis, I use the term to refer to a heterogeneous collection of 
rationales, unconscious thought processes, beliefs, understandings, value 
systems, behavioural codes and modes of perception and relation that both 
enable and motivate rapists to commit rape. That is to say, for the purposes 
of this discussion, a rapist mentality is a mode of (conscious or unconscious) 
thinking by which rapists come to perceive, experience or ‘know’ an act of 
sexual violence to be, within his own psyche, an acceptable and desirable 
course of action.424 Importantly, ‘rapist mentalities’ should not be seen as 
innate—either to the deviant ‘mentally ill’ rapist or to ‘all men’—but as a 
learned mode of thought and relation, a culturally-constructed product of 
rapists’ socialisation into dominant models of masculinity and the Anglophone 
West’s prevailing behavioural and ethical codes. Similarly, to further clarify 
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and Terence Dawson, ‘Glossary’, in The Cambridge Companion to Jung, ed. by Polly 
Young-Eisendrath and Terence Dawson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 
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the concept, it is also important to note that it should not be taken as a 
suggestion that all rapists can be grouped into a monolithic category or 
homogenous community or that there is a fixed ‘personality type’ that 
predetermines or predicts rape perpetration. Rather, the notion of ‘rapist 
mentality’ describes the numerous combinations of socialised or culturally 
acquired thought processes that facilitate and motivate sexual violence. As 
such, it is applicable to all rapists not because all rapists are in any sense 
identical or united by anything other than their sexual violence, but because 
the concept acknowledges, and functions as a collective term for, the wide 
range of rape-enabling and rape-motivating modes of thought, perception 
and relation which I argue to be endemic to the dominant culture. Similarly, 
the social production of rapist mentalities should not be seen simply as the 
mechanical result of the social production of rapable bodies: the two 
processes are intimately related and share many roots and supporting 
structures but the presence of ‘legitimate’ targets does not automatically instil 
into others either the psychological capacity or the desire to commit rape. 
Instead, the social production of rapist mentalities must be seen as a process 
in its own right that mirrors, but cannot be collapsed into, the social 
production of rapable bodies. In other words, an account must be made of 
the ways in which individuals are socialised into a variety of rape-enabling 
and rape-motivating perceptions of themselves in relation to others and in 
relation to ‘rapable bodies’. Ultimately, it is such an account that this chapter 
aims to deliver, using the myths of natural and aberrant rapists as points of 
departure to explore the socialised ‘psychology’ of rape and its relation to 
prevailing ideologies and practices, to examine why such socialisation is so 
prolific and to interrogate the place of ‘the rapist’ in the vast web of power 
relations that make up the dominant culture of the Anglophone West. This 
enquiry will begin by exploring the psychological capacity to rape, leading 
into this analysis by reprising the discussion of naturalised rape introduced in 
the first chapter.  
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Learning to Harm Others: Socialisation and Inhibitions against Abuse  
 
One of the key aspects of the myth of the natural rapist, at least for the 
civilisation-critical arguments of this thesis, is the suggestion that normative 
socialisation into the dominant culture produces a rational, ethical objection 
to sexual violence that counteracts a supposed inherent ‘male’ drive to 
commit rape. That is, in such conceptions, the desire to rape is seen as 
‘natural’ and common to ‘all men’ and it is only through the development of 
sophisticated, ‘moral’ societies that most men come to view rape as 
something damaging and objectionable and so ‘learn’ not to commit it. 
Although this thinking also pervades both some rape-supportive arguments, 
often in the form of statements such as ‘boys will be boys’ as discussed 
previously, and some feminist anti-rape theory (certainly, as suggested in the 
first chapter, we can find similar positions in Susan Brownmiller’s work), it is 
perhaps most apparent in the ostensibly ‘neutral’ work of some evolutionary 
biologists.425 It clearly underpins statements such as Richard Wrangham and 
Dale Peterson’s suggestion that ‘[s]ociety’s growing sympathy for rape 
victims may [...] be working to end a system that has deep evolutionary 
roots’, which sets up civilisation’s moral ‘progress’ as the solution to ‘natural’ 
rape.426 This is even starker, and framed even more directly as a practical 
‘solution’ to sexual violence, in Randy Thornhill and Craig Palmer’s proposals 
for ‘an evolutionary informed educational program’ that teaches ‘young men 
to acknowledge the power of their sexual impulses and then [explains] why 
human males have evolved to be that way’.427 They continue by stating that  
 
the program should stress that, if he understands and adamantly 
resists his evolved desires, a young man may be able to prevent their 
manifestation in sexually coercive behavior. We suggest that the 
program conclude with a detailed and graphic discussion of the 
penalties of rape.428 
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Here, a propensity to rape is clearly framed as ‘natural’ and the ‘solution’ as 
being the product of ‘civilised’ culture, manifest as educational programs that 
propose a rational and moral effort to control coercive urges and as a 
sophisticated legal system that allegedly punishes those who abuse 
others.429 Implicit within such arguments is the assumption that ‘men’ have 
no inhibitions against sexual violence until they are socialised to develop 
them: that is, it is assumed that the psychological capacity to rape is innate 
and that inhibitions against doing so are learned and internalised as a result 
of external cultural influence. This point is significant in itself; however, far 
more significant, at least for the purposes of our discussion here, is the fact 
that feminist critiques of ‘the natural rapist’ rarely address this issue. Although 
many theorists suggest that the desire to commit rape is learned or 
socialised, discussion of the ways in which rapists overcome inhibitions 
against committing rape is largely limited to analysis of the dehumanisation 
and objectification of women, with little consideration given to other aspects 
of this process. This lack of analysis functions as a de facto assumption that 
‘men’ lack inhibitions against rape, or at least lack those inhibitions that aren’t 
entirely circumvented by the social production of rapable bodies. However, 
whilst the process of making women culturally rapable is hugely important to 
this issue, to ignore other aspects of how rapists come to see sexual violence 
as personally acceptable—that is, how they develop one of the two 
components of a rapist mentality—is to overlook a significant reason why 
rape is so prolific in the Anglophone West. Accordingly, it is to this issue that 
the analysis will now turn. 
 
                                                                                                                                          
‘young’, ‘healthy’ and ‘attractive’ (the authors more or less conflate these terms) or that 
women’s behaviour and clothing choices provoke sexual violence (pp. 180−186). Indeed, 
they even suggest warning women that they have evolved a ‘tactical’ use of ‘clothing as 
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The fact that the psychological capacity to rape is, in many respects, an 
underanalysed issue places limitations on the sources available for 
developing a full understanding of how it is socialised into individuals and 
how it functions as part of a rapist mentality. Accordingly, it is necessary to 
develop an argument with reference to other contexts in which abusers are 
socialised to discount their inhibitions against abusing others. Of course, in 
doing so, it is important not to treat ‘rape’ as neatly interchangeable with 
generalised ‘violence’ and ‘abuse’: rape, after all, exists within a highly 
specific network of gendered power relations and gendered socialisation that 
makes it distinct from other forms of socialised abusiveness. However, in 
terms of the psychological capacity to commit rape, there is enough 
correlation between the processes that enable rape and those that enable 
other forms of abuse that this remains an appropriate comparison and allows 
analysis of generalised abuse to serve as a useful point of departure. The 
notion that generalised ‘violence’ is ‘natural’ or that human beings inherently 
lack inhibitions against abusing others is highly significant to the social 
structures and ideological traditions of the West. Indeed, the foundations of 
the Western (neo)liberal state lie in this assumption and in the subsequent 
conclusion that a powerful, coercive and punitive centralised government is 
thus necessary to ‘protect’ the citizenry from the threat of ‘natural violence’.430 
However, this position is, I suggest, largely the product of conjecture and the 
projection of ‘civilised’ attributes onto a ‘human nature’: after all, not only do a 
great many cultures without centralised governments display remarkably low 
levels of violent behaviour (in fact, if there is a characteristic that is common 
to these cultures, it is far closer to cooperation or mutuality than to 
aggression), but a great deal of evidence also suggests that cultures with 
centralised governments (and perhaps the West most of all) actually socialise 
the ‘natural’ lack of inhibitions into their citizens.431 This is perhaps mostly 
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clearly illustrated by the fact that, when governments require certain citizens 
to perform acts of violence and abuse, they have to actively train them to be 
psychologically capable of doing so: as David Livingstone Smith notes, 
‘despite what we see in the movies [...] it’s very difficult, psychologically, to 
kill another human being [...] or to inflict atrocities on them’ suggesting that to 
do so, humans must ‘overcome the very deep and natural inhibitions they 
have against treating other people like game animals or vermin’.432 The 
inhibitions Smith refers to here are widely noted to greatly undermine a 
soldier’s capacity to kill, or otherwise abuse, ‘enemy’ soldiers and civilians 
and so must be ‘un-learnt’ through the extensive training and socialisation 
that characterises life in the military.433 Moreover, this is not limited to 
soldiers: for example, Mark A. Costanzo and Ellen Gerrity observe ‘people 
asked to implement the policy of torture must find psychological mechanisms 
for lowering their inhibitions against cruelty’.434 Similarly, Hannah Arendt 
asserts that that one of the key difficulties the Nazi Party faced in the 
execution of the Holocaust was overcoming ‘the animal pity’ that affected 
concentration camp guards ‘in the presence of physical suffering’.435 These 
observations all point to the notion that the psychological capacity to abuse 
other people, to act with violence towards them or to kill them, is a learned 
‘skill’, the product of patterns of intensive training and socialisation 
specifically intended to undermine and overcome inhibitions against abusive 
behaviour. 
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The same, I suggest, is true of the perpetration of sexual violence in the 
Anglophone West: the psychological capacity to commit rape—or the 
absence of internal inhibitions against rape—is not an innate aspect of a 
homogenised ‘male sexuality’ but a learned ability brought about by 
socialisation into the patriarchal and misogynistic dominant culture; indeed, 
the second item on Julie A. Allison and Lawrence S. Wrightsman’s list of 
conditions necessary for a rapist to commit rape is that the potential rapist’s 
‘internal inhibitions against acting out [the] desire [to commit rape] have to be 
undermined’.436 However, the existing literature that addresses this issue is 
primarily concerned with rapists’ perceptions of their targets and the ways in 
which the objectification and dehumanisation of women—that is, the 
processes through which women come to be seen as rapable bodies—
enables rapists to overcome these inhibitions. For example, Diana E.H. 
Russell’s study, from which Allison and Wrightsman derive their list of 
conditions, mainly focuses on factors such as the perception of ‘female 
sexuality [...] as a commodity’, the acceptance of rape myths and 
(mis)understandings of consent and the (sub)cultural acceptance of violence, 
in general and against women.437 These are all significant issues and I have 
touched on several of them throughout the thesis but they are not the only 
factors that enable rapists to overcome internal inhibitions against sexual 
violence. After all, as I suggested in the introduction, the presence of a 
legitimate ‘victim’ does not automatically produce an uninhibited victimiser; 
rather, the psychological capacity to rape arises not only from the ways in 
which the rapist perceives women but also how he perceives himself. That is 
to say, the processes that enable a rapist to overcome inhibitions against 
rape do certainly include the objectification of women or the social production 
of rapable bodies outlined at length in the previous chapter but they cannot 
be collapsed into or considered to be subsumed by them: they also include 
the rapist’s ‘mentality’, his modes of (self-) perception and relation, his 
conscious and unconscious understandings of his self in relation to others. 
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This is well illustrated by returning briefly to the examples of generalised 
violence and abuse noted above. 
 
The dehumanisation of ‘enemies’ and ‘targets’ prefigures most, if not all, acts 
of institutionalised abuse primarily because it enables abusers to overcome 
inhibitions against what they are expected to do by moving their victims out of 
the moral realm, marking them as undeserving of ‘humane’ treatment. This 
operates in multiple forms with various manifestations ranging from the use 
of animalising or ‘vermin-ising’ racial slurs (Jews as rats, Tutsis as 
cockroaches) to the ‘scientific’ classification of groups or races as subhuman 
(‘Negroes’ as closer to apes than humans, the eugenical sterilisation of 
disabled people) through to the transformation of victims’ physical 
appearances until they no longer look ‘human’ (the starved and shaved 
inmates of the concentration camps, the ‘bagged’ and hooded inmates of 
Abu Ghraib).438 However, in each of the cases above, such dehumanisation 
is not the only process in operation: the guards, soldiers, slave traders, 
eugenics doctors and countless others must all understand themselves to be 
entitled to act as they do, to be legitimised, to be performing ‘normal’ actions 
or else extraordinarily worthwhile actions, or at least to be simply following 
orders as part of a larger pattern in which human responsibility is 
surrendered to hierarchy and command structure. In other words, contrary to 
the position underpinning much of the Anglophone West’s prevailing political 
and cultural ideologies, the psychological capacity to abuse another human 
being is something that must be learned or acquired and this requires not 
only that the target be dehumanised but also that the abuser develops an 
‘abuser mentality’ or a mode of thinking that enables them to overcome their 
inhibitions against their own prescribed behaviour. Again, the same is true of 
the perpetrators of sexual violence who must, I suggest, develop a rapist 
mentality: some combination of rationales, unconscious thought processes, 
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beliefs, understandings, value systems, behavioural codes or modes of 
perception and relation that enables them, at least in the moment of the 
assault, to commit rape.439 However, there is an important distinction 
between sexual violence and the previous examples of abuse: in the majority 
of cases, sexual violence is not the result of a direct order enacted by a 
member of a coherent organisation that operates on specific command 
structures and mechanisms of responsibility and putatively surrendered 
agency. As I will now discuss, this has important ramifications for how we 
conceive of the content or components of rapist mentalities. 
 
In his pioneering sociological study of the Holocaust, Zygmunt Bauman 
endeavours to ‘reconstruct the social mechanism of “overcoming the animal 
pity” employed by Nazi officials to enable concentration camp guards to 
engage in ‘conduct contrary to innate moral inhibitions’.440 Referring to this 
process as ‘the social production of moral indifference’, Bauman, following 
Herbert C. Kelman, proposes three conditions that enabled ‘normal’ 
individuals to commit the atrocities, abuse and violence of the Holocaust: ‘the 
violence is authorized (by official orders coming from the legally entitled 
quarters), actions are routinized (by rule-goverened practices and exact 
specification of roles), and the victims of the violence are dehumanized (by 
ideological definitions and indoctrinations)’.441 Further into his study, Bauman 
adds ‘physical and/or psychic distance between the act and its 
consequences’ to these conditions, describing this as ‘the social production 
of moral invisibility’ and citing both the use of gas chambers instead of firing 
squads as the direct means of killing and the bureaucratic distancing of those 
who organised the logistics of the Holocaust as examples.442 Setting aside 
the issue of dehumanisation (the relevant equivalent of which—the social 
production of rapable bodies—is covered in the previous chapter), we can 
note that there are, broadly speaking, three conditions that composed the 
mentalities that had to be inculcated into concentration camp guards: a 
perceived lack of personal responsibility achieved through surrendering 
moral autonomy to ‘superiors’, a ‘numbness’ to the suffering of others caused 
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by the routine ‘normality’ of abuse and a denial of the consequences of acts 
facilitated by the technological and psychological separation of cause and 
effect. Moreover, these conditions are by no means limited to the 
socialisation of Nazi guards: soldiers, torturers and other ‘institutional’ 
abusers display similar mentalities, manifest in numerous ways, from the (not 
unreasonable) belief of the Abu Ghraib personnel who tortured inmates that 
they were following orders and protocols given by their superiors, to the ways 
in which the normalising of abusive ‘interrogation’ enables increasing levels 
of unrestrained cruelty (such as that found in Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo 
Bay), to the use of unmanned drones in contemporary warfare.443 Together, 
these socialised conditions compose mentalities that, in conjunction with the 
dehumanisation of their targets, allow ‘normal’ individuals to overcome 
internal inhibitions against abusing others. Moreover, given the routine use of 
sexual violence as a weapon of war (and colonialism) and a tool of 
‘interrogation’, we can also note that such mentalities help individuals 
overcome their inhibitions against committing rape (a point which reinforces 
the parallels drawn in the current line of analysis).444 However, outside of 
such specific state-sanctioned contexts, the mentality that (in conjunction 
with the social production of rapable bodies) allows rapists to overcome 
internal inhibitions against committing rape is not the product of command 
structures, the routines of employment or the distancing of the abuser and 
the abused. In line with this, it is apparent that rapist mentalities are 
composed of distinct (although not entirely unrelated) components and it is to 
these that the analysis will now turn. 
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Overcoming Inhibitions: Three Rape-Enabling Components of Rapist 
Mentalities  
 
Broadly, there are three closely related and intersectional rape-enabling 
components that, in conjunction with the motivation or desire to rape, make 
up a rapist mentality.445 Firstly, a rapist must, at least for the duration of the 
assault, experience extreme levels of self interest or an extreme 
understanding of ‘the self’ as primary: at its most basic level rape is enabled 
by the rapist’s belief that his gratification (whether that is sexual, ‘power-
based’ or, most likely, an intersection of the two) is of more importance than, 
and takes precedence over, the pain and trauma caused to the survivor. This 
applies equally to rapists who deny that their actions constitute rape and to 
those who acknowledge this fact and its consequences for survivors. Diana 
Scully describes ‘deniers’ as rapists who refute even ‘the existence of a 
victim, someone harmed by their behavior [...] and who can justify their 
actions because their construction of reality excludes women’s perspectives’ 
and ‘admitters’ as being ‘aware of the emotional impact of rape on women. 
While raping, they took satisfaction in the belief that their victim felt 
powerless, humiliated and degraded’.446 In the former case, self interest is so 
absolute that the interests of survivors do not even register in the rapists’ 
perception of their actions whereas, in the latter, they are recognised but 
dismissed as less significant thanthe rapists’ own interests. Closely related to 
this component is the fact that a rapist must, if only at the point at which he 
commits rape, lack feelings of ‘inhibitory empathy’. I stress inhibitory empathy 
in acknowledgement of the fact that simply empathising with the survivor—
that is, merely recognising the traumatic results his sexual violence have 
upon the target of those actions—does not necessarily prevent a rapist from 
committing rape. Indeed, it is often in empathising with the survivor’s plight 
and recognising himself as the cause of her suffering that a rapist achieves 
gratification: as Susan Griffin notes, ‘[a] man who derives pleasure from 
raping a woman clearly must enjoy force and dominance as much or more 
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than the simple pleasures of the flesh [...] one must assume he derives 
pleasure directly from terrorizing, humiliating and harming a woman’.447 In 
this sense, we must recognise the response to empathy rather than simply 
empathy itself, noting that, in order to be capable of abusing a survivor, a 
rapist must be able to prevent himself from acknowledging the survivor’s 
distress or from allowing the survivor’s distress to induce sufficient guilt, pity 
or disgust to force him to stop. Interwoven with these first two points is the 
final component: a sense of entitlement. Ultimately, a rapist must believe that 
he is entitled to rape the survivor, that he has the ‘right’ to force sexual 
contact upon her without considering her consent and its refusal. This may 
be the product of extreme levels of self interest (if the survivor’s ‘interests’ are 
seen as inconsequential and irrelevant, then the rapist perceives himself to 
be automatically entitled to do to her whatever he desires) or it may be the 
product of specific socio-cultural systems of entitlement (such as the cultural 
belief that a man has the ‘right’ to sexual contact with ‘his’ wife, or a ‘client’ 
with a sex worker, or a white man with a woman of colour, regardless of the 
survivor refusing consent) or a combination of these factors.448 Additionally, 
as I will explore in more detail further into the chapter, this entitlement may 
take the form of a conscious sense that the rapist is at liberty to rape women 
or it may be an unconscious mode of perception that means he does not 
even consider the survivor’s consent, with the result that he cannot 
distinguish between sex and sexual violence and is unaware he has 
committed rape. 
 
It is important to note that these components are less discrete than they are 
presented to be in the above discussion; in reality, they are indistinct and 
indefinite with permeable, unstable boundaries, each merging with, 
supporting and providing foundations—or even direct points of origin—for the 
others. Nevertheless, in broad terms, self interest, an absence of inhibitory 
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empathy and a sense of entitlement encapsulate the complex, conscious and 
unconscious thought processes that enable a rapist to commit rape. In this 
sense, the three components serve as a framework which organises an 
otherwise unmanageably diverse collection of rationales, unconscious 
thought processes, beliefs, understandings, value systems, behavioural 
codes and modes of perception and relation into manageable, workable 
concepts which may be employed to support the assertion that all rapists 
have, at least for the duration of their assaults, ‘rapist mentalities’: shared 
modes of thinking that enable them to commit rape. Having established the 
components of a rapist mentality, it is important to realise that, in some 
respects, this understanding of rapists’ psychological capacity to rape is well 
established; similar traits have consistently been found in psychiatric studies 
of ‘sex offenders’ for several decades. Consider, for example, a fuller version 
of Groth’s definition of ‘the rapist’ cited in part earlier, in which he describes 
‘the rapist’ as:  
 
a person who has serious psychological difficulties which handicap 
him in his relationships with other people and which he discharges, 
when he is under stress, through sexual acting-out. His most 
prominent defect is the absence of any close, emotionally intimate 
relationship with other persons, male or female. He shows little 
capacity for warmth, trust, compassion, or empathy, and his 
relationships with others are devoid of mutuality, reciprocity, and a 
genuine sense of sharing.449 
 
As a description of the characteristics or components of a rapist’s psyche that 
enable him to commit rape, Groth’s description here is largely in agreement 
with my theory of rapist mentalities. Certainly, his assertion that rapists lack 
‘compassion, or empathy’ and fail to relate to others with ‘mutuality, 
reciprocity, and a genuine sense of sharing’ reflects the three rape-enabling 
components of a rapist mentality outlined above. However, there are two 
crucial differences between these understandings. Firstly, whilst the concept 
of a rapist mentality suggests that these components can only truly be said to 
be present in all rapists for the duration of the attack (although in many cases 
they will extend far beyond this moment), Groth presents them as absolute, 
immutable ‘conditions’ that characterise the entirety of a rapist’s psyche and 
shape all of his social interactions. That is to say, ‘rapist mentality’ is used to 
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describe the modes of thought and relation that enable rape, whilst Groth’s 
treatment of the same components is used to diagnose a pathological 
personality type supposedly common to all rapists. In this sense, Groth’s 
position is focused on labelling rapists as belonging to a distinct and discrete 
group, a psychological subculture of ‘anti-social’, ‘mentally ill’ pariahs, 
whereas the notion of a rapist mentality is concerned with socialised thought-
processes that allow ‘normal’ men to commit rape. Extending from this is the 
second distinction: Groth’s work treats the psychologies of rapists as rare 
and ‘deviant’, as emerging from within individuals’ ‘damaged’ minds rather 
than, as the rapist mentality theory suggests, from external cultural influence. 
In this understanding, then, ‘the rapist’ is an exceptional figure, an aberration 
whose sexual violence is not considered to be the product of, or even related 
to, cultural conditioning or wider patterns of male violence and patriarchal 
oppression but rather is perceived to be simply the result of ‘the rapist’s’ 
psychopathology. In contrast to this, I will argue that rapists are, as 
suggested above, ‘normal’ men whose psychological capacity to rape is 
neither ‘natural’ nor ‘aberrant’ but the product of normative socialisation. To 
understand how Groth’s understanding differs so starkly from this, it is useful 
to turn briefly to the methodology used to reach his definition and diagnosis 
of the aberrant rapist. 
 
The fact that Groth’s study finds rapists to be ‘mentally ill’ pariahs can be 
explained by one simple, but fundamental, flaw in his methodology: although 
the study does draw, to a far lesser extent, on various other offenders (all of 
whom were apprehended by the police, although not necessarily tried or 
convicted), Groth states that ‘the principal sources of our clinical data’ came 
from studies of ‘convicted offenders who were adjudicated dangerous and 
committed to a special security treatment centre’.450 It is both obvious and 
unavoidable that a study will find a correlation between capacity to commit 
rape and mental disturbance or social exclusion if the study’s ‘test subjects’ 
are primarily people who are considered so dangerous that they have to be 
contained within ‘a special security treatment centre’. In particular, the fact 
that these people are in a special security treatment centre and not a high-
security prison suggests entirely that they suffer from what are considered to 
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be ‘serious psychological difficulties’. Whilst a study of rapists undergoing 
treatment for ‘mental illnesses’ may demonstrate that ending rape involves 
pathologising individual rapists and not challenging socio-cultural attitudes, 
beliefs and practices (although this in itself is highly questionable), there is 
absolutely no reason to assume that this conclusion is applicable outside of a 
cherry-picked group of ‘test subjects’. In other words, Groth’s study entirely 
fails to account for, or even consider, those rapists who are not contained in 
secure treatment centres but who continue to function, without ‘serious 
psychological difficulties’ within the dominant culture. Given that it is widely 
noted that the vast majority of rapes are committed by psychologically 
normative, ‘normal’ men (who usually know the survivor and most often 
commit rape not ‘in the bushes’ or in a dark alley but in the home or other 
private spaces), this gap in Groth’s study leaves an extremely large 
percentage of rapists outside the scope of his study; as Andrea Dworkin so 
accurately and necessarily reminded a conference of five hundred pro-
feminist men, ‘[rape] is done here and it is done now and it is done by the 
people in this room as well as by other contemporaries: our friends, our 
neighbours, people that we know’.451 That is to say, what Groth fails to 
acknowledge, and what entirely undermines his conception of ‘the rapist’ as 
aberrant, ‘insane’ pariah, is that sexual violence is, almost entirely, committed 
by otherwise well-adjusted, upstanding members of the community: the 
trusted officials, the coercive husbands, the drunken students, frat boys and 
sports teams, the ‘boy next door’, the workmate, the fellow activist, the friend, 
the lover, the brother, the father. As soon as such examples are included in 
the analysis, Groth’s ‘abnormalising’ construction of ‘the rapist’ is discredited 
and it is possible to argue that what truly enables a man to commit sexual 
violence is a rapist mentality, learned and developed through normative 
cultural conditioning, and it is to this issue that the analysis will now turn.  
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Being a Man: Self-Interest, Lack of Inhibitory Empathy and a Sense of 
Entitlement 
 
In the previous analysis we have seen that humans must be socialised to 
overcome inhibitions against harming and abusing others.452 We have also 
established the three rape-enabling components of a rapist mentality—self-
interest, lack of inhibitory empathy and a sense of entitlement—which, 
together with the objectification of women, allow rapists to overcome 
inhibitions against committing rape.453 It is now necessary to establish that, 
contrary to the understanding disseminated by the myth of the aberrant 
rapist, these characteristics are not deviancies produced by, as Groth 
phrases it, a rapist’s ‘serious psychological difficulties’ but rather are 
remarkably ‘normal’ traits, both in the sense that they are commonplace and 
in the sense that they develop from patterns of normative socialisation and 
cultural conditioning.454 Indeed, as Diana E. H. Russell notes, ‘rape is not so 
much a deviant act as an over-conforming one [...] It is an extreme acting-out 
of qualities that are regarded as masculine in this and many other 
societies’.455 The most important part of Russell’s statement is the notion that 
rape represents not conforming but overconforming to normative masculinity; 
in highlighting this point, Russell distances her argument from simplistic 
assertions that simply conforming to normative masculinity turns men into 
rapists, asserting instead that rape functions as an extreme manifestation of 
normative masculinity. That is, Russell does not suggest that all normatively 
socialised men commit sexual violence but that all sexual violence committed 
by men reflects an extreme version of their normative socialisation. Russell 
applies this reasoning to those ‘masculine’ attributes associated with the 
‘desire’ to rape—power, dominance, aggression and so forth—but it is 
equally applicable to the psychological capacity to commit rape. That is to 
say, the psychological capacity to commit rape is not the product of deviant, 
‘mentally ill’ or ‘damaged’ psychologies, but of rapists’ overconforming to 
normative masculine attributes of self-interest, lack of inhibitory empathy and 
a sense of entitlement.  
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Importantly, as in Russell’s understanding, this approach does not suggest 
that all normatively socialised men are rapists, or even that all normatively 
socialised men have the psychological capacity to rape; rather, it argues that 
normative masculine socialisation provides a foundational mentality focused 
on self-interest, lack of inhibitory empathy and a sense of entitlement which, 
when taken to its extreme forms, renders rapists psychologically capable of 
rape. In this sense, this examination conceives of masculine behaviour not as 
starkly divided into ‘normal’ and ‘deviant’ but as operating on a continuum. As 
Liz Kelly notes, continuum understandings of sexual violence suggest that 
‘specific forms of sexual violence are connected to more common, everyday 
aspects of male behaviour.’456 In such conceptions, sexual violence is 
perceived to be, as Russell’s statement suggests, an ‘extreme’ version of 
‘normal’ masculinity, or an extreme point on a continuum of normative 
masculine behaviour. In other words, where the myth of the aberrant rapist 
presents rapists’ beliefs and behaviours as radically removed from normative 
masculinity, continuum understandings, as Kelly argues, highlight the fact 
that ‘“typical” and “aberrant” male behaviour shade into one another’.457 In 
the context of the current discussion, then, we can assert that the ‘typical’, 
normatively socialised attributes of self-interest, lack of inhibitory empathy 
and a sense of entitlement shade into the extreme ‘aberrant’ forms of these 
attributes that enable rapists to commit rape. In this sense, normative 
masculine socialisation, whilst not making all men rapists, operates as a 
continuum, providing the conditions from which extreme, rape-enabling 
versions of self-interest, lack of inhibitory empathy and a sense of entitlement 
develop. Accordingly, to understand the ways in which the psychological 
capacity to rape is not so much a deviation from but an overconforming to 
normative masculinity, we must explore the extent to which these 
characteristics are an extremely widespread and pervasive presence in the 
dominant culture’s prevailing understandings of masculinity and patterns of 
masculine socialisation, and it is to this that the analysis now turns.  
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The significance of self-interest to hegemonic masculinity and its presence in 
normative masculine socialisation is perhaps the most readily identifiable of 
the three rape-enabling components of a rapist mentality discussed above. In 
the broadest terms, we can note that it appears as an important aspect of two 
of the key components of contemporary hegemonic masculinity: 
‘independence’ and ‘competitiveness’.458 That is to say, the cultural valuing of 
independence as a ‘manly’ attribute fosters an understanding of ‘real men’ as 
unburdened by either the need for support from others, or concern for the 
interests of others, highlighting instead autonomy and the self-reliant search 
for one’s own fortunes and the pursuit of one’s own interests. Similarly, the 
association of masculinity and competitiveness often presents the desire to 
pursue one’s own interest at the expense of others’ interests as a central 
component of hegemonic masculine identity.  As with much normative 
masculine socialisation, the conditioning of self-interest as an acceptable and 
admirable ‘masculine’ quality can often be found in childhood socialisation, 
including both the ‘primary socialisation’ of family and the ‘secondary 
socialisation’ of school. Certainly, it is widely noted that parents’ attitudes 
towards children’s playing styles are starkly gendered, with boys being 
praised and rewarded for displaying independence, assertive pursuit of what 
they desire and competition with other boys, and sometimes even having 
direct selfishness with toys excused as expressions of ‘boys will be boys’ 
assertiveness.459 For more specific analysis, we can refer to Becky Francis’ 
analysis of gendered behaviour in school classrooms in the UK. In her study 
of both primary and secondary schools, she identifies a repeated pattern of 
normalised ‘selfishness’ on the part of many of the boys, especially those 
who have the most ‘masculine’ social power within their peer groups. She 
notes that ‘in primary schools, [...] I found that a construction of masculinity 
as assertive and demanding (selfish) [...] allowed boys to dominate the 
choice of role play scenario and to grab the most popular roles’.460 That is to 
say, even in the primary-school setting, Francis identified a clear sense that 
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boys were portraying a model of masculinity that was brazenly self-
interested, as well as being highly competitive. She also observed similar 
dynamics in the secondary-school setting, writing that:  
 
[M]any boys were often assertive and inconsiderate of the feelings of 
others in the classroom, whether it be abusing one another or 
shouting out answers and comments, often over other pupils who 
were trying to speak. This “selfish” construction overlapped with the 
dominant construction of masculinity as competitive: some boys took 
great delight in ridiculing or shouting down the answers of other boys 
and girls.461 
 
What is particularly significant in both cases is not simply that the boys in 
both cases were pursuing their own interests, but that this also intersects with 
a pronounced sense of entitlement: a belief that they are entitled to pursue 
their own interests despite disruption to others, and that they are entitled to 
the rewards of doing so, whether that is the ‘most popular roles’ in the role 
play exercise, or their own self-interested delight at ridiculing others. Francis 
also notes that in both settings, this behaviour was tolerated by girls, socially 
‘weaker’ boys and even some teachers, and that the ‘selfish’ boys often 
gained ‘power in the classroom [...] derived both from the prestige such 
constructions earned and from the ability to use these constructions to put 
down or threaten other pupils (and teachers)’.462 In other words, the 
classroom setting served as a site of masculine socialisation in which boys 
developed and strengthened understandings that self-interest and a sense of 
entitlement were not only acceptable models of masculinity but highly 
rewarding ones that brought them social power to which they assumed they 
were entitled.  
 
We can observe similar patterns in male participation in sports, an area that 
is, as Don Sabo notes, ‘a major vehicle for male socialization, [...] [which] 
does much to shape men’s individual and collective behavior and 
consciousness’.463 Whilst self-interested masculinity might be most obviously 
displayed in individual sports, where each man pursues his own interests at 
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the expense of those of his competitors, it is also highly present in team 
sports; staying with analysis of childhood socialisation, we can note that the 
socialisation of boys through team sports often revolves around self-interest. 
For example, discussing the study of communication in boys’ team sports, 
Julia T. Wood argues that ‘[i]n playing games, boys learn to communicate to 
accomplish goals, compete for and maintain status, exert control over others, 
get attention, and stand out’.464 That is to say, Wood’s discussion highlights 
the way many boys are socialised to interact and communicate in team 
sports settings is less concerned with ‘the team’, united by shared aims, 
cooperative practices and the exchange of ideas, and more with a loose-
collection of disunited individuals, all pursuing their own interests and vying 
for social power and influence. In this respect, as Wood notes, it is 
‘consistent with other aspects of masculine socialisation [...] [in its] emphasis 
on individuality and competition’.465 In other words, despite the fact that the 
boys are operating as part of a ‘community’, ostensibly with shared interests 
and cooperative strategies, team sports serve as another site of masculine 
socialisation in which boys learn that it is acceptable and rewarding to 
struggle with one another in pursuit of personal gain. Moreover, such 
cooperation as is present in these settings could be argued to represent not a 
negating of self-interest but the forming of alliances with those who share and 
support one’s own interests, specifically as a means challenging those whose 
interests are in conflict with one’s own. Jeff Hearn, exploring these issues in 
relation to men rather than boys, adopts a similar position, arguing that it is a 
‘long established practice of men’s “solidarity” [...] in sports and so on [...] that 
such ‘“solidarity” is often at the expense of other similar “teams” of men’.466 In 
other words, although team sports may serve as a means of socialising men 
to embrace cooperation and collaboration, this in itself can be implicitly 
framed around the primacy of serving one’s own interests and the 
competitive struggle to see that those interests are met by actively preventing 
(some) other men from meeting their interests.  
 
                                                 
464
 Julia T. Wood, Gendered Lives: Communication, Gender, and Culture, 11th edn. 
(Stamfort: Cengage Learning, 2013), p. 110. 
465
 Ibid. 
466
 Jeff Hearn, The Gender of Oppression: Men, Masculinity and the Critique of Marxism 
(London: Harvester Wheatsheaft, 1987), p. 174. 
 210 
 
Indeed, in this respect, a sports team can function as what some 
masculinities theorists call a ‘fratriarchy’. Kathleen Starck defines ‘fratriarchy’ 
as ‘a mode of male domination, based on the self-interest of the association 
of men itself [...] [and] on fictitious kinship in brotherhoods or fraternities’.467 
That is to say, a fratriarchal community is a group composed exclusively of 
men and organised around the principle that the collective strength of the 
group is the most effective means of serving one’s own interests. Indeed, 
reflecting the centrality of both self-interest and entitlement to such groups, 
John Remy argues that, at heart, fratriarchy ‘reflects the demand of a group 
of lads to have the “freedom” to do as they please’.468 Fratriarchally 
organised groups can serve as a powerful means of reinforcing masculine 
socialisation patterns; after all, as Michael Kaufman and Michael Kimmel 
note, ‘[m]en look to other guys to define what it means to be a man’, and the 
homosocial environment of fratriarchal groups involves considerable social 
pressure to conform of models of masculinity most esteemed within the 
group.469 Given that such models, as noted above, are greatly concerned 
with the entitled ‘freedom’ to act only in one’s own interests, these settings 
create a ‘feedback loop’ of socialisation in which men pressure each other to 
conform to this model and the understanding that self-interest is an 
acceptable and laudable ‘masculine’ quality is constantly repeated and 
reaffirmed.  It is worth noting that, whilst Remy’s use of the word ‘lads’ here 
implies an informal, possibly working-class setting, fratriarchal groups, and 
their intense focus on self-interest, can be found throughout class and 
privilege hierarchies, from the most marginalised street gangs to Oxford 
University’s Bullingdon Club.470 Indeed, Starck notes that fratriarchal 
organisation is extremely widespread, with examples including ‘male pub 
culture, hooliganism, bookmakers, college fraternities, political institutions, 
managerial clubs, the army, street gangs, scientific societies, boarding 
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schools, or marauding youths during a war’.471 The pervasiveness of this 
form of social organisation highlights how significant it is in the socialisation 
of self-interest as an aspect of socially-acceptable masculinity within the 
dominant culture at large. However, as pervasive as it is, it is not the only 
form of masculine socialisation to celebrate and inculcate self-interest. 
 
What we might call the archetypal form of self-serving masculinity is more 
concerned with the independent individual serving his own interests: the ‘lone 
wolf’ who might occasionally form fratriarchal alliances to further his own 
ends but remains firmly focused on his personal gain. Perhaps the most 
significant example of this can be found in the world of corporate business, 
which routinely celebrates self-interest as a central part of socially-acceptable 
and culturally-rewarded masculinity. Although this understanding is the 
product of a long association of masculinity with ruthless, self-serving 
business practices, R.W. Connell describes the most recent version of this 
model of idealised masculinity as ‘transnational business masculinity’ and 
describes it as being ‘marked by increasing egocentrism, very conditional 
loyalties (even to the corporation), and a declining sense of responsibility for 
others (except for the purposes of image making).’472 In a direct manner, this 
model of self-serving masculinity is only inculcated into those within the 
corporate setting, largely through intergroup dynamics such as internal 
competition, the mocking of those who don’t conform to the model and the 
adulation of those who do, as well through the presentation of such 
masculinities as aspirational in trade literature and training manuals.473 
However, its true significance comes from the fact that the successful 
businessman is one of the most influential masculine ideals within the 
dominant culture. Indeed, power and wealth attained through successful 
business practices are so widely celebrated as a masculine attribute that they 
are, as Cliff Cheng notes, capable of displacing attributes such as physical 
strength that are traditionally associated with hegemonic masculinity from 
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some contemporary masculine ideals.474 Likewise, it also transcends many 
subcultural divisions, operating as a masculine ideal that legitimises self-
interest celebrated in other more marginalised models of masculinity, as in 
the widely employed media narrative of the ‘rapper turned businessman’.475 
Within a capitalist framework that emphasises personal gain as a prerequisite 
of success, this model of self-serving corporate masculinity is an extremely 
pervasive ideal that plays an important role in socialising men to view self-
interest as an admirable ‘masculine’ quality.  
 
This also brings us to the socialisation of another of the rape-enabling 
characteristics: a sense of entitlement. Several of the forms of masculine 
socialisation discussed above inculcate a sense of entitlement into men, such 
as schoolboys’ belief that they are entitled to the best roles in the role playing 
exercise, or fratriarchies’ understanding that they are entitled, as Remy 
notes, to ‘the “freedom” to do as they please’.476 However, the ‘business 
masculinity’ described by Connell relates to a form of entitlement that is 
particularly relevant to our discussion: the belief that men are entitled to 
women. Connell observes that ‘the assumption in [executive’s] trade 
magazines and advertising is that they will have dependent wives running 
their homes and bringing up their children.’477  That is to say, implicit within 
the socialisation of this model of masculinity is an understanding that men 
conforming to this form of self-interested masculinity are entitled to the 
domestic labour of women. This understanding, however, is far from limited 
to this particular form of masculine socialisation. Dating back at least as far 
the rise of ‘separate spheres’ doctrine around the time of the Industrial 
Revolution, the dominant culture of the Anglophone West has long 
considered it ‘normal’ for women to do the majority of domestic labour in 
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heterosexual households.478 Recent studies show that, whilst the situation is 
neither as extreme nor as grounded in social doctrine as it once was, there is 
still a vast disparity in men and women’s domestic labour.479 Wood offers 
gendered socialisation as a possible explanation for this, writing that 
‘masculine socialization [...] typically doesn’t emphasize developing skills in 
domestic chores [...] [whilst] girls are often socialized to perform more 
traditionally “feminine” tasks such as laundry, cooking, and dusting’.480 This 
is, I suggest, an accurate but incomplete assessment: it is not simply 
because they have not been socialised to develop ‘skills in domestic chores’ 
that leads to men doing far less housework than women but also the fact that 
they have been socialised to expect women to do it for them, and that they 
are entitled to women’s domestic labour. This sense of entitlement is 
frequently propagated through the ‘primary socialisation’ of boys in family 
settings. Scott Coltrane notes that it remains common for boys to be ‘raised 
to expect mothers to wait on and nurture them, and girls to help mothers 
perform repetitive family work’.481 This early conditioning in entitlement and 
expectation profoundly shapes the way many men view women, especially in 
regard to women’s domestic ‘duties’. As Coltrane continues, if entering a 
domestic, ‘family’ setting in later life men frequently carry their conditioned 
beliefs with them and expect ‘families to conform to their own sense of 
masculine entitlement, expecting that their wives will care for and serve 
them.’482 In other words, the way many young boys experience their own 
mothers’ domestic labour and their own (and often their fathers’) seeming 
entitlement to it socialises them to believe that men are entitled to women’s 
support, care and domestic labour.  
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Such ideas are further reinforced by cultural attitudes about gender roles and 
women’s supposed domesticity and by media coverage, which both mirrors 
and reinforces these understandings. For example we only have to look at 
the fact that it is incredibly rare for television or cinema to show men—and 
especially successful, powerful or ‘sexy’ men who measure up to hegemonic 
ideals—doing domestic tasks, and on the occasions where this is displayed, 
it is almost never presented as something admirable; indeed, as Philip Green 
notes, ‘[i]n Hollywood a man doing housework is comic or sad, and usually 
has to be rescued from his fate’.483 Such presentations further condition men 
to perceive housework as ‘unmasculine’ and women’s domestic labour as 
something that men are entitled to and ‘real men’ ensure they have access 
to. However, entertainment media socialises men to believe that they are 
entitled not only to women’s domestic labour but to women in general, and 
especially women as romantic or sexual partners. Joseph H. Pleck highlights 
this when he discusses the way many films present women as the prize men 
get for successful displays of masculinity, for overcoming obstacles or 
competing successfully with other men. Pleck explores this in relation to the 
1973 film The Paper Chase, noting that when the law student protagonist 
‘gets the professor’s daughter at the end, she is simply another one of the 
rewards he has won by doing better than the other males in her father’s 
class’.484 However, this trope is extremely common (indeed, seeing as it is 
largely a variation on the fairy tale story of the brave knight slaying the 
dragon and winning the fair maiden’s hand, it is surely one of the oldest and 
most common tales in Anglophone Western popular culture). There are 
numerous variations of this idea, although perhaps the most common are the 
action hero, whose victory over his enemies is finally sealed by ‘seducing’ the 
female ‘love interest’ after the climax of the movie, and the common 
‘romantic’ plot line where a man either falls in love with or ‘loses’ his ‘love 
interest’ and spends the rest of the movie pursuing her, until he finally 
succeeds and the movie ends.485 Of course, the challenges the man faces, or 
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the forms of masculinity he must display in order to appear successful, are 
not consistent between films but the underlying message is the same: if a 
man is successful within a given set of guidelines and obstacles then he 
always ‘gets the girl’.486  
 
Tina Chanter argues that in such films, ‘idealized versions of the spectators 
are [...] represented to themselves [...] We are not, after all, the hero who 
gets the girl, conquers the world, or lives a life of luxury and leisure—but we 
could be’.487 In the case of masculine identity, I would argue that this is not so 
much a case of ‘could be’ as ‘should be’: these films help to socialise men to 
believe that if they act in a certain way, overcome any obstacles in their path, 
and meet the requirements of a given situation then they, like the heroes of 
the movies, should be rewarded. As Luke Winslow argues, motives 
contribute significantly to cultural narratives filled with ‘idealized gendered 
expectations’, including the understanding that ‘[i]f James Bond gets the girl, 
then the one who can best emulate James Bond will also get the girl’.488 
Again, the masculine ideal is not necessarily the James Bond-style suave 
action hero (although this has remained a highly celebrated model of 
masculinity since the film series’ conception) but the message still remains, 
as argued above, that the man displaying successful masculinity, overcoming 
obstacles and vanquishing his rivals, is entitled to, and always receives, his 
desired woman as a prize. As such, these presentations of masculine 
behaviour and its supposed rewards socialise many men not only to emulate 
certain models of masculinity, but to believe that doing so entitles them to 
women.  
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Media representations of masculinity, and especially the figure of the ‘action 
hero’ discussed briefly above, are also a key site of socialisation which 
presents a lack of inhibitory empathy as a laudable ‘masculine’ characteristic. 
Cinematic portrayals of gender have long reflected and shaped 
understandings of socially acceptable and culturally rewarded masculinities, 
often responding to cultural concerns and broader political ideologies. An 
obvious example is what Rosalind Gill describes as ‘the rise of “muscular 
heroes” in action cinema during the late 1980s and early 1990s”, 
characterised by actors such as Arnold Schwarzenegger, Sylvester Stallone 
and Bruce Willis.489 Many theorists have presented the celebration of this 
model of cartoonish machismo, stunted emotions and hard, impenetrable, 
indestructible male bodies as a reflection of cultural fears about the 
‘feminising’ effects of technology and the rise of the sensitive ‘new man’, and 
as an effort to re-establish traditional models of masculinity to serve as 
supports for right-wing US foreign policy and, as Philippa Gates notes, as ‘a 
denial of the failure of masculinity incited by the conclusion of [America’s war 
with] Vietnam’.490 As Gates notes, the 1990s saw this focus wane 
considerably, with ‘the appearance of protagonists who were defined by 
brains instead of brawn’ reflecting an increasing ‘appreciation of a thinking, 
feeling, and more sensitive masculinity over the muscle-bound, violent 
masculinity that was on the rampage in the 1980s’.491 This shift has also 
intensified throughout the early twenty-first century, with more space being 
made both for ‘sensitive’ male heroes and for heroines.492 However, whilst 
the idealised masculinity of the action hero now includes some degree of 
emotional coherence, his lack of inhibitory empathy remains as present as it 
has always been. Gates observes that ‘[d]espite the shift to the cerebral, the 
American hero, nonetheless, must be a man [...] of action, and [...] must 
always learn how to be somewhat physical and violent before he can 
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successfully defeat the villain.’493 In other words, whilst the ‘new’ action hero 
is allowed some degree of emotionality, it remains vital that his ‘sensitivity’ 
does not prevent him from torturing, maiming and killing others.  
 
We can see a clear example of this in the development of the character 
James Bond in the latest films in the long-running series: Casino Royale 
(2006), Quantum of Solace (2008) and Skyfall (2012). These three films, all 
starring Daniel Craig as Bond, were widely praised for displaying far greater 
emotional depth than previous instalments; in particular, critics highlighted 
Craig’s portrayal of the famously macho spy as a man who suffers 
significantly from the traumas of his past and who, contrary to most previous 
portrayals, is capable of forming emotional attachments to others, even if he 
is not adept at expressing them.494 Certainly, this is a noteworthy remodelling 
of a character that has long served as an exemplar for suave, sophisticated 
and sexually attractive masculinity, and significant not only in its (admittedly 
minor) disruption of the association of masculinity with emotional restraint, 
but also in its bold decision to demonstrate the considerable costs of 
masculine socialisation patterns that teach men to suppress their emotions. 
However, the fact that the ‘new’ Bond is not absolutely devoid of emotional 
depth, as he has been almost continuously throughout decades of previous 
films, does not detract from the fact that both the character and the plots of 
the films remain entirely reliant on his arguably sociopathic ability to inflict 
pain, suffering and death on others, before moments later casually ordering 
cocktails and seducing women. This lack of inhibitory empathy remains a key 
aspect of the character and, despite some efforts to question the social 
acceptability of such restricted emotionality, it is still largely presented in the 
films as something admirable, ‘suave’ and, ultimately, ‘manly’. As such, like 
the older instalments, these later Bond films continue to condition the idea 
that ‘real men’ do not allow empathy to prevent them from achieving what 
they set out to achieve. Of course, such socialisation is far from limited to this 
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particular film series, or to the difficulties of updating a character that has 
long been emblematic of a more traditional model of masculinity. Numerous 
other versions appear throughout Anglophone Western media, with examples 
ranging from the unrestrained (and supposedly patriotic) torture routinely 
engaged in by Jack Bauer, the lead character in Fox’s 24 (2001) to the oddly 
charming and occasionally played-for-laughs sociopathy of Dexter Morgan 
from Showtime’s Dexter (2006).495 Moreover, such socialisation is also far 
from limited to media representations of masculinity but rather appears in 
many institutions, practices and discourses throughout the dominant culture.  
 
Perhaps the most obvious site of masculine socialisation that conditions men 
to see inhibitory empathy as a negative and ‘unmanly’ attribute is the military. 
As touched upon in earlier discussions, a central aspect of military training is 
the eroding of recruits’ empathy so that it does not prevent them from fulfilling 
their prescribed roles; after all, as Eileen L. Zurbriggen notes, if soldiers were 
not ‘taught to suppress their feelings of compassion [...] it would likely make 
them less able to kill, and therefore, less effective as soldiers’.496 Such 
socialisation often takes forms such as desensitising recruits to violence 
through representations of pain and suffering, and especially through  acts of 
ritual humiliation and ‘hazing’ enacted against recruits by recruits designed to 
break both self-esteem and empathic inhibitions against harming others.497 
Crucially, such formal and informal training is not only an example of military 
socialisation but also masculine socialisation, or rather a combined military-
masculine socialisation in which rhetoric on how to be a ‘real soldier’ is 
almost inseparably entwined with rhetoric on how to be a ‘real man’. That is 
to say, numerous studies show that central to military training regimes is 
repeated questioning of recruits’ masculinity through gender insults (such as 
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calling recruits ‘pussies’, ‘girls’ and ‘bitches’) if they show ‘unmanly’ qualities 
like weakness or an empathetic concern for others.498  This socialisation, 
then, explicitly connects acceptable masculinity with a lack of inhibitory 
empathy. Of course, military training might seem to be an extreme example, 
and one that applies only to those actually undergoing such training; 
however, this model of military-masculine socialisation is highly influential 
and intersects with and shapes other sites of masculine socialisation. An 
obvious example is its intersection with the cinematic action hero discussed 
above, as many of the characters, and the models of masculinity they 
represent, come from military or military-like backgrounds.499 It is also widely 
noted to be a key factor in the training of many sports teams, which often 
feature gendered insults, ‘hazing’ practices and the framing of competition in 
militaristic terms, where the sportsmen must ‘destroy the enemy’ without 
mercy.500 Likewise, similar patterns can be identified in many workplace 
hierarchies, especially in terms of ‘hazing’ as a way of proving one’s 
masculinity and in a focus on destroying one’s competitors without mercy or 
empathetic concern.501 
 
Moreover, it is important to realise that the conditioned suppression of 
empathy is really only an aspect of a far wider pattern of masculine 
socialisation: the reviling and repression of all emotions (except in some 
cases, ‘manly’ anger).502 Like many of the socialisation practices discussed 
here, the belief that ‘real men’ do not show emotions is conditioned from a 
young age. As Coltrane notes, the early or primary socialisation of children is 
characterised by  
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‘[g]ender-differentiated treatment [...] [and] expectations for behavior 
that result in praise and reinforcement for gender-appropriate 
behavior and reprimand and punishment for gender-inappropriate 
behavior. Parents tend to actively discourage displays of emotion in 
boys by pressuring them not to cry or otherwise express their 
feelings.503 
 
That is to say, many boys are conditioned to perceive their emotions as 
shameful and inappropriate, and learn to suppress them in order to display a 
socially-acceptable form of masculinity and avoid chastisement for 
expressing unsuitable characteristics. This lesson is also often internalised 
into their own personal understandings of masculinity and carried forward 
into adulthood where it both continues to influence their own behaviour and 
encourages them to chastise and punish not only the next generation of boys 
but also their peers. Hence, many homosocial settings (including the 
fratriarchal groups discussed above) are characterised by adult men 
maintaining established gender ideology by recreating the same forms of 
conditioning that shaped their early socialisation, ridiculing each others’ 
emotions  and admonishing each other to ‘man up’ and ‘stop being a little girl’ 
in a world in which ‘boys don’t cry’ and ‘real men’ do not show emotions.504  
 
This socialisation has been widely noted to have a significant impact on 
many heterosexual relationships, bringing normatively socialised men into 
conflict with partners who pressure them to express their emotions more. 
Wood cites a representative interview from a recent study in which a young 
man explains that  
 
My girlfriend wants me to open up and show my feelings and talk 
about them and stuff like that. But the guys on the team get on my 
case whenever I show any feelings other than about winning a game. 
I’m supposed to be sensitive or not. I’m supposed to keep my 
feelings to myself or not.505 
 
What the interviewee highlights here is a significant aspect of prevailing 
understandings of gender in the contemporary Anglophone West: the fact 
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that, whilst decades of feminist activism have made it increasingly possible 
for women to critique aspects of masculinity that are damaging to their 
relationships with men, the attitude within many male homosocial groups and 
spaces remains extremely traditional in their understandings of masculinity 
and emotionality. The result of this conflict is largely that, while men may 
respond to women’s pressure by becoming more openly emotional in private, 
the public face of masculinity—that is, masculinity, as Kimmel describes it, as 
a ‘homosocial enactment’—remains characterised by the denial and 
repression of emotionality.506 This situation further reinforces the mutual 
socialisation noted above, with homosocial groups being composed of men 
all maintaining a public appearance of restricted emotionality, and so 
reinforcing the belief that a lack of emotions is a key part of ‘normal’ and 
socially-acceptable masculinity. Moreover, efforts to change this situation and 
convince men to be more emotionally articulate can also reinforce the idea 
that it is ‘normal’  for men to be emotionally restricted, as demonstrated in the 
slew of self-help guides addressing the subject.507 Such texts purport to help 
women navigate their relationships with ‘unemotional’ men, but in reality they 
present a polarising, pseudoscientific vision of ‘natural’ genders that treats 
the emotional restriction conditioned into many men as an expression of 
neurological ‘hardwiring’ inherent to all men; the resultant naturalising of 
masculine emotional restriction presents it as unfortunate but ultimately 
normative and so reinforces the patterns of socialisation that actually produce 
the issue.508 
 
The above discussion provides an overview of some the most prevalent and 
pervasive forms of masculine socialisation that condition men to perceive 
self-interest, a lack of inhibitory empathy and a sense of entitlement as 
central aspects of normative, socially-acceptable and culturally rewarded 
masculinity. In doing so, it demonstrates how deeply embedded these 
characteristics are in prevailing understandings of masculinity in the 
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dominant culture. This is highly significant to understanding the position of 
the rapist within both normative masculinity and the dominant culture of the 
Anglophone West at large for it highlights the fact that the rape-enabling 
components of a rapist mentality are not aberrations produced by rapists’ 
psychopathologies but reflections and manifestations of normative masculine 
socialisation. That is to say, as discussed in the introduction to this section, 
whilst prevailing patterns of masculine socialisation do not necessarily render 
men capable of committing rape, they do establish a continuum of self-
interest, lack of inhibitory empathy and perceived entitlement of which the 
psychological capacity to rape is an extreme but still highly normative 
component. In this sense, the above discussion challenges the myth of the 
aberrant rapist by highlighting the fact that the rape-enabling components of 
a rapist mentality do not deviate from normative masculinity but overconform 
to it. This locates the psychological capacity to rape, and rapists more 
broadly, not on the peripheries of the dominant culture but firmly within its 
prevailing understandings, ideologies, behavioural codes and patterns of 
socialisation. However, there is also a wider context that must be considered 
here because these characteristics are not only common components of 
normative masculine socialisation; they also represent some of the most 
widespread, the most celebrated and the most ‘successful’ characteristics 
within the dominant culture itself. In the ‘correct’ forms, self-interest, lack of 
inhibitory empathy and a sense of entitlement are widely considered to be 
admirable qualities, especially for men but, as neo-liberal, advanced capitalist 
forms of ‘feminism’ gain ascendancy, increasingly for women too.509 
Certainly, it is possible to argue, as I will presently, that these are 
characteristics held by a great many of the Anglophone West’s most powerful 
figures, and that they frequently play a key role in enabling individuals to 
attain the money and power that are so often treated as synonymous with 
‘success’ in the dominant culture. Likewise, it is possible to suggest that they 
are the characteristics on which the dominant culture itself operates, the 
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characteristics that underpin the neo-colonial, neo-liberal, advanced capitalist 
policies and practices not only of individuals but of corporations, 
organisations and whole states. Accordingly, this wider context, as I will now 
explore, is central to understanding how far from their supposed aberrant, 
deviant status rapist mentalities truly are and raises the possibility that 
Anglophone Western rapists are not only overconforming to prescribed 
masculine behaviour but also to the ethics, ideologies and practices of the 
dominant culture. 
 
 
The Normality of Harming Others: The Anglophone West’s Culture of Abuse 
 
Whilst rapist mentalities are profoundly gendered, it is crucial to realise that 
they also exist within, and are at least in part manifestations and expression 
of, wider patterns of abusive, coercive and exploitative ideologies and 
practices that are widely normalised within, and of central importance to, the 
dominant culture of the Anglophone West. As Michael Kaufman notes of 
male violence against women more generally, an act of gender violence is     
 
At the same instant [...] the individual man acting out relations of 
sexual power [...] [and] the violence of a society—a hierarchical, 
authoritarian, sexist, class-divided, militarist, racist, impersonal crazy 
society—being focused through an individual man onto an individual 
woman [...] In total these acts of violence are like a ritualized acting 
out of our social relations of power510 
 
In other words, whilst an incident of sexual violence is the product of an 
individual’s personal choice to commit rape, it is also simultaneously a 
manifestation of a culture that operates, to its deepest levels, on an 
understanding that exploiting, abusing and consuming others is acceptable, 
desirable and simply ‘normal’. In his capacity to commit sexual violence, a 
rapist is not aberrant or deviant but is simply engaging in a gendered, 
sexualised expression of the self-serving abuse and exploitation on which the 
dominant culture operates, just as a sweatshop owner engages in a capitalist 
expression or a soldier engages in a neo-imperialist expression. The 
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individual discourses and modes of socialisation differ from case to case, 
power dynamic to power dynamic, but they are all at root manifestations of a 
broader cultural understanding that normalises and venerates the self-
interested consumption of others. Accordingly, to understand the extent to 
which rapist mentalities are a normative expression of wider cultural 
ideologies and practices, we must begin to critically examine how the 
dominant culture operates and prevailing understandings of what constitutes 
acceptable and exemplary behaviour. Central to this task is acknowledging 
which characteristics and modes of thought and relation are, beneath the 
rhetoric of neo-liberal ‘democracy’, actually most celebrated within, and of 
most direct benefit to, the dominant culture. 
 
 Marimba Ani provides an uncompromising discussion of the above issue, 
noting that, contrary to how the dominant culture’s ethical codes are usually 
described 
 
it is not considered immoral in the West to act in one’s own interest at 
the expense of [...] others; rather, selfishness, competitiveness, 
exploitation of others [...] represent moral behavior [...] in that they 
are sanctioned by every aspect of the culture, and the individual [...] 
is conditioned to manifest them. The successful “culture-bearers” of 
Europe [...] possess these characteristics. The truly “Western man” is 
the most competitive and aggressive person. While the least 
successful person in the culture, who in no way determines what the 
West becomes, is characterized by [...] identification with and 
consequent respect for those around her [...] This person is trampled 
upon in and by European culture. She is considered “worthless.”511 
 
What is immediately striking here is that Ani’s description of what constitutes 
‘moral behaviour’ in the West is remarkably similar to both my own 
description of rapist mentalities and to the dominant culture’s understanding 
of the supposedly aberrant and pathological psyches of rapists. That is, in 
Ani’s description we find what we might call a ‘civilised mentality’ in which 
self-interest, lack of inhibitory empathy and a sense of entitlement are key 
components and which enable self-serving abuse and exploitation in a 
manner that directly mirrors the ways in which rapist mentalities enable 
rapists to commit rape. Importantly, as Ani suggests, these are not aberrant 
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and deviant mentalities but the prevailing, normative means of understanding 
the self and relating to the world. Plumwood makes a similar argument with 
regard to what she calls ‘[t]he rational egoistic mode’: a mode of thought and 
relation in which ‘the self is treated as an end itself, of primary or intrinsic 
value’ and so is ‘not only free to conceive of others without constraint as 
instruments, but has no motivation to do anything else’.512 Such egoism, 
Plumwood writes, is conceived of in Western liberal (and neo-liberal) 
traditions ‘as an unfortunate fact of human nature [...] [and yet] is taken to be 
the dominant rational mode and altruism a subsidiary one, a praiseworthy but 
irrational exception.’513 In other words, whilst prevailing rhetoric presents non-
selfish, non-entitled, empathetic behaviour as admirable and worthy, it is still 
those who display these things that are considered to be aberrant, to be 
deviating from ‘normal’, or even the ‘natural’, modes of thought and relation. 
 
We can also take Plumwood’s point further to note that, whilst the dominant 
culture superficially celebrates altruism, it celebrates and rewards the self-
interest, lack of inhibitory empathy and sense of entitlement that make up 
civilised mentalities far more expansively and consistently. Indeed, in general 
terms, it is not those who relate with respect, empathy and altruism who are 
considered to be ‘successful’ in the Anglophone West or who attain positions 
of influence and respect (in fact, such people are, as Ani suggests, ‘trampled 
upon in and by European culture’). Rather, the highest echelons of the 
Anglophone West are composed of those who display the self-serving, 
exploitative characteristics of civilised mentalities and who use these 
‘attributes’ to attain the great power and its symbolic substitute, great wealth, 
that constitute ‘success’ in the dominant culture.514 We find examples of this 
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throughout the dominant culture in everything from the aggressive, self-
serving competitiveness of politicians and the narcissism of ‘celebrities’ to the 
oligarchical manipulation of media moguls and the objectifying hubris of 
intellectuals and scientists.515 In one manner or another, most ‘successful’ 
figures, from the above categories and beyond them, have acted with self-
interest, lack of inhibitory empathy and a sense of entitlement, in the 
attainment of ‘success’ or from a position of entitled authority having become 
‘successful’. Indeed, to some extent, these characteristics are not only key to 
attaining ‘success’ but also to simply existing—and surviving—within the 
dominant culture; they are, as suggested above, part of the ‘normal’ 
operations of this society, deeply ingrained in the ways in which Western 
cultures function, both ideologically and in a practical, ‘day-to-day’ sense. 
Perhaps the most obvious example of this can be found in the fact that, to 
operate within the capitalist system that permeates, shapes and governs so 
much of Western life, it is both normal and, to a degree, necessary to adopt 
the characteristics of the civilised mentality, as I will now discuss.  
 
Capitalism, by its nature, encourages and operates through competition: from 
capitalists competing over capital and workers competing over increasingly 
scarce jobs and increasingly reduced wages to individuals competing over 
consumer products or through conspicuous consumption and states 
competing over contracts, resources, land and power.516 Whatever form such 
competition takes, to exist within a capitalist system is to compete over finite 
resources under a doctrine of infinite expansion.517 In this arena of perpetual 
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competition, the characteristics of a civilised mentality are a clear asset, even 
a necessity. As Erich Fromm argues 
 
It is obvious that the relationship between competitors has to be 
based on mutual human indifference. Otherwise any one of them 
would be paralysed in the fulfilment of his economic tasks—to fight 
each other and not refrain from the actual economic destruction of 
each other if necessary.518  
 
The ‘mutual human indifference’ Fromm describes here once again mirrors 
the components of rapist mentalities and civilised mentalities: to fulfil one’s 
‘economic tasks’ in a capitalist model, it is necessary to be concerned 
primarily or exclusively with one’s own interests, to lack empathy that might 
inhibit one’s capacity to ‘destroy’ rivals and to hold a belief that one is entitled 
to profit from the losses of others. As such, the shared characteristics of 
rapist mentalities and civilised mentalities are enshrined in contemporary 
capitalist interaction where they serve the purpose of enabling individuals 
(and, indeed, companies, corporations, states and other bodies) to perform 
effectively the duties, and meet the aims, assigned to them by prevailing 
capitalist socialisation.  
 
Importantly, this is far from limited to overtly capitalist interaction in the 
‘business world’: it permeates, and is part of the very fabric of, Western 
culture. In the dominant culture, it is, as Derrick Jensen observes, considered 
normal (and somehow not utterly ‘insane’) that one must pay money to exist 
on the planet: one must buy or rent land on which to live, and pay to access 
such basic things as food, water or materials with which to clothe and house 
oneself.519 At the same time, it is considered normal, and even ‘natural’—and 
again not utterly ‘insane’ and abusive—that large numbers of people should 
be unable to access such basic ‘resources’ or should face extreme 
exploitation in order to do so.520 In this cultural climate, it is inevitably 
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considered ‘normal’ to be concerned primarily with one’s own interest, to 
block out the suffering and exploitation of others and to operate in a constant 
state of denial that the comforts and privileges one personally enjoys are 
made possible only by the privation and suffering of others. As in 
Plumwood’s observation above, those who go against this normative 
behaviour—people who, for example, renounce property or who dedicate 
their lives to the interests of others, or who simply do not share the dominant 
culture’s stark distinction between self-interest and the interests of others—
are seen as abnormal and deviant. Moreover, such people are under great 
social pressure to conform to normative modes of passive exploitation and 
apathetic acceptance of others’ suffering; indeed, Bertrand Russell’s 
observation that ‘[e]very man who has really sincere desire for any great 
amelioration in the conditions of life has first to face ridicule, then 
persecution, then cajolery and attempts at subtle corruption’ remains at least 
as true today as when it was composed in 1917.521 We might even go as far 
as to concur with Forbes’ assertion that, as this way of life grows in intensity 
and influence towards a hegemonic domination of both Western and global 
societies, ‘there may soon be very few places in the world where a 
nonaggressive person can survive except as a lackey or a slave’.522 In this 
fashion, the pervasive influence of capitalism on Western culture works to 
normalise the characteristics shared by rapist mentalities and civilised 
mentalities, ingraining them deeply into day-to-day existence in the dominant 
culture. As such, these characteristics and the forms of self-serving and often 
abusive or exploitative behaviour that they enable are, as in Ani’s statement 
cited above, ‘sanctioned by every aspect of the culture, and the individual [...] 
is conditioned to manifest them’.523 In other words, prevailing patterns of 
capitalist socialisation that shape Western life condition into individuals the 
psychological capacity to directly and indirectly partake in and profit from the 
abuse and exploitation of others.  
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Jensen explores these issues in relation to his own life as an individual who 
is both a politically-aware social justice and environmental activist and a 
thoroughly conditioned member of the ‘civilised’ Anglophone West: 
 
[N]aturally I value money over life. Why else would I own a computer 
with a hard drive put together in Thailand by women dying of job-
induced cancer? Why else would I own shirts made in a sweatshop 
in Bangladesh, and shoes put together in Mexico? [...] I benefit from 
the exploitation of others, and I do not much want to sacrifice this 
privilege. I am, after all, civilized, and have gained a taste for 
“comforts and elegancies” which can be gained only through the 
coercion of slavery. The truth is that like most others who benefit 
from this [...] I would probably rather die (and maybe even kill, or 
better, have someone kill for me) than trade places with the men, 
women, and children who made my computer, my shirt, my shoes.524 
 
What Jensen highlights here is that that even for many of those who 
acknowledge the suffering and privation that underpins their own privileges, it 
remains ‘normal’ and ‘acceptable’ to pursue self-interest, to ignore damage 
such pursuit brings about and to consider oneself to be entitled to take what 
one wants regardless of the cost to others.525 Of course, this is not limited to 
issues of sweatshop labour or the vast wealth, power and privilege disparities 
between the (over)developed world and the global south: it remains a 
‘normal’ and ‘acceptable’ fact that throughout the world and throughout the 
Anglophone West there are people without homes, without food, without 
even basic amenities, people who have to work constantly just to survive, 
who have no time free for leisure or relationships or whose lives are 
unremitting misery.526 Simultaneously it remains a ‘normal’ and ‘acceptable’ 
fact that the vast majority of Anglophone Western citizens are far too 
preoccupied with their own interests, and far too numb to the suffering of 
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others, to even acknowledge that their lifestyles are dependent on, and their 
actions increase, the suffering of others, let alone for them commit to 
anything more than token gestures to help alleviate this suffering.527 As such, 
the characteristics of self-interest, lack of inhibitory empathy and sense of 
entitlement are again both extensively normalised and conditioned into 
individuals through capitalist socialisation. However, it is also important to 
realise that these characteristics do not originate in capitalism but are part of 
the ‘character’ of the Anglophone West at a more fundamental level. 
 
Whilst capitalist conditioning is perhaps the most readily demonstrable—and, 
at least currently, amongst the most pervasive—aspect of self-serving 
Western socialisation, it is only one component of a far larger pattern. 
Indeed, as Ani argues, capitalism itself is only a manifestation of underlying 
Western values, ‘another vehicle for the expression of the insatiable 
European “will-to-power”’ that already exists in the dominant culture.528 In 
other words, pre-capitalist Western cultures were still shaped by and still 
socialised individuals to adopt self-interest, lack of inhibitory empathy and a 
sense of entitlement; these characteristics are embedded in the West’s 
longstanding hierarchical social organisation, ‘democratic’ political systems 
dominated by the privileged and powerful,  endless expansionism and empire 
building, routine oppression and exploitation of marginalised groups, 
suicidally destructive relationship with non-human nature and many other 
aspects of its underlying ideologies and structures.529 Amongst these deeply 
rooted expressions, capitalism—and, indeed, what we might call ‘capitalist 
mentalities’ or the modes of thought and relation that enable individuals to 
economically exploit and abuse others—is a relatively recent manifestation of 
the civilised mentality that has always, in various forms, profoundly shaped 
Western culture. That is to say, these forms of exploitation and abuse, which 
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exert such a significant influence on Western culture, are all intimately 
connected not only in the sense of following similar patterns of power 
disparity and normalised exploitation but also in the fact that they all require 
and condition into individuals remarkably similar mentalities which are 
characterised by self-interest, lack of inhibitory empathy and a sense of 
entitlement. Plumwood argues a similar point when she notes that  
 
The same basic structures of self which appear in the treatment of 
nature as lifeless instrument also underlie the rational egoism and 
instrumentalism of the market, the treatment of those supposedly 
less possessed of reason as inferior, and as instruments for their 
more civilised western neighbours (as in slavery, colonialism and 
racism), and the treatment of women as inferior others whose norms 
of virtue embody a thinly disguised instrumentalism.530  
 
In line with my arguments, Plumwood highlights here that, whilst they 
manifest in different ways, it is still the ‘same basic structures of self’ that 
underlie the many forms of self-serving, exploitative and abusive behaviour 
that structure Western society. ‘Translated’ into the terms of the current 
discussion, we can note then that whilst there are different mentalities that 
enable different forms of abuse (for example, rapist mentalities or capitalist 
mentalities) they remain expressions of a broader mentality, that which I have 
been referring to as the civilised mentality. 
 
Considered from the above perspective, the myth of the aberrant rapist is 
even further destabilised: rapists are not deviant pariahs expressing 
idiosyncratic psychopathologies, nor are they only conforming to normative 
models of ‘masculinity’; rather they are enacting the modes of thought and 
relation that are most extensively normalised in the dominant culturein a 
specific gendered and sexualised form. Indeed, like my remodelling of Peggy 
Reeves Sanday’s work in the previous chapter—which concluded that ‘where 
objectification is a way of life, objectification frequently achieves sexual 
expression in the form of rape’—we can note that where individuals are 
conditioned to pursue only their own interests with no regard for the suffering 
of others and with a profound sense of entitlement, these characteristics 
pervade the ways in which they relate to others, including their sexualised 
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relations.531 Of course, this is not to suggest that all those who are socialised 
into the dominant culture’s normative modes of thought and relation—that is, 
all those who exhibit culturally-conditioned civilised mentalities—also have 
rapist mentalities or actually commit rape. Rather, it is to highlight the fact 
that the psychological capacity to rape is not aberrant but a normative, and 
predictable, expression of a society in which self-interest, lack of inhibitory 
empathy and a sense of entitlement are normalised, legitimised, celebrated 
and rewarded. Likewise, it is not intended to deny the significance of the 
specific forms of masculine socialisation outlined above (or of social 
production of rapable bodies discussed in the previous chapter) but to locate 
these socialisation patterns in the wider context of how the dominant culture 
operates, and explore how this wider context enables self-serving, entitled 
and abusive models of masculinity to gain ascendency throughout the 
Anglophone West. To explore these issues further—and to develop a fuller 
understanding of how dominant models of masculinity relate to the dominant 
culture as a whole—it is now useful to bring into the analysis the other central 
component of rapist mentalities: the motivation or desire to rape. As 
suggested at the beginning of the chapter, to commit sexual violence, a rapist 
must both be capable of committing and actually want to commit rape, and 
only by understanding how this desire for sexual violence is socially 
produced can we fully understand the place of the rapist in the dominant 
culture of the Anglophone Westand, accordingly, it is to this that I will now 
turn. 
 
 
Real Men: Masculinity, Heterosex and Rape Motivations 
 
As suggested at the beginning of this chapter, a rapist mentality is composed 
of both the psychological capacity to commit rape and the desire or 
motivation to do so. Having established the role of rape-enabling 
characteristics, the chapter will now move on to consider the second 
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component, or the question of why rapists commit rape and how this issue 
relates to the dominant models of masculinity, and the dominant culture, of 
the Anglophone West. Perhaps the first thing to establish here is that, like the 
capacity to do so, the desire or motivation to rape is not ‘natural’ or an innate 
‘male’ instinct. Unlike with the psychological capacity, however, we have the 
advantage of a wealth of feminist analysis to draw on in support of this point. 
We can point, for example, to Susan Griffin’s observation that it is, in fact, 
rape-supporting patriarchal ‘mythology’ that presents rape as ‘an animal 
instinct inherent in the male’, or to Joanna Bourke’s argument that, far from 
being ‘natural’, ‘rape and sexual violence are deeply rooted in specific 
political, economic and cultural environments’.532 We can also refer back to 
the cross-cultural studies discussed previously to acknowledge that, whilst 
we cannot definitively prove that any culture is entirely free from rape, rates 
of sexual violence incidence vary so widely across cultures—from almost no 
known cases in some to as many one in five women suffering sexual assault 
in others (in this case, the UK)—that the motivation to rape is clearly dictated 
by cultural attitudes rather than ‘natural’ instincts.533 Together, these 
arguments all point incontrovertibly to the fact that rapists’ motivations are 
socially produced rather than ‘natural’ or the product of a universal ‘male’ 
instinct or drive. Such arguments further destabilise the myth of the natural 
rapist introduced at the beginning of the chapter, reinforcing the argument 
that sexual violence is a socially produced behaviour. The second myth—that 
of the rapist as aberrant or deviant—also proves relatively simple to discredit 
in terms of motivation; however, as I will explore, it also provides us with 
several important points to consider in relation to the position of ‘the rapist’ in 
the dominant culture.   
 
At the most basic level, the notion that the desire to rape is aberrant can be 
disproved by referring to the statistics cited in the thesis introduction: if rape 
occurs in the Anglophone West with such extreme regularity, then the desire 
to commit rape can hardly be said to be entirely aberrant.534 However, this 
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only addresses the normativity of the desire to rape at its most superficial 
level; the argument can be extended far further to posit that the desire to 
rape, although not always recognised as such or even acted upon, is not so 
much deviant as it is an extension of normative ‘masculine’ behaviour and 
prevailing heterosex scripts. Certainly this is the position taken by Lucy 
Gilbert and Paula Webster when they write that  
 
‘[m]any rapes merely extend traditional heterosexual exchanges, in 
which masculine pursuit and female reticence are familiar and 
formalized. Although rape is a gross exaggeration of gender power, it 
contains the rules and rituals of heterosexual encounter, seduction 
and conquest.’535 
 
Whilst this argument is arguably marred by a homogenising treatment of 
heterosex, it does contain a useful point: if one takes the statement as 
referring only to some dominant models of, rather than to all, heterosex, then 
Gilbert and Webster highlight the fact that rape and (hetero)sex are not as 
comfortably discrete as many consider them to be. In this respect, it recalls 
MacKinnon’s observation, cited in the first chapter, that when it comes to 
separating ‘sex’ and ‘rape’, ‘[t]he problem remains what it has always been: 
telling the difference’.536 Again, this falls prey to the old, ineffectual and 
inaccurate assertions that heterosex and rape are inherently synonymous 
and interchangeable but, considered in a less totalising manner, it 
emphasises an issue that will be central to the following discussion: although 
heterosex can be—and frequently is—entirely consensual, mutual, non-
exploitative, non-objectifying and non-oppressive, many dominant heterosex 
encounters bear marked similarities to sexual violence. Such similarities, I 
will argue, extend to shared motivations behind many heterosex encounters 
and many incidents of sexual violence. Before exploring this in more detail, 
however, it is important to note that this analysis also recalls Russell’s 
observation that ‘rape is not so much a deviant act as an over-conforming 
one [...] It is an extreme acting-out of qualities that are regarded as masculine 
in this and many other societies’.537 This, then, is another important theme for 
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the current discussion: rape not only represents an extension of prevailing 
heterosex scripts but also of dominant models of masculinity and prescribed 
‘masculine’ behaviour. Diana Scully and Joseph Marolla make a similar point 
when they note that ‘rape can be viewed as the end point in a continuum of 
sexually aggressive behaviors that reward men and victimize women.’538 
However, I will extend this argument further to suggest that rape functions as 
one point on a continuum of more general ‘aggressive’ behaviours, for which 
men are culturally rewarded in the dominant culture. Together, these two 
points are key to understanding quite how ‘normal’ rapists’ motivations are 
and, as such, they will be central to the coming analysis. First, however, it is 
necessary to establish more clearly what actually motivates rapists to commit 
rape.   
 
As Scully and Marolla observe, one of the advantages of abandoning the 
notion that rapists are psychopathological deviants is that ‘it forces one to 
examine the goals that some men have learned to achieve through sexually 
violent means’.539 That is to say, by moving beyond the misconception that 
rapists are driven by idiosyncratic compulsions (or, for that matter, by a 
‘natural’ instinct), we are able to acknowledge that rapists commit rape 
because they gain something from it or have learned that it is rewarding 
behaviour. This provides us with a foundation from which to consider the 
social production of the desire to commit rape and the ways in which an 
individual may both develop certain goals or desires and come to understand 
certain acts as a means of achieving or sating them. To begin this task, it is 
important to acknowledge that the motivation to commit rape is a complex 
and multifaceted issue, and that rapists are a broad, heterogeneous ‘group’ 
of individuals who commit rape for a range of different reasons. Indeed, as 
Clive R. Hollin concisely observes, ‘[d]ifferent men rape to gain different 
rewards’.540 Scully and Marolla provide a revealing study of this matter which 
found that the (convicted) rapists interviewed  
 
 
                                                 
538
 Scully and Marolla, ‘“Riding the Bull at Gilley’s”’, p. 262. 
539
 Ibid., p. 254. 
540
 Clive R. Hollin, Psychology and Crime: An Introduction to Criminological Psychology 
(London: Routledge, 2002), p. 85.  
 236 
 
had used rape to achieve a number of objectives [...] [S]ome men 
used rape for revenge or punishment while, for others, it was an 
“added bonus” − a last minute decision made while committing 
another crime. In still other cases, rape was used to gain sexual 
access to women who were unwilling or unavailable, and for some it 
was a source of power and sex without any personal feelings. Rape 
was also a form of recreation, a diversion or an adventure and, 
finally, it was something that made these men “feel good.” 541 
 
In other words, rapists do not fit a convenient homogenous model of 
motivation but rather commit sexual violence in order to achieve a range of 
different forms of personal gain which operate on different levels and in 
various combinations of corporeality (such as physical gratification) and 
cerebrality (such as the use of rape to express anger or elevate self-esteem 
through feeling powerful). This considered, however, it is still possible to 
identify trends in, and to establish key understandings that underpin, these 
diverse motivations. That is to say, just as it is possible to locate the myriad 
thought processes that enable rapists to commit rape within the broad 
descriptors or categories of self-interest, lack of inhibitory empathy and a 
sense of entitlement, we can also posit broad categories of motivation that, 
although manifesting in different forms, are common to most, if not all, 
rapists.    
 
Katherine K. Baker provides a useful framework for considering the key 
trends of rapists’ motivation when she writes that, whilst ‘[a]ll rapes are not 
alike’, they are all ‘in part, about sex and masculinity and domination. But 
some rapes are predominantly about sex, some rapes are predominantly 
about masculinity, and some rapes are predominantly about domination’.542 
Baker’s observation is useful here because it acknowledges the diversity of 
rapists’ motivations whilst highlighting the fact that they still share common 
bases; as such, this provides a framework for understanding more precisely 
how rapists come to see rape as a desirable or rewarding action in general 
terms without homogenising rapists into a single monolithic ‘type’. However, 
as useful as this is, there is a limitation in how the framework is conceived. 
This is not to suggest that the three motivation components are inaccurate: 
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we have already noted the significance of ‘masculinity’ and ‘sex’ to rape 
motivation and, as I will demonstrate presently, ‘domination’ is of central 
importance. Rather, it is in Baker’s understanding of the relationship between 
these elements that we can identify issues. Specifically, we can note that, 
whilst the framework does acknowledge that all rapes are ‘in part, about sex 
and masculinity and domination’ it fails to develop this point to its fullest 
conclusion: that it is not simply the combined presence of these elements 
that composes the motivation to rape but the ways in which they intersect 
with each other and, in particular, the ways in which ‘domination’ intersects 
with ‘masculinity’ and ‘sex’. Baker’s position treats ‘masculinity’, ‘sex’ and 
‘domination’ as discrete components that collectively comprise rape 
motivation but still remain discrete, if related, components; in contrast, I 
suggest that the motivation to commit rape results not simply from each of 
these components but from each of these components as they are shaped by 
the others. That is to say, rapists’ motivations can be traced to the fact that 
dominant cultural understandings of all three components are produced in 
relation to dominant understandings of the others, with ‘masculinity’ shaping 
understandings of ‘sex’ and ‘domination’, ‘sex’ shaping understandings of 
‘masculinity’ and ‘domination’, and ‘domination’ shaping understandings of 
‘sex’ and ‘masculinity’. As I will now discuss, it is only through this 
intersectional triangulation that the components become central to the 
motivation to commit rape.     
 
Because ‘domination’ is, I suggest, the key aspect of the ‘triangle of 
motivation’, it is perhaps best to begin by looking at the intersection of ‘sex’ 
and ‘masculinity’ before plotting their intersections with this central third 
element. There are several points to highlight in this regard, each of which 
provides insight into how prevailing understandings of ‘masculinity’ and ‘sex’ 
intersect with, and help to define, each other. One of the most significant of 
these is the fact that heterosexual sex is central to the Anglophone West’s 
dominant models of masculinity, or to what is understood to constitute a ‘real 
man’. It is important to note at this stage that masculinity, as Lynne Segal 
notes, ‘is not some type of single essence, innate or acquired. As it is 
represented in our culture, “masculinity” is a quality of being which is always 
incomplete, and which is based as much on a social as on a psychic 
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reality.’543 In other words, masculinity is not the transculturally, 
transhistorically constant essence that it has traditionally been understood to 
be, but an unstable and incoherent act in which those characteristics that are 
culturally recognised as ‘masculine’ in a given time and place must be 
endlessly displayed and proven in the social realm. A central means through 
which many men make such displays is through the performance of 
heterosexual desire and heterosexual practices. Because heterosexuality is 
largely ‘invisible’ in Western culture (due to its assumed ‘naturalness’ and 
‘normality’), perhaps the most obvious example of this can actually be found 
in the fact that homosexuality—the alleged binary opposite of 
heterosexuality—is widely recognised to be ‘unmanning’ and ‘feminising’. As 
R. W. Connell observes,   
 
Gayness, in patriarchal ideology, is the repository of whatever is 
symbolically expelled from hegemonic masculinity, the items ranging 
from fastidious taste in home decoration to receptive anal pleasure. 
Hence, from the point of view of hegemonic masculinity, gayness is 
easily assimilated to femininity.544  
 
That is to say, ‘homosexuality’ does not simply describe one’s erotic partner 
preferences but rather, as Connell suggests, functions as a wider signifier of 
all that is ‘unmanly’. Accordingly, men who seek to prove their ‘manhood’ by 
the conditions of prevailing models of masculinity must not only avoid same-
sex sexual contact but also avoid even the suggestion or the suspicion that 
there is anything ‘gay’ about them or their desires. Although this 
encompasses many aspects of appearance, behaviour, interaction and other 
social signifiers, the most significant means of avoiding such suggestions is 
constantly asserting and reasserting heterosexual desire. 
 
Michael S. Kimmel observes that amongst the things ‘heterosexual men do to 
make sure no one could possibly get the “wrong idea” about them’ is to 
‘[a]lways be prepared to demonstrate sexual interest in women [...] In this 
sense, homophobia, the fear of being perceived as gay, as not a real man, 
keeps men exaggerating all the traditional rules of masculinity, including 
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sexual predation with women’.545 There are two important points here: firstly, 
Kimmel emphasises the fact that heterosexuality must be constantly and 
repeatedly displayed in order to ‘prove’ masculinity. However, he also alludes 
to an even more significant point, namely that it is not simply ‘heterosexuality’ 
in a general sense that must be displayed but a particular hegemonic model 
of predatory, supposedly compulsive, uncontrolled and uncontrollable 
heterosexuality. In other words, in dominant understandings of masculinity 
and heterosex, a ‘real man’ always pursues heterosexual encounters, always 
needs sexual ‘release’ and can—and will—always ‘perform’ if given even the 
slightest opportunity (including ‘opportunities’ that must be ‘created’ and 
coerced).546 In line with this, we find aspersions cast on the masculinity of not 
only ‘homosexual’ men but many men whose ‘heterosexuality’ does not 
measure up to prevailing standards, such those who experience ‘erectile 
dysfunction’, who are not sexually experienced or whose heterosex practices 
are restrained, inhibited or non-predatory.547 This social pressure to conform 
to an ‘assertive’, allegedly compulsive and often predatory model of 
heterosexual practices in order to prove one’s ‘masculinity’ is highly 
significant to rape motivation. Again there are numerous manifestations or 
examples of this, ranging from the stereotypical ‘stranger rapist’ lashing out 
at random women in response to a perceived slight to his masculine identity 
by another woman to the naive teenage boy ignoring consent in his insecure 
and self-absorbed ‘need’ to prove his manhood to his peers.548   
 
Moreover, in another variation on the myth of the natural rapist, the belief that 
men should display active, often predatory, heterosexuality is widely 
naturalised in Anglophone Western society so that normatively socialised 
men come to believe that they inherently have no control over their ‘desires’. 
This is widely noted to be routinely employed by rapists both as a justification 
for sexual assault and as a means of coercing and pressuring survivors in 
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date-rape or acquaintance rape scenarios; as Scully and Marolla argue, 
‘males are taught to have expectations about their level of sexual needs and 
expectations for corresponding female accessibility which function to justify 
forcing sexual access’.549 However, it also functions as another form of 
motivation or another criterion for prescribed ‘manliness’ to which many men 
feel they must measure up: that is, it sets a behavioural code that is not only 
used to ‘justify’ sexual violence but also serves as a model to which many 
men feel compelled to conform.550 Importantly, in this point we can also see 
how the intersection of ‘masculinity’ and ‘sex’ shapes not only masculinity but 
also heterosex: the notion that men inherently require, and are driven by a 
perceived need for, sexual ‘release’ (a ‘requirement’ that is assumed to be 
absent in women) fosters the notion that heterosex exists to serve this 
purpose. Perry highlights this point in recounting his teenage inculcation into 
this dominant understanding of ‘sex’. He writes that ‘[t]he fact that girls could 
like sex hadn’t even crossed our minds. We knew sex was supposed to 
involve some type of mutual appreciation for each other’s genitals, but we 
didn’t understand why—after all, it was us boys who were doing the “getting” 
of “some” right?’551 That is, prevailing understandings of ‘male’ sexuality as 
something compulsive and uncontrollable that must be ‘released’ encourages 
the understanding of heterosex as something designed to meet this ‘need’, 
like a pressure valve designed to maintain the healthy function of a boiler. 
This relates in turn to a broader aspect of how prevailing understandings of 
masculinity shape how heterosex is conceived in the dominant culture: the 
fact that the patriarchal framing of the dominant culture’s gender relations 
constructs ‘sex’ from a homogenised ‘male’ perspective. 
 
There are numerous expressions of this male-centric understanding of 
heterosex, ranging from the popular understanding of penile-vaginal 
penetration as the only form of ‘real’ sex to defining the duration and endpoint 
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of heterosex encounters in terms of male orgasm to the ‘notches on the 
bedpost’ reduction of sexual ‘partners’ to units for measuring ‘masculine’ 
achievement.552 In broader cultural terms, it is also widely observed to shape 
many forms of media in manifestations such as the ‘straight male gaze’ that 
shapes much Anglophone Western film and literature, projecting onto the 
audience a ‘heterosexual’ ‘male’ perspective, or the extreme focus on ‘male’ 
gratification found in the majority of pornography.553 Of course, thanks to the 
efforts of many forms of feminism over many decades, prevailing heterosex 
scripts are demonstrating an increasing focus on female sexual pleasure; 
indeed, as Segal argues, ‘our culture has increasingly impressed upon men 
the importance of the female orgasm’.554 However, as positive as this is in a 
general sense, it remains the case that this focus is still frequently framed in 
terms of ‘male’ achievement, with many men primarily concerned with their 
ability to ‘make’ a woman orgasm as a mark of their ‘masculine’ prowess 
rather than with genuine mutual pleasure.555 The male-centric focus, as we 
have seen in the previous chapter, creates an understanding of heterosex in 
which women are in many respects irrelevant except as an objectified 
focus—or indeed receptacle—for ‘male’ sexuality.556 This, again as 
discussed previously, further reduces the distinctions between normative 
heterosex scripts and rape scripts and so further highlights the similarities 
between many men’s motivations for ‘sex’ and many rapists’ motivations to 
commit ‘rape’.557 Whilst each of these points has only been outlined briefly, 
the above discussions provide an overview for understanding how the 
intersection of ‘masculinity’ and ‘sex’ creates cultural understandings of each 
that are highly conducive to sexual violence and, especially, to the 
normalising of rape motivations. However, whilst they are in themselves 
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significant issues, they truly become rape-motivating factors when both 
‘masculinity’ and ‘sex’ intersect with ‘domination’ and it is to this that the 
analysis now turns. 
 
 
Patriarchal Power or Personal Power?: Exploring Domination Motivations 
 
The previous discussion explored how the intersection of prevailing 
understandings of ‘masculinity’ and ‘sex’ is central to rapists’ motivations and 
highlighted the fact that the motivation to commit rape is not aberrant but 
rather is a reflection of normative heterosexual masculine socialisation. The 
following section will suggest, however, that this is only the case because 
both ‘masculinity’ and ‘sex’ intersect with, and have their cultural ‘meanings’ 
shaped by, prevailing understandings of ‘domination’ as ‘beneficial’ or 
rewarding that exist both within both prevailing understandings of gender and 
the dominant culture of the Anglophone West. As I will discuss throughout 
the closing sections of this chapter, this point is particularly important to the 
current discussion because it again highlights the fact that the social 
production of rapist mentalities does not occur in isolation but rather is an 
inevitable product of a culture that, I will argue, values, celebrates, rewards 
and in many respects revolves around domination. However, before arguing 
this point, it is necessary that we establish precisely how intersection with 
‘domination’ shapes prevailing understandings of ‘masculinity’ and ‘sex’ in a 
manner that makes them key factors in rapists’ motivations. As a route into 
this discussion, it is useful to consider an aspect of feminist rape theory that 
has long influenced understandings of rapists’ motivations: the image of 
rapists as what Brownmiller calls ‘front-line masculine shock-troops’ who 
commit rape in order to enforce the collective subordination of all women and 
secure the collective male power and patriarchal privilege of all men.558 As 
part of a wider radical feminist analysis, this understanding made an 
important contribution to how rapists and sexual violence more generally are 
understood in the Anglophone West. However, the conclusion it ultimately 
draws regarding why rapists commit rape is, I believe, erroneous for, 
although it recognises the three key elements of ‘masculinity’, ‘sex’ and 
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‘domination’, it is premised on a fundamentally inaccurate understanding of 
how masculinities are organised and interact, which undermines its overall 
argument. By critiquing these inaccuracies whilst still drawing on the 
strengths of the research, we are able to develop a clearer understanding of 
how ‘masculinity’ and ‘sex’ intersect with each other and with ‘domination’ to 
motivate rape, and it is to this task that the analysis will now turn. 
 
The contributions of the pioneering anti-rape scholars of the 1970s cannot be 
overestimated; through their more astute observations, they brought about a 
fundamental shift in the conceptualising of rape, providing a framework for 
treating sexual violence not as a matter of individual deviancy but as a social 
problem that could only be resolved through political action.559 Indeed, as 
Nicola Gavey notes, ‘[a]lmost overnight, it seems in retrospect, rape was 
politicized and became the target for revolutionary change.’560 This 
politicising of rape has been of incalculable benefit to the struggle against 
sexual violence, paving the way for numerous activist responses that range 
from Rape Crisis centres to ‘Reclaim the Night’ marches (also known as 
‘Take Back the Night’ marches) to the contemporary phenomenon of ‘Slut 
Walks’.561 However, whilst this shift in focus made a significant contribution 
towards undermining myths of rapists as deviant (although, as we have seen, 
one that is yet to be truly successful), it is important to note, as Segal 
reminds us, that ‘[t]here are other rape myths, however, which dominant 
strands of feminist thinking have not demolished. Indeed, they have 
underwritten them.’562 Segal primarily directs this argument towards the 
assertion that, as we have seen, some early feminist anti-rape texts 
reinforced the notion that rape is a ‘natural’ male instinct; however, the point 
can be developed further to suggest that these texts not only underwrote pre-
existing misconceptions but, with the very arguments that collapsed one set 
of myths, created new ones of their own. The notion that rapists are 
motivated by a conscious aim of securing collective male power over women 
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is one such myth. Moreover, although the arguments discussed in this 
section were produced nearly forty years ago, this myth is a relevant 
contemporary concern for the early anti-rape texts in which it originally 
appeared remain highly influential and are widely (and uncritically) cited in 
everything from newspaper articles to Rape Crisis websites.563 
 
Perhaps the key reason the myth is cited and replicated so frequently is that, 
whilst it is premised on conjecture and misunderstandings of masculinities, it 
still arises from a foundation of sound analysis. In particular, it has its roots in 
the notion that, regardless of whether or not they personally commit the act, 
all men benefit from sexual violence against women. As Brownmiller argues, 
‘[a] world without rapists would be a world in which women moved freely 
without fear of men. That some men rape provides a sufficient threat to keep 
all women in a constant state of intimidation’.564 Brownmiller makes an 
extremely important contribution to the understanding of rape here: that the 
relationship between patriarchy and rape is reciprocal. That is to say, by 
focusing on how rape affects the lives of women (a consideration that was, 
incredibly, almost entirely absent from pre-feminist studies of sexual 
violence), Brownmiller highlights the fact that rape is not only a product of 
patriarchal social organisation but a means through which this patriarchy is 
maintained. The very existence of rape and rapists within a society—
particularly when this existence is emphasised and revelled in by men and 
the male-dominated media—leads to many women perceiving a persistent, 
underlying threat to their safety and bodily integrity which, in turn, causes 
them to perceive themselves as reliant on male ‘protection’. In this sense, as 
Griffin suggests, rape ‘severely limits the freedom of women and makes 
women dependent on men.’565 What Griffin highlights here is that the 
generalised fear of rape discussed above is situational: it is structured by the 
belief that certain situations or scenarios increase a woman’s chances of 
being sexually assaulted. Despite the fact that most survivors are raped by 
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men that they already know, usually in a private, indoor space with which 
they are already familiar, several studies show that most women’s fear of 
rape is centred on the stereotypical attack, on what Lisa Jervis calls the 
‘stranger-in-the-bushes-with-a-knife paradigm’.566 This fear—which, it should 
be noted, is greatly increased by media sensationalising of the relatively rare 
‘stranger rape’ and the myth that women bring rape upon themselves by 
behaving ‘irresponsibly’ (a term which appears to indicate nothing more than 
behaving like autonomous beings rather than delicate, vulnerable victims)—
limits, as Griffin suggests, the movements, leisure activities, work life and 
sexual expression of many women. Women may, for example, decide not to 
socialise in the evening due to concerns about walking home alone at night, 
or may avoid drinking out of a fear of alcohol or drug facilitated rape, or may 
restrict their sexual activities to set patterns, scenarios or relationships, afraid 
that other expressions may lead to date rape.  
 
The curtailing of women’s freedom highlighted by Griffin confers a distinct 
collective power on men as a class over women as a class.567 Where 
women, as a result of a fear of rape and the conditioned belief that they are 
incapable of defending themselves, do not feel safe outside certain (usually 
private, often ‘male-protected’) spaces such as ‘the home’ without male 
‘protection’, they become reliant on men: their ability to experience many 
aspects of their lives—indeed, their ability simply to live without fear—
depends upon the ‘kindness’ of men, on men agreeing to accompany them, 
to ‘guard’ them from other men. In other words, through experiencing the 
threat of rape as ever-present, many women are conditioned to surrender 
their autonomy, their subjectivity, in exchange for male ‘protection’. They 
must, this conditioning dictates, accept that they are not subjects capable of 
independent action but objects to be acted upon by others, by men; their 
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choice is simply whether this action is rape or ‘protection’. Moreover, such 
‘protection’ is conditional, reliant on the choices, the inclinations and fancies, 
of the ‘protector’. Indeed, as Griffin argues, the ‘security’ offered in this 
scenario operates like a mafia ‘protection racket which depends for its 
existence on rape’: women must meet with the approval of the ‘protector’, 
must please him and conform to codes of behaviour and appearance that he 
approves of, or he will revoke his ‘protection’, reinstating the threat of rape by 
other men.568 Furthermore, this not only operates on an individual, 
interpersonal level but is enshrined in judicial and media responses to sexual 
violence where the survivor’s account is disbelieved if she is seen as having 
violated accepted codes of behaviour by drinking heavily, having 
promiscuous sex or otherwise behaving ‘recklessly’.569  
 
Considered in light of the above analysis, the collective male ‘rewards’ of 
rape are readily apparent: the fear of rape limits many women’s 
engagements with public life and forces them into a position of subordinated 
dependence, allowing men to take effective ‘stewardship’ of women, who 
must then please them in exchange for protection. This is manifest in 
everything from men who benefit from the domestic ‘duties’ fulfilled by 
women who feel compelled to remain in the home or the sexual ‘duties’ 
fulfilled by women who feel obliged to repay the ‘kindness’ of their ‘protectors’ 
to men whose identities, sense of self-worth and masculine pride revolve 
around serving as the paternalistic protector of ‘worthy’ women (or, indeed, 
politicians and other public ‘servants’ who employ the promise of ‘defending’ 
women from rape—that is, the threat of rape by other men—as a means of 
achieving power and influence).570 In this, then, we find the accurate and 
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insightful assertion that that men collectively benefit from, and at least 
potentially have a vested interest in, sexual violence, an assertion which was, 
and remains, one of the most significant contributions to the struggle against 
rape in the Anglophone West. However, as noteworthy as this position is, it is 
transformed into a rape myth through one simple piece of reasoning that 
characterises many (although not all) such arguments: the conflation of the 
results of rape and the motivation to rape to suggest that, because all men 
benefit from rape, this is also the reason that rapists commit rape. 
 
Brownmiller provides a clear example of this conflation in what is perhaps the 
most iconic and widely cited feminist depiction of sexual violence: 
 
Man’s discovery that his genitalia could serve as a weapon to 
generate fear must rank as one of the most important discoveries of 
prehistoric times, along with the use of fire and the first crude stone 
axe. From prehistoric times to the present, I believe, rape has played 
a critical function. It is nothing more or less than a conscious process 
of intimidation by which all men keep all women in a state of fear.571 
 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, this statement has proved highly controversial and 
provoked many critiques, not least from those who protest the idea that all 
men commit rape.572 Diana E. H. Russell counters these latter challenges to 
Brownmiller’s position, writing: 
 
If Brownmiller is saying [...] that all men consciously use rape to 
intimidate women, she seems to be guilty of overstatement [...] If, on 
the other hand, Brownmiller means that all men benefit from the state 
of fear that affects all women because some men consciously 
intimidate women by raping them, then she contributes a brilliant 
insight. Since Brownmiller makes the latter point elsewhere in her 
book, it seems to be the best interpretation of her rather ambiguous 
statement.573 
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Russell is right to suggest that Brownmiller is not arguing that ‘all men 
consciously use rape to intimidate women’: after all, as discussed in the first 
chapter, the understanding of rape found in Against Our Will is frequently 
undermined by the suggestion that rape is largely the product of specific 
‘subcultures of violence’.574 However, Russell’s suggestion that the above 
declaration is simply a modification of the assertion that all men benefit from 
rape is, I believe, less convincing and any ambiguity in Brownmiller’s ‘rather 
ambiguous statement’ is only there if one strongly wishes to find it. The 
notion of rape as ‘a conscious process’ is central to this point. Russell’s 
(re)interpretation of the statement rests on the idea that rapists ‘consciously 
intimidate’ only the women they rape, and that the intimidation of other 
women is an unplanned, unconscious side-effect that benefits all men. 
However, whilst this position would be far more defensible, it simply does not 
match Brownmiller’s argument: rape, in Brownmiller’s statement, is ‘a 
conscious process’ and one that is engaged in by ‘all men’. The stark 
implication here is that every stage of the ‘process’ of rape—of some women 
being raped by some men leading to all women being subordinated to all 
men—is consciously enacted, that is, enacted with and motivated by the 
‘conscious’ aim of subordinating women.  
 
What Russell describes, then, is at best an unconscious ‘process of 
intimidation by which all men keep all women in a state of fear’ or perhaps 
more truly a series of intimidating occurrences committed by men who are 
conscious of their intimidating effect on their targets but do not relate this to, 
are not conscious of—and so are certainly not motivated by—any form of 
wider ‘process of intimidation’. Brownmiller, however, describes a scenario, 
apparently unchanging throughout world history, in which rapists consciously 
play their role as terrorists or ‘soldiers of patriarchy’, raping women with the 
express aim of creating a symbol of male authority and a warning for ‘all 
women’ of their vulnerability and the necessity of male ‘protection’, just as a 
burning watchtower, a desecrated temple, a crucified body declare the 
authority of a conquering army, the powerlessness of the conquered and the 
necessity of acquiescence. In other words, Brownmiller presents rapists as 
committing sexual violence in order to achieve a distinct political goal, the 
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effects of which extend far beyond themselves as individuals to benefit ‘all 
men’. The flaws in this position are highlighted by following the reasoning on 
which it is premised to its logical, if not necessarily intended, conclusion. The 
argument that rapists commit rape in order to secure a political victory for ‘all 
men’ ultimately relies on the unlikely assumption that rapists have some form 
of inclusive, fraternal ‘fellow feeling’ towards all other men and are motivated 
by a sense of responsibility, a belief that they, personally, should contribute 
to the collective gain of their ‘fellows’. This may seem a facetious proposition 
but it follows Brownmiller’s logic: Brownmiller not only presents rape as an 
act that is knowingly employed by rapists in order to achieve a political goal 
(‘a conscious process of intimidation’ directed at ‘all women’) but actually 
precludes the possibility of any other motivation, explicitly stating that rape is 
‘nothing more or less’ than this specific politicised act. Of course, we might 
rework the notion of ‘fellow feeling’ to present rapists as zealous, extremist 
figures who assume the role of self-elected representatives of ‘all men’ and 
are motivated by the self-perceived responsibility to ‘fight’ for the political 
dominance of this same supposedly homogenous group. However, even this 
presents rapists as, within the confines of male homosocial relationships, 
curiously selfless figures, less concerned with their own gratification and gain 
than with the benefits they can ‘win’ for ‘men’ as a class. Such an 
understanding is, as I will now discuss, in direct conflict with how men and 
masculinities are organised and relate to one another in the dominant culture 
of the Anglophone West. 
 
Although as a class men do, in different ways and to different degrees, 
benefit from patriarchal social organisation, just as they benefit from rape, 
this does not mean that ‘men’ can be considered to be a stable, coherent and 
unified group. For example, Connell observes that  
 
Men’s interest in patriarchy [...] is fissured by all the complexities in 
the social construction of masculinity [...] Men’s interest in patriarchy, 
then, does not act as a unified force in a homogenous structure. 
Recognizing this, we can move decisively beyond the one-
dimensional strategic thinking that flowed from earlier models of 
patriarchy.575   
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As Connell indicates, ‘men’ are not a cooperative community working 
collectively towards a consistent shared goal; rather they are a large number 
of individuals with their own aims, priorities and self-serving interests 
organised in complex, often hierarchical, relationships with each other. That 
is to say, whilst all men share de facto unity in that they all benefit from 
patriarchy and all have a vested interest in the subordination of women, this 
does not imply that they share a unity of interest or are consciously working 
towards collective enterprises, even those that they all benefit from on some 
level. Indeed, it is perhaps more accurate to suggest that men as a group are 
characterised less by unity and more by isolation, insecurity and rivalry. This 
is particularly apparent if we consider the instability of masculine identity. As 
discussed above, masculinity is not the expression of an innate male 
‘essence’ but an unstable performance that must be constantly displayed and 
‘proven’ through social acts. Accordingly, masculine identity is always 
insecure, always open to questioning and interrogation, always balanced on 
the edge of being undermined and ‘disproved’. Kimmel makes this same 
point when he observes that ‘masculinity is a relentless test’ in which men 
are under great pressure to ‘keep trying, valiantly and vainly, to measure up’ 
in the eyes of other men who ‘watch us, rank us, grant our acceptance into 
the realm of manhood.’576 As Kimmel suggests, despite shared privileges, 
other men are not necessarily co-conspirators and unproblematic allies in a 
collective patriarchal struggle to subordinate women but interrogators and 
judges who have the potential to undermine a man’s masculine identity and 
(at least some of) his social power. 
 
Moreover, other men are not only judges but also fellow competitors, the 
ones against whom a man’s masculinity is measured. As Todd W. Reeser 
notes, ‘though masculinity might seem to function alone and on its own 
terms, it inevitably functions in implicit or explicit relation to a series of others. 
In fact, it is defined by that very dialogue.’577 Perhaps the most obvious 
manifestation of this can be identified in the avoidance of, and indeed hostility 
towards, that which is culturally considered to be feminine or un-masculine. 
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Premised on the dualisms of male/female and masculine/feminine discussed 
in the first chapter, this logic suggests that ‘masculinity’ can be displayed by 
simply not displaying ‘femininity’ for, in a dualistic culture, that which is not 
‘feminine’ must be ‘masculine’.578 However, as Reeser suggests when he 
writes that masculinity functions in ‘relation to a series of others’, it is not only 
in dialogue with femininity that masculinity finds its definition. If one considers 
the fact, now largely understood to be axiomatic, that there are numerous 
different forms of masculinity, all created by gender’s intersection with race, 
class, sexuality, personal experience and countless other factors, all with 
different levels of social power/status, and all existing in complex relations to 
one another (in short, that ‘masculinity’ is better understood as 
‘masculinities’), then this dialogic definition of masculinity becomes 
considerably more complex.579 The notion that there are many masculinities 
allows for the possibility that a man’s masculinity is defined not only in 
relation to ‘the feminine’ but also in relation to the masculinities of other men. 
 
Reeser gives an example of this, observing that ‘white masculinity could be in 
dialogue with black masculinity in certain circumstances, for example, by 
virtue of a white man’s desire to imitate a black man’s relation to rap music or 
the way he moves his body.’580 In this case, the white man relates his 
masculinity unfavourably to the black man’s, and seeks to remedy this 
through emulating aspects of this other masculinity. Numerous other 
examples can be readily identified: a white man might just as easily define 
his masculinity favourably in a racist dialogue with a culturally-feminised 
black masculinity; likewise, a straight man may define his masculinity in 
homophobic relation to a gay man or a male body builder may define his 
through relation to the masculinities of men of average build.581 Some such 
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comparisons may be favourable and others unfavourable but always a man’s 
masculinity is, in this manner, defined by and in relation to other men and 
other masculinities. Accordingly, masculinity in the Anglophone West 
functions as a complex hierarchy, an ever-shifting network of largely rivalrous 
relations in which each man’s masculinity is defined in relation to others 
within the network, and in which almost all men vie to have their masculinity 
favourably compared to others’. Accordingly, men as a class are not united in 
an all-motivating collective aim (to suppress women or otherwise) but rather 
fractured by insecurities and isolation, divided by relationships of competition 
where each man is driven to prove his masculinity against those of other 
men. In this sense, the notion that rapists are motivated by a desire for 
collective male benefit is, ultimately, untenable. Indeed, we can modify 
Connell’s discussion of men’s varying interests in patriarchy accordingly: 
 
Men’s interest in rape [...] is fissured by all the complexities in the 
social construction of masculinity [...] Men’s interest in rape, then, 
does not act as a unified force in a homogenous structure. 
Recognizing this, we can move decisively beyond the one-
dimensional strategic thinking that flowed from earlier models of 
rape/rapists.582  
 
Given the disunity, conflict and competition that characterises masculinities, 
the Anglophone West’s rape problem cannot realistically be considered to be 
the collective enactment of ‘a unified force’, as Brownmiller’s analysis 
appears to suggest; likewise, although all men benefit, to varying degrees, 
from the Anglophone West’s rape culture and its support of Anglophone 
Western patriarchy, neither all men nor even all rapists can be said to be a 
‘homogenous structure’ seeking to secure the domination of all women.583 
Rapists do benefit from committing rape and this benefit does revolve around 
domination (intersecting with ‘masculinity’ and ‘sex’). However, as I will now 
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discuss, it is not collective domination that motivates rapists but personal 
domination, both in the form of ‘proving’ masculinity through dominating rape 
survivors and as sexual gratification in a culture that conflates heterosex with 
conquest and coercion. 
 
 
Displaying Dominance: Rape and Power 
 
As noted previously, perhaps the most significant contribution made by the 
pioneering anti-rape feminists of the 1970s was the politicising of sexual 
violence; this conceptual shift presented rape as something intimately 
connected to and inseparable from normative patriarchal society and its 
prevailing heterosex practices and codes of masculine behaviour. Although, 
as argued above, the understanding of rapists’ motivations underpinning 
such arguments was premised on an inaccurate understanding of how 
masculinities are organised, the central point that the actions and motivations 
of rapists cannot be considered in isolation from the dominant culture 
remains highly significant. Reconceived in terms of individual domination 
rather than the collective domination of all men over all women, this 
understanding is central to understanding rapists’ motivation for, as 
suggested previously, there are multiple points of intersection between 
‘masculinity’, ‘sex’ and ‘domination’, each of which shapes not only rape 
motivations but also normative ‘masculine’ motivations and normative 
‘heterosexual’ motivations; indeed, the key point to consider in this regard is 
that these forms of motivation cannot be discretely separated into the normal 
and ‘acceptable’, and the aberrant and abusive, and that it is cultural 
understandings of ‘domination’ that unite these supposedly disparate groups. 
This point is clearly demonstrated by considering the role ‘domination’ plays 
in the previous examples of ‘masculinity’ and ‘sex’ intersecting to motivate 
rape.  
 
Whilst the intersection of ‘masculinity’ and ‘sex’ does indeed, as 
demonstrated above, play a central role in producing the motivation to rape, it 
does so only because of the prevailing cultural understandings of both 
‘masculinity’ and ‘sex’ that are already profoundly shaped by cultural 
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understandings of domination. This is, I suggest, applicable to all rapists, 
despite the great diversity in individual’s motivations. Returning to Scully and 
Marolla’s exploration of these diverse motivations is a useful means of 
highlighting this point for, whilst it is true that rapists use ‘rape to achieve a 
number of objectives’, it can also be noted that each of the objectives 
revolves around domination and, specifically, personal rather than collective 
domination.584 If we consider the first example Scully and Marolla provide—
the use of ‘rape for revenge or punishment’—this point is readily apparent. In 
broadest terms, there are two types of revenge rape, distinguished by a 
rapist’s choice of target: that is, a rapist may enact revenge against a specific 
woman he perceives to have wronged him or, as Scully and Marolla observe, 
against another, unrelated woman who, thanks to his belief in ‘collective 
liability’—the notion that all members of a ‘group’ or ‘category’ are 
accountable for the actions of their supposed peers—serves as a surrogate 
target.585 Beyond this, such rapes become even more diverse as the specific 
thought processes that constitute the rapists’ motivation vary from individual 
to individual, both within and across these two types of ‘revenge’ rape. 
Despite this diversity, however, there are commonalities that connect many 
such revenge or punishments rapes. Particularly common, and again 
discussed by Scully and Marolla, are rapists’ beliefs that ‘men have the right 
to discipline and punish women’ or that rape can serve ‘“to put women in their 
place” and as a method of proving their “manhood”’.586 In this we can 
immediately see the significance of both ‘masculinity’ and ‘sex’ as key 
aspects of the rapist’s motivation but, crucially, it is the significance of 
‘domination’ to ‘masculinity’ and ‘sex’ that makes this so. It is only because 
the rapist considers his masculinity to be reliant on his ability to dominate 
women and perceives ‘sex’ to be means of enacting such domination that 
these become motivational factors. As such, whilst masculinity and sex 
dictate the form of the ‘punishment’, the underlying motivation is ‘domination’ 
and specifically, the notion that domination is something positive, something 
that confers value upon the dominator. The same is, of course, true in cases 
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where rape was seen by the rapist as ‘a source of power’.587 Likewise, in a 
variant form, it is domination that underpins motivations where ‘rape was 
used to gain sexual access to women who were unwilling or unavailable’.588 If 
the aim is to ‘access’ unwilling women then the true objective is to ‘dominate’ 
that woman, to overcome and nullify her lack of consent and take control of 
her body against her will. In other words, if the woman is unwilling then the 
‘sexual access’ that is being sought is not motivated by a desire for 
connection, mutuality and shared experiences with an equal but a desire to 
occupy and control an object. ‘Masculinity’ and ‘sex’ again feature heavily but 
the root of the motivation is ultimately ‘domination’ and the individual rapist’s 
capacity to dominate others.  
 
The role of domination in the other examples Scully and Marolla provide is 
perhaps less obvious but is ultimately no less central. The remaining 
motivations—cases where rape is ‘an “added bonus” [...] while committing 
another crime’, ‘sex without personal feelings’, ‘a form of recreation, a 
diversion or an adventure’ or simply ‘something that made these men “feel 
good”’—are all framed in terms of sexual gratification.589 That is to say, they 
are presented by the interviewed rapists as acts that are committed for purely 
‘carnal’ reasons, to experience sexual pleasure. However, in none of these 
examples is this truly a motivation; rather it is simply the role the rape fulfilled 
in the rapist’s broader activities and understandings. The true motivation for 
these acts lies in the question of why rape makes the rapists ‘feel good’, or 
why it serves as ‘recreation’, enjoyable ‘sex’ (apparently ‘without emotions’) 
or a gratifying ‘bonus’. In other words, to understand why such rapists are 
motivated to commit rape we must understand why the act is rewarding for 
them, and I suggest that domination is again key to this. Even when 
presented as ‘sex without emotions’, sexual gratification is not purely 
mechanical; to the extent that they can be discretely divided, the ‘corporeal’ 
is always reliant to some degree on the ‘cerebral’, on, as Jerrold Greenberg 
and others notes, ‘the subjective feeling of pleasure’.590 In the above cases, it 
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is an understanding of ‘sex’ as a form of domination, and of domination as 
rewarding (both in terms of masculinity and other cultural associations) that 
underpins the various motivations, making rape cerebrally and corporeally 
gratifying. After all, as noted in the previous chapter with regard to 
objectification, if one understands ‘sex’ to be a mutual, collaborative 
encounter between two or more autonomous, subjective individuals then 
rape cannot be gratifying; it can only be abhorrent and repulsive.591 To find 
rape rewarding (in the sense of making one ‘feel good’ or serving as a 
‘recreation’ and so forth) one must understand ‘sex’ to serve as a form of 
domination and find domination to be gratifying or rewarding (again, in terms 
of one’s masculine identity as a ‘dominator’ or because of broader cultural 
connotations). Accordingly, whilst ‘masculinity’ and ‘sex’ are highly significant 
to these forms of rape motivation, this is once again only the case because 
‘masculinity’ and ‘sex’ are seen through a lens of normalised and rewarding 
domination and, as such, it is domination that lies at the root of the 
motivations.  
 
This even applies in cases where the rapist is not consciously seeking to 
commit rape but simply does not understand or refuses to recognise consent 
and its refusal. The obvious examples of this are the naive, self-absorbed 
teenagers Perry discusses, who are so fixated on ‘getting some’ that they, at 
least potentially, fail to consider whether this is actually what is wanted by 
both parties.592  Despite the fact that it is seemingly ‘just’ ‘sex’ that such 
individuals are seeking, rather than consciously attempting to dominate 
another person through rape, it is still domination that is central to the 
motivation in such cases. Domination, after all, does not necessarily imply 
physically overpowering an individual; it is just as applicable to an 
understanding of ‘sex’ as something that does not involve the survivor as an 
autonomous site of subjectivity but as an object or event that must be 
overcome or achieved for the rapist’s own benefit. Where someone is 
seeking ‘sex’ so fixedly that they are oblivious to the survivor’s consent or 
bodily integrity, they are truly seeking to conquer someone, to be able to say 
that they achieved a specific act, overcame specific obstacles: in short that 
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they achieved dominion over the situation. This point is useful here because 
it leads us to the fact that such domination motivations are, as I will now 
discuss, not aberrant and deviant but rather are common throughout 
normative masculine socialisation and prevailing heterosexual scripts. 
 
That ‘domination’ or power over others is central to hegemonic masculinity in 
the Anglophone West has been widely observed, although perhaps nowhere 
more succinctly than in Kimmel’s statement that: ‘the hegemonic definition of 
manhood is a man in power, a man with power, and a man of power.’593 This 
point is well demonstrated by returning to the notion that a man’s masculinity 
is never fixed, assured or entirely beyond question but rather exists in 
competition with other men’s masculinities and must be constantly asserted 
and reasserted through social action. We have seen how heterosexuality and 
homophobia play a central role in such displays (and, shortly, we will see 
how ‘domination’ is also central to the relationship) but there are also several 
other components that comprise prevailing understandings of what it means 
to ‘be a man’. As Eileen L. Zubriggen notes, the findings of enquiries into the 
key elements of Western masculinity are largely interchangeable, the 
different studies simply employing alternative phrases and criteria to describe 
what are, effectively, the same elements.594 For this reason, Zubriggen 
amalgamates the various studies to suggest that the key elements of 
contemporary hegemonic masculinity are: ‘femininity avoidance’, ‘status and 
achievement’, ‘toughness and aggression’, ‘restricted emotionality’ ‘self-
reliance’, ‘non-relational sexuality’, ‘homophobia’ and 
‘dominance/power/control’.595 However, whilst these concepts are indeed 
central to contemporary masculinities and do function as separate 
components of hegemonic masculine identity, I suggest that they are also all 
expressions of the centrality of domination to hegemonic masculinity. Indeed, 
each of the above elements can, in fact, be subsumed into the overarching 
element of ‘domination’ and is largely central to ‘masculinity’ precisely 
because it helps men to obtain or display ‘domination’. 
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Zurbriggen’s category of ‘status and achievement’ is, perhaps, the most 
obvious example of this: a man with a greater status (or higher achievements 
which confer greater status) gains more authority, more social capital, a 
greater ability to influence, control and dominate others. Indeed, a man’s 
status is routinely measured, as Susan Griffin observes, in the number of 
subordinates he has power over or in financial terms wherein money serves, 
as Ani argues, as ‘the representation of power’ over others.596 In short, the 
higher a man’s status and achievements the more power over others he has, 
and, as a result, ‘status and achievement’ may be considered to be 
significant to contemporary masculinities because it enables or represents a 
man’s domination of others. The same subsuming is applicable to the other 
elements. Cliff Cheng argues, for example, that ‘toughness’ (particularly in 
the form of physical strength) and ‘aggression’ are the traditional, long-
celebrated means of dominating and securing power both over women and 
over other men.597 Associated with this, ‘femininity avoidance’ also equates 
to domination. In part this is because, in the Anglophone West, femininity is 
understood to be passive, weak and subordinate, and so to be the antithesis 
of the ‘toughness and aggression’ with which a man traditionally secures his 
dominance.598 Perhaps more importantly, however, are the relative social 
statuses of women (who are, in general terms, the cultural exemplar of 
femininity) and men. In a statement that mirrors Gayle Rubin’s discussion of 
the use of women as exchangeable objects in male power-relations, Kimmel 
observes that women are routinely treated as ‘a kind of currency that men 
use to improve their ranking on the masculine social scale’; as such, women 
under Anglophone Western patriarchy, are understood as the dominated 
property of the powerful, rather than as powerful dominators themselves.599 
As such, in the understandings that prevail in the Anglophone West, to be 
seen as ‘feminine’ is to be seen as dominated—or at least as someone who it 
is possible to dominate—rather than as an indomitable dominator. ‘Restricted 
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emotionality’ equates to domination for a similar reason: emotionality 
(particularly uncontrolled, ‘hysterical’ emotionality) has long been seen as a 
‘feminine’ condition, a sign of ‘female’ weakness.600 Additionally, together 
with ‘self-reliance’, ‘restricted emotionality’ performs an image of dominance, 
of man with no weakness: after all, the performance suggests, who but a 
powerful, dominant man with no weaknesses could function without ever 
needing the assistance of others (‘self-reliance’) or emotional support 
(‘restricted emotionality’)? In this fashion, it is readily apparent that 
‘domination’ is central to hegemonic masculinity in the Anglophone West, 
shaping the key characteristics that define how one successfully performs 
‘manliness’. Moreover, this centrality also extends to the intersection of 
‘masculinity’ and ‘sex’, allowing ‘sex’ to function as a vehicle for ‘masculine’ 
domination.   
 
The significance of ‘domination’ to ‘sex’ is also well documented. This is 
particularly true in terms of the intersection of ‘sex’ and ‘masculinity’, that is, 
where heterosexuality is performed in order to ‘prove’ one’s manliness. 
Previously, we noted that such displays frequently rely on a particularly 
predatory and supposedly compulsive mode of heterosexual performance. 
We can expand this point here to note that it is the dominance component of 
such heterosexual modes that makes them both a highly common and a 
highly normative means of demonstrating ‘manliness’. The most obvious 
example of this is, as Kimmel suggests, the widespread ‘masculine’ practice 
of boasting about one’s ‘latest sexual conquest’: here, as in the previous 
discussion of rapists who are not conscious of their own transgression, the 
model of ‘sex’ at play is one framed around domination, not necessarily 
through physically overpowering women but through an understanding of 
women as a goal or achievement to be overcome rather than as a subjective 
being with whom to interact.601 Importantly, in this we can already identify the 
extent to which ‘domination’ shapes understandings of ‘sex’ as held by both 
‘rapists’ and ‘non-rapists’ (to the extent that these categories can actually 
exist as truly discrete). We see this further in the fact that, as Nicola Gavey 
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notes, dominant ‘discourses of sex and gender’ present and produce male 
and female sexuality in a manner that is conducive to sexual displays of male 
dominance: ‘women’s passive, acquiescing (a)sexuality and men’s forthright, 
urgent pursuit of sexual “release”’.602 Playing out the sexual script suggested 
by this understanding of male and female sexuality allows men to obtain and 
display power through the sexual act; indeed, this recalls Gilbert and 
Webster’s observation that ‘[m]any rapes merely extend traditional 
heterosexual exchanges’.603 Quite simply, without this understanding of 
gendered sexuality, this direct extension would not exist because there would 
be no foundation from which to perceive ‘male’ sexuality as conquering a 
supposedly passive and reluctant ‘female’ sexuality. 
 
Likewise, it recalls Perry’s observation that men are not socialised ‘to expect 
and proactively ensure that every sexual interaction is marked by mutual 
enjoyment and respect’604 In other words, prevailing models of heterosex are 
not concerned with ‘relation’ or ‘mutuality’; they are focused on the man’s 
accomplishment of an objective, and his conquest of an object. As suggested 
above, just because this does not follow the model of physical ‘conquest’ 
does not mean that its purpose and motivation is not domination: it still 
revolves around engineering the situation, controlling the other party’s 
response through pressure and coercion or other less obviously malevolent 
forms of manipulation in order to achieve ‘victory’. If heterosex is understood 
to be ‘relational’ or ‘mutual’, then it does not have the capacity to achieve or 
express domination in the same manner; conceived of as it is in the dominant 
discourses, however, it becomes what Perry calls an ‘adversarial climate’ of 
which ‘sexual violence is one of many inevitable negative outcomes’.605 In 
this manner, we again see that domination is a central component of 
normative heterosexual practices and understandings and plays a key role in 
motivating much ‘normal’ heterosex rather than only deviant sexual violence. 
This point is reinforced by looking briefly again at the homophobia that is so 
central to dominant models of both heterosexual identity and masculine 
identity. After all, if male sexuality is conceived of in terms of objectifying 
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domination—the act of penetration understood as a form of conquest—then 
homosexual sex, particularly the notion of being penetrated, is distinctly 
threatening to hegemonic masculinity, as Emmanuel Reynaud observes. He 
writes that 
 
Homosexuality directly threatens man’s power, as it excludes him 
when it is between women, and when it is between men it represents 
the risk for him of being sexually appropriated ... the possibility of 
being used as a sexual object by a man usually causes him great 
anxiety.606  
 
Accordingly, homophobia (which, as Kimmel suggests, is essentially an 
expression of ‘the fear of being perceived as gay’) serves as a public display 
of a man’s heterosexuality, his impenetrability, his status as dominator not 
dominated: in short, as a display of his domination.607 The above analysis all 
points towards the fact that rapists’ motivations, although diverse, revolve 
around the intersection of masculinity, sex and domination, the last of which 
provides the central motivation factor for sexual violence. We have also seen 
that such dominance motivations are far from aberrant and deviant but rather 
are deeply ingrained in both domination models of masculinity and prevailing 
understandings of heterosex. However, it is also crucial to realise that such 
dominance motivations extend far beyond these areas and that they are, as I 
will now demonstrate, perhaps the most common and significant motivation 
in the dominant culture of the Anglophone West. 
 
 
Conquest and Control: Sexual Violence in a Culture of Domination  
 
Although manifesting in different forms, flowing down different channels and 
being played out in different fields, dominance motivation—that is, being 
motivated by the aim of attaining power over others—is central to and 
extremely widespread throughout the dominant culture of the Anglophone 
West. Indeed, it is so widespread, so extensively normalised, that it is often 
almost invisible, but if we actually look for it, it is readily identified in 
numerous ‘everyday’ motivations and desires. Robert A. Emmons and Laura 
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A. King suggest the following as the key forms of power or dominance based 
motivations: ‘(a) establishing or maintaining power; (b) having impact, control, 
or influence over others; (c) seeking fame or public attention; (d) comparison 
and/or competition with others; (e) dominating, persuading, or convincing 
others; and (f) arousing emotions in others’.608 This is a relatively 
comprehensive list, although it is, I think, improved by including the desire for 
wealth because, as Ani reminds us, financial wealth is a representation of 
power over others.609 With this addition, we have a useful framework for 
considering quite how normative dominance motivations are in the 
Anglophone West; after all, manifestations of the above categories are 
almost self-evident. For example, a desire to climb in workplace hierarchies 
or to excel in business, politics and other competitive fields contains at least 
the first two examples and my addition of money as symbolic power, and has 
the potential to include all of the others too.610 Likewise, we can plot several 
of the motivation forms onto a desire to excel at sports and other activities 
that are framed around the notion of dominating both one’s rivals and the 
frailties of the human body.611 Other examples are also readily available, 
ranging from the wish to gain (and, especially, restrict others’ access to) 
knowledge for purpose of gaining power and influence to military adventurism 
at both the level of soldiers desiring to dominate ‘the enemy’ and officers 
wanting to dominate ‘the enemy’ and their own subordinates.612 At the very 
least, we can suggest that the vast majority of ‘successful’ figures in the 
Anglophone West embody at least one of Emmons and King’s dominance 
motivations, if only by virtue of the fact that, as we have repeatedly seen, 
these forms of motivation are required for one to excel in most activities 
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Anglophone Western culture recognises as significant. Indeed, as previously 
noted, (direct or indirect, symbolic) power over others is the cornerstone of  
the dominant culture’s definitions of ‘success’, which revolves around high 
social status, money and social influence.613 In this sense, dominating others 
is highly culturally rewarding: if one has power over others then one is 
perceived to be a ‘success’, to be an admirable, influential and inspirational 
figure (and with this, of course, comes further power and dominance).614  
 
Of course, such motivations are not always direct and conscious; that is, 
dominance motivations are not necessarily framed as a desire to control 
others and subjugate them to one’s own will. Even seemingly innocuous 
desires—aspiring to be more popular, knowledgeable or influential, for 
example—may ultimately function as domination. As Harold B. Barclay 
observes  
 
the significant feature of power is how it readily becomes a matter of 
domination [...] For instance, in my argument to convince another 
person I may resort to domination by asserting my assumed greater 
knowledge, social position, or more sophisticated ability to express 
myself. In such cases, I am consciously or unconsciously seeking to 
dominate.615   
 
Indeed, one might not even desire domination per se and still find it to be 
central to one’s motivation. For example, an individual may desire to gain a 
promotion so that they can work fewer hours and have more money to buy 
services that increase the time available to enjoy leisure activities. This is a 
commonplace enough desire, and the motivation appears to be premised on 
a wish for personal autonomy rather than the domination of others. However, 
the tasks that this person wishes to avoid doing in order to enjoy greater 
personal autonomy must be performed by others, be they workplace 
subordinates or service providers. In this manner, whilst the individual’s 
desire may be focused on personal autonomy, when this is filtered through 
Western hierarchical organisation and monetisation of everything from food 
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and water to leisure time and a place in which to exist upon the earth, it 
manifests as a dominance motivation. That is, the domination is indirect: it 
relies on the domination inherent to a socio-political system where if one 
does not devote a large proportion of one’s time to earning money then one 
does not have a place to live, food to eat and other necessities, and allows 
this to ‘force’ others to do undesirable tasks and provide more personal 
autonomy for those with greater power or dominance. In this sense, in the 
dominant culture, even a wish for ‘autonomy’ is frequently perceived to be 
reliant on having power over others and directly or indirectly compelling them 
to work for your benefit. Ani locates this as a component of Western 
individualist democratic organisation, arguing that, in the West, ‘[d]emocracy 
is envisioned as the system that guarantees the “freedom” of the individual to 
do what she must on behalf of her own self-interest, which in turn she 
interprets as the control of others’.616 In other words, the intense focus upon 
‘the individual’ in Anglophone Western culture combined with hierarchical 
organisation creates a climate in which it is widely understood that the only 
way to serve one’s own interests—even seemingly innocuous interests such 
as ‘freedom’ and ‘autonomy’—is at the expense of, and by dominating, 
others. This is exacerbated by the rhetoric of ceaseless competition that 
frequently accompanies Anglophone Western individualism in the form of 
platitudes such as ‘it’s a jungle out there’ or ‘it’s a dog eat dog world’ which 
suggest that to survive one must dominate or be dominated by others. This 
understanding helps to create a society in which it is ‘normal’ to seek to 
dominate others; indeed, as the allusions to life in the West being ‘a jungle’ 
implies, such competitive domination is frequently presented as being an 
aspect of ‘human nature’.617 However, as with many things I have discussed 
throughout these thesis, this supposedly ‘natural’ motivation is, in fact, the 
product of the dominant culture of the Anglophone West 
 
In a very significant sense, the Anglophone West embodies dominance 
motivation: it is ‘motivated’ by a ‘need’ to sustain and expand itself, to 
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maintain and increase its global power. Indeed, one of the most fundamental 
aspects of ‘civilisation’ generally is a desire to dominate non-human ‘nature’, 
to subordinate it to civilised humanity’s own ends.618 Similarly, both the 
contemporary Anglophone West’s presence in the world and the history its 
adopts by presenting itself as the progeny of early ‘Western’ civilisations are 
profoundly shaped by the domination of other cultures, from the Roman 
Empire to the colonisation of America to the neo-colonialism and ‘oil wars’ of 
today.619 Likewise, both its current formation and those found throughout its 
adopted line of succession are characterised by extreme levels of social 
control and hierarchical dominance, maintaining the internal power structures 
and extraction of wealth, resources, and labour that shape its internal 
organisation.620 The crucial point here is that it is no coincidence that the 
‘civilised’ Anglophone West engages in such practices: it requires these 
forms of dominance in order to exist and expand. Derrick Jensen observes 
that ‘[c]ivilization is not and can never be sustainable. This is especially true 
for industrial civilization’; he supports this point by noting that, by definition, 
‘civilisation’ involves human population densities that exceed the amount of 
resources available from the local landbase, meaning that ‘civilisation’ cannot 
support itself in a sustainable manner without routinely gaining resources 
from other areas.621 However, Jensen also notes that the communities living 
in these other areas ‘do not often voluntarily give up [...] the resources on 
which their communities are based until their communities have been 
destroyed’: that is, acquiring resources from external sources in the 
quantities needed to keep ‘civilisation’ functioning (let alone in the quantities 
needed to support its excesses and extremes) requires the subjugation, 
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exploitation, and often colonisation of other communities.622 As such, 
‘domination’ is integral to the ‘civilised’ Anglophone West, fuelling its 
continued functioning and constant expansion. Perhaps even more crucially, 
at least for the purposes of the current discussion, the Anglophone West 
needs individuals to enact this domination: ‘agents of civilisation’ who are 
motivated by and desire domination and, in acting on this desire, further the 
dominance of the Anglophone West.  
 
Although ‘military intervention’ (largely a ‘Newspeak’ translation of ‘imperialist 
invasion’) still contributes significantly to the extraction of the resources the 
Anglophone West ‘requires’ from the Majority World, it does so largely by 
removing political obstacles (such as uncooperative ‘regimes’) and ‘opening 
up’ foreign markets, whilst the actual extraction takes more insidious, neo-
colonial forms.623 Central to such forms (with or without military assistance) 
are the actions of West-centric institutions like the IMF and the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), who pressure Majority World governments into 
accepting SAPs that make their countries more ‘open’ to profiteering by 
Western corporations.624 Accordingly, the institutions of the Anglophone West 
are ultimately reliant on individuals whose dominance motivations tally with 
their own to staff and direct such institutions (as well as serve in corporations, 
militaries and so forth). In short, without such figures, the Anglophone West 
would not be able to maintain its primary function of sustaining and extending 
its own power.  
 
This is not to say that these individuals have a personal desire to dominate 
the Majority World, but simply that their own desire for dominance within the 
internal hierarchies of their organisations  and—through wealth, power and 
influence—in society more broadly corresponds to the aims of the 
Anglophone West. Importantly, the reason they have such desires and 
motivations is because they are  normatively socialised and so, as discussed 
above, understand dominance to be culturally rewarding, the measure of 
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success. As the above analysis has begun to demonstrate, domination has 
this cultural ‘meaning’ because it is of central importance to the dominant 
culture of the Anglophone West. That is, the discourses of civilisation place 
value on domination and so also assign value to those who enact such 
domination, which in turn becomes culturally recognised as a valued and 
rewarded ‘characteristic’ and is replicated and reproduced through normative 
socialisation. Moreover, the Anglophone West’s need for dominance-
motivated individuals is by no means limited to its ‘leading figures’: it needs 
all or most of its subjects to keep seeking dominance, whether that takes the 
form of dominance-driven soldiers enabling civilised expansionism or workers 
seeking promotions and extra money and so maintaining the capitalist status 
quo and economic circulation or many other forms of dominance. Likewise, it 
needs individuals who have the psychological capacity to follow up on this 
desire for dominance—enabled by self-interest, lack of inhibitory empathy 
and a sense of entitlement—because simply wishing to dominate is of little 
real use to the dominant culture. Accordingly, as we have seen, the 
psychological capacity to dominate and abuse others also becomes part of 
the Anglophone West’s normative socialisation patterns. This means that the 
dominant culture socialises individuals (and particularly men, a point I will 
return to presently) to develop both the psychological capacity and the 
motivation to dominate others. In a society that also routinely objectifies 
women, reducing them to dehumanised rapable bodies, this lays a significant 
foundation for widespread presence of rapist mentalities; indeed, it arguably 
makes the Anglophone West’s rape culture an all but inevitable component of 
the dominant culture. To rework Sanday’s statement yet again, we can note 
that where ‘domination is a way of life, domination frequently achieves sexual 
expression in the form of rape’, that where it is ‘normal’, ‘acceptable’ and 
highly rewarding to dominate others, this prevailing understanding will be 
manifest in numerous forms of ideology and behaviour, including sexual 
violence.625 The fact that these traits are culturally valued and culturally 
coded as ‘masculine’ does not necessarily imply a causal relationship 
brought about by the patriarchal dominance of society; rather, whilst 
patriarchal social organisation is central to associating these valued traits 
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with masculinity, and helps to perpetuate this value in doing so, the actual 
roots of this value lie in the fact that characteristics such as dominance serve 
the Anglophone West. 
 
In societies with different priorities, different modes of living that do not 
revolve around power, exploitation and abuse, traits such as a capacity and 
desire for dominating others are not valued. As Fromm notes: 
 
The primitive band society and probably prehistoric hunters since 
about fifty thousand years ago were fundamentally different from 
civilized societies precisely because human relations were not 
governed by the principles of control and power; their functioning 
depended on mutuality. An individual endowed with the passion for 
control would have been a social failure and without influence.626 
 
Whilst Fromm’s statement is perhaps a little sweeping and generalising, the 
central point is still significant: in a society that does not value domination, 
the capacity and desire to dominate others is not be culturally valued, and 
individuals with these characteristics are not respected, celebrated or 
rewarded. In such a society, those with dominator mentalities, those with 
rapist mentalities, would truly be aberrant and deviant, their desires and 
behaviours marking them as dangerously antisocial. In contrast, for cultures 
such as the Anglophone West these traits are ‘normal’: interpersonal 
manifestations of a cultural drive to dominate, exploit, conquer and abuse. As 
the previous chapter demonstrated, rape survivors are not only survivors of 
patriarchal gender violence but of the dominant culture itself, ‘collateral 
damage’ in a culture that views the world as composed of consumable 
objects and rapable bodies. The same also applies to rapists: men who 
commit rape are not only enacting patterns of normatively socialised 
masculine violence but also one of the core behaviours of the ‘civilised’ 
Anglophone West, playing out the cultural logic of domination through their 
own desires and motivations. Challenging the patriarchal organisation of 
society, prevailing patterns of masculine socialisation and dominant models 
of heterosex are, of course, all central to undermining the Anglophone West’s 
rape culture and reducing the number of men who are psychologically 
capable of and motivated to commit sexual violence. However, this struggle 
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cannot be treated as an isolated issue, unrelated to the dominant culture at 
large; to be truly effective, it must be located in the context of wider patterns 
of exploitation and abuse, of a culture that values, rewards and relies upon 
domination and those who pursue it. Only by seeing the capacity and desire 
to rape as deeply rooted in the ideologies and practices of the dominant 
culture can we understand the true extent of their cultural foundations, and 
only by doing this can we halt the social production of rapist mentalities and, 
ultimately, destabilise the rape culture of the Anglophone West. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
On October 12th 1492, Christopher Columbus and a party of fellow 
Europeans arrived at an unknown island far from their homes and far from 
their intended destination of South Asia. In truth, Columbus was not the first 
Westerner to reach this land—Nordic and Celtic sailors had sailed to the 
continent centuries earlier—although he is the most celebrated and, in many 
respects, the most significant.627 Nor was this truly a ‘New World’ waiting to 
be ‘discovered’: when Columbus and his men came ashore, they were met 
by those who already inhabited the island, a people whose manner and 
behaviour, whose whole way of life, were starkly different to those of the 
visiting Europeans. Columbus described these people, the Arawaks of the 
Bahamas, as remarkably hospitable and generous, rarely disposed to conflict 
and with no apparent greed or covetousness; their societies were marked by 
relatively egalitarian cooperation, as opposed to the violently maintained 
hierarchies of Europe, and their gender relations were characterised by 
equality and by sexual and reproductive freedom.628 Faced with a people 
who offered no violence, who did not know swords and ‘cut themselves out of 
ignorance’ upon seeing them for the first time, a people who were gladly 
willing to share and trade freely with the Europeans, Columbus concluded 
that the Arawak ‘would make fine servants [...] With fifty men we could 
subjugate them all and make them do whatever we want’.629 Whilst this 
response might appear deplorable and disgusting to modern readers, it is 
important to realise that Columbus’ perspective was far from aberrant,in the 
context of fifteenth-century Europe. As Jack D. Forbes argues, ‘Columbus 
stands as a clear example of [...] a killer and a cannibal, a user and abuser of 
his fellow human beings. But, of course, Columbus was not unique, nor was 
he alone’.630 Rather, Columbus was acting within the bounds of accepted 
behaviour in a culture that routinely justified and celebrated the abuse, 
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exploitation and murder of those it deemed inferior and disposable.  Indeed, 
as Forbes continues, ‘the “heroes” of European historiography, the heroes of 
the history textbooks, are usually imperialists, butchers, founders of 
authoritarian regimes, exploiters of the poor, liars, cheats and torturers’.631 In 
his perception of the Arawak people as commodities and objects to be 
enslaved, traded and slaughtered at will, Columbus—like not only the 
‘heroes’ of Western history but a great many ‘normal’ Westerners too—is 
expressing modes of perception and relation which are grounded in the twin 
beliefs that some lives are worth less than others and so may be consumed 
without regret or recourse, and that the domination of others is a great 
achievement, bestowing honour and ‘success’ upon the dominator.  
 
In the days, months and years following this initial ‘contact’, the twin beliefs 
that it is acceptable to objectify and consume others and that conquest and 
subjugation are laudable and rewarding produced numerous atrocities: 
children cut open to test the sharpness of blades, babies killed and used as 
roadside markers, individuals used to feed Spanish hunting dogs or simply 
decapitated for the amusement of soldiers, to name only a few examples in a 
campaign that wiped out half of the 250,000 indigenous inhabitants in only 
two years.632 It is perhaps of no surprise that, amongst these violent 
expressions of ‘civilised’ Western culture, we can also find the routine rape of 
Arawak women. Michelle de Cuneo, a personal friend of Columbus who 
joined him on his second voyage to the Americas, provides the first record of 
such sexual violence:  
 
I captured a very beautiful Carib woman [...] with whom [...] I 
conceived desire to take pleasure. I wanted to put my desire into 
execution but she did not want it and treated me with her finger nails 
in such a manner that I wished I had never begun [...] I took a rope 
and thrashed her well, for which she raised such unheard screams 
that you would not have believed your ears. Finally we came to an 
agreement in such manner that I can tell you she seemed to have 
been brought up in a school of harlots.633 
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De Cuneo’s rape—and the innumerable other cases that occurred—is a 
manifestation of the cultural understandings that shape the colonisers’ 
actions more generally: the normalising of objectification and the celebration 
of domination. Of course, it is also a specifically gendered act that expressed 
a specific set of  gender politics; after all, European society at the time was, 
as Andrea Smith notes, structured by a ‘thoroughly misogynistic [...] Christian 
patriarchy [...] [which] was inherently violent’.634 However, both these gender 
politics and the rampant sexual violence of the invading Europeans were also 
part of a wider pattern and a manifestation of a prevailing understanding that 
some lives are worth less than others and so may be legitimately consumed 
and that domination is a mark of triumph and success. Without these 
underlying beliefs, there would have been no foundation from which to 
reduce the Arawak women to ‘rapable bodies’, nor from which to consider 
their domination through sexual violence to be ‘rewarding’ or, indeed, 
anything but a grotesque and reprehensible violation. 
 
Of course, the response to these matters most favoured by apologists for 
Western civilisation is that these acts—the rapes, the mutilations, the 
genocide and colonisation more generally—were the product of a supposedly 
more violent age which the contemporary Anglophone West has  outgrown 
and ‘progressed’ beyond.635 As reassuring as many may find this notion, it is 
far from the truth: the contemporary dominant culture of the Anglophone 
West is also characterised by routine exploitation, murder, colonisation and 
abuse, and it is  marked by extremely high levels of sexual violence.636 
Moreover, like fifteenth-century Europe before it, the contemporary 
Anglophone West is profoundly shaped by the understandings that some 
lives are worth less than others and so may be consumed with impunity and 
that dominating others is a laudable act that bestows honour and worth upon 
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the dominator. As I have argued throughout this thesis, it is this that 
underpins the exploitation, abuse and violence that structure the 
contemporary dominant culture, and it is this, ultimately that provides the 
crucial foundation for the Anglophone West’s rape culture.  
 
Dominant Culture as Rape Culture: The Case against the ‘Civilised’ 
Anglophone West  
 
It is perhaps useful at this stage to reiterate the arguments presented in the 
preceding chapters, to clarify the argument that the Anglophone West’s rape 
culture is a deeply-rooted, inevitable and arguably inherent aspect of the 
dominant culture of the Anglophone West itself before going on to question 
how this might relate to future anti-rape scholarship and activism. A key 
foundation of this position is the refutation of the long-standing association of 
rape with ‘savagery’ (and the consequent disassociation of sexual violence 
and civilisation). In the first chapter we saw how this understanding exerts a 
pronounced influence on how rape is conceived of both in the dominant 
culture at large and in many feminist analyses. Perhaps the most 
immediately apparent examples of this can be found in the assumption that 
sexual violence is a far bigger problem in non-Western, supposedly more 
‘primitive’ cultures. This perception is based on an implicit understanding of 
the West as a superior, ‘progressive’ society; as Christine Helliwell notes, 
‘[b]ecause the practice is widespread in “civilised” Western countries, it is 
assumed to pervade all other societies as well, since these latter are 
understood as located closer to the savagery end of the evolutionary 
ladder.637 The implicit conjecture here is that rape is an ‘uncivilised’ practice, 
entirely at odds with the ideologies, ethics and practices of the ‘civilised’ 
West. This same conjecture, in a variant form, also pervades many feminist 
and non-feminist treatments of prehistory, a clear demonstration of which can 
be found in Susan Brownmiller’s assumption that, because rape is rife in the 
contemporary West, it must necessarily have been at least as widespread in 
the ‘the violent landscape inhabited by primitive woman and man’.638 As in 
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the treatment of non-Western cultures, the underlying understanding of rape 
here is again that it is something ‘savage’ and ‘natural’, something 
‘uncivilised’ that a culture progresses past by becoming more civilised. These 
same basic understandings also routinely appear in the treatment of rape 
within the contemporary Anglophone West. Often this takes the form of an 
assumed tension between a man’s apparent ‘civilised’ erudition and 
refinement and his use of sexual violence (the apparent surprise that a 
sophisticated and successful man like Strauss-Kahn could commit rape being 
a case in point).639 In other cases, these ideas manifest in racist and classist 
stereotyping of men of colour and poor men which assume firstly that men in 
these ‘groups’ are more prone to rape, secondly that they are inherently less 
civilised or less successfully inculcated into the dominant culture and finally 
that this is the cause of their alleged predisposition to sexual violence. Such 
arguments suggest that there are ‘subcultures of violence’—‘savage’ cultural 
enclaves outside the civilising influence of the dominant culture—in which 
poor men and men of colour continue to enact their ‘natural’ instincts for rape 
because they have not been socialised to do otherwise by the supposedly 
rape-opposed dominant culture of the Anglophone West.640  
 
Although they are concerned with different contexts, each of the above 
examples makes the same basic arguments: that rape is a ‘savage’ drive 
rooted either in ‘human nature’ or in violent habits developed in more 
‘primitive’ times and places, and that to end sexual violence requires 
‘advancing’ away from ‘nature’ and ‘savagery’ by becoming more ‘civilised’. 
None of these arguments, however, actually have any reasonable grounding. 
For example, despite the attention paid to—and accusations levelled at—
non-Western countries, the ‘civilised’ Anglophone West has some of the 
highest rates of rape incidence in the world, certainly remarkably higher than 
many supposedly ‘primitive’ cultures.641 Similarly, whilst we cannot claim that 
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rape was not as common in prehistory as it is in the contemporary 
Anglophone West, there is also simply no evidence to support the suggestion 
that it was: Brownmiller and others’ arguments are composed entirely of 
supposition, the projection of contemporary Western understandings onto 
entirely unrelated cultures and the prejudiced assumption that ‘civilised’ 
Western culture is the most egalitarian and peaceful form of social 
organisation. The theories underpinning the notion of ‘subcultures of 
violence’ are similarly unfounded in that they are premised on the groundless 
belief that violence, including sexual violence, is somehow at odds with the 
ideologies and practices of the dominant culture, meaning that rape must be 
‘learned’ in a subcultural setting. Accordingly, as soon as one explores the 
fact that the dominant culture is, in fact, rife with—and, indeed, founded on 
and structured, organised and maintained by—violence, exploitation, abuse 
and oppression, the argument that rape is solely the product of subcultural 
socialisation is shown to be untenable. In this manner, the first chapter 
worked to discredit arguments that rape is simply a ‘natural’ or ‘savage’ 
instinct that the dominant culture of the Anglophone West struggles to 
contain and control. This opened up the possibility, introduced at the end of 
the chapter and explored in more detail throughout the rest of the thesis, that 
not only do the ideologies, philosophies, practices and ethics of the dominant 
culture fail to prevent rape, they may actually be central to the widespread 
use of sexual violence throughout the the Anglophone West.  
 
The second chapter was concerned with one half of the above argument: the 
normalising of objectification in Western culture and the ways in which this 
supports the Anglophone West’s rape culture. Central to this discussion is 
the argument that the civilised West has an underlying philosophy of 
objectification. Drawing on Forbes’ concept of the ‘cannibal psychosis’ of the 
civilised—the belief in the acceptability of ‘consuming [...] another’s life for 
one’s own private purpose or profit’—this argument suggests that there is a 
foundational acceptance of objectifying and using others that is deeply rooted 
in Western culture and which underpins all oppression and exploitation in the 
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dominant culture of the Anglophone West.642 Of course, in its many 
manifestations throughout  the dominant culture, objectification operates on 
vastly different scales and draws on different forms of ‘justification’ and 
different supporting traditions, systems and structures. However, as I have 
argued, underpinning all cases is the basic belief that some lives are worth 
less than others and so may be legitimately consumed by those who are 
more powerful and privileged. Without the core belief that it can ever be 
acceptable to use others as objects, specific forms of objectification and 
consumption would have no ideological base. Again, the actual ‘justifications’ 
for such practices take different forms but they are each founded on the 
same core belief that objectification is, in at least some cases, ‘normal’ and 
‘justifiable’. In the same manner, it is this underlying philosophy of 
objectification that underpins the Anglophone West’s rape culture for, without 
the core belief that objectifying and consuming others is acceptable, there is 
no foundation for sexual objectification and ‘consumption’ through rape.  
 
The above point is well demonstrated by contrasting the Anglophone West 
with other cultures. Peggy Reeves Sanday’s study ‘The Socio-Cultural 
Context of Rape’ is perhaps the most ambitious investigation of this issue 
and it provides us with a crucial point: that, by and large, cultures with low 
incidence of sexual violence share common characteristics that differ from 
those shared by cultures with a high incidence of sexual violence.643 
Unsurprisingly, a culture’s gender relations are a key determinate of both 
rape incidence and associated cultural attitudes but, significantly, the 
correlations and trends revealed by the survey also extend beyond this.644 In 
particular, Sanday highlights a prominent relationship between violence in a 
general sense and sexual violence specifically, noting that ‘where 
interpersonal violence is a way of life, violence frequently achieves sexual 
expression’.645 In demonstrating this, Sanday presents rape as related to, 
and an expression of, cultural attitudes at large, rather than only those 
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relating directly to gender and sexuality, locating it within the broad matrix of 
culturally prescribed practices. Sanday’s findings also go beyond this to 
highlight further correlations such as the fact that cultures with low levels of 
rape incidence also have low levels of hierarchical social organisation or 
exploitative attitudes towards non-human nature.646  In this manner, it 
becomes readily apparent that in cultures where objectification in a general 
sense is rarely practiced, sexual violence rarely occurs, whereas, to modify 
Sanday’s previous statement, ‘where objectification is a way of life, 
objectification frequently achieves sexual expression in the form of rape’. The 
traditional cultural values found in many American Indian nations reinforce 
this point. As Forbes notes, the cultures of Native North America are 
characterised by a general lack of objectification stemming from a belief in 
‘the sacredness, beauty, power and relatedness of all forms of existence’.647 
This lack of generalised objectification correlates directly with the fact that, 
whilst, as Smith notes, ‘gender violence occurred prior to colonization’, it was 
rare and culturally unacceptable (certainly compared to the contemporary 
Anglophone West).648 Of course, a significant aspect of this can be explained 
by the generally egalitarian gender organisation of Native North America but 
this too is part of a wider pattern of cultural values that abhor the 
objectification and consumption of others. Indeed, as Forbes notes, ‘[t]he 
rape of a woman, the rape of a land, and the rape of a people, they are all 
the same. And they are the same as the rape of the earth, the rape of the 
rivers, the rape of the forest, the rape of the air, the rape of the animals.’649 
Each of these forms of ‘rape’ is premised on the same foundational belief in 
the acceptability of objectifying and consuming others; accordingly, without 
the foundation that normalises such objectification and consumption, sexual 
violence is rare, as in Native North America, whereas inthe Anglophone 
West, where this foundation is provided by the underlying philosophy of 
objectification, rape is commonplace, normalised and often legitimised.  
 
Importantly, this is more than a conceptual connection: many of the forms of 
objectification discussed previously not only share common roots in the 
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West’s underlying philosophy of objectification but also intersect with sexual 
objectification and contribute directly to the Anglophone West’s rape problem. 
That is to say, it is not only sexual objectification that marks women as 
culturally rapable; rather, as Thomas Macaulay Millar observes, ‘racism, 
classism, and the prison-industrial complex, as just a few examples, create 
circumstances under which some women can be and are raped with 
impunity’.650 Indeed, the intersection of many such systems of oppression 
produces some of the most virulent forms of objectification, marking 
marginalised women as especially consumable. Sexual violence against 
women of colour provides a particularly clear demonstration of this. Kimberlé 
Williams Crenshaw notes that ‘the intersection of racism and sexism factors 
into Black women’s lives in ways that cannot be captured wholly by looking at 
the race or gender dimensions of those experiences separately.’651 That is to 
say, women of colour are not only the targets of white-supremacist 
oppression that presents people of colour as subhuman and ‘savage’, nor 
only of misogynistic sexual objectification that marks women as rapable, but 
of a distinct intersectional form of oppression that combines and, in many 
respects, goes beyond both. This is highly significant to the issue of sexual 
violence for, in this context, as Patricia Hill Collins asserts ‘[r]ace becomes 
the distinguishing feature in determining the type of objectification women will 
encounter. Whiteness as symbolic of both civilization and culture is used to 
separate objects from animals’.652 In other words, the intersectional 
oppression of women of colour not only objectifies but often entirely 
dehumanises them; this, in turn, marks women of colour not only as rapable 
but, in a sense, as ‘unrapable’ because, as Karen Michelle Bowdre 
(summarising bell hooks) observes, in the dominant culture ‘animals cannot 
be raped, hence, Black women [can] not be raped’.653 Moreover, it is not only 
in the sense of not qualifying for ‘human’ rights that women of colour are 
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marked as rapable/unrapable. The same ‘animalising’ stereotyping presents 
women of colour as being inherently promiscuous, as having ‘bestial’ sexual 
urges. This alleged animalistic ‘hypersexuality’ means that, in the dominant 
culture, women of colour are understood to be always consenting to any 
sexual contact in any context and so to be effectively ‘unrapable’ in the sense 
that no sexual contact can be classed as rape because ‘consent’ is believed 
to be automatically given.    
 
Similar intersectional oppression characterises the experiences of other 
marginalised women too and also serves to mark them as culturally rapable 
(often by presenting them as inherently unrapable). Women who have 
immigrated to the Anglophone West, for example, are routinely objectified 
and treated as not having the right to bodily integrity supposedly given to 
non-immigrant women by virtue of their ‘citizenship’. Likewise, sex workers 
are, almost by definition, seen as ‘always consenting’ as well as being 
treated as though they have forfeited their right to give or refuse consent 
because of their profession and as though they are so ‘tainted’ and ‘impure’ 
that they too are dehumanised (and so have no ‘human right’ to bodily 
integrity). Variations of these forms of objectification also characterise the 
experiences of other marginalised women such as queer women, trans 
women (and trans men) and disabled women, many of whom are subject to 
forms of intersectional objectification that marks them as culturally rapable. In 
this manner, objectification can be seen as frequently taking complex 
intersectional forms that need to be challenged not in isolation but as a 
complex, multifaceted whole. 
 
The Anglophone West’s rape culture, then, not only has an ideological 
foundation in the West’s underlying philosophy of objectification, but is also 
shaped and structured by multiple, intersectional forms of oppression and 
objectification, each with its roots in the underlying philosophy. Crucially, 
however, these forms of objectification—and, indeed, the underlying 
philosophy of objectification itself—are not incidental: they are central 
aspects of Western culture and play a vital role in enabling the Anglophone 
West to maintain and extend itself. Because, as has been noted at several 
points in the thesis, the ‘civilised’ Anglophone West is unsustainable (not to 
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mention extremely avaricious), it is always reliant on taking from others both 
within and outside its borders; it requires the exploitation of other countries 
and cultures (especially those in the Majority World) and of marginalised 
communities within its own borders to fuel its constant consumption and 
constant expansion. In other words, the Anglophone West is reliant on 
objectification: without the notion that it is acceptable to consume others it 
could not have the resources, expendable labourers, exploitable communities 
and conquerable, colonisable lands that it requires. Accordingly, the 
foundations—and many of the structures—of the Anglophone West’s rape 
culture are actually highly significant to the ways in which the dominant 
culture operates. Whilst we cannot state conclusively that this means that the 
rape culture is inherent to the Anglophone West, it does raise the point that it 
is an inevitable expression of philosophies and ideologies that are currently 
integral to the dominant culture and which cannot be neatly removed from it 
without significant and widespread social change.  
 
The final chapter reinforced this argument by exploring how the structures, 
systems, philosophies and ideologies of the dominant culture not only 
inevitably mark women as rapable but also inevitably produce men who are 
motivated to commit, and capable of committing, rape. This argument 
involved refuting two myths that shape popular and specialist understandings 
of rapists: that rape is a ‘natural’ instinct and that rapists are aberrant or 
deviant. Initially, this was focused on the psychological capacity to commit 
rape, one half of a ‘rapist mentality’. Contrary to prevailing assumptions, 
abusing other humans is not a ‘natural’ human ability; rather, as David 
Livingstone Smith notes, to abuse others, individuals must ‘overcome the 
very deep and natural inhibitions’ in order to so.654 This is well demonstrated 
by studying figures such as soldiers, torturers or concentration camp guards 
because the individuals taking these roles do not have an innate 
psychological capacity to abuse others but rather have to undergo significant 
periods of training and conditioning to overcome their inhibitions against 
inflicting suffering. Of course, central to this is the task of dehumanising the 
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target of the abuse—through propaganda, changes of appearance, 
derogatory language and so forth—but there is there is also much that must 
change within the psychology of the individual. A clear example of this is the 
Nazi Party’s great difficulty in finding ways to avoid ‘the animal pity’ that 
affected concentration camp guards ‘in the presence of physical suffering’: 
even with the extensive dehumanisation (indeed, ‘verminisation’) inflicted 
upon Jews and other Holocaust victims, concentration camp guards still had 
to develop the psychological capacity to abuse and murder others.655 This 
same point is applicable to the psychological capacity to rape: it is not an 
innate male ability but rather something that a rapist develops or ‘learns’. As 
in the above examples, this is partly achieved through the cultural 
presentation of women as rapable discussed in the second chapter but, also 
like the previous examples, it also requires that rapists develop particular 
modes of thought and relation: the rape-enabling component of a rapist 
mentality. 
 
Drawing on Zygmunt Bauman’s analysis of concentration camp guards, I 
proposed that there are three core elements that must characterise a rapist’s 
modes of thought and relationality at least for the duration of the assault: self-
interest, a lack of inhibitory empathy and a sense of entitlement. In 
conjunction with the objectification of women, these components make 
sexual violence personally acceptable to a rapist, if only for the duration of 
the rape itself (although such modes of thinking often extend before and after 
also). Unlike in the previous examples, where the capacity to abuse others is 
learned through specific, institutional training, these components are the 
product of broader patterns of socialisation into normative models of 
masculinity. That is to say, they are the ‘normal’ modes of thought and 
relation that ‘properly’ socialised men are expected, and conditioned, to have 
with regard to women. Under Anglophone Western patriarchy, ‘real men’ are 
expected to consider their own wants and needs above those of women 
(and, indeed, are routinely ridiculed and emasculated for not doing so), are 
taught not to register or be inhibited by ‘feminine’ emotions such as empathy, 
and are routinely told, in numerous ways, that they are entitled to use women 
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however and whenever they wish. Importantly, however, such conditioning 
extends beyond masculine socialisation, for these are characteristics that are 
highly valued by and highly normative within the dominant culture at large. In 
other words, the three psychological characteristics that enable a rapist to 
commit rape are not only far from aberrant but are actually necessary 
components of interacting successfully within the dominant culture of the 
Anglophone West. As explored in the second chapter, great power disparities 
and the normalised consumption of others are a central aspect of both life in 
the West and the West’s relationship with the Majority World. Accordingly, to 
participate in the dominant culture in a normative manner requires accepting 
this abusive and exploitative dynamic as a way of life. This, ultimately, 
requires that one values one’s own interests above those of others, is not 
inhibited in carrying out ‘normal’ activities by the damage they cause to 
others, and considers oneself entitled to the luxuries of (most) Western 
lifestyles despite the fact that they come at a significant cost to other less 
privileged individuals in and outside the West, including non-human nature. 
In this manner, just as the underlying philosophy of objectification provides a 
foundation for the objectification of women which ‘justifies’ rape, so too does 
this core conditioning provide a foundation for the development of rape-
enabling modes of thought and relation. 
 
This same point is also applicable to the reasons why rapists commit sexual 
violence; like the psychological capacity, the desire or motivation to rape is 
widely presented both as ‘natural’ and as aberrant. However, also like the 
psychological capacity, it is in reality neither of these but rather is a socialised 
desire that is extremely common throughout the Anglophone West. The fact 
that sexual violence incidence rates vary so much between cultures provides 
a clear indication that the desire to rape is not ‘natural’ or an innate ‘male’ 
instinct: in simplest terms, if this were the case then rape would occur at 
universally high levels. Likewise, the simple fact that rape incidence in the 
Anglophone West is extremely high indicates that the desire to rape cannot 
be considered aberrant because rape is so widely committed. Going beyond 
this, however, we can also note that, again like the psychological capacity, 
the desire to rape is, in many respects, an aspect of normative masculine 
identity (particularly in relation to dominant understandings of 
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heterosexuality). Key to this is the fact that, on some level, all sexual violence 
motivation revolves around power and domination. However, contrary to 
influential arguments pioneered by Brownmiller and Susan Griffin, the form of 
domination in question here is not the collective domination of ‘all women’ by 
‘all men’ (which may be said to be a result of, but not a motivating factor for, 
the actions of Western rapists) but rather individual rapists seeking to both 
‘prove’ and gratify themselves by dominating rape survivors. Of course, this 
manifests in different forms—from a conscious desire to overpower and 
torture the survivor to an almost subconscious understanding of ‘sex’ as a 
form of conquest or victory that men must ‘acquire’ from reluctant women—
but it remains at the core of all rape motivation. Significantly, this desire for 
domination is itself neither ‘natural’ nor aberrant; it is something that is 
learned through highly normative patterns of socialisation. Certainly, ‘power’ 
is central to contemporary understandings of masculinity to the extent that, 
as Michael S. Kimmel observes, ‘the hegemonic definition of manhood is a 
man in power, a man with power, and a man of power.’656 A ‘real man’, this 
belief suggests, should be able to dominate everything around and in him: his 
emotions, his corporeal weaknesses, his surroundings, his ‘destiny’, the 
‘natural world’, other men and, of course, women. Considered in light of this, 
sexual violence is, as Diana E. H. Russell notes, ‘not so much a deviant act 
as an over-conforming one [...] It is an extreme acting-out of qualities that are 
regarded as masculine in this and many other societies’.657 Likewise, 
domination is a common aspect of many normative heterosexual practices: 
understandings of ‘male’ and ‘female’ sexuality and normative heterosex 
scripts routinely frame intercourse as a process through which an assertive 
male initiator overcomes the obstacles put forth by a reluctant, passive 
female and so achieves a ‘conquest’ over her presumed inhibitions and 
displeasure at sex and, ultimately, over ‘her’. In this sense, then, rape can 
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also be seen as over-conforming to normative heterosex practices or, as 
Lucy Gilbert and Paula Webster phrase it, extending ‘traditional heterosexual 
exchanges, in which masculine pursuit and female reticence are familiar and 
formalized’.658 Accordingly, we find that the desire to dominate and commit 
rape, far from being aberrant, is an expression and inevitable result of 
prevailing understandings of gender and (hetero)sexuality. 
 
Again, however, such dominance motivations are not limited to masculine 
socialisation and heterosex scripts: they are the key driving forces behind  
the dominant culture. As discussed above in relation to objectification, the 
Anglophone West is reliant on extracting resources, land, labour and wealth 
of various kinds from other cultures and landbases and from marginalised 
groups within its own borders. Because individuals are reluctant to give up 
the land on which they live or the resources on which they rely or to 
surrender their time, energy and, effectively, their lives for another’s profit 
(especially at the rate and in the quantities that the dominant culture 
requires), the Anglophone West is reliant on theft and force, conquering and 
dominating others to get the things it wants or needs. Accordingly, the 
dominant culture places a high value on both the psychological capacity and 
the desire to dominate others because the West’s way of life requires agents 
to manifest these dominance motivations in order to secure the resources 
and so forth that it requires. This valuing of dominance influences notions of 
worth and ‘success’ within the dominant culture, helping to shape normative 
socialisation by holding the powerful, the dominating and oppressive as 
cultural exemplars and rewarding competitive, self-serving, aggressive and 
power-orientated ideologies and practices. When this dominance motivation 
intersects with the Anglophone West’s patriarchal social organisation it 
produces understandings of masculinity that stress dominance and power as 
key ‘manly’ attributes, reinforces the understanding that one must dominate 
others in order to be ‘successful’ and contributes to the devaluing and 
objectification of women. In this manner, sexual violence can be seen not 
only as an expression of Anglophone Western gender politics but also as an 
inevitable manifestation of a culture that is driven by a need to dominate and 
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consume and which teaches individuals, and especially men, that the ability 
and desire to dominate others are not only acceptable but highly laudable 
and rewarding. As with the social production of rapable bodies, it is not 
possible to irrefutably claim that this makes the social production of rapist 
mentalities an inherent aspect of the Anglophone West; however, it does 
raise the issue that current configurations of the dominant culture are 
intimately entwined with the ideological foundations of sexual violence. This, 
in turn, reinforces the arguments that the Anglophone West’s rape culture is 
an inevitable expression of the way in which the dominant culture functions 
and operates, and that truly challenging sexual violence ultimately requires 
addressing not only gender organisation but broader issues of social justice 
and social change too. Without addressing the underlying belief that 
objectifying, dominating and consuming others is acceptable, necessary and 
laudable, the struggle to end sexual violence will always be undermined by it 
as it continues to reinforce patriarchal gender organisation and multiple 
intersecting systems of oppression, condition men to abuse and dominate 
others, and structure the dominant culture of the Anglophone West around 
the same core structures and ideologies that underpin rape.  
 
 
A Holistic Analysis of the Anglophone West’s Rape Culture: Conclusions and 
Implications 
 
The arguments summarised above and developed in detail throughout the 
thesis build upon a foundation of feminist analysis of sexual violence. They 
accept as a central tenet that rape is a gendered act that is deeply entwined 
in the patriarchal and misogynistic structures and systems that shape 
Anglophone Western culture. Likewise, they are in agreement with 
arguments that gender organisation in the Anglophone West must be 
radically altered if the incidence of sexual violence is to be reduced, let alone 
stopped altogether. In particular, they build upon intersectional forms of 
feminist analysis which relate the subjugation of women to other systems of 
oppression. Arising originally in the works of marginalised feminists—those 
for whom intersectionality is a lived experience—this approach is increasingly 
shaping feminist analysis more generally, as marginalised feminists gain 
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wider recognition and as other feminists recognise and challenge their own 
privileges. The significance of this approach is that it recognises that sexual 
violence—and the oppression of women more broadly—cannot be 
adequately addressed solely in terms of gender and sexuality: sexual 
oppression intersects with other systems of oppression in a manner which 
not only contributes to the rape of marginalised women but also influences 
the whole shape and makeup of the Anglophone West’s rape culture. To 
focus solely on gender issues, then, is to deny the privileges held by many 
Western feminists, to ignore the experiences and voices of marginalised 
women and, in some respects most importantly, to fail to engage with the 
ways in which rape relates to broader aspects of the dominant culture. This 
thesis both draws upon and contributes to this approach, incorporating key 
arguments, as well as adding further support and demonstrations. However, 
it also moves beyond this approach to consider an even wider perspective on 
sexual violence, and it is in this that the thesis makes its most significant 
contributions to the field and, potentially, to anti-rape activism.   
  
The critical position employed in this thesis departs from the intersectional 
approach discussed above in two principal ways. Firstly, it not only examines 
those issues that relate to sexual violence on an immediate, direct level (such 
as the ways gender oppression intersects with other systems of oppression 
to make marginalised women rapable), but also explores the shared 
foundations and cultural roots of these systems, and relates them to wider 
trends within the dominant culture. Extending from this, the second key 
departure is that this thesis treats all of these issues—the direct and the 
indirect—holistically, as existing within an overarching cultural framework; 
that is, it does not limit its analysis to relationships between sexual violence 
and aspects of the dominant culture but also examines those between sexual 
violence and the dominant culture itself. This represents a significant 
departure from existing studies, expanding the field of enquiry to engage 
critically with, and chart connections and relationships between, a much 
broader range of ideologies, philosophies, systems, structures, ethical codes 
and prescribed practices. In other words, many theorists explore how aspects 
of the dominant culture shape the role of rape in specific contexts or against 
specific groups—for example, the use of rape as a tool of colonialism or the 
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role institutionalised racism plays in sexual violence against women of colour; 
however, they do not use such analysis to explore how this shapes the 
Anglophone West’s rape culture as a whole, nor to explore how deeply 
rooted that rape culture is in the dominant culture. bell hooks comes closest 
to this position in her suggestion, cited in full earlier, that root cause of men’s 
violence against women is ‘the Western philosophical notion of hierarchical 
rule and coercive authority’. 
659 
   
However, this observation, although highly perceptive and highly significant, 
remains a largely isolated statement with very little supporting analysis of 
deeper exploration. In a sense, then, the arguments in this thesis seek to 
support and provide evidence for hooks’s position, but they also push beyond 
it, expanding it to consider not only hierarchy and coercion, but other central 
foundations of  Anglophone Western culture. As well as bringing together 
different branches of feminist analysis, this task required setting feminist 
theories in dialogue with wider social criticism and, particularly, with studies 
that seek to critique Western culture in a broad, all-encompassing manner.  
 
In many respects, these wider social critiques are as crucial to the critical 
position taken in this thesis as feminist analyses of sexual violence. This is 
particularly true of those studies that have a highly holistic approach to 
understanding Western culture, such as Forbes’ Columbus and Other 
Cannibals, Marimba Ani’s Yurugu and the works of Derrick Jensen. These 
texts all provide greater levels of intersectional analysis, covering a wider 
range of issues than the feminist analysis discussed previously; specifically, 
they treat Western culture (under names such as ‘European culture’ and 
‘Western civilisation’) as a network of abusive ideologies, philosophies, moral 
systems and behavioural codes that both celebrates and is reliant upon 
exploitation and the consumption of others’ lives. However, they also lack 
specialised and highly detailed analysis of gender issues pertaining to the 
Anglophone West’s rape culture. This is not to say that they do not 
incorporate sexual violence into their broad, holistic approaches (indeed, 
                                                 
659
 bell hooks, Feminist Theory: From Margin to Center (Boston: South End Press, 1984), p. 
118. 
 288 
 
rape is a recurrent and highly significant theme in Jensen’s work in particular) 
but rather to note that their analysis rarely engages with the multifaceted 
complexities of the subject in the manner one finds in many feminist studies. 
Accordingly, setting these approaches in dialogue with detailed feminist 
analysis of rape expands both fields and contributes to greater understanding 
of the rape culture and the dominant culture of the Anglophone West, and the 
significant relationships between them. Indeed, it highlights the fact that, in 
some respects, a truly full understanding of how both the Anglophone West’s 
rape culture and its dominant culture operate must each account for the 
functions of the other. More specifically, because of the scale they operate 
on, the arguments in the thesis are able to explore the interrelation of the 
Anglophone West’s rape culture and the dominant culture in enough detail to 
raise the question of whether rape is actually inherent to the Anglophone 
West. The thesis does not seek to definitively answer this question (largely 
because it far too speculative to truly be answered) but in raising the issue it 
still pushes analysis of sexual violence forward into relatively unexplored 
areas. Moreover, by exploring the possibility that rape is inherent to the 
Anglophone West, the thesis is able to demonstrate that rape is at least an 
inevitable aspect of the dominant culture in its current  form. This, in turn, 
points to the significant conclusion—or at least, the significant proposal—that 
challenging the Anglophone West’s rape culture requires not only changing 
contemporary gender organisation, nor only tackling the many intersectional 
systems of oppression highlighted in previous feminist studies, but 
considerable, wide-ranging and far-reaching social change across the entire 
fabric of the dominant culture.  
 
This conclusion is, in many respects, bleak and challenging: the task of 
changing the Anglophone West’s gender relations—normally proposed as a 
solution to sexual violence—is already immense and daunting, and 
expanding it to include wider social change only increases this. Indeed, to 
suggest that ending the Anglophone West’s rape culture requires radical 
social change throughout the dominant culture and the undermining of key 
ideologies, philosophies and systems that are central to Anglophone Western 
life is potentially to court apathy and jaded defeatism. However, it is, I think, 
also a necessary consideration, particularly if one approaches this matter in 
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relation to the central role denial plays in the continuation of prevailing ways 
of life in the dominant culture. Consider, for example, the fact that 
contemporary Western civilisation remains reliant upon exploitation (from 
‘expendable’ labourers in the Majority World’s sweatshops and mines to 
poorly-paid, overworked and often routinely abused workers in the 
Anglophone West itself), or that its wealth and resources result from warfare 
and imperialism (‘oil wars’ in the Middle East, for instance) or from neo-
colonial activities organised by the likes of the IMF and the World Bank.660 
Indeed, consider the fact that, although not the only contributor, the industrial 
civilisation of the Anglophone West is amongst the most responsible for 
environmental catastrophe and ecocide on an unprecedented scale that is, 
realistically, highly likely to destroy all life on the planet.661 In response to 
these and many other perennial issues, the dominant culture either denies 
the reality of what is actually taking place or constructs great fallacies with 
denial at their core. From ‘caring capitalism’, ‘eco-friendly’ consumption and 
the militarised ‘liberation’ of other countries to genetically modified crops, lab-
grown meat and symbolic gestures towards ‘sustainable lifestyles’, 
arguments that the Anglophone West can maintain its decadent, 
consumptive way of life without invoking catastrophe or causing widespread 
suffering are near ubiquitous in contemporary culture.662 All of these notions 
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seek to preserve the dominant culture’s integrity by denying its reliance upon 
exploitation, consumption, abuse, murder and environmental devastation, as 
though these components can be neatly excised without affecting the whole. 
However, as I have argued at various points throughout this thesis, these 
practices and ideologies are not incidental: they are inevitable products of the 
ways in which the Anglophone West is organised and operates and any effort 
to bring about change without addressing this fact is an exercise in futility and 
denial. Although perhaps to a lesser degree, this same point applies to the 
Anglophone West’s rape culture and efforts to challenge it without relating it 
to the overall culture in which it operates. 
 
The particular significance of the findings of this research is that, like the 
other examples of exploitation, abuse, objectification and domination given 
above, sexual violence is not something that can be neatly removed from the 
dominant culture without changing the dominant culture itself. Rape is not 
something ‘savage’, a product of ‘primitive’ history that we can move beyond 
by embracing ‘progress’: it is profoundly entwined in the way the dominant 
culture functions, and specifically in the normalised objectification and 
domination on which ‘civilised’ life relies and from which, albeit often on 
vastly different levels, all ‘civilised’ Westerners benefit. There are incredibly 
important changes that can be, and are being, brought about through 
focusing on rape as a gendered act, and such work is both highly admirable 
and absolutely vital both to ending the Anglophone West’s rape culture and, 
in the mean time, supporting those who survive its nefarious practices. 
However, such work cannot be wholly successful in its aims without also 
treating the rape culture’s deepest roots, including those that extend beyond 
sexual and gender politics, and this, I propose, requires significant changes 
to the dominant culture of the Anglophone West as a whole. Because the 
philosophies, ideologies, ethical systems, prescribed practices and ways-of-
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life that underpin the Anglophone West’s rape culture are the very same ones 
that are central to how the dominant culture operates, sexual violence is, in 
many respects, inseparable from ‘normal’ life in the West. To suggest that 
citizens of the Anglophone West can maintain the comforts made possible 
only through (directly or indirectly) objectifying and dominating others without 
this influencing Anglophone Western culture in myriad ways including the 
fortifying of the Anglophone West’s rape culture, is ultimately to engage in 
further denial.  
 
Of course, this is not to say that anti-rape activism should be subsumed by 
wider political struggles: such a proposal has long been used by patriarchal, 
usually left-wing political groups to co-opt feminist struggles, profiting from 
women’s activism whilst diluting and defusing their challenges to male 
dominance. Nor is it to suggest that anti-rape activists should stop treating 
rape as a gendered act or stop working to undermine patriarchy and 
misogyny. Rather it is to suggest that such activism, if it is to succeed in 
ending rape, needs to relate this gendered activism to wider issues and 
broader intersections, and to engage critically with the way sexual violence 
relates to the culture as a whole, including those aspects they enjoy and 
profit from. This is particularly true of the largely white, middle-class, 
heterosexual, able-bodied, cis-gender dominated mainstream of anti-rape 
activism, which is, by and large, the least aware of other systems of 
oppression and privilege and the least willing to consider whether the 
dominant culture or further ‘civilisation’ and ‘progress’ can truly serve as 
solutions to, rather than central components of, the Anglophone West’s rape 
culture. Perhaps even more importantly, however, other social justice 
activists, campaigning against other manifestations of these same root 
issues, must come to recognise the significance of gender politics in general 
and sexual violence in particular. It is hardly surprising that meaningful and 
effective alliances are rarely drawn between anti-rape activism and wider 
social justice campaigning when such groups are almost exclusively 
patriarchal in structure and, from ‘wikileaks’ supporters to the Socialist 
Workers party (SWP) to the Occupy movement, routinely fail to address even 
 292 
 
their own internal rape cultures.663 However, such alliances—allied analyses 
and allied struggles—are crucial not only to the success of anti-rape activism 
but also to other social justice causes because each of these issues has 
shared roots and shared structures that are ultimately grounded in a way of 
life, a way of thinking about and relating to others, that is central to the 
dominant culture of the Anglophone West. It is, I suggest, only in addressing 
this deeply-rooted core both through and beyond single-issue political 
struggles that lasting, wide-scale change can be achieved, to the Anglophone 
West in general and the its rape culture in particular. It is in relation to this 
that I will now briefly discuss the limitations of my study, areas of future 
research and the possibility of hope amongst the abusive networks of the 
dominant culture. 
 
 
The ‘Global’ and the ‘Local’: Limitations, Further Research and Hope 
 
Although the scale on which this thesis operates and its holistic approach 
are, in many respects, its greatest strength and the source of its strongest 
contributions, as discussed above, it is also its biggest limitation. To analyse 
the relationship between sexual violence and the dominant culture of the 
Anglophone West necessarily requires working in broad strokes, picking up 
the key trends and recurrent themes that are most directly relevant to the 
discussion. Whilst this is unavoidable when working from such a broad 
critical perspective, it does mean that some of the subtleties, inconsistencies 
and points of discord and opposition that occur within any society cannot be 
adequately considered. Of particular significance in this respect is that the 
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fact the broad critical position adopted in this thesis examines only the 
dominant culture and, though it does explore the oppression of marginalised 
cultures within this framework, it does not offer substantial analysis of smaller 
cultural groupings. That is to say, it obscures the fact that the dominant 
culture is the prevailing, but not the only, culture within the Anglophone West, 
and the fact that it is composed of and exists uncomfortably alongside other 
smaller cultures and subcultures.  The same is also true of the Anglophone 
West’s rape culture: what this thesis discusses is what is effectively the 
dominant rape culture but it is important to realise that every rape culture is 
composed of ‘rape subcultures’, from the rape cultures of individual 
countries, to those of specific communities, almost down to an individual’s 
‘rape culture’ or the specific understanding individuals develop in relation to 
their peers within a broader rape culture framework.  
 
All such rape subcultures relate to, interact with and are components and 
products of the overarching rape culture of the Anglophone West but they are 
also discrete and diverse. Even within a country, or a region or a city, there is 
great diversity amongst rape subcultures: for example, the rape subculture of 
a wealthy, white-dominated college fraternity will be different from that of a 
poor, racially-diverse neighbourhood, which will be different again from the 
rape subculture found in an anarchist social centre, or in a particular music 
scene or any other culture within or alongside the dominant culture. These 
will all share common elements and common roots but they also take on 
diverse forms with differing (and non-fixed) responses to specific aspects of 
rape culture and its wider relations. Further explorations of such ‘rape 
subcultures’—within a framework that relates them, on some level, not only 
to overarching rape culture but to the dominant culture also—is, I believe, an 
important direction for future research because it is on this scale that the 
most significant social changes can be brought about.  
 
The significance of exploring sexual violence on the microsocial scale of rape 
subcultures, whilst still relating this to broad macrosocial analysis such as 
that contained in this thesis, is that it is at this level that weakness in the 
Anglophone West’s rape culture are most apparent and can be best 
exploited. Understanding that this rape culture operates as a vast network of 
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self-supporting, mutually reinforcing ideologies, philosophies, socialisation 
patterns, ethical codes and prescribed practices that is at once deeply 
engrained in the foundations of the dominant culture and woven through its 
institutions, social structures and cultural outputs is important. However, it 
also means that the Anglophone West’s rape culture appears unassailable, 
as, on this scale, it most likely is. Broken down into its composite cultures, 
however, it is more readily apparent that the Anglophone West’s rape culture 
does not maintain comprehensive coverage, that there are chinks in the 
armour and weak links in the chains: points of tension between rape-
supportive and rape-opposing ideologies at which pressure may be applied 
to greater effect. There are, within and outside of the dominant culture, 
communities and individuals who reject the ideologies of the dominant 
culture, who see, or could come to see, the correlations between forms of 
objectification and domination that they experience and those that they enact. 
There are marginalised voices that do not register within the dominant culture 
which speak of how rape is fought in their communities and in their lives and 
have important experiences and advice to share. There are men who reject 
the forms of behaviour prescribed and more who teeter on the edge of doing 
so, needing only further education on the realities of sexual violence. There 
are groups and individuals who do not yet realise—but, with contact and 
communication, could come to understand—that the structures and systems 
they oppose are the same as those that underpin the Anglophone West’s 
rape culture and that the struggles they are engaged in are inseparable from 
the struggle against sexual violence. 
 
It is these areas that I suggest are key directions for future research, 
engagement and activism, for these potential connections are perhaps best 
achieved through exploring the microsocial level of specific rape subcultures 
within a holistic framework that relates them to a broader macrosocial 
understanding of the Anglophone West’s rape culture and its relationships 
with the dominant culture. In this respect, the directive, popular in recent 
years, to ‘think globally, act locally’ is apt: tackling the Anglophone West’s 
rape culture as whole on the ‘global’ scale is an unrealistic and most likely 
impossible task but addressing it at multiple ‘local’ sites, from the grassroots 
up, has a far stronger chance of achieving significant social change and 
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challenging both its manifestations and its roots. The overall ‘global’ 
perspective has the potential to help unite different sites of ‘local’ analyses 
and ‘local’ activism, and not only those which pertain to sexual violence but 
other social justice issues intimately connected by their shared roots in the 
dominant culture of the Anglophone West. In such unification, alliances can 
be drawn, perspectives exchanged, tactics shared and solidarity offered, 
under a general principle of refuting, challenging and overthrowing the 
principles of objectification, domination and consuming others on which the 
dominant culture is premised. It is, I believe, in this—in understanding sexual 
violence to be an inevitable manifestation of the dominant culture and so 
organising outside of and against the principles it espouses—that we find the 
greatest hope of ending the social production of rapable bodies and rapist 
mentalities and of ending the Anglophone West’s rape culture. 
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